Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

[Richard Anderson]

Not a word about the horse vs. truck logistical distribution in either place.

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Conceptual clarity, guys. It saves lots of wasted time. [Translation: Basic research guys. Do it for me please, it saves a lot of my time. There, fixed it for you.]

Have a look at the FMS Study T-8 Problems of Supply in Far-Reaching Operations. By Generalmajor Alfred Toppe and others; 28 vols, 1152 pp, 61 illus; Army War College mimeograph; 1951. A series of studies covering all aspects of the supply problems arising from the unique conditions of Eastern Europe. Supply is treated at all levels, from the Army High Command down to the divisions.

Basically horse transport doesn't get a mention. It is for local distribution only, from depots to the units. German logistics centred on the railways, as they did in 1870 and 1914. The

The distance between the rail head and the front line depends on how many trucks are available. A modern army which is not limited in fuel will need to be prepared for large scale employment of motor transport in the event that railways are temporarily disrupted. German experience with non organic units suggests that a minimum of 30,000 tons capacity is required.

Hitler's decision to fight as close as possible to the beaches in Normandy was very counter productive logistically. There wasn't enough motor transport to support the army given the distance between the battlefield and the railheads. The Seventh army was starved of ammunition.

Yup Hitler had a blind spot when it came to logistics... .

You basically have to dissect what was there typically, because there is no real simple answer or breakdown. So, for example, in Normandy 7. AOK's Nachschubtruppen included four Kraftfahr-Kolonne, each with nominally 180-ton motorized capacity (60 3-ton LKW or equivalent). However, the bulk of its transport were in two Nachschub-Bataillonen with two motorized and eight horse-drawn Fahrkolonne, each of 30-ton capacity. Nominally a standard Fahrkolonne consisted of 92 officers and men, with 46 Ef. 40 wagons, each capable of hauling around 750 kg (6 were for the unit baggage and supply), but there was a lot of variation. Probably there were large numbers of the Hf. 1 to 7 series also used and apparently most of the manpower were probably HiWi (two of the Fahrkolonne had just 4 and 18 personnel, but the count was probably of Germans). Assuming all were full strength - rather a stretch - then the army had a capacity of 780 tons motorized and 240 tons horse-drawn. LXXXIV AK also had a Kraftfahr-Kolonne, but of just 30-ton capability, while the other corps probably only had access to Fahrkolonne, but the number remains murky.

Division transport also varied markedly. In the case of 352. Infanterie-Division, it had one Kraftfahr-Kolonne of 90-ton capacity and two Fahrkolonne, each of 60-ton capacity, so a nominal total of 90 motorized and 120 horse drawn tons.

Next, for artillery, you have to look at how ammunition was carried within the unit, which would vary between divisions and Heerestruppen. In a unit such as 352. Infanterie-Division in Normandy, it nominally had three battalions, each of 12 10.5cm leFH and one battalion of 12 15cm sFH. The Erste Muni-Ausstattung (effectively unit of fire or what the division carried organizationally was:

Each 10.5cm leFH battalion had 8,100 rounds of all types, 225 per howitzer, weighing 172.5 tons. Of those, 6 rounds per howitzer traveled with each piece in the battery limbers, so 72 per battalion (1.5 tons). Another 1,440 rounds traveled with the Muni-Staffel of each battalion (30.7 tons). The remaining 1,188 rounds per battalion (25.3 tons) traveled with the divisional Nachschubtruppen. Note that none of the battalions were motorized.

The 15cm sFH battalion had 1,800 rounds of all types, 150 per howitzer, weighing 98 tons. None traveled with the pieces, but were instead 720 rounds (39.2 tons) were held by the Muni-Staffel of the Abteilung and the rest by the divisional Nachschubtruppen. Again, the battalion was not motorized.

Normally, in combat, the battery would draw from the Muni-Staffel, using its horse-drawn limbers. The Muni-Staffel would be resupplied as needed by the divisional Nachschubtruppen, probably with motorized vehicles, drawing from temporary corps depots or the army's Muni-Lagern, while a combination of the motorized and horse-drawn army Nachschubtruppen would stock the army's Muni-Lagern from railheads and move the ammunition forward to the Muni-Staffel.

