Rundstedt's central reserve

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Kingfish » 26 Jun 2021 22:36

Aber wrote:
26 Jun 2021 18:51
Because we know the Germans did make successful counterattacks in Normandy often before the Allies were fully organised in defence.
Over multiple nights and only at night?
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Cult Icon » 27 Jun 2021 01:15

Howling Wolf wrote:
25 Jun 2021 01:54
I don't think the Allies would have gaps in their front lines wide enough for battalions to sneak through at night. From 1944 forward the German infantry battalion was about 700 infantry men usually divided into 3 rifle companies of around 150 men each and a heavy weapons company of around 200 plus a supply company.

A company could possibly slip through. Daylight reconnaissance could identify small gaps in the Allies front lines in a few places and maybe at night a half company up to a company could slip through but even that would be difficult without making noise and alerting the forward picket lines.
The infiltration assault by 2. SS for OP Luttich was done by a depleted formation with 5 weeks of action, its battalions were probably more like companies. The German force that encircled Hill 314 was approx. the same size as the force it encircled. The tactics employed against the US battalion was to use small groups of men with armored support to push up and then immediately retreat once the US artillery bracketed them high volume fire, then attack over and over again, sometimes employing tricks. They also targeted the forward observer teams, and destroyed 1 out of 2. It is interesting that the German force drew a lot of artillery fire on itself, inflicted substantial losses on the battalion, but was unable to complete its important mission.

The infiltrating counterattacks by 9.SS in response to BLUECOAT with up to 5 small battle groups at once was also done by a depleted formation. The depiction of the assault in "Firestorm in the Last year of the war" gives the impression of a classic attempt (with the same problems) of using multiple battle groups to cut off and encircle the armored spearhead; however the small KGs achieved a mixed result. They destroyed a lot of armor and vehicles but their units were too small to "close the pocket" against a much larger force.

Full strength divisions would have a very different result against these obstacles.

I am looking at the map of D-day + 1, I think I've been recently underrating the Germans in my posts by referring too much to OP Luttich rather than what the 3 Pz divisions were doing June 6-June 15 with their conventional improvised attacks.

I think there would be 2 phases to the Allied assault, first a fluid phase that was historically the case with assaulting units of the British 2nd Army being intercepted by the 3 Pz divisions on improvised confrontations with available elements, each fighting their own private war. A 3 division coordinated push would have been much more effective.

Then once they encountered a lot of resistance the XXX Corps and I Corps would pull back to dig-in and solidify the defense, required a more measured response and possibly a planned attack.

It is unknown to me whether or not the 12.SS, Pz Lehr, and 21.Pz would employ the infiltration tactics of the 2.SS and 9.SS.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Aber » 27 Jun 2021 08:35

Kingfish wrote:
26 Jun 2021 22:36
Over multiple nights and only at night?
Not my argument :)

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Howling Wolf » 29 Jun 2021 19:19

