Germany permanently stays on the defensive after conquering Poland

[historygeek2021]

What if Germany permanently stayed on the defensive after completing the conquest of Poland in 1939?

The main point of departure would be that Hitler is killed by Georg Elser's bomb at the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich on November 8, 1939. Hermann Göring was not present in the OTL, so he would survive and become Hitler's successor. Göring was far more cautious than Hitler, so he would be reluctant to attack the Allies and would hope instead for a diplomatic solution. At the same time, Göring and the German military leadership would not willingly renounce their conquests in Poland, so the war would continue.

The Allies, likewise, would have no intention of attacking Germany. They would be content to pursue an economic strategy, relying on the British blockade and using their superior economic power to bid for natural resources from neutral countries on the continent.

Adam Tooze describes plans by Georg Thomas, chief of the military economic staff at the OKW, to keep Germany supplied for three years. The plans required that no offensive actions be taken. Germany would invest in its synthetic industries and increase exports to neutral countries on the continent in exchange for needed raw materials. Nevertheless, Thomas believed that Germany could only hold out for three years.

It seems doubtful that the Allies would launch a ground invasion of Germany before then, if ever. The French and British were still scarred from the experience of World War I. A major ground offensive that could bog down into years of trench warfare would be a nightmare they would refuse to repeat. They would be content to sit and besiege Germany economically indefinitely.

Göring would probably do his utmost to appease the Allies, forbidding U-boat attacks or bombing raids. With no major military setbacks like the fall of Norway, Neville Chamberlain would likely remain in office until he became too sick to continue in 1940. Would Churchill succeed him, or Halifax? In the OTL, Churchill was appointed prime minister in the midst of a dual crisis: the defeat in Norway and the German attack on Belgium and the Netherlands. If, instead, Chamberlain had slowly realized he was too sick to continue, it's possible that he could have coaxed Halifax into succeeding him. Halifax would certainly continue the sitzkrieg strategy, while Churchill would press for action. Even if Churchill became PM, he wouldn't be able to persuade the French to go over to the offensive. The most he could do is order nightly bombing raids on German cities, which had little consequence before 1942.

That leaves Stalin. Stalin was poised to enter the war after both sides had exhausted each other, but in this scenario there would be almost no fighting. But Stalin would control the fate of Germany as Germany would depend on the USSR for its most vital imports. Would Stalin continue selling raw materials to Germany in order to prop it up and weaken the Allies, or would Stalin gradually tighten the noose and demand ever increasing exports of German machinery in return for smaller and smaller raw materials deliveries?

It seems Stalin would stand the most to gain from the war continuing, but with Germany receiving only enough raw materials to keep it alive. Without a threat on its western flank, the Soviet Union would be able to deter the Japanese from any ambitions in the east. The Soviet Union would be able to modernize its industry and military without the threat of immediate war. Stalin would concentrate on spreading communist agitation throughout Eastern Europe and even into Germany.

In the United States, with the sitzkrieg extending throughout 1940, there is no emergency to serve as an excuse for FDR to seek a third term. Nevertheless, the Republican Wendell Willkie continues to support the British and French through Cash and Carry after his election, but without a crisis, there is no lend-lease. However, lend-lease is not needed since the Germans aren't attacking.

With Germany's economic situation gradually deteriorating, pressure mounts on Göring to seek a deal with the Allies. In clandestine negotiations, the Allies demand that Göring and other senior Nazis be permanently barred from office, that the Enabling Act be repealed and the Weimar Constitution be restored, and that Poland, Bohemia and Moravia be liberated. The Germans likely insist on keeping the Danzig corridor. With the Allies anxious to contain the Soviet threat, they concede on the Danzig corridor and the war ends.

With France never losing control of its Pacific colonies, there is no oil embargo against Japan. As the situation in Europe gradually defuses, there is growing international pressure for Japan to abandon its conquests in China. Without Hitler to distract the western powers, Japan relents and returns most of its conquered territory to China.