It has been calculated that the overall average consumption of the Heer was about 15.3 leFH rounds per piece per day and 11.4 rounds of sFH rounds per piece per day. However, anecdotally, the battalions of 352. Infanterie-Division apparently fired off its entire 1. Muni-Ausstatung in the first 24-hours or so of the invasion. So there was likely a lot of horse0drawn and motorized traffic moving ammunition, although through June and July IIRC, 7. AOK averaged about 500 tons per day of all artillery ammunition.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I do not know of the ammunition numbers but there were long barrages of up to 80 minutes and so prior to offensive lunges.

That is surprising, because the German habit was for short, intense concentrations in support of the schwerpunkte, with lengthier, but intermittent fires as diversions, masking, and deception. Lengthy intense fires were avoided due to the extreme consumption of ammunition stockpiles, which were calculated based on average and intense days of combat.

My guess is the 80 minutes referee to the time of a total program. The assorted fire missions described above at different points during this time & not a continual fire on a target or target.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I think the divisional artillery of the 716 division was roughly where it ended up on D Day. Merville battery had been occupied since 1942 and I suspect the same is true of the Maisy grandcamp battery I have seen pictures of AR 1716's guns in other places, but dating from 1942 ish.

Im missing something here. That accounts for two batteries, is that all the 716 division had? The maps I've seen that allegedly depict the 716 artillery positions shows many other batteries in the div area.

By spring 1944, LXXXIV Corps artillery was mostly in emplacements rather than 'staked out posiitons'. Some of the Coastal artillery was redeployed to an alternate position. Famously the Pointe Du Hoc battery, but also the Ouistrehem battery as well.

Those two were as I understand were large caliber long range guns for shooting at the invasion fleet, not the lighter division artillery which had the mission of shooting at things on the beach.

The most recent reinforcements to the Corps were from ID352 and Abteilung 989 which deployed too late to be emplaced - and escaped notice in the D Day fire plan.

Your assumption about indolance in Seventh Army and LXXXIV Corps may be right.

Indolence was not what I was thinking, at least not how I'd use the term. Lack of support personnel/units to assist the division artillery in this. Its difficult for me to believe those who were present were undertrained, but sometimes it seems to lead that way.

Staudinger is right to question why after four years of occupation and two of the Atlantic Wall, there were no contingency plans to receive reinforcing artillery. It would not have taken too much effort. Rommel in his famous inspection tours doesn't seem to have asked any penetrating questions of the GOC 7th Army sometime Chief of Artillery General Dollman. or LXXXIV Corps General of Artillerie Marcks or Artillerymen who commanded ID 716 (Richter) and 21 Panzer Div (Feuchtinger)

Its also possible there was, but Staudinger missed the memo. Its painful for me to recall how many times in 20+ years I saw officers, commanders & HQ staff, fail to check critical documents, not receive critical documents, ect... Im visualizing Staudinger in his rage kicking a peg in the ground with a survey datum inked on the side...

[Richard Anderson]

Im missing something here. That accounts for two batteries, is that all the 716 division had? The maps I've seen that allegedly depict the 716 artillery positions shows many other batteries in the div area.

Art.-Regt. 1716
Gefechtsstand – Unknown
Kdr.: Oberstleutnant Helmut Knüppe
I. Abtl.
Gefechtsstand – Colomby
1. Bttr. – Merville (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
2. Bttr. – WN 16 (Colleville-sur-Orne) (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
3. Bttr. – Bréville (northeast of Caen) (four 7.5cm FK 16 n.A.)
4. Bttr. – WN 12 (Ouistreham “Water Tower Battery”) (four 15cm
s.F.H. 414 (f))
10. Bttr. – 4 kilometers northeast of Bayeux (four 15.5cm s.F.H. 414 (f)
11. Bttr. “Graf Waldersee” (six 15cm s.FH 13 (Sfl.)
II. Abtl.
Gefechtsstand – Crépon
5. Bttr. – WN 35b (Crépon) (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
6. Bttr. – WN 32 (la Mare-Fontaine) (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
7. Bttr. – WN 28a (Bény-sur-Mer) (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
III. Abtl. (attached to 352. Inf.-Div.)