Cult Icon wrote:
27 Jun 2021 01:15
The infiltration assault by 2. SS for OP Luttich was done by a depleted formation with 5 weeks of action, its battalions were probably more like companies. The German force that encircled Hill 314 was approx. the same size as the force it encircled. The tactics employed against the US battalion was to use small groups of men with armored support to push up and then immediately retreat once the US artillery bracketed them high volume fire, then attack over and over again, sometimes employing tricks. They also targeted the forward observer teams, and destroyed 1 out of 2. It is interesting that the German force drew a lot of artillery fire on itself, inflicted substantial losses on the battalion, but was unable to complete its important mission.
I am not familiar with Op Luttich. What source (prefer book) is good for this?
The infiltrating counterattacks by 9.SS in response to BLUECOAT with up to 5 small battle groups at once was also done by a depleted formation. The depiction of the assault in "Firestorm in the Last year of the war" gives the impression of a classic attempt (with the same problems) of using multiple battle groups to cut off and encircle the armored spearhead; however the small KGs achieved a mixed result. They destroyed a lot of armor and vehicles but their units were too small to "close the pocket" against a much larger force.
So the TO&E was far superior in the Allies 11th Arm Div & Gds Arm Div then the 9 and 10 SS Div ?
Full strength divisions would have a very different result against these obstacles.
I believe some full strength German armored divisions could have been transferred west if the proposed military putsch to replace Hitler and the SS was accomplished by May - June 1943 and the new leaders cancelled all offensive operations on the eastern front - SEE MY POSTS ABOVE. How many full strength armored div's would be available for the Allied invasion of France IDK.
I am looking at the map of D-day + 1, I think I've been recently underrating the Germans in my posts by referring too much to OP Luttich rather than what the 3 Pz divisions were doing June 6-June 15 with their conventional improvised attacks.
So an additional 3 full strength armored divisions transferred from the east and deployed close to the Normandy beaches before 6 June would/could compress the Allies back towards their beach heads?
I think there would be 2 phases to the Allied assault, first a fluid phase that was historically the case with assaulting units of the British 2nd Army being intercepted by the 3 Pz divisions on improvised confrontations with available elements, each fighting their own private war. A 3 division coordinated push would have been much more effective.

Then once they encountered a lot of resistance the XXX Corps and I Corps would pull back to dig-in and solidify the defense, required a more measured response and possibly a planned attack.

It is unknown to me whether or not the 12.SS, Pz Lehr, and 21.Pz would employ the infiltration tactics of the 2.SS and 9.SS.
[/quote]

The problem with the OP's "what if" will always come down to the Allies enormous men and material advantages. It has been argued by historians in the last 20 years - and by some posters on this thread that the previous studies and conclusions of Trevor N. Dupuy and Martin van Creveld are flawed or totally wrong. There is also a new book on German tactical prowess which looks interesting but I have not read it link here:
https://www.amazon.com/dp/1526790378/?c ... _lig_dp_it

Regardless of whether or not one draws a conclusion that, man for man, and tank for tank, all things being equal - really does not matter because in reality that was never the case. There is no question that the Germans - from the late 19th century through 1945 - were as good as any forces on earth as far as tactical/operational military proficiency (notice I never said better). However their grasp of the larger STRATEGICAL realities were very flawed and the "German way of war" was only victorious 1 time - The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871.

All things in war are, for the most part, on a strategic level, rarely equal. It would seem to me that the members posting here that have been repeatedly brushing aside with sources, the abilities of the German forces on the western front, are, unless I am missing something, bent on proving that "all things being equal" the Germans would still have lost.

This obsession with elevating the Allies and diminishing the Germans does not help anyone when discussing/debating military success. These posters often use the term "Nazi fan boy" and others on anyone who submits a pro German post. Does this accomplish anything except giving them a fleeting moment of self satisfaction? NO.

The bottom line is that the Allies were victorious because of superior resources. This is an undeniable FACT. And no I am not positing that the Allies "cheated" and that the Germans would have won "if everything was equal" - the latter of which could never be proven. To win a war by accomplishing all of your strategic goals always come down to sound methods in strategy. This is something that Hitler and his OKW/OKH General Staff and field Generals seemed to have overlooked when they invaded the SU and declared war on the U.S.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Michael Kenny » 29 Jun 2021 19:50

Howling Wolf wrote:
29 Jun 2021 19:19

This obsession with elevating the Allies and diminishing the Germans does not help anyone when discussing/debating military success. These posters often use the term "Nazi fan boy" and others on anyone who submits a pro German post. Does this accomplish anything except giving them a fleeting moment of self satisfaction? NO.
Given the root of 99.9% of every WW2 'What If' is to find a way for Germany to win and that for a German Army to win all it has to do turn up in a 'fair -fight' condition and it will always, always win any subsequent battle then denying that baseless assumption is by no stretch of the imagination 'diminishing the Germans'.
Howling Wolf wrote:
29 Jun 2021 19:19
The bottom line is that the Allies were victorious because of superior resources.
Wording is slightly wrong. It should read 'the Allies, who possessed superior resources, were victorious'.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Howling Wolf » 29 Jun 2021 21:15