Mussolini can't do anything but sit and stew on the sidelines. With France still the dominant power on the continent, King Victor Emmanuel III refuses to allow him to become involved in the war.

The major world powers then turn their attention to the Soviet Union. With growing international pressure, the survivors of Stalin after 1953 gradually increase democratic reforms, and the Soviet Union splits up by the 1960s. With the western powers not weakened by a world war, they are able to prop up Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao's communists never control more than a remote part of the Chinese countryside. Tibet remains free. Britain and France are unable to maintain their colonies past the 1950s. Franco and Mussolini eventually die and their countries return to democracy. The world becomes free and democratic, tens of millions of lives having been spared, all thanks to Georg Elser.

[glenn239]

Stalin and FDR certainly have the whip hand, just like they did historically. Chamberlain might stay in power past May 1940 because there is no Norway debacle, and Churchill can be assumed to be his successor. You also seem right that Italian neutrality seems likely with no Battle of France.

After that, the scenario goes off the rails a bit I think. Germany is not collapsing economically just because the British have a blockade, and Stalin is not going to go along with the US dominating either Japan or Germany. Stalin may indeed attempt to export communism into Europe, but he will have no success. Stalin will also attempt to supplant the British and French empires with independent communist nations, and in that he might find all sorts of success there.

The Franco-German war will peter out unless the US comes in, and the story will be communist revolution in the British and French Empires against the background of an emerging US-Soviet rivalry where the Soviet Union is far stronger than it was historically.

[T. A. Gardner]

France and England would certainly continue their military build up and the two by the end of 1940 will be in much better position to fend off a German offensive, or even initiate one of their own.

Do the British and French start a bombing campaign on Germany? That'd seem a certainty. How do the Germans respond to that? It would build up in seriousness.

Without a U-boat campaign to speak of, Britain doesn't have to invest billions into an anti-submarine fleet and doesn't lose shipping at anywhere close to the rate they did. That means they and the French can focus more resources into their armies and air forces. If Italy stays out of the war the British in particular are far better off in these areas not having to invest huge amounts of resources into fighting a Mediterranean campaign.

The US is still going to sell or lend-lease huge amounts of equipment and materials to the British and French.

In the Pacific, at some point Japan pushes the US into a war through their actions in China and Asia. The IJA simply cannot and will not let their military operations there come to a halt without total victory. For them there will always be one more push to final victory and at some point the next push becomes the one-too-many that brings the US into the war. Once that happens, Japan is going to face a total war ending in their complete defeat and occupation.

The question would be where does Stalin get involved in all of this? For him, Asia is a distant backwater of no real consequence. So long as Japan stays out of Soviet business, Stalin has little motivation to get involved there until it is clear he can do a cheap land grab by jumping in. In Europe he's gotten a huge buffer zone with half of Poland now in his possession.

In Germany without Hitler at the helm, the Nazi party quickly loses popularity as the war drags on going nowhere. Göring would have to make a deal but a Treaty of Versailles-like peace won't fly. The British and French would have to reach a negotiated settlement favorable to all parties would have to be reached.

Without the Soviet Union having military control over Western Europe, Communist attempts to take control of various nations fail uniformly even as they retain minority status in parliaments and government. They would be no more successful than they were post war where open elections were held in Eastern Europe. It would take the presence of a totalitarian military to force the issue in the Communist's favor.

In China, I could easily see a divided nation like Korea or Vietnam, or even Germany became if the Soviets got into the Pacific war later on. I could also see a follow-on series of wars between the communist portions and non-communist.

[History Learner]

Anglo-French planning was to start an offensive of their own, be it in 1941 or 1942; Churchill in 1940 was saying '41, the French were saying 1942 based off their industrial production. While it was seen as a matter of exact timing, both agreed to the eventual undertaking of offensives regardless. Specifically for the issue of the Germans, however, why exactly would Goering do nothing? Sitting still only gives the Anglo-French time and strengthens the Army against his own power but more importantly ignores the character of the man; he rather famously told the Spanish Ambassador in 1940 that if he was Fuhrer, the Germans would've already invaded Spain for their refusal to join the Axis....