Art.-Regt. 352
Gefechtsstand – Moulagny
Kdr.: Oberst Kurt-Wilhelm Ocker
I. Abtl.
Gefechtsstand – Château d’Etréham
Kdr: Major Werner Pluskat
1. Bttr. – Houtteville (between Surrain and Etreham) (four 10.5cm
le.FH) – Oberleutnant Bernhard Frerking
2. Bttr. – Hill 29 and Hill 61 (near Montigny, two 10.5cm l.F.H. in each
position)
3. Bttr. – south of the Coleville-St. Laurent road, northeast of Formigny
(four 10.5cm le.FH) – Hauptmann Wilkening
II. Abtl.
Gefechtsstand – St. Clément
4.-6. Bttr. (four 10.5cm le.FH each)
III. Abtl.
Gefechtsstand – La Rosière (north of Bayeux)
7. Bttr. – Pierre Solain (four 10.5cm le.FH)
8. Bttr. – Sommervieu (la Tringale) (four 10.5cm le.FH)
9. Bttr. – Magny-en-Bessin (near Vaux-sur-Aure) (four 10.5cm le.FH)
IV. Abtl.
Gefechtsstand – Asnières en Bessin
10.-12. Bttr. (four 15cm s.FH each)
Bttr. – Longueville
III./Art.-Regt. 1716 (- 10. Bttr.)
Gefechtsstand – Le Cambe
8. Bttr. – Maisy La Martiniere (Wn 84) (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
9. Bttr. – Maisy Les Perruques (Wn 83) (four 15cm s.F.H. 414 (f))

[Carl Schwamberger]

Thanks for the number Rich.

It has been calculated that the overall average consumption of the Heer was about 15.3 leFH rounds per piece per day and 11.4 rounds of sFH rounds per piece per day. However, anecdotally, the battalions of 352. Infanterie-Division apparently fired off its entire 1. Muni-Ausstatung in the first 24-hours or so of the invasion. So there was likely a lot of horse0drawn and motorized traffic moving ammunition, although through June and July IIRC, 7. AOK averaged about 500 tons per day of all artillery ammunition.

This beings me back to a point I touched earlier. The ammunition was typically distributed to depots convenient to supplying the batteries. Piles at 'railheads' would be found in some situations, but the preference was distribution to storage sites nearer the firing units. Or their anticipated positions. Dispersing the ammunition storage made it less vulnerable to air attack. Clusters of sites. Columns of these horse wagons and automobiles converging on piles along the railroads tracks is not the best practice.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Im missing something here. That accounts for two batteries, is that all the 716 division had? The maps I've seen that allegedly depict the 716 artillery positions shows many other batteries in the div area.

Art.-Regt. 1716
Gefechtsstand – Unknown
Kdr.: Oberstleutnant Helmut Knüppel ...
...
8. Bttr. – Maisy La Martiniere (Wn 84) (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
9. Bttr. – Maisy Les Perruques (Wn 83) (four 15cm s.F.H. 414 (f))

No sooner than I remember where I can find a map of this than Richs list pops up.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Hitler's decision to fight as close as possible to the beaches in Normandy was very counter productive logistically. There wasn't enough motor transport to support the army given the distance between the battlefield and the railheads. The Seventh army was starved of ammunition.

There is a question of what quantity of ammunition was arriving at the railheads for 7th Army. I've seen claims that 10% of requirements were delivered during June & July. Rundsteadt & his staff at OB West, in March 1944 were studying the decline of French railway capacity. The trends indicated to them the capacity, or ability to supply the 15th or 7th Armies, would be effectively zero by mid summer.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Have a look at the FMS Study T-8 Problems of Supply in Far-Reaching Operations. By Generalmajor Alfred Toppe and others; 28 vols, 1152 pp, 61 illus; Army War College mimeograph; 1951.

Thank you.

Basically horse transport doesn't get a mention. It is for local distribution only, from depots to the units.

As I've been suggesting all along.

German logistics centred on the railways, as they did in 1870 and 1914.

