Japanese carry out their own Doolittle Raid & bomb Washington DC

[T. A. Gardner]

It is also worth noting that training for the Doolittle raid took about six weeks. I would imagine training Japanese army pilots to fly off a carrier would take about the same time. Thus it would take until late June-early July to mount the attack. IMHO if Japan had not inflicted a severe enough defeat on the allies to bring them to the bargaining table by that time, they never would.

The G4M and G3M were IJN bombers, not IJAAF. If the IJAAF was to do such a raid I would think they'd send either Ki 21 or Ki 49 bombers to do it. But a raid where the two services cooperated? I'm thinking not.

[Rob Stuart]

Taking the north Pacific route and arriving undetected in June 1942, the carrier launches two flights 100 miles from off the fog-shrouded coast of the boglands of Oregon.

The whole reason why the US used B-25s to attack Tokyo was that they dared not approach to within 150 nm of Tokyo and attack it with SBDs and TBDs. Using B-25s allowed the attack to be launched from hundreds of miles offshore, which greatly reduced the risk of losing Hornet and/or Enterprise.

I think that the IJN would have recognized that coming in close enough to the US coast to allow carrier-borne twin-engine aircraft to attack DC would have been way too dangerous, as well as being impractical and tying up two of their largest carriers for a month.

[glenn239]

The G4M and G3M were IJN bombers, not IJAAF. If the IJAAF was to do such a raid I would think they'd send either Ki 21 or Ki 49 bombers to do it. But a raid where the two services cooperated? I'm thinking not.

KI-21 had a 73', 10" wingspan which seems considerably more suitable than the naval models.

[glenn239]

It is about 3200 nm from Paramushiro to a launch point 100nm from Oregon, so a 6400 nm round trip if there are no deviations (e.g., to dodge Soviet ships, turning into the wind so that the second carrier could launch or recover fighters, etc).

The original proposal for a close-to-shore launch looks infeasible due to exposure to defenses. A launch from much further offshore, (i.e., 1,200nm) would be possible provided the targets are on the West Coast, not too far inland.

Kaga's 10,000 mile range could be realized only if it sailed at a steady 16 knots. Fuel consumption would go up when steaming in heavy weather, during the final sprint to the launch point, while launching and recovering planes, and when withdrawing after the G4M1 were launched. Furthermore, a significant reserve of fuel would have to be carried to permit unplanned high speed steaming to take place, in the event that a US task force is encountered, for example.

By June 1942 the IJN could walk and chew gum at the same time in terms of understanding its own underway logistics and carrier raids and tactics.

The carrier(s) will also require escorts. At a minimum it will have to have a couple of heavy cruisers, lest enemy surface vessels be encountered in the dark, and at least four destroyers. To keep the destroyers' tanks topped up, and to ensure that the carriers and cruisers always had enough fuel to steam at high speed if required, you now have to have at least a couple of oilers supporting the operation, plus an additional destroyer to escort the oilers when they are detached from the main body.

The IJN isn't sending two carriers east of Hawaii unsupported, so I would assume an Indian Ocean type OOB boosted by, say, 7th Cruiser Division.

To sum up, a reverse Doolittle raid would be far less practical and far more dangerous for the IJN than the 18 April raid was for the USN.

Nimitz will have some warning from HYPO intercepts, but it is possible that the Doolittle aspect of the raid might not be fully understood. He will have four carriers, (if Coral Sea occurred) or five if it did not. Tactically, his PBY's are split between Hawaii and the West coast and Nagumo - assuming he launches from over 1,000 miles out - is in the gap between the two coverage zones. Whether the raid is of the bomb attack or the (IMO more useful) commando landing attack variety, the raid on California itself is a pinprick. Except for the fact that it will draw defenses to the West Coast and away from elsewhere, even as Nagumo has the freedom to operate towards the Hawaii-Midway axis.

[Rob Stuart]

Glenn, as you are a fellow Canuck, I have to ask, why are you spelling "defences" incorrectly? Were you educated in the US, eh?