[maltesefalcon]

Based on prior results, if discussion in this thread starts to focus too much on the death of Hitler aspect, the mods will likely lock it.

Perhaps we could discuss the state of the German economy and its investment in the military industrial complex? The Reich had invested very heavily on its armaments and the means to produce them. More than they could really afford, in fact. But until late 1941, the armed forces had at least partially paid for themselves; by plundering land, goods, resources, weaponry and manpower from its conquests in Europe.

Without those additional conquests it's likely that Germany would need to curtail both their spending and the size of their armed forces to a significant degree.

Of course, there is a possibility their enemies could see this as a sign of detente. But they could also exploit this to out-build Germany and crush them.

[TheMarcksPlan]

why exactly would Goering do nothing?

It's a pretty big jump.

Goering would have been a weak dictator, needing to mollify many constituencies to remain in power. Probably the most important would be the Heer, whose core identity was based on aggressive action. I don't find it plausible that Goering remains indefinitely defensive because if he did, he'd probably be coup'd.

Hitler's intervention probably was not necessary to adoption of the Manstein Plan; Halder was working it up already when Manstein met with Hitler to advocate it. Maybe the attack doesn't happen May 10 but probably that summer France falls.

The most interesting question re Elser killing Hitler as described regards German-Soviet relations. Attacking the SU in 1941 seems to have been all Hitler. With Goering at the helm, we have a powerful Raeder-Ribbentrop-Goering faction favoring accommodation with the SU; the army is unopposed. Recall Molotov's main conditions for joining the Tripartite Pact (assuming Goering can pull that off ATL) in November '40:

1. Bases on the Dardanelles.
2. Guarantee to Bulgaria with bases.
3. Germany leaving Finland completely.

#'s 2 & 3 are probably politically unacceptable to Germany but maybe there's a compromise:

2alt: German/Russian guarantees to Bulgaria, neither side establishes bases.
3alt: Germany leaves Finland on understanding that she will remain independent.

With those conditions satisfied, I could see SU joining the Pact, which has innumerable butterfly effects on the course of world history. The W.Allies can't beat that continental bloc so long as it holds together - not even with A-bombs. Maybe the flip Stalin at some point; maybe they give Goering the alliance Hitler always wanted (some in Britain viewed Goering as a moderate; in this ATL there's no Soviet holocaust yet). Who knows, the whole world is up for grabs.

If, however, German-Soviet negotiations can't reach a compromise then Germany will realize too late the SU has become both hostile and powerful. ATL Goering may order Barbarossa in '42 but it faces a much stronger RKKA and probably gets nowhere; Stalin takes Berlin in '43. Alternatively, Germany doesn't launch Barbarossa and Stalin strolls into Berlin in a 6-month campaign launched in '44/'45 - once the W.Allied bombing campaigns have got going - with ~10mil RKKA against a weaker Heer.

[History Learner]

why exactly would Goering do nothing?

It's a pretty big jump.

Goering would have been a weak dictator, needing to mollify many constituencies to remain in power. Probably the most important would be the Heer, whose core identity was based on aggressive action. I don't find it plausible that Goering remains indefinitely defensive because if he did, he'd probably be coup'd.

Hitler's intervention probably was not necessary to adoption of the Manstein Plan; Halder was working it up already when Manstein met with Hitler to advocate it. Maybe the attack doesn't happen May 10 but probably that summer France falls.