Michael Kenny wrote:
29 Jun 2021 19:50
Given the root of 99.9% of every WW2 'What If' is to find a way for Germany to win and that for a German Army to win all it has to do turn up in a 'fair -fight' condition and it will always, always win any subsequent battle then denying that baseless assumption is by no stretch of the imagination 'diminishing the Germans'.
I have read all of your responses about the OP of the thread. I see that you have collected 7,000 books and obviously are in possession of thousands of official after action reports and other documents of Anglo Allied national archive centers - do you use any German archives or dismiss them all as false?

Collecting and researching all of this material must have taken you many, many years and a lot of your free time. Don't take this personally but it is a FACT that no matter how much of your lifetime you spend on your hobby you, me, and anyone else in the world, will never be able to prove that if "all things were equal" one side or the other would have won. If you think otherwise you are in denial.


Wording is slightly wrong. It should read 'the Allies, who possessed superior resources, were victorious'.
I don't see how the wording is wrong but if the above wording makes you happy its fine with me.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Richard Anderson » 30 Jun 2021 01:10

Howling Wolf wrote:
29 Jun 2021 19:19
The problem with the OP's "what if" will always come down to the Allies enormous men and material advantages.
Oh, there are many other problems with it than just that... :D
It has been argued by historians in the last 20 years - and by some posters on this thread that the previous studies and conclusions of Trevor N. Dupuy and Martin van Creveld are flawed or totally wrong.
I don't believe Trevor's work was fundamentally flawed, nor was the work that Creveld piggy-backed off of Trevor. The problem is that Trevor's work is generally badly misunderstood, interpreted in the light of just NPW, which was written very early in the development of the QJMA/TNDM, and his conclusions then tend to be interpreted to suit whatever argument is being made...by both those accepting and denying his work. I can only imagine what he would say about some of the arguments that have been made here. :lol:
There is also a new book on German tactical prowess which looks interesting but I have not read it link here:
https://www.amazon.com/dp/1526790378/?c ... _lig_dp_it
Interesting, I may try to pick that up, but I'm leery of buying a pig in a poke on the subject. However, since he is focused on German tactical prowess there may be hope for this work...it was their major flaw. Citino pointed it out IIRC long ago in Path to Blitzkrieg, the interwar Reichswehr concentrated on tactical excellence, while eschewing any serious attempt to develop strategic excellence...the dubious strategic settings for the interwar maneuvers highlights that issue. It goes back to an issue I pointed out in an earlier thread when the notion that the Germans could win if they would simply "think better" strategically prewar, which is a big if...they simply didn't and there was little attempt to develop excellent strategic thinking prewar.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Michael Kenny » 30 Jun 2021 02:29

Howling Wolf wrote:
29 Jun 2021 21:15
- do you use any German archives or dismiss them all as false?
Long ago I noticed the German obsession with tank losses and the way it had become their default way of claiming a victory when actually winning a battle was long a thing of the past. Every German setback is sugar-coated with an inflated list of claimed Allied tank losses as if this mitigates the scale of her catastrophic defeats. This insanity is taken to its most extreme level with the way The Battle Of Berlin is portrayed as a huge Germans success because a lone King Tiger 'ace' claims he knocked out 3 complete Soviet tank Regiments all by himself.
Howling Wolf wrote:
29 Jun 2021 21:15
Don't take this personally but it is a FACT that no matter how much of your lifetime you spend on your hobby you, me, and anyone else in the world, will never be able to prove that if "all things were equal" one side or the other would have won.
And yet here you are posting in a whole section of the forum where a good number of people are constantly trying to do exactly that.



Howling Wolf wrote:
29 Jun 2021 21:15

If you think otherwise you are in denial.