No doubt railways are the biggest strategic factor - ended up being critical for the Allies in France in 1944 as well.

The Grosstransportraum, however, was a necessary condition of the WW2 Heer's operational mobility, which is the difference between a WW1 Heer that can break through but can't force a strategic decision, and a WW2 Heer that can.

Hitler's decision to fight as close as possible to the beaches in Normandy was very counter productive logistically. There wasn't enough motor transport to support the army given the distance between the battlefield and the railheads. The Seventh army was starved of ammunition.

Yup Hitler had a blind spot when it came to logistics... .

To be fair to Hitler (lol), he can't be blamed for everything that went badly. Given Rommel's attitude towards logistics in North Africa, I suspect Hitler wasn't aware of the logistical implications of Rommel's recommendations. Hitler did personally intervene to address ground logistics after the Battle of France, something I suspect FDR or Churchill wouldn't think of. Let's leave some blame for the German generals.

[Translation: Basic research guys. Do it for me please, it saves a lot of my time. There, fixed it for you.]

As regards you, it'd be just recompense for hours of saying "No, Richard, that's not the point" and then explaining the point at length for seventh time. I've given that up for now though. While you do provide some numbers, you rarely provide sources, so I'm still awaiting just recompense.

You have this toxic idea that there's something untoward about asking for reading material on a WW2 forum. What I know I want to share - I'm always pretty generous with screenshots and quotes. Perhaps unlike you, I'm not worried that others' general increase of knowledge threatens my viewpoint. The more folks know, the more they'll agree with me, think I. You seem to fear the opposite.

[Cult Icon]

Going back into a 2000 TDI study and its summary form, I wasn't recalling precisely. The summary says:

Results from Ardennes Data:
Mission Success [emphasis added]

It does not appear that the US Army
performed better in the attack in the
Ardennes engagements than it did in the
Italian engagements. Slide 9

...as all TDI studies find lower US effectiveness in Italy, this implies lower US effectiveness in the Ardennes.

However - when get into the weeds of the casualty effectiveness - versus mission success - it looks like the US might have outperformed the Germans in the Ardennes. That full study concludes on page 61:

The Germans and the US were roughly equivalent in combat effectiveness, with the US being within 20 to 30 percent of the Germans (possibly lower). This appears to have been especially true in Italy, although they may have had the same combat effectiveness in the Ardennes.

TDI's judgment there must a combination of mission and casualty effectiveness in the Ardennes, as the study's text has good evidence for higher US casualty effectiveness. The report notes, however:

Unfortunately, the Ardennes data may be biased. It includes 35 engagements drawn from the
US III Corps attack on the German southern flank. In this case, the initial US attack benefited from surprise, and the German opposition was dispersed and out of position. As such, it was an unusually successful offensive and in fact may not be a typical example. A mixture of other US attacks in the Ardennes would need to be analyzed if one was to have confidence in this data.

----------------------------------------------

Note that this 2000 study isn't a QJM-style analysis scoring weapons systems and adjusting effectiveness for relative numbers. It's purely based on number of casualties inflicted - whether one super-GI or super-Landser fought on one side or 50,000. It also ignores the effects of airpower.

The German army themselves rated their own, partially refitted and undertrained divisions rather low.

And rightly so, relative to their own standards. These divisions still put in respectable showing relative to the Allies, demonstrating perhaps equal combat effectiveness.

That quantitative analysis can't identify an overwhelming edge in American effectiveness is telling here. US Army had massive material advantages (inc. air support) after the battle's first days, many of the Germans were very poorly trained and their morale was quite low (apart, perhaps, from some of the psychotic SS divisions gleefully marching to Gotterdammerung).

I looked at the PDF, which is a summary. It would be more interesting to see what each of these engagements were. Ultimately the US vs German losses ended up being similar. However certain operational factors should have influenced the results:

The first wave of the Northern (main) effort was dominated by US artillery and strong reserves, leading to extremely high losses and loss of one of the spearheads. The more successful, central effort was characterized by German numerical superiority.

The Northern effort would have the German rated more poorly than the Central effort. However the Central effort relied on successful German deception- otherwise the area would have been plugged with additional prepared forces and artillery, making the Germans much less successful.