The most interesting question re Elser killing Hitler as described regards German-Soviet relations. Attacking the SU in 1941 seems to have been all Hitler. With Goering at the helm, we have a powerful Raeder-Ribbentrop-Goering faction favoring accommodation with the SU; the army is unopposed. Recall Molotov's main conditions for joining the Tripartite Pact (assuming Goering can pull that off ATL) in November '40:

1. Bases on the Dardanelles.
2. Guarantee to Bulgaria with bases.
3. Germany leaving Finland completely.

#'s 2 & 3 are probably politically unacceptable to Germany but maybe there's a compromise:

2alt: German/Russian guarantees to Bulgaria, neither side establishes bases.
3alt: Germany leaves Finland on understanding that she will remain independent.

With those conditions satisfied, I could see SU joining the Pact, which has innumerable butterfly effects on the course of world history. The W.Allies can't beat that continental bloc so long as it holds together - not even with A-bombs. Maybe the flip Stalin at some point; maybe they give Goering the alliance Hitler always wanted (some in Britain viewed Goering as a moderate; in this ATL there's no Soviet holocaust yet). Who knows, the whole world is up for grabs.

I highly, highly recommend you get Stalin's War by Sean McMeekin. It's brand new and he's unearthed a lot of research, with his particular focus (alluded to by the title) challenging a lot of previous scholarship to favorable reviews; FT did a review of it pretty recently.

If, however, German-Soviet negotiations can't reach a compromise then Germany will realize too late the SU has become both hostile and powerful. ATL Goering may order Barbarossa in '42 but it faces a much stronger RKKA and probably gets nowhere; Stalin takes Berlin in '43. Alternatively, Germany doesn't launch Barbarossa and Stalin strolls into Berlin in a 6-month campaign launched in '44/'45 - once the W.Allied bombing campaigns have got going - with ~10mil RKKA against a weaker Heer.

I know in the past you've stated that you looked at a 1942 Barbarossa as the better option but have since-rightly in my opinion-moved away from such but still, I don't think it would go as bad as presented. It does, however, depend on three main factors:

(1) What is the status of the Western Front, over the course of this ATL 1940-1941? Have the British been sufficiently damaged to be forced out or their war effort hobbled?
2) What is the status of Japan? Have they brought the Americans in and have the Germans found themselves at war with them likewise?
3) What is the status of the Red Army's disposition in 1942? Offensive or defensive?

For (1), there's a lot that could be said. Would Goering act the same way as Hitler did with regards to the Manstein Plan or would such be irrelevant? That could range from OTL results, to worse for the Germans (France Fights On, Italy stays neutral) to better (BEF destroyed in France, PM Halifax seeks Armistice). Assuming OTL, there's still a lot that could change from then on with regards to the UK itself, given Goering-to my knowledge-did not share Hitler's Anglophilia which so hampered German operations in the Summer of 1940 in the lead up and early stages of the Battle of Britain. I cannot foresee Operation Sealion going forward regardless, but it is possible for the Germans with better strategic choices in this framework to gain control of the air over Southern England and inflict serious damage, if not force the British Government into peace.

Moving beyond that and assuming OTL for the above for the sake of the argument, I mentioned earlier how Goering rather blatantly told the Spanish in 1940 he would have invaded them if he were Fuhrer for their refusal to join the Axis. Now, there is a serious question if this was a bluff; making himself the "Bad Cop" to Hitler's "Good Cop" with Franco, in essence. Taking it at face value, however, it seems likely Goering would more seriously pursue a Spanish alliance in 1940 than even Hitler did, using the stick to make up for what he lacked in carrot. Putting Madrid into a "Thailand 1941" style situation, where the choice is either to be bombed by the British as part of the axis or to be bombed by both sides if they joined the Allies and then the Germans overrun them. Knowing Franco, it's likely to me he will take the Axis alliance as the better choice of the two.

