Rundstedt's central reserve

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@Cult
Should they not have cheap mobile artillery, rocket , mortar units which could have plastered the front lines and rapidly change positions before counter battery fire ? To be used in defence or attack ?

What would you do with the artillery?

I do not mention artillery as I do not think that their artillery was material enough for an offensive operation. I see infantry as being the most important arm, artillery/airpower/armor shoots them onto target.

Sevastapol, Kerch, Don Bend/Stalingrad was where their artillery/airpower was the strongest in the attack.

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Battle Experience of Recent Operations by 2nd Panzer Division, Whose
Sector Is Being Taken Over by 36th Infantry Division

Signed: Freiherr von Lüttwitz

Above battle experience of 2nd Panzer Division forwarded herewith for information and
exploitation.
Signed: Marcks
GSO 1
for Commander 326 Infantry Div

Selections:

(a) The special nature of the country of Normandy
The country in which the fighting is taking place consists of meadow and bush land
enclosed squarely by hedges, with embankments and sunken roads. This does not lend
itself to engagements over large areas. All engagements soon resolve themselves into
shock-troop and individual engagements. The possession of ‘dominating heights’ is often
not as decisive as the possession of traffic junctions. Often the former cannot be exploited
because hedges and trees limit visibility and field of fire, whereas road traffic arteries are
essential, since it is only by roads that the heavy weapons, artillery and tanks can be
brought forward. Nevertheless certain features always retain their dominating role,
whereas conversely some traffic junctions can be dispensed with.

(b) The great material superiority of the enemy, even on so-called quiet fronts
The incredibly heavy artillery and mortar fire (of the enemy) is something new, both for
the seasoned veterans of the Eastern front and the new arrivals from reinforcement units.
Whereas the veterans get used to it comparatively quickly, the inexperienced
reinforcements require several days to do so, after which they become acclimatized. The
average rate of fire on the division sector per day is 4,000 artillery rounds and 5,000
mortar rounds per day. This is multiplied many times before an enemy attack, however
small. For instance, on one occasion when the British made an attack on a sector of only
two companies they expended 3,500 rounds in two hours. The Allies are waging war
regardless of expense. In addition to this, the enemy have complete mastery of the air.
They bomb and strafe every movement, even single vehicles and individuals. They
reconnoitre our area constantly and direct their artillery fire. Against all this the GAF
[German Air Force or Luftwaffe] is conspicuous by its complete absence. During the last
four weeks the total number of German aircraft over the division area was six.
From the operations point of view, our own offensive operations by day, after
completed assembly etc. - i.e. attacks prepared all ‘according to the book’, have little
chance of succeeding. The assembling of troops is spotted immediately by enemy
reconnaissance aircraft, and smashed by bombers, fighter bombers and artillery directed
by aircraft; and if, never-theless, the attacking troops go forward they become involved in
such dense artillery and mortar fire, that heavy casualties ensue and the attack peters out
within the first few hundred metres. The losses suffered by the infantry are then so heavy
that the impetus necessary to renew the attack is spent.

Better results have been obtained by attacks prepared down to the last detail by
assault detachments operating by night on a broad front. These penetrate the enemy
positions noiselessly and in each individual case surprise and overcome the enemy,
without the enemy artillery or air force having a chance to intervene. The primary
condition for this is that each individual assault detachment be fully acquainted with its
task and knows what to do in various circumstances, is in close liaison with its neighbours,
and that the heavy weapons and artillery know exactly when to come into operation
(usually only in the case of local failure when the element of surprise has not been
achieved). The direction of such operations is less a question of large-scale elaborate
planning than that of practical instruction and reminders. The mere fact that ‘assembly has
been completed before the attack begins’ is of less importance than the fact that every
company and platoon commander has thought of everything necessary to ensure the
success of the operation of his assault detachment. It is an essential duty of the staff
planning the operation to put everyone down to the lowest ranking commanders
completely in the picture. An attack of this nature attains no far-distant objective, but
proceeds only by small stages, night after night. But in the end it reaches its objective
without paying a heavy toll in manpower. The more cunning and variable the fighting, the
more successful the operation. This ‘infiltration’ has proved its worth in every case
hitherto, as far as this division is concerned.

