Rundstedt's central reserve

[Cult Icon]

No doubt. The mass of Allied troops on the Normandy ground at the end of June 6th is just too huge to be defeated immediately. Things are a little different by D+6 or so, as someone noted above.

It was too huge for (isolated in time and location) regimental battlegroups which constituted the largest anti-invasion attacks..basically the Germans committed their forces lightly. The I SS Pz Korps was simply too small to contain all those extremely heavily armed forces that had reinforcements available (3.ID (B), 3.ID (C), 7.AD, 50.ID) and covered with vast artillery superiority & air supremacy. 50.ID was effectively a double division. Multiply the regimental KG attack by 10 which is what a two Pz Korps attack looks like and the situation is different. I have no idea what the road network can support though.

The deployment of German PZ KG in the first days to the first two weeks was heavily influenced by command confusion from the imaginary FUSAG/Pas-de-Calais landing/Operation Fortitude. Pz Group West tried to jockey for a position to attack with at least two of them at once, but they moved up to the front too slow. The 21.Pz was pre-empted by British attacks. The 12.SS division, now alone, saw modest commitments- starting from their win at Authie on June 7th- and was relatively idle after the 12th. The 12.SS won in several village fights in those days up to June 15th, lost a few (Bretteville and Norrey in particular) too. There were all line-adjustment attacks aimed at securing assembly areas for the I SS Pz Korps counterattack that didn't materialize.

It should be noted that by circa June 25th the 12.SS was still a strong division, approx. the infantry strength of full Pz division. The Pz Lehr infantry was burned out. The 21.Pz inf was heavily depleted. The 2.Pz had arrived in mid-June.

[Michael Kenny]

The 12.SS division, now alone, saw modest commitments- starting from their win at Authie on June 7th-

But their aim was not just to 'win' at Authie was it? This was the first time an Allied and German attack collided. The result was that the Canadian attack south was unsuccessful and the 12th SS attack on the beachead was unsuccessful. 12th SS were stopped and held at Les Buissons.

[Juan G. C.]

No doubt. The mass of Allied troops on the Normandy ground at the end of June 6th is just too huge to be defeated immediately. Things are a little different by D+6 or so, as someone noted above.

What do you mean? Wouldn't the Allied force be even huger by D+6?

[Carl Schwamberger]

Initially he designated the 15th Army area as the invasion & destination. That idea wasn't dropped until after 04:00. One wonders what the effect of Pz Divs rushing off to Calais & Boulogne at 03:00 would have been. Then turning sharply south at 04:30 as new orders arrive.

What is the source for that? The sources I've read say nothing of that. United States Army in World War II: Cross Channel Attack says:

Rundstedt had reacted to the first news of the airborne landings with a quick decision to commit at once all operational reserves within striking distance. (Map XIII) He took this decision, despite uncertainty as to the extent of the Allied landings, on the grounds that whether the landings were major or subsidiary it was still imperative to repel them at once. It was between 0330 and 0400, two hours before the seaborne landings, that he ordered the 12th SS Panzer Division to move immediately toward Caen and the Panzer Lehr Division to prepare for similar movement.96 He estimated that the reported airborne landings were on such a large scale that they could not be a mere deception maneuver and they therefore would have to be reinforced from the sea. The only feasible area for such reinforcement was the east coast of the Cotentin and the beaches between the Vire and Orne Rivers. From observation Allied assault exercises, the Germans were sure the assault on the coast would take place at dawn. Rundstedt wanted have armor at hand to counterattack the first hours. There was therefore no time to debate contingencies. He reasoned further that, even if the Normandy assault were planned by the Allies as a secondary effort, it was probable that they would exploit whatever success it achieved. The attack, whatever its character, should therefore be met with all available force. Rundstedt's reasoning was clear and his action decisive.

The above leaves out the effect of Op GLIMMER on Kranckes staff & at Rudsteadets HQ. Re: Germans in Normandy' Hargreaves, 'The Deceivers' Holt. Tandem with the drop of dummy parachutists near Calais was a false signal operation against select Naval radar stations north of Buolougne. This deception op left selected radar stations un jammed and instead gave them false signal returns resembling a fleet coming over the horizon towards Calais. Reports of these signals appear to have triggered the reports circa 02:00 to Krancke the enemy invasion fleet had been spotted. Krancke , who was a Bordeaux for a inspection/confrence, directed the reports forwarded to Runsteadsts HQ. Some indicate this had had already been done. Along with the radar stations reports, which continued to track a 'incoming fleet' until until after 04:00, a radio report from a patrol boat reported contact with enemy surface ships east of Calais. West of LeHavre the sea search radar stations (owned & run by the Navy) were only able to report extensive and continual jamming, as had regularly occurred in the previous three months. Neither was the patrol boat on the Bai Du Seine nor a utility boat out that night reporting any contacts off LeHavre or the Calvados coast. These early reports were what cause Rundsteadts staff to warn the reserves of a move to 15th Army sector.