In such a case, then, we have Operation Felix by January of 1941, with Gibraltar falling probably pretty quick once its water supplies are exhausted. Further to the East, Goering probably bullies the Italians into skipping Greece in favor of Malta in 1941, with the FMs getting butchered there instead of Crete. Such clears the way for greater Axis logistical flow to Libya, which will probably enable Rommel to make a dash for Nile by late 1941. Turkey, too, will be a particular focus in 1941 and get the Franco treatment in terms of being forced in. Vichy Syria can thus be supported, as would the uprising in Iraq and possibly a Pro-Axis coup in Iran as well. All this together would collapse the Allied position in the Middle East, possibly triggering the Pan-Arab Revolt that many feared in the wake of victorious Fascist arms in the region. Would this, in of itself, be enough to force the British to the table? Possibly, particularly if the Americans still aren't any but either way, I think it cripples the British war effort.
___

For (2), I think this should be obvious:

NOVEMBER 22
EUROPEAN WAR
Interviewing Date 11/7-12/41
Survey #252-K Question #11

It has been suggested that Congress pass a resolution declaring that a state of war exists between the United States and Germany. Would you favor or oppose such a resolution at this time?

Favor.............................. 26%
Oppose.............................63
No opinion......................... 11

Yes, less than a month from Pearl Harbor as the Germans advanced on Moscow nearly two thirds of Americans were still opposed to entry into the conflict; this despite the Reuben James and other events. Americans had been responding in the affirmative to "eventually" getting into the war since almost 1939, the problem therein is that such sentiments were the future nature of such questions, in that such always involved some sort of uncertain date of involvement; in effect, useless platitudes. If there is no Pearl Harbor, the United States just lacks the political will to join in for awhile longer yet, at the minimum.

Further, the strategic ramifications of Japan not striking South in 1941 would loom large over Moscow. They don't exactly have a free hand in the West vis-a-vis Germany if the Kwantung Army is sitting strong in their rear.
___

Finally, (3), which is most important I consider in terms of the tactical framework of a 1942 Barbarossa.

Most of the people reading this have probably heard of the Icebreaker Hypothesis, which argues Stalin was within days of striking Hitler when the latter got lucky and hit him first. It's a very debated subject with most Western historians being opposed in terms of the exact specifics while the debate in Europe and Russia is more mixed. Still, over the last few years there has been some changes on this front. David Glantz, who wrote his Stumbling Colossus trilogy as a response to Icebreaker, has stated that Stalin was most likely looking for offensive action by 1942. Anthony Beevor, meanwhile, has stated his belief that such was even earlier, being the Winter (?!) of 1941. Stalin's War, which I talked about earlier, suggests something was afoot for August of 1941 or thereabouts. Long story short, it seems Stalin very much planned to attack at some point and attacking sooner rather than later seems to be conceded by all parties at this point.

Accepting such, and taking the Glantz estimation of 1942, then I foresee a Second Kharkov writ large. Glantz, who wrote an entire book on that battle, notes a lot of the lackings of the Red Army even after a year of hard lessons learned on the battlefield. In particular, command and control-especially of mechanized forces-was still very much lacking and repeatedly shows up throughout the 1942 campaign at large too. The Luftwaffe remains king of the battlefield, being more experienced with much better A2G coordination and striking ability which proves essential to German tactical success. Now add in the fact that this is happening in a much better ATL strategic environment where the Germans are operating from their own bases closer to their supply origins while the Soviets are far from theirs and any offensive action has taken them onto a different rail gauge. One common problem for the RKKA in the 1941 border battles was very poor logistics given that, and flooding the borderlands with more forces to conduct an offensive would not exactly help matters.

Thus, I think my gist here is pretty obvious. Stalin decides to go for it in 1942 or, having the wrong ideas about how strong the Red Army is in 1942, goads Hitler into attacking him first (McMeekin argues this might be what happened in 1941) just to lose the border battles because of poor training, maintenance, air support and logistical issues. The Germans thus achieve their historical 1941 goals in this ATL 1942, in that much of the Pre-War Red Army gets destroyed before the D-D Line and at that point the Germans can occupy much of the USSR before Soviet force regeneration came make up for such heavy losses.

[TheMarcksPlan]

recommend you get Stalin's War by Sean McMeekin.

Thanks for the reminder; I had bookmarked it over the winter.