The rapidly improvised Operation Nordwind in the Alsace was something like 2 German casualties for every American, the area was plugged with strong reserves, leading to shallow penetration. The Slyvester attacks/US defense were probably around one for one.

[Richard Anderson]

Thanks for the number Rich.

You're welcome.

This beings me back to a point I touched earlier. The ammunition was typically distributed to depots convenient to supplying the batteries. Piles at 'railheads' would be found in some situations, but the preference was distribution to storage sites nearer the firing units. Or their anticipated positions. Dispersing the ammunition storage made it less vulnerable to air attack. Clusters of sites. Columns of these horse wagons and automobiles converging on piles along the railroads tracks is not the best practice.

Yes, and the principal 7. AOK Muni-Lagern concerned with supply the German artillery in Normandy were Vire, Alencon, Falaise, and La-Ferte-Mace. All were conveniently placed near rail lines and most were concealed in forests. It may not have been best practice, but there may not have been another good option.

In theory, they were all in easy distance by motor or horse of the firing positions along the coast, so when the 1. Muni-Ausstattung was expended it could be easily replenished...except it did not work that way. The initial expenditure was so high in the first days may indicate that supply discipline was lax or ignored in the face of the massive Allied landing. The ammunition at the gun positions should have been sufficient for about 15 days firing, but was expended in many cases in the first day. So close to 300 tons needed to be on the road from the Muni-Lager to just 352. Infanterie-Division, likely hundreds of motor vehicles on the roads. Now add in the columns of reinforcements moving up. The roads quickly became a target rich environment for the thousands of armed reconnaissance sorties flying over the battlefield. Worse, it took some time to move up III. Flak-Korps and reinforcements to contest those communications routes.

To top that off, the rail interdiction of the Seine-Loire line strangled the ability of the Ob.West Qu-Gen to get supply forward to the depots. For the week ending 7 April, 1,116 loaded trains were able to pass west into the 7. AOK zone, but by the week ending 2 June that was reduced to 466, then 201 the following week, and over the following nine, an average of 33 trains per week made it through. On 6 June, air attacks on the station at Alencon damaged 32 car loads of munitions totaling 510 tons and was followed by an attack on 7 June, which damaged another 1,260 tons. By 9 June, 7. AOK recorded the consumption of 2,800 tons of munitions and received just 142 on 9 June. By 19 June, another 7,286 tons were consumed, before 231 tons were received. It was not until 21 June that regular shipments began to arrive and from then until the end of the month, 3,639.8 tons were received, but a further 3,955 were consumed. (Note these figures are for all munitions - artillery, mortar, tank and antitank, and small arms - albeit artillery ammunition normally was the bulk, typically about 50% percent of on hand and consumption is a good rule of thumb).

[Richard Anderson]

[Translation: Basic research guys. Do it for me please, it saves a lot of my time. There, fixed it for you.]

As regards you, it'd be just recompense for hours of saying "No, Richard, that's not the point" and then explaining the point at length for seventh time. I've given that up for now though. While you do provide some numbers, you rarely provide sources, so I'm still awaiting just recompense.

You have this toxic idea that there's something untoward about asking for reading material on a WW2 forum. What I know I want to share - I'm always pretty generous with screenshots and quotes. Perhaps unlike you, I'm not worried that others' general increase of knowledge threatens my viewpoint. The more folks know, the more they'll agree with me, think I. You seem to fear the opposite.

I will respond directly to this for once.

As regards TMP, it is fascinating to see how such a clever chap can so utterly miss the point. TMP has the habit of dismissing out of hand research that does not confirm his assumptions as "minutia", but never hesitates to happily hoover up other's work he believes does confirm his assumptions. The latest of these was

Liedtke's argument is air tight: the crushing material losses in Western Ukraine forced production to flow east when it was needed West for any chance of an effective counter to D-Day. Material shortages delayed or prevented deployment of most mechanized units that fought in Normandy or feasibly might have.