As you wrote earlier: if the above wording makes you happy its fine with me.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Richard Anderson » 30 Jun 2021 03:41

Howling Wolf wrote:
29 Jun 2021 19:19
Cult Icon wrote:
27 Jun 2021 01:15
The infiltration assault by 2. SS for OP Luttich was done by a depleted formation with 5 weeks of action, its battalions were probably more like companies. The German force that encircled Hill 314 was approx. the same size as the force it encircled. The tactics employed against the US battalion was to use small groups of men with armored support to push up and then immediately retreat once the US artillery bracketed them high volume fire, then attack over and over again, sometimes employing tricks. They also targeted the forward observer teams, and destroyed 1 out of 2. It is interesting that the German force drew a lot of artillery fire on itself, inflicted substantial losses on the battalion, but was unable to complete its important mission.
I am not familiar with Op Luttich. What source (prefer book) is good for this?
Sorry, got interrupted by dinner; I meant to reply to this in my earlier post.

LÜTTICH was the battle of Mortain, from 6 August to c. 13 August 1944. A Good source is Mark Reardon's Victory at Mortain and also Allyn Vannoy and Jay Karamales' chapter on Mortain in Against the Panzers is also good.

Unfortunately though, there was no "infiltration assault" either planned or executed in the battle. It was simply a multi-pronged attack seeking to advance along multiple corridors, which succeeded in a coupe of cases in "infiltrating" the American positions simply because they were so diffuse...the 2d Battalion, 120th Infantry ended up isolated on Hill 314 partly because the 3d Battalion was attached to the 2d Armd Div far to the south, while it and the 1st Battalion were scattered in blocking positions around l'Abbaye Blanche, Hill 314, Mortain, and further south maintaining a loose connection with the 2d Armd Div. Overall, the two battalions were nominally covering a front of around three miles.

Nor were the troops on Hill 314 encircled by 2. SS-Panzer Division, it was KG 17. SS-Panzergrenadier Division that did most of the heavy lifting there. Most of the 2. SS right wing got stuck trying to break through the outpost at l'Abbaye Blanche, which they failed miserably at, unable to overwhelm a defense that consisted essentially of a single towed 3" TD platoon. The 2. SS did succeed in slipping south of Hill 314, mostly IIRC with the PzAA and routed the overwhelmed the defenders of Mortain, which was basically the 120th regimental HQ and Service Company, but did not do much more.

The attack further north by a heterogeneous group comprised of elements of 1. SS-Panzer Regiment, 2. SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment, and elements of 2. Panzer Division broke through lightly defended roadblocks and then engaged in a vicious battle with two companies of the 1st Battalion, 117th Infantry, supported by another 3" towed TD platoon. The Germans eventually broke through, but suffered heavy losses, as did the Americans, but were checked by the rest of the 117th Infantry further west.

The most successful "infiltration" was by elements of 2. Panzer further north, which exploited the seam between two regiments of the 9th Inf Div further north to "infiltrate" itself into a cul de sac it eventually retreated from.
So the TO&E was far superior in the Allies 11th Arm Div & Gds Arm Div then the 9 and 10 SS Div ?
I am not sure what you mean?
I believe some full strength German armored divisions could have been transferred west if the proposed military putsch to replace Hitler and the SS was accomplished by May - June 1943 and the new leaders cancelled all offensive operations on the eastern front - SEE MY POSTS ABOVE. How many full strength armored div's would be available for the Allied invasion of France IDK.
But in that case you've just wiped all those SS formations off the books.
So an additional 3 full strength armored divisions transferred from the east and deployed close to the Normandy beaches before 6 June would/could compress the Allies back towards their beach heads?
Unlikely.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Howling Wolf » 01 Jul 2021 16:30

Richard Anderson wrote:
30 Jun 2021 03:41
Sorry, got interrupted by dinner; I meant to reply to this in my earlier post.
I was interrupted by life the last couple days mainly work.
LÜTTICH was the battle of Mortain, from 6 August to c. 13 August 1944.
Ok, Mortain was Hitler's counteroffensive "Luttich" (I was not aware of the OP code name). AKAIK it was a complete failure that led to the encirclement of the majority of the German forces in France at Falaise.
Unfortunately though, there was no "infiltration assault" either planned or executed in the battle. It was simply a multi-pronged attack seeking to advance along multiple corridors, which succeeded in a coupe of cases in "infiltrating" the American positions simply because they were so diffuse...the 2d Battalion, 120th Infantry ended up isolated on Hill 314 partly because the 3d Battalion was attached to the 2d Armd Div far to the south, while it and the 1st Battalion were scattered in blocking positions around l'Abbaye Blanche, Hill 314, Mortain, and further south maintaining a loose connection with the 2d Armd Div. Overall, the two battalions were nominally covering a front of around three miles.