Knowing Franco, it's likely to me he will take the Axis alliance as the better choice of the two.

I agree. Canaris informed Franco that Hitler wouldn't invade if Spain stayed neutral; my read is that Franco was sufficiently scared to have joined the Axis had Hitler massed troops along the border.

I know in the past you've stated that you looked at a 1942 Barbarossa as the better option but have since-rightly in my opinion-moved away from such

Pretty sure I've never said so here; I did think so years ago pre-TMP.

For (1), there's a lot that could be said

I disagree with much of what you've said but I'm not confident either of us has decisive arguments one way or another.

tactical framework of a 1942 Barbarossa.

then I foresee a Second Kharkov writ large

Second Kharkov writ large would be massively better for SU than OTL Barbarossa. Why? Because SU lost ~50mil to occupation in '41 and "only" ~5mil on the battlefield. Second Kharkov cost "only" men and material; Barbarossa and Blau cost so much more (e.g. 40% of Soviet GDP).

If we suppose the casualty exchange ratio of the ATL '42 Soviet offensive is the same as OTL Barbarossa (ten Second Kharkov's or 3.3mil PoW), but that the front line stays around the 1940 borders, then we can approximate the ATL '43 RKKA by adding ~50% to the OTL '43 RKKA (due to 50% bigger SU) and stepping it off much farther west. That's a formula for Zhukov in Berlin during 1943, no matter how shambolic is Soviet C&C. Besides that, a Germany that postpones its Winter Crisis by a year or so isn't as mobilized in ATL '43 as in OTL, so Wehrmacht is weaker as well (especially if they're chasing the British across the Middle East simultaneously).

[History Learner]

Thanks for the reminder; I had bookmarked it over the winter.

It's worth every penny I spent on it, very interesting and valuable addition.

Pretty sure I've never said so here; I did think so years ago pre-TMP.

Here is where you said it:

For a long time I thought this ATL was the best German victory scenario but now disagree. Haven't read the whole thread but here's a summary of why:

Again, I don't disagree with this analysis because 1941 is far easier, but I still think 1942 can be made to work.

I disagree with much of what you've said but I'm not confident either of us has decisive arguments one way or another.

To what, specifically, do you disagree with? You seem to be in agreement concerning Spain.

Second Kharkov writ large would be massively better for SU than OTL Barbarossa. Why? Because SU lost ~50mil to occupation in '41 and "only" ~5mil on the battlefield. Second Kharkov cost "only" men and material; Barbarossa and Blau cost so much more (e.g. 40% of Soviet GDP).

If we suppose the casualty exchange ratio of the ATL '42 Soviet offensive is the same as OTL Barbarossa (ten Second Kharkov's or 3.3mil PoW), but that the front line stays around the 1940 borders, then we can approximate the ATL '43 RKKA by adding ~50% to the OTL '43 RKKA (due to 50% bigger SU) and stepping it off much farther west. That's a formula for Zhukov in Berlin during 1943, no matter how shambolic is Soviet C&C. Besides that, a Germany that postpones its Winter Crisis by a year or so isn't as mobilized in ATL '43 as in OTL, so Wehrmacht is weaker as well (especially if they're chasing the British across the Middle East simultaneously).

Second Kharkov IOTL was a means to an end, not the ends itself; Soviet forces in the Southern USSR were so damaged that it enabled the deep advance of Fall Blau that carried AGS to the Volga and Maikop in the Caucasus. The same is what I'm arguing here in terms of the comparison; I'd expect the Soviet border armies to be destroyed and this would enable a deep German advance into the USSR just as 1941 happened but here, Stalin's offensive motives would've resulted in more of the Pre-War Red Army being destroyed compared to OTL 1941. Say the Germans are able to take Kiev, Smolensk and achieve the Luga Line sooner/before Soviet force regeneration is able to working effectively again. This is obviously a better situation than 1941 for them.