The fact that modernly equipped Panzer Divisions with two tank battalions and two
(infantry) battalions with armoured half-tracked vehicles is not necessary for such fighting
methods is another question.

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Individual Arms

Our soldiers enter the battle in low spirits at the thought of the enemy’s enormous
material superiority. They are always asking ‘Where is the GAF?’ The feeling of
helplessness against enemy aircraft operating without any hindrance has a paralyzing
effect, and during the barrage this effect on the inexperienced troops is literally ‘soul
shattering’ - and it must be borne in mind that four-engine bombers have not yet taken part
in attacking ground targets in this division’s area. It is, therefore, essential for troops to be
lifted out of this state of distress the moment the counter-attack begins. The best results
have been obtained by the platoon and section commanders leaping forward uttering a
good old-fashioned ‘hurrah’, which spurs on the inexperienced troops and carries them
along. The revival of the practice of sounding a bugle call for the attack has been found to
answer the purpose, and this has been made a divisional order. Moreover, the use of the
bugle in territory where visibility is restricted enables the troops to know when and where
the attack is taking place. An attack launched in this manner is an experience which new
troops will never forget, and stimulates them into action again.

The Panzer Grenadiers fight as assault detachments, in this more depends on the
NCOs than ever before. Only an energetic commander will get his men to go forward. For
weaklings there is every inducement and opportunity to hide in the hedges. Close-combat
weapons (flame throwers, anti-tank close-combat weapons, mines and explosive charges)
are specially effective in country of this nature. In defence it may be expedient to deplete
the front line in order to maintain sufficient reserves for counter-attack. Specially efficient
NCOs should be selected for this.

2. Tanks
There is no question of tank employment in the true sense of the term. They can only be
employed to accompany infantry. Their mobility is limited by the sunken roads and
hedges. They can only penetrate the square areas enclosed by hedges at certain points, and
these points are registered by the enemy anti-tank guns. Therefore the anti-tank weapon
must be neutralized before the tanks advance again. Since the country favours close antitank combat, each single tank must have strong flank protection. It is unprofitable to
employ more than one troop of tanks at the time. On sunken roads, which are often the
only places where tanks can move, the first and last tanks of the column get knocked out
and those in between are wedged in. Therefore the tanks must work in the closest
cooperation with their infantry. The tanks must give HE and MG covering fire along
the ridge of the hedgerow until the infantry have reached it by passing along the hedgerow
running at right angles to it. The infantry then mop up, and then the tanks make another
bound forward to the next hedgerow and the process is repeated. In this case the actual
punch is delivered by the infantry and the fire power supplied by the tanks, and thus the
control of the operation lies with the infantry.
3. Anti-tank
(a) SP - The employment of self-propelled anti-tank guns is extremely limited in country
of this kind. Their low structure is a disadvantage, and in many cases they are unable to
shoot over hedges and walls. Since the turret cannot be traversed, SP guns are
completely helpless on sunken roads. The best method of employing them is to have
them in a concealed position at the side of main roads. Therefore SP anti-tank guns
should be kept back as reserves in order to intercept enemy thrusts along the main roads
in the event of an armoured break-through.