[maltesefalcon]

It is also worth noting that training for the Doolittle raid took about six weeks. I would imagine training Japanese army pilots to fly off a carrier would take about the same time. Thus it would take until late June-early July to mount the attack. IMHO if Japan had not inflicted a severe enough defeat on the allies to bring them to the bargaining table by that time, they never would.

The G4M and G3M were IJN bombers, not IJAAF. If the IJAAF was to do such a raid I would think they'd send either Ki 21 or Ki 49 bombers to do it. But a raid where the two services cooperated? I'm thinking not.

Sorry my mistake on which service they were attached to. That being said, they were land based aircraft and the crews would still need practice and training to safely take one off from a carrier.

[OpanaPointer]

My friends at the Naval War College suggest substituting battleships for bombers in this scenario.

[maltesefalcon]

The carrier has a 10,000 mile range [...]

To sum up, a reverse Doolittle raid would be far less practical and far more dangerous for the IJN than the 18 April raid was for the USN.

Wouldn't a reverse Doolittle raid entail sending a handful of bombers from Toyko out to bomb the Hornet?

[OpanaPointer]

Bam!

[Rob Stuart]

The carrier has a 10,000 mile range [...]

To sum up, a reverse Doolittle raid would be far less practical and far more dangerous for the IJN than the 18 April raid was for the USN.

Wouldn't a reverse Doolittle raid entail sending a handful of bombers from Toyko out to bomb the Hornet?

"Toyko"? What's that? A sort of combined Toys R Us and Costco?

[T. A. Gardner]

As of June 12th, the USN had

18 PBY in the Puget Sound area (Tongue Point and Seattle)
11 PBY at Alameda (SF Bay area)
8 OS2U on inshore patrol duty Puget Sound area (these fly closer to the coast on ASW patrols)
There's more patrol planes up towards and in Alaska too.
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/h ... un-42.html

That doesn't include USAAF aircraft flying patrol missions off the US Pacific coast.

[OpanaPointer]

And the chance for WASPs to score a kill shouldn't be ignored.

[Von Schadewald]

Would an approach south of Hawaii, launching from Cedros Island off Mexico, or even further south, decrease their chance of being detected (Chicago 1800 miles, Washington DC 2300 miles)?

If they painted over their Meatballs and toned down their Mt Fuji green, they would be taken by most to be US Marauders on a training flight. Would painting on fake USAAF white stars have breached Bushido/the Geneva convention ?

Alternatively, was there one single oil depot/refinery/factory/power station/dam/port target in Texas/the Gulf (1200 miles), the destruction/heavy damaging of which in 1942 would have made a real dent in the US war effort?

[Richard Anderson]

That doesn't include USAAF aircraft flying patrol missions off the US Pacific coast.

37th Fighter Squadron, Olympia in P-38
38th Fighter Squadron, McChord Field as of 14 December 1941, transitioning to P-38, moved to Paine Field 9 September 1942
54th Fighter Squadron, Paine Field as of 22 January 1942, transitioning to P-38, moved to Alaska 25 May 1942
59th Fighter Squadron, Paine Field May-June 1942 with P-40
390th Bombardment Squadron, McChord Field, with B-18, B-26, and A-29
406th Bombardment Squadron operated out of Paine Field, Marsh Field, and Portland AAB April-May 1942 with B-18, B-26, and A-29

That's just for Washington.

[Richard Anderson]

Would an approach south of Hawaii, launching from Cedros Island off Mexico decrease their chance of being detected (Chicago 1800 miles, Washington DC 2300 miles)? If they painted over their Meatballs and toned down their Mt Fuji green, they would be taken by most to be US bombers on a training flight.

Or they could paint "We're Not Japanese!" on their wings.

Alternatively, was there one single oil depot/refinery target in Texas/the Gulf, the destruction/heavy damaging of which in 1942 would make a real dent in the US war effort?

No. There were something on the order of 40+ refineries in the Gulf PADD alone.