[sailorsam]

the economic aspect interests me.
we would have seen tons (literally and figuratively) of goods going through neutral Spain (and Portugal, and even Italy).

hard to imagine the French initiating any offensive, especially after giving Germany 2-3 years to build up their defenses.

a Goering PR offensive ('all that aggression was Hitler, we want to co-exist") could have convinced enough Brits to convince the French to stand down. maybe some gesture (allowing a smaller Polish state).

England would have been unhappy watching the Bismark, Tirpitz and Graf Zeppelin being constructed. Goering might have scrapped them as part of the negotiations.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Anglo-French planning was to start an offensive of their own, be it in 1941 or 1942; Churchill in 1940 was saying '41, the French were saying 1942 based off their industrial production. While it was seen as a matter of exact timing, both agreed to the eventual undertaking of offensives regardless.

Earlier technically. The French intent was to start with small limited objective tactical offensives, & gradually over 1940-1942 escalate to larger & larger attacks. There were several reasons behind this. One was to test the German forces, a second was to adopt offensive doctrine to current conditions. Third was to take advantage of larger Franco/British combined production capability & began a escalating war of material attrition.

French war plans remain obscure to me as their is precious little of any value written in English. The bits I've picked up suggest a ongoing French examination of the German war economy predicted decisive German inferiority to the Allies by 1942.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Here is where you said it:

Ah ok. I was referring to pre-TMP TMP, based on casual college reading.

Second Kharkov IOTL was a means to an end, not the ends itself; Soviet forces in the Southern USSR were so damaged that it enabled the deep advance of Fall Blau that carried AGS to the Volga and Maikop in the Caucasus. The same is what I'm arguing here in terms of the comparison; I'd expect the Soviet border armies to be destroyed and this would enable a deep German advance into the USSR just as 1941

Wouldn't this imply that Germany has built up the logistical infrastructure (e.g. Eisenbahnpionere and Grosstransportraum) for deep advances? Otherwise, if SU attacked in August - as McMeekin suggests would have been their game plan - by the time Germany collates those resources it's too late to get very far. OTOH, if Germany has the logistical infrastructure lying around the border area then why not just attack?

1941 is far easier, but I still think 1942 can be made to work.

To be precise I should say that I don't have a precise view on '42 Barbarossa other than it's not as well-placed as '41.

How can we be confident that it would have worked against an RKKA nearly twice as strong? Consider the Battle of Smolensk: Hoth/Guderian penetrate into a somewhat-strong echeloned defense and take weeks to close the trap; all the while taking heavy casualties. If I project that battle onto a much stronger RKKA, it's feasible that the trap never closes and/or that the panzer groups are isolated and destroyed. OKH had learned enough by Taifun not to try that deep lunge again; in ATL '42 they don't know this yet during the Border Battles or the next step.

So I wouldn't advocate against '42 Barbarossa with the same level of epistemic confidence I maintain for a well-planned '41 Barbarossa, but I also don't see a good argument that '42 Barbarossa would have been better than its '41 version - which obviously wasn't good enough.

To what, specifically, do you disagree with? You seem to be in agreement concerning Spain.

The biggest piece is Turkey - I don't think Germany can move against it unless in cooperation with SU, otherwise it's war with SU. Absent the Turkey piece the logistical obstacles to reaching the MidEast seem likely insuperable.

The idea of Goering "bullying" Mussolini into avoiding Greece also seems under-justified to say the least. Plus absent Greece it's harder to force Turkey into the Axis, even were this possible without provoking war with Stalin.

This is, basically, counterfactual analysis of a Mediterranean strategy. Probably best for its own thread, of which there are many.

[historygeek2021]

When Göring learned of the explosion at the Bürgerbräukeller, he told his liason to Hitler, Karl Bodenschatz, that if Hitler had been killed, he would have immediately ended the war by withdrawing German troops from all non-German territory. It's doubtful that Göring would have actually done anything that extreme, as it would have been humiliating for Germany to abandon everything it had acquired in the previous years without a fight, but it shows Göring's state of mind in 1939: he wanted peace.