Nor were the troops on Hill 314 encircled by 2. SS-Panzer Division, it was KG 17. SS-Panzergrenadier Division that did most of the heavy lifting there. Most of the 2. SS right wing got stuck trying to break through the outpost at l'Abbaye Blanche, which they failed miserably at, unable to overwhelm a defense that consisted essentially of a single towed 3" TD platoon. The 2. SS did succeed in slipping south of Hill 314, mostly IIRC with the PzAA and routed the overwhelmed the defenders of Mortain, which was basically the 120th regimental HQ and Service Company, but did not do much more.

The attack further north by a heterogeneous group comprised of elements of 1. SS-Panzer Regiment, 2. SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment, and elements of 2. Panzer Division broke through lightly defended roadblocks and then engaged in a vicious battle with two companies of the 1st Battalion, 117th Infantry, supported by another 3" towed TD platoon. The Germans eventually broke through, but suffered heavy losses, as did the Americans, but were checked by the rest of the 117th Infantry further west.

The most successful "infiltration" was by elements of 2. Panzer further north, which exploited the seam between two regiments of the 9th Inf Div further north to "infiltrate" itself into a cul de sac it eventually retreated from.
I am not familiar with the details of the individual battles at the platoon/company/battalion/regiment and divisions opposite each other in NW Europe. I know the "general history" of the western front post 6 June 1944 and the main events as they unfolded chronologically. To engage in this subject I had to research on the internet and use a plethora of the resources available. I use this site often.
https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelv ... saww2.html
So the TO&E was far superior in the Allies 11th Arm Div & Gds Arm Div then the 9 and 10 SS Div ?
I am not sure what you mean?
Michael Kenny posted this -
Context is everything. This is BLUECOAT and 11th Arm Div & Gds Arm Div were advancing south and were tasked with cutting the Vire-Vassy road. The Germans were trying to secure Vire and block the British advance. Both sides then advanced and by chance the German attack by II SS Pz Korps (9th & 10th SS) ran across and through the rear of the advancing British units.
Kenny also posted a helpful map

Cult Icon then posted this -
The infiltrating counterattacks by 9.SS in response to BLUECOAT with up to 5 small battle groups at once was also done by a depleted formation. The depiction of the assault in "Firestorm in the Last year of the war" gives the impression of a classic attempt (with the same problems) of using multiple battle groups to cut off and encircle the armored spearhead; however the small KGs achieved a mixed result. They destroyed a lot of armor and vehicles but their units were too small to "close the pocket" against a much larger force.
So my question to Cult Icon was how depleted was the Table of Organization and Equipment of the 9 and 10 SS.

I believe some full strength German armored divisions could have been transferred west if the proposed military putsch to replace Hitler and the SS was accomplished by May - June 1943 and the new leaders cancelled all offensive operations on the eastern front - SEE MY POSTS ABOVE. How many full strength armored div's would be available for the Allied invasion of France IDK.
But in that case you've just wiped all those SS formations off the books.
What I meant - I apologize for not - to say is that all of the SS divisions on both fronts, which were almost always subordinated to a Wehrmacht commander at the army and corps level would have to be sure the SS commanding officers and NCO's from the battalion/regimental/divisional level would accept the orders and commands by the new leaders after the putsch. I know there were SS corp commanders - Hausser and Steiner from Kursk until the end of the war but I dont think Steiner or Hausser would oppose a putsch by the Wehrmacht and a removal of Hitler.
So an additional 3 full strength armored divisions transferred from the east and deployed close to the Normandy beaches before 6 June would/could compress the Allies back towards their beach heads?
Unlikely.
[/quote]