It was between 0330 and 0400, two hours before the seaborne landings,

This time matches reports coming into Runsteadts HQ of: 1. Only dummy paras dropped near Calais. 2. The main AB Landings west of Carentan & NE of Caen being well underway & confirmed. Op GLIMMER continued to keep Kranckes staff bemused until it was shut down by 05:00, but the confirmation that landings of reinforced AB regiments had occurred by 03:30 persuaded Rundsteadt & staff the invasion, at least that day was coming at Calvados not Calais.

[Carl Schwamberger]

No doubt. The mass of Allied troops on the Normandy ground at the end of June 6th is just too huge to be defeated immediately. Things are a little different by D+6 or so, as someone noted above.

It was too huge for (isolated in time and location) regimental battlegroups which constituted the largest anti-invasion attacks..basically the Germans committed their forces lightly. The I SS Pz Korps was simply too small to contain all those extremely heavily armed forces that had reinforcements available (3.ID (B), 3.ID (C), 7.AD, 50.ID) and covered with vast artillery superiority & air supremacy. 50.ID was effectively a double division. Multiply the regimental KG attack by 10 which is what a two Pz Korps attack looks like and the situation is different. I have no idea what the road network can support though.

The deployment of German PZ KG in the first days to the first two weeks was heavily influenced by command confusion from the imaginary FUSAG/Pas-de-Calais landing/Operation Fortitude. Pz Group West tried to jockey for a position to attack with at least two of them at once, but they moved up to the front too slow. The 21.Pz was pre-empted by British attacks. The 12.SS division, now alone, saw modest commitments- starting from their win at Authie on June 7th- and was relatively idle after the 12th. The 12.SS won in several village fights in those days up to June 15th, lost a few (Bretteville and Norrey in particular) too. There were all line-adjustment attacks aimed at securing assembly areas for the I SS Pz Korps counterattack that didn't materialize.

It should be noted that by circa June 25th the 12.SS was still a strong division, approx. the infantry strength of full Pz division. The Pz Lehr infantry was burned out. The 21.Pz inf was heavily depleted. The 2.Pz had arrived in mid-June.

I've found the descriptions of Geyrs attempts to execute his long planned massed counter attack to be particularly instructive. Originally intended to be executed on the 8th June losses in the 21st PzD & delays in the arrival of the other PzDiv caused the attack date to be set at the 10th, D+4. Also the initial scope of the attack was altered. Instead of the massed simultaneous strike by 6-8 PzD a initial attack by Schweppenbergs Corps would be made with other PzD following the next day. Late afternoon the attack was still pending. Rommel arrived at Schweppenbergs HQ, conferring with him & Geyr. Geyer would have preferred to execute the 'massed strike' option, but Rommels argument there had been to many delays carried weight & the logic of initiating a first stage attack now was clear. Geyrs idea of a large massed armored assault 2-3 days after landing was a dead letter at this point.

The attack was never ordered. Just as afternoon was transiting into evening a air strike by a combination of RAF Mitchel bombers and Typhoons hit Schweppenbergs HQ putting it completely out of action. Although the Germns radio intel service detected the incoming strike and its target, they were not warned. The HQ staff & n service troops were caught out side their shelter & suffered severe losses. Rommel had left a hour before the first bomb hit, but Schweppenberg & Geyr were both wounded. Most of the Pz Corps staff were killed, & the bulk of the service/support soldiers were killed or wounded. Losses of equipment were severe, particularly vehicles & radio equipment. On the up side no Panther tanks were lost

This is a nice description about some aspects of the air attack

https://rafoverlord.blogspot.com/2019/0 ... -west.html

What struck me there was the relative speed of the Allied response when the cumulative evidence hit the tipping point the morning of the 10th June. Theres also in this article the question of what happens if Rommel is still present when the bombs hit.