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4. Artillery
The highest demands are made on the elastic use of artillery. Since our own artillery can
only fire one tenth of the amount fired by the enemy, success can only be achieved by
closest concentration and best possible ground observation. Therefore, forward observers
must be placed well forward. Ample provision of means of communication are essential.
Even in counter-attack the forward observers must be well forward. It is essential to
maintain ample reserves of forward observers in order to avoid loss of all forward
observers and their equipment during the enemy barrage. The allotment of ‘SOS’tasks
which can be brought down automatically during an enemy attack has proved profitable.
The artillery must change its position frequently, since it is spotted very rapidly and
engaged with the aid of observation from the air. Good results have been achieved by
‘roving’ artillery troops and ‘roving’ guns which mislead the enemy as to the siting and
strength of our own guns. Every attempt at harassing fire on the part of our artillery is
promptly repaid many times over by the enemy. The artillery must take up different
positions by day and by night. Here on the Western front, too, the siting of the artillery for
all-round defence is the chief support for the main battle area.
5. Anti-Aircraft
The AA cannot protect everything. It is better to concentrate all the light and heavy troops
on the point of main effort instead of scattering over the whole division area in troops and
sections. In bad weather the AA can be used successfully in an artillery role. In this case,
but in this case only, they are placed under command of the artillery. The siting of light
AA troops in concealed positions close behind the main line of defence is with the sole
task of engaging any artillery-spotting aircraft. By this means the division succeeded in
shooting down two enemy aircraft in the course of a few days, and now the enemy
spotting-aircraft keep a safe distance of approximately three kilometres from the main line
of defence, whereas formerly they used to fly right over it.

9. Supplies
The entire supply system, including the receiving, works by night. The time is very short,
with the results that losses are constantly incurred due to journeys made in the daytime
(also by moonlight). The supply of ammunition is insufficient. Hitherto it has been out of
the question to engage the enemy artillery. The enemy, too, is gradually realizing this, and
is, therefore, moving up closer and closer in order to take full advantage of the range to
disrupt our communications in the rear. Consequently our supply lines are under constant
artillery fire, even at night. Our supplies of POL
36 are adequate, since the division is in a
fixed position. The use of MT traffic is reduced to a minimum. The supplies of food
obtained from the land are very good, but those obtained through supply channels are
mediocre.
The question of spare parts and tyres is a serious problem. The division has to fetch
everything over distances of hundreds of kilometres, so that in spite of the division being
engaged in static warfare, its mobility gradually becomes less and less.
The enemy’s air superiority presents an almost insolvable problem with regard to
supplies.

[Gooner1]

Thx for posting. Don't know how much good it did 326th Division. They got pulverised and their commander killed just a few days later in Bluecoat.

Better results have been obtained by attacks prepared down to the last detail by
assault detachments operating by night on a broad front. These penetrate the enemy
positions noiselessly and in each individual case surprise and overcome the enemy,
without the enemy artillery or air force having a chance to intervene. The primary
condition for this is that each individual assault detachment be fully acquainted with its
task and knows what to do in various circumstances, is in close liaison with its neighbours,
and that the heavy weapons and artillery know exactly when to come into operation
(usually only in the case of local failure when the element of surprise has not been
achieved). The direction of such operations is less a question of large-scale elaborate
planning than that of practical instruction and reminders. The mere fact that ‘assembly has
been completed before the attack begins’ is of less importance than the fact that every
company and platoon commander has thought of everything necessary to ensure the
success of the operation of his assault detachment. It is an essential duty of the staff
planning the operation to put everyone down to the lowest ranking commanders
completely in the picture. An attack of this nature attains no far-distant objective, but
proceeds only by small stages, night after night. But in the end it reaches its objective
without paying a heavy toll in manpower. The more cunning and variable the fighting, the
more successful the operation. This ‘infiltration’ has proved its worth in every case
hitherto, as far as this division is concerned.

That is interesting, reminds me of the 'Peaceful Penetration' tactics developed by John Monash in the previous do.

Not sure where it was successful for 2nd PzD though? Perhaps the withdrawal from Amaye-sur-Seulles?

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Critique
by General der Infanterie Günther Blumentritt

Selections

Q.
Describe the road nets used and the types and performance of communications.
A.
We utilized all roads leading to Normandy. However, the use of these roads was very limited in the long summer days because of the air threat. Signal communication from OB West was in order; there were no particular difficulties.

