I'd think a really serious look at the actual long term French plans is necessary before drawing conclusions about which way the French leadership decides 1941-1942. Economically & politically France, and Britain for that matter had some strong incentives not to allow a economically strong Germany to continue. Some sort of active offensive action vs Germany was a solution. This does not necessarily mean they were thinking in terms of bloody ground offensives. Projections for Allied air strength in late 1941 are 'large, which might be dismissed except OTL 1941 British aircraft production alone rivaled Germany. The French had sacrificed a lot of early production 1938-1939 in order to reform their aircraft industry. Their goals for 1940-1942 were ambitious. Then there was the growth of US production, which in 1940 had explosive growth, mostly for Allied purchases.historygeek2021 wrote: ↑24 May 2021, 07:31... Stalin would be reluctant to fight a ground war against Germany alone while France sat behind the Maginot Line. The French would see it as fruitless to attack into the narrow corridor between Luxembourg and the Rhine, which was fortified by the Siegried Line, so they would be content to cripple Germany's economy through blockade. Eventually, Britain and France would realize that Germany was able to survive and maintain a defensive posture indefinitely by conducting trade through the Soviet Union. ...
Another question is how effective a Allied perhiphrial strategy would be absent German offensive operations. Allied political and military pressure on Norway & Sweden absent any German counter action would be a easy gain. Without German aggressive success Mussolini has disincentives to act on Germanies behalf. In the longer term in this situation its in Italics interest to cooperate with the Allies vis the Blockade. Ditto for the Balkan states & Turkey. Germany on the defense loses influence in many directions. When nations like Sweden, Turkey, & Rumania find they can embargo
Germany their products & still sell at a profit elsewhere a passive German war plan is in trouble. At the end of the day Soviet resources are not a Pancea & there is no guarantee the Allies will not find a combination of incentives in that direction.
Again to judge the success of a German 'passive' strategy we need to have a much clearer understanding of French intent & examine how viable that was.