This is clear from all the accounts of Göring's actions in the lead up to hostilities in 1938 and 1939. He wanted peace. He had become very wealthy, had a newborn daughter, and stood to lose everything from war. He worked tirelessly with Swedish businessman Birger Dahlerus in the days leading up to the German invasion of Poland to negotiate a compromise with the British, and the British government took these negotiations seriously. Ribbentrop scuttled them by making impossible demands and telling Hitler the British were bluffing. Göring's reluctance to go to war made him a popular candidate to succeed Hitler among the army plotters who felt an attack on the Allies was suicidal. Göring even arranged for Dahlerus to meet known resister Admiral Canaris after Dahlerus asked him if his loyalty was to Hitler or to Germany.

So it's not only plausible but exceedingly likely that Göring would have ordered Germany to go strictly on the defensive if he had become Chancellor in November 1939. He also would have showed willingness to offer to return certain territories in return for peace. These would likely be Bohemia, Moravia and Poland outside of the Danzig Corridor. Given the reluctance of France and Britain to actually fight a war, they might have even reached a peace deal with him in 1940.

If a deal were not reached in 1940, then the populations of Britain and France would grow restless, and their leaders would become increasingly concerned about Stalin having a free hand in the east. Stalin would be reluctant to fight a ground war against Germany alone while France sat behind the Maginot Line. The French would see it as fruitless to attack into the narrow corridor between Luxembourg and the Rhine, which was fortified by the Siegried Line, so they would be content to cripple Germany's economy through blockade. Eventually, Britain and France would realize that Germany was able to survive and maintain a defensive posture indefinitely by conducting trade through the Soviet Union.

Thus, with all sides refusing to commit to offensive action on the ground, a negotiated peace settlement would be likely, most likely in 1940 but perhaps as late as 1942. The peace settlement would likely allow Germany to keep the "German" portions of the territory it had acquired in the 1930s (e.g., Austria, the Sudetenland and the Danzig Corridor) and form small states out of Bohemia, Moravia and the rest of Poland. Western Europe and the United States would then turn their attention to pressuring Japan and the Soviet Union to back down from their territorial ambitions, and eventually, into becoming democracies.

[TheMarcksPlan]

He [Goering] wanted peace.

What are your sources on Goering? I'm not deeply read on him. His personality doesn't fall within my core interests but might put it on the background audiobook list.

My impression is that Goering may have wanted peace but he wanted power more. Taking and keeping power means accommodating bellicose German nationalism from which Hitler was no outlier. My impression is the German generals only opposed attacking France in Fall '39, not '40.

Western Europe and the United States would then turn their attention to pressuring Japan and the Soviet Union to back down from their territorial ambitions, and eventually, into becoming democracies.

For a history buff you seem very eager to reach Fukuyama's end of history.

What if, as seems clear from the historical record, there is no earthly pressure that can force Stalin to form a democracy?

What happens regarding the SU's post-MR Pact acquisitions? Do the Allies condone a war against the SU to free these territories, a war conducted primarily by a Germany that is still basically Nazi? Do countries that assisted and encouraged an authoritarian slaughter of ~1mil in Indonesia - all in the name of anti-communism - balk from using (post-treaty) Nazis as the sword of anti-communism? What's our tolerance limit for mass-slaughter in the ensuing campaign? A million murdered Indonesians was super-great (yay Democracy!) but maybe 2 million murdered Soviets is too far?

If/When Japan leaves China, do the democracies also use authoritarian Japan as its eastern anti-communist sword in China and/or Russia? History is clear that the Cold War West valued anti-communism 100x more than democracy so it's unlikely we push out Japan's ruling military clique. Or do we launch an Operation Japanese Freedom to depose the military clique? Plutonium-flavored freedom?

[historygeek2021]

Source on Goering is this biography: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00KO9J544/re ... TF8&btkr=1

Never heard of the authors but it is well sourced.