I know its unlikely I am just trying to help add scenarios to the original OP topic.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Richard Anderson » 01 Jul 2021 17:48

Howling Wolf wrote:
01 Jul 2021 16:30
I was interrupted by life the last couple days mainly work.
I heartily recommend retirement. :D
Ok, Mortain was Hitler's counteroffensive "Luttich" (I was not aware of the OP code name). AKAIK it was a complete failure that led to the encirclement of the majority of the German forces in France at Falaise.
Indeed, it was hardly a poster child for the wonderful results of German "infiltration assault". It was also the icing on the cake for the encirclement of German forces in France, but did not lead to it. On 7 August, when the attack began, the US XV Corps was already at Mayenne, 29 miles to the south-southeast and on its way to Le Mans. LÜTTICH simply stuck the German's heads even more firmly into the encirclement that was already happening.
I am not familiar with the details of the individual battles at the platoon/company/battalion/regiment and divisions opposite each other in NW Europe. I know the "general history" of the western front post 6 June 1944 and the main events as they unfolded chronologically. To engage in this subject I had to research on the internet and use a plethora of the resources available. I use this site often.
https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelv ... saww2.html
Good one. If you are interested in the actual documents those histories were derived from I recommend https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/ and https://arena.usahec.org/web/arena, along with https://www.benning.army.mil/Library/Virtual.html.
So my question to Cult Icon was how depleted was the Table of Organization and Equipment of the 9 and 10 SS.
Okay, gotcha. T/O&E strength for those two divisions was roughly 17,995 with c. 171 tanks and 43 assault guns.

As of 1 June, 9. SS reported a strength of 18,616 and 52 HiWi, although it appears that only about 17,043 (the 30 June reported strength of 15,898, plus the 1,045 casualties reported to then in Normandy) were committed to Normandy. Another 2,370 casualties were reported for July, with 1,024 alone 11-20 July. Few, if any replacements were received, so it was roughly at a strength of 13,500 by the end of July when BLUECOAT began. As of 1 June it had 83 tanks and 40 assault guns on hand, By 30 July it had 51 tanks and 27 assault guns operational.

Strength as of 1 June for 10. SS was 16,011, plus 506 HiWi, with 40 tanks and 35 assault guns. It reported casualties of 2,707 to 31 July and as of then had 25 tanks and 20 assault guns operational.

So yes, they were pretty beaten up.
What I meant - I apologize for not - to say is that all of the SS divisions on both fronts, which were almost always subordinated to a Wehrmacht commander at the army and corps level would have to be sure the SS commanding officers and NCO's from the battalion/regimental/divisional level would accept the orders and commands by the new leaders after the putsch. I know there were SS corp commanders - Hausser and Steiner from Kursk until the end of the war but I dont think Steiner or Hausser would oppose a putsch by the Wehrmacht and a removal of Hitler.
That is likely wishful thinking, but since everything else usually gets hand-waved away in these exercises, I suppose I shouldn't have a problem with it. :lol:
I know its unlikely I am just trying to help add scenarios to the original OP topic.
The issue for me, which for some reason always seems to escape most other posters, is that for a "what if" to be viable, it needs to have a reasonable basis in reality. This one, like so many, starts with an unreal and highly unlikely premise with no real description of how it might occur and then goes downhill from there to accounts of mythical episodes of "infiltration assaults". It smacks too much of the "what if Napoleon had a B-52 at Waterloo" SNL sketch back in the 1970s. :D
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Sheldrake » 01 Jul 2021 18:54

Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Jul 2021 17:48
The issue for me, which for some reason always seems to escape most other posters, is that for a "what if" to be viable, it needs to have a reasonable basis in reality. This one, like so many, starts with an unreal and highly unlikely premise with no real description of how it might occur and then goes downhill from there to accounts of mythical episodes of "infiltration assaults". It smacks too much of the "what if Napoleon had a B-52 at Waterloo" SNL sketch back in the 1970s. :D
i agree that much of the discussion has been tangential bordering on the unreal. However, there is a sensible premise.