[Carl Schwamberger]

No doubt. The mass of Allied troops on the Normandy ground at the end of June 6th is just too huge to be defeated immediately. Things are a little different by D+6 or so, as someone noted above.

What do you mean? Wouldn't the Allied force be even huger by D+6?

Technically no. 6th June a maximum effort managed close to 14,000 sorties out of a operating strength of 12,000. That sort of thing cant be sustained. Combat and operating losses plus the usual operating ability of 90-95% put the daily sortie rate closer to 10,000. Conversely the target identification benefitted from accumulated intel gathering. Less guesswork & more solid real time information.

[Juan G. C.]

Initially he designated the 15th Army area as the invasion & destination. That idea wasn't dropped until after 04:00. One wonders what the effect of Pz Divs rushing off to Calais & Boulogne at 03:00 would have been. Then turning sharply south at 04:30 as new orders arrive.

What is the source for that? The sources I've read say nothing of that. United States Army in World War II: Cross Channel Attack says:

Rundstedt had reacted to the first news of the airborne landings with a quick decision to commit at once all operational reserves within striking distance. (Map XIII) He took this decision, despite uncertainty as to the extent of the Allied landings, on the grounds that whether the landings were major or subsidiary it was still imperative to repel them at once. It was between 0330 and 0400, two hours before the seaborne landings, that he ordered the 12th SS Panzer Division to move immediately toward Caen and the Panzer Lehr Division to prepare for similar movement.96 He estimated that the reported airborne landings were on such a large scale that they could not be a mere deception maneuver and they therefore would have to be reinforced from the sea. The only feasible area for such reinforcement was the east coast of the Cotentin and the beaches between the Vire and Orne Rivers. From observation Allied assault exercises, the Germans were sure the assault on the coast would take place at dawn. Rundstedt wanted have armor at hand to counterattack the first hours. There was therefore no time to debate contingencies. He reasoned further that, even if the Normandy assault were planned by the Allies as a secondary effort, it was probable that they would exploit whatever success it achieved. The attack, whatever its character, should therefore be met with all available force. Rundstedt's reasoning was clear and his action decisive.

The above leaves out the effect of Op GLIMMER on Kranckes staff & at Rudsteadets HQ. Re: Germans in Normandy' Hargreaves, 'The Deceivers' Holt. Tandem with the drop of dummy parachutists near Calais was a false signal operation against select Naval radar stations north of Buolougne. This deception op left selected radar stations un jammed and instead gave them false signal returns resembling a fleet coming over the horizon towards Calais. Reports of these signals appear to have triggered the reports circa 02:00 to Krancke the enemy invasion fleet had been spotted. Krancke , who was a Bordeaux for a inspection/confrence, directed the reports forwarded to Runsteadsts HQ. Some indicate this had had already been done. Along with the radar stations reports, which continued to track a 'incoming fleet' until until after 04:00, a radio report from a patrol boat reported contact with enemy surface ships east of Calais. West of LeHavre the sea search radar stations (owned & run by the Navy) were only able to report extensive and continual jamming, as had regularly occurred in the previous three months. Neither was the patrol boat on the Bai Du Seine nor a utility boat out that night reporting any contacts off LeHavre or the Calvados coast. These early reports were what cause Rundsteadts staff to warn the reserves of a move to 15th Army sector.

It was between 0330 and 0400, two hours before the seaborne landings,

This time matches reports coming into Runsteadts HQ of: 1. Only dummy paras dropped near Calais. 2. The main AB Landings west of Carentan & NE of Caen being well underway & confirmed. Op GLIMMER continued to keep Kranckes staff bemused until it was shut down by 05:00, but the confirmation that landings of reinforced AB regiments had occurred by 03:30 persuaded Rundsteadt & staff the invasion, at least that day was coming at Calvados not Calais.

Thanks for the sources! Did Rundstedt ever order the reserves to move to Pas de Calais, or only warned them?

Rommel arrived at Schweppenbergs HQ, conferring with him & Geyr (...). Rommel had left a hour before the first bomb hit, but Schweppenberg & Geyr were both wounded.

It is nothing important, but aren't you making two different people out of general Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg?

[Kingfish]

Monty did occasionally over extend and was inclined occasionally to impulsive actions. The board front advance to Catania and Op Market Garden come to mind.

It's one thing to push a little harder when your own position is secure and the enemy is being driven back, and quite another when your own forces are barely feet dry and the armored counterstroke you know is coming, is coming.