Q.
Give a personal eyewitness account of conferences attended, engagements observed, and so forth.
A.
The conferences I attended as Chief of Staff OB West were naturally many and interesting. Only these conferences could give an insight into why certain actions were ordered and what such men as von Rundstedt and von Kluge actually thought and believed. These considerations are much more important from the historical and psychological viewpoint than the heaps of “dead” orders and documents. A report on these factors, however, would also fill volumes.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Better results have been obtained by attacks prepared down to the last detail by
assault detachments operating by night on a broad front. These penetrate the enemy
positions noiselessly and in each individual case surprise and overcome the enemy,
without the enemy artillery or air force having a chance to intervene. ... An attack of this nature attains no far-distant objective, but
proceeds only by small stages, night after night. But in the end it reaches its objective
without paying a heavy toll in manpower. The more cunning and variable the fighting, the
more successful the operation. This ‘infiltration’ has proved its worth in every case
hitherto, as far as this division is concerned.

Cult Icon,

Thanks for posting these details from 2nd Panzer Division.

Does anyone have any details of successful infiltration operations by 2nd Panzer Division though? It would be interesting to compare those with the diaries of the British units they opposed.

Regards

Tom

[Michael Kenny]

Does anyone have any details of successful infiltration operations by 2nd Panzer Division though? It would be interesting to compare those with the diaries of the British units they opposed.

The source

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Asg ... on&f=false

https://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/Blood-a ... Pub/p/9986

[Richard Anderson]

Thanks for posting these details from 2nd Panzer Division.

Does anyone have any details of successful infiltration operations by 2nd Panzer Division though? It would be interesting to compare those with the diaries of the British units they opposed.

Regards

Tom

Yes, they are interesting, but what do they really tell us? There are no dates, no actual battle descriptions, and no accounting of casualties or actual objectives captured. During the second half of June, 2. Panzer opposed elements of both First U.S. Army (V Corps and 1st Inf Div for the most part) and Second British Army (XXX Corps). I cannot find where 2. Panzer actually made any significant advances such as described in that period, except in support of the operations at Villers Bocage.

It does not appear that in June those operations were directed at the 1st U.S. Inf Div. It spent much of the month recovering from the landing operations, while maintaining the connection with the British, while holding an extended front facing parts of 2. Panzer at Caumont. From about 12 June when 2. Panzer started to enter the line, to the end of the month, the 1st Inf Div reported 525 battle casualties. For its part, 2. Panzer reported 1,391 casualties for June, roughly 600-700 per week; I don't know if that is "without paying a heavy toll in manpower" or not?

Of course, Allied losses in that period would include those of XXX Corps, but then it would also include the rest of the Germans engaged in the Villers Bocage battles.

July of course gets messier. For 1-10 July, 2. Panzer reported 282 BC, then 293 11-20 July and 350 21-31 July. But was it really engaged in casualty conserving "Peaceful Penetration" tactics or simply not as heavily engaged as other German divisions? I don't seem to be able to find anything from V U.S. Corps commenting on an erosion of its front caused by such tactics, nor are the losses of the 1st Inf Div indicative of any significant defensive or offensive operations against the Germans around Caumont. From 1-20 July they reported just 218 BC, then from 21-25 July as they shifted to the VII Corps for COBRA they reported zero BC.

Anyway, the data are probably there if we can trace where 2. Panzer and its opponents were, but I suspect it will not reveal a huge dividend for any supposed "Peaceful Penetration" tactics.

[Sheldrake]

Does anyone have any details of successful infiltration operations by 2nd Panzer Division though? It would be interesting to compare those with the diaries of the British units they opposed.

The source

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Asg ... on&f=false

https://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/Blood-a ... Pub/p/9986

One possibility might be the role of 2nd Panzer Division in the battle of the Box 13-16 June in the aftermath of operation Perch at Villers Bocage. This was 2nd Panzer Division's first operation in Normandy. One reason the British withdrew so quickly from the Villers Bocage salient was the ULTRA sourced intelligence of the imminent arrival of the 2nd Panzer Division. Many British accounts portray 7th Armoured Division giving way in the face of attacks by a full strength fresh panzer division which were only halted by massed artillery fire from 30th and V US Corps. At least one of the 3RHA Battery war diaries records the issue of amphetamines to fight fatigue.