Worse, since he has little idea of the basic research and sources available and utilized for such analysis, he can, with the confidence of ignorance, proclaim things like

Liedtke is an excellent researcher capable of connecting the dots across strategic theaters and between economics and battlefield outcomes. A rarity in his field.

Given TMP apparently completely misread Liedtke's paper (and Liedtke actually has some glaring holes in his research), I suspect that remark was due to confirmation bias. TMP thought Liedtke was saying what TMP wanted to hear, so Liedtke is obviously the best.

Thus my remark. TMP thinks he can distinguish between an "excellent researcher capable of connecting the dots" and research that is irrelevant "minutia" unworthy of his attention, but rarely hesitates to demand others do his work for him when he is in search of more confirmation.

BTW, I think I've demonstrated over the years that I can back up my remarks with sources and have happily shared data when asked, including, if he thinks about it a moment, with TMP. However, the recent crop of trolls that began appearing here a few years ago has soured me on the habit.

[Richard Anderson]

I looked at the PDF, which is a summary. It would be more interesting to see what each of these engagements were. reserves, leading to shallow penetration.

The full set considered were:

ARDENNES - NORTH
Honsfeld 17 Dec 1944 Bde
Trois Ponts 18 Dec Bn
Stavalot 18 Dec Bn
Stoumont 19 Dec Bn
Malmady 21 Dec Bde
Dom Butgenbach I (Recon Probe) 18 Dec Squad
Dom Butgenbach II (2nd attack) 19 Dec Bn
Dom Butgenbach III (3d-5th attack) 19 Dec Bn
Dom Butgenbach IV 19 - 20 Dec Bde
Dom Butgenbach V 20 Dec Bde
Dom Butgenbach VI 21 Dec Bde
La Gleize 22 - 25 Dec Bde


ARDENNES - CENTER
Schnee Eifel, South 16 - 19 Dec Div
Schnee Eifel, Center 16 - 19 Dec Bde
Schnee Eifel, North I 16 Dec Div
Schnee Eifel, North II 16 - 19 Dec Div
Our River, North 16 - 17 Dec Div
Our River, Center 16 - 18 Dec Corps
Hoefen 16 Dec Bde
Hosingen 16 - 18 Dec Div
Rochefort 23 - 24 Dec Bde
Celles 24 - 28 Dec Div
Verdenne 25 - 27 Dec Div

ARDENNES - SOUTH
Diekirch 16 - 19 Dec Corps
Dillingen 16 - 18 Dec Div

ARDENNES - Bastogne
Bastogne I 19 Dec 1944 Corps
Bastogne II 20 Dec Corps
Bastogne III 21 Dec Corps
Bastogne IV 22 Dec Div
Bastogne V 23 Dec Div
Bastogne VI 24 Dec Div
Bastogne VII 25 Dec Div
Bastogne VIII 26 Dec Div
Bastogne IX 27 Dec Div
4th AD Attack I 22 Dec Div
4th AD Attack II 23 Dec Div
4th AD Attack III 24 Dec Div
4th AD Attack IV 25 Dec Div
4th AD Attack V (Assenois) 26 Dec Div
Assenois 26 Dec Bde
4th AD Attack VI 27 Dec Div
4th AD Attack VII 28 Dec Div
4th AD Attack VIII 29 Dec Div
167th VGD Attack I 30 Dec Div
167th VGD Attack II 31 Dec Div
80th ID Attack I 22 Dec Div
80th ID Attack II 23 Dec Div
80th ID Attack III 24 Dec Div
80th ID Attack IV 25 Dec Div
80th ID Attack V 26 Dec Div
Stalemate on the Sure I 27 Dec Div
Stalemate on the Sure II 28 Dec Div
Stalemate on the Sure III 29 Dec Div
Stalemate on the Sure IV 30 Dec Div
Stalemate on the Sure V 31 Dec Div
26th ID Attack I 22 Dec Div
26th ID Attack II 23 Dec Div
26th ID Attack III 24 Dec Div
26th ID Attack IV 25 Dec Div
26th ID Attack V 26 Dec Div
26th ID Attack VI 27 Dec Div
26th ID Attack VII 28 Dec Div
26th ID Attack VIII 29 Dec Div
26th ID Attack XI 30 Dec Div
26th ID Attack X 31 Dec Div
Bastogne Corridor I 27 Dec Div
Bastogne Corridor II 28 Dec Div
Bastogne Corridor III 29 Dec Div
Lutrebois I 30 Dec Div
Lutrebois II 31 Dec Div
Foy (Bastogne XXVI) 13 Jan 1945 Div

The Slyvester attacks/US defense were probably around one for one.