The worst Allied experiences in 1944 came from attempts to push into enemy territory against an apparently weak enemy. Even now historians castigate Lucas for his failure to exploit the Anzio landings and dash for Rome. Yet his three divisions could never have achieved a decisive result. Penny the GOC 1st British diviison said we could have spent 24 hours in Rome and eighteen months in the bag. When finally prodded to advance VI Cporps was over extended and vulnerable to counter attack.

The repulse of Operation Perch was possibly the worst setback on the British sector. A single armoured Division was not capable of unpicking the German defences and in an exposed salient very vulnerable.

What if the allies did not face a piecemeal surge of German reinforcements towards Bayeux, but a thinly held screen inviting the Allies to push south and extend their beach head to Falaise - Domfront - St Lo, well outside NGS range. There would have been a lot of pressure on the allies to liberate that territory, not least from the media and politicians. That might be the circumstances under which a concentration of armour might have made a difference in the kind of battle envisaged by Gewr von Sc hweppenburg.

OK There are problems:

How to respond to the threat to Cherbourg. (But historically most of the German reiforcements went to the Caen sector.)
Would Montgomery have been moved by pressude from behind?
ULTRA and surprise.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Cult Icon » 02 Jul 2021 01:02

Initial supply KTB 6.6.1944 ALA (Pz Lehr division, only indirect fire rounds):

Artillery: 840 shells of light howitzers 720 shells for heavy howitzers

Infantry: 500 mortar rounds 254 for light inf guns 147 for heavy inf guns

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Michael Kenny » 02 Jul 2021 10:42

Sheldrake wrote:
01 Jul 2021 18:54


What if the allies did not face a piecemeal surge of German reinforcements towards Bayeux, but a thinly held screen inviting the Allies to push south and extend their beach head to Falaise - Domfront - St Lo, well outside NGS range. There would have been a lot of pressure on the allies to liberate that territory, not least from the media and politicians. That might be the circumstances under which a concentration of armour might have made a difference in the kind of battle envisaged by Gewr von Sc hweppenburg.
It was expected that the Germans would pull back into the interior of France and all Allied plans were made so as to deal with just such a situation. The Allies would land, carve out enough ground to open the Atlantic ports and then sit out/defeat all the German attacks until the remainder of The US Army was shipped over direct from The USA for the decisive battle of the interior followed by a push over The Rhine in June 1945. It is important to remember the pre-D Day planning was done of the basis that the war would end/be won in July 1945 and many weapons developments/contracts were being ended if they did not deliver before that date.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

Post by Sheldrake » 02 Jul 2021 10:49

Michael Kenny wrote:
02 Jul 2021 10:42
Sheldrake wrote:
01 Jul 2021 18:54


What if the allies did not face a piecemeal surge of German reinforcements towards Bayeux, but a thinly held screen inviting the Allies to push south and extend their beach head to Falaise - Domfront - St Lo, well outside NGS range. There would have been a lot of pressure on the allies to liberate that territory, not least from the media and politicians. That might be the circumstances under which a concentration of armour might have made a difference in the kind of battle envisaged by Gewr von Sc hweppenburg.
It was expected that the Germans would pull back into the interior of France and all Allied plans were made so as to deal with just such a situation. The Allies would land, carve out enough ground to open the Atlantic posts and then sit out/defeat all the German attacks until the remainder of The US Army was shipped over direct from The USA for the decisive battle of the interior followed by a push over The Rhine in June 1945.
Agreed, but the allies assumed the Germans would be making some sort of fighting retreat, trading ground for casualties. This scenario postulates an Anzio situation that might lure the allies to extend their forces and render them vulnerable to piecemeal defeat. I doubt if the allies had enough troops ashore to secure a beachhead including Falaise, Domfront and St Lo.

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