I think there is a thread somewhere about the forces actually employed by 2nd Panzer Division which was thrown into battle piecemeal with its wheeled elements committed over 48 hours before its tracked vehicles arrived. This might fit the description in the briefing for 326 Division

Aha here it is viewtopic.php?f=50&t=240651&p=2193659&h ... e#p2192296

There is an FMS manuscript interview with the Divisional Commander vom Luettwitz. B257. It is fairly detailed but clearly recollections rather than supported by source documents.

The first point is that the tracked vehicles of the Divisions did not arrive until 18th June, so until the the "Division" was four PG battalions, the Aufklaerungs' battalion and two battalions of artillery and a distinct shortage of anti tank weapons.

The commanding officer of the Aufklaerung's battalion was dismissed as the unit deployed and his replacement - the senior company commander incompetent.

There are British accounts claimed as the "Battle of the Box" with huge weights of fire being deployed on what must have been agricultural targets.

This may have been a case where Ultra was a hinderance more than a help.

[Kingfish]

I cannot find where 2. Panzer actually made any significant advances such as described in that period, except in support of the operations at Villers Bocage.

You may have to drill down to company or maybe even platoon level to find any examples, if they exists at all.

Nocturnal attacks on a "broad front" in bocage country sounds more like recon raids rather than a concerted effort to push the front line forward in measured steps, especially when you consider the overwhelming firepower advantage the allies enjoyed in terms of artillery (a fact the author of that report pointed out several times).

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2nd Pz was plugging the empty gaps. The first tanks of 2nd Pz came on June 18th.

The report gives a good accounting of the conditions the German units faced. The Germans were on the defensive, Op Luttich is more informative of what an offensive could look like.

The issue isn't whether or not the counterattacks can seize and take short objectives. The Germans did this routinely in the normandy campaign. It is bizarre (and telling) to even question this.

[Cult Icon]

One possibility might be the role of 2nd Panzer Division in the battle of the Box 13-16 June in the aftermath of operation Perch at Villers Bocage. This was 2nd Panzer Division's first operation in Normandy.

Divisional HQ set up on June 12th.

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You may have to drill down to company or maybe even platoon level to find any examples, if they exists at all.

Let me help you. The list of units is fine except for 2.Pz. The 2.Pz histories are in German and French. 11.Pz fought in Southern France.

Sources on German armored units in Normandy to understand what their counterattacks entailed, and their track record:
viewtopic.php?f=19&t=242367&p=2239582&h ... w#p2239582

Also, the detailed unit histories are available in english but at a high price. These can also be cross referenced with battle histories, the records and unit histories of their opponents. Besides this, there are also detailed histories of armored sub-units and units:

116.Pz, 17.SS, 1.SS, 2.SS, 2.Pz, 9.SS, 10.SS, 12.SS, 11.Pz

Op Luttich was the most significant German attack in Normandy and it has a lot of insightful literature. The detailed "Old Hickory: The 30th Division" unit history was published not long ago. "The Fighting 30th" has personal accounts from veterans. "Saving the Breakout" is detailed and entirely from the 30th ID perspective. "Mortain 1944" osprey has some good side information and data. "Victory at Mortain" is the best operational history. "Fire Mission!" is a very insightful personal account from the point of view of a forward observer of the encircled 2nd battalion, 120th Inf regiment on Hill 314.

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9.SS "H"'s response to Bluecoat was to form various KGs for the counterattack (eg. Weiss, Zollhofer, Meyer, etc).

p.65 " Sons of the Reich", Reynolds

It is important to understand the tactics used against the British in this fighting. The War diary of the Guards Armoured Division states that no attempt was made by the Germans to occupy permanently the numerous obstacles, hamlets and dominating features; instead, they used them tactically as needed. Small groups of single, or sometimes up to five tanks, with accompanying SS Panzer-grenadiers, would infiltrate between the British units and cut lines of communication. It was ' like having a rabble of snipers loose in the battalion area', one Guards unit said. Others described how their re-supply columns were shot up in the area between Montchamp and the Perrier spur. In fact, the situation became so serious that a substantial part of the additional infantry Brigade allotted to the 11th Armoured Dviision, instead of being used to strengthen its positions, was employed protecting its supply lines.