In the scenario postulated there would be huge pressure from the rear to dash forwards and liberate France. Look at how everyone goaded Lucas and castigated him for not trying to dash for Rome with his inadequate resources.

Could or would Eisenhower resist the pressure to push forwards, to take a risk and save lives?

Monty had no problem telling an impatient Winnie that the attack at El Alamein would not proceed until all preparations were complete. 2 years and several important victories later I think he would have had no problem sticking to what worked despite the noise from the rear.

[Kingfish]

Something else to consider: the flip side of withdrawing out of range of NGFS means gifting the allies the necessary room to build airfields for their tactical air force.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Thanks for the sources! Did Rundstedt ever order the reserves to move to Pas de Calais, or only warned them?

My take is they received a warning order. At the end of it Rundsteadt & staff knew the Grofaz had the only authority to release them to move.

It is nothing important, but aren't you making two different people out of general Leo Geyr von Schweppeonburg?

Yes, sloppy there.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Something else to consider: the flip side of withdrawing out of range of NGFS means gifting the allies the necessary room to build airfields for their tactical air force.

OTL there was a problem establishing the planned airfield capacity in Normandy

https://rafoverlord.blogspot.com/2019/0 ... milly.html

[Mori]

No doubt. The mass of Allied troops on the Normandy ground at the end of June 6th is just too huge to be defeated immediately. Things are a little different by D+6 or so, as someone noted above.

What do you mean? Wouldn't the Allied force be even huger by D+6?

The balance of strength was hugely favorable to Allies on D-Day. But a few days later, as the Germans sent troops, and Allies didn't have more airborne divisions to land (all spent on D-Day), situation got close to strength parity. I'm quoting from memory here: you certainly want to look into detailed figures. You may also check wargames on this campaign: their OOB are very detailed and handy for such analysis.

[Tom from Cornwall]

The 12.SS division, now alone, saw modest commitments- starting from their win at Authie on June 7th- and was relatively idle after the 12th.

What was the objective of 12 SS Pz Division on 7th June? Authie? The German immediate counter-attack on 7th June was a failure, a flop and a fiasco. After all, this was the most vulnerable time for an amphibious landing and a mission that the Germans had been preparing for and yet staff work was sloppy, coordination between units was non-existent and the tactical handling of the forces involved was disastrous. :roll:

Regards

Tom

[Cult Icon]

What was the objective of 12 SS Pz Division on 7th June? Authie? The German immediate counter-attack on 7th June was a failure, a flop and a fiasco.

Not for the Canadians on the receiving end...

Authie was in German hands for a month. With this logic everything the Germans did was a fiasco as their poor strategic situation hovered over everything they did. And everything the British-Canadians did at minimum, was a limited success . It was completely unrealistic for this battlegroup to reach their objectives.

Not unexpected, this is the British-Canadian "take" :roll:

[Michael Kenny]

What was the objective of 12 SS Pz Division on 7th June? Authie? The German immediate counter-attack on 7th June was a failure, a flop and a fiasco.

Not for the Canadians on the receiving end...

"

That is the trouble of those who limit their reading to the German accounts of the Campaign. They absorb the JJF collection of SS myths and can not accept the awkward reality. The 12th SS counter-attack was not designed to just 'take Authie' and ground to a halt just 2 miles to the north. The was but 1 (as in a single tank unit) Canadian Tank regiment involved who lost 15 tanks compared the the 12th SS loss of 12 tanks. All the German tales of 'at once 20 Canadian tanks burst into flames' are rubbish. 12th SS failed to carry out the mission it was given on June 7th 1944.


This is not the first attempt to distort the record

Maybe the Canadian records are inaccurate and don't give the number of "damaged" on the Canadian side and in reality there was recovery & repair. A lot of tanks are knocked out and require only minor repairs to be brought into action. Doesn't necessarily mean it made it to the typewriter. Maybe the British-Canadian records understate the extent of their losses and the German claims are the more accurate than the typewriter says throughout the Normandy campaign?

Nor the first attempt to skew the data:

e.

On Table Pg 23. for US 3.AD, 4.AD it puts 199 US tank casualties vs 140 German tank casualties. If you minus "vicinity arracourt" the figure is now 179 tank casualties vs 66!

Nor is it the first example of completely absurd claims:

the 12.SS saw lighter use (approx 3/4th starting combat strength) while holding an overextended 12-15 mile front prior to the EPSOM attack on its 26.PzR front.