What is a Slyvester attacks? Does it involve Tweetie Bird?

[Sheldrake]

I think the divisional artillery of the 716 division was roughly where it ended up on D Day. Merville battery had been occupied since 1942 and I suspect the same is true of the Maisy grandcamp battery I have seen pictures of AR 1716's guns in other places, but dating from 1942 ish.

Im missing something here. That accounts for two batteries, is that all the 716 division had? The maps I've seen that allegedly depict the 716 artillery positions shows many other batteries in the div area.

By spring 1944, LXXXIV Corps artillery was mostly in emplacements rather than 'staked out posiitons'. Some of the Coastal artillery was redeployed to an alternate position. Famously the Pointe Du Hoc battery, but also the Ouistrehem battery as well.

Those two were as I understand were large caliber long range guns for shooting at the invasion fleet, not the lighter division artillery which had the mission of shooting at things on the beach.

The most recent reinforcements to the Corps were from ID352 and Abteilung 989 which deployed too late to be emplaced - and escaped notice in the D Day fire plan.

Your assumption about indolance in Seventh Army and LXXXIV Corps may be right.

Indolence was not what I was thinking, at least not how I'd use the term. Lack of support personnel/units to assist the division artillery in this. Its difficult for me to believe those who were present were undertrained, but sometimes it seems to lead that way.

Staudinger is right to question why after four years of occupation and two of the Atlantic Wall, there were no contingency plans to receive reinforcing artillery. It would not have taken too much effort. Rommel in his famous inspection tours doesn't seem to have asked any penetrating questions of the GOC 7th Army sometime Chief of Artillery General Dollman. or LXXXIV Corps General of Artillerie Marcks or Artillerymen who commanded ID 716 (Richter) and 21 Panzer Div (Feuchtinger)

Its also possible there was, but Staudinger missed the memo. Its painful for me to recall how many times in 20+ years I saw officers, commanders & HQ staff, fail to check critical documents, not receive critical documents, ect... Im visualizing Staudinger in his rage kicking a peg in the ground with a survey datum inked on the side...

I mentioned the Miaisy batteries and Merville, beacuse both were in concrete emplacements by 6th June and Merville had a prior circular platform to allow for rapid traverses to cover 360 degree to engage paratroops. I should have mentioned the La Mere Fontaine battery which was also in casemates. I am not sure how long the other batteries had been deployed in thse un concreted positions.

I really do not buy the lack of staff argument. The deployment of artillery from an incoming corps is at at least initally a Corps or even Army matter. Marcks had been a powerful advocate of Normandy as a likely landing zone. He must have had some ideas about where he would expect to deploy armoured reinforcements. As an artillery officer he ought to have known what information an incoling corps might needs in the way of potential OPs, gun positons and

716 Infantry Division had been in the coastal area for two years. They were not in contact with any enemy. Not everyone was involved in digging defences. It would not have have taken a couple of officers on horseback more than a couple of weeks to identify two dozen potential gun positions and for a survey party to survey in pegs.

[Richard Anderson]

I really do not buy the lack of staff argument.

I would not dismiss it out of hand. For one thing, IIRC at this time there were only around 15 or 16 Artillerie-Regiments-Stab z.b.V. in the German order of battle. They were the units that provide the grunt work for the ArKo in operations, otherwise the ArKo was reduced to piggy-backing on the division artillery staff. None of the Artillerie-Regiments-Stab z.b.V. were in Normandy on 6 June, the closest was Art.-Regt.-Stab z.b.V Suippes. The next was Art.Regt.-Stab z.b.V. 1020, which completed organization in July and was assigned to 5. PzAOK.

[Richard Anderson]

We can again compare the organizational robustness of the American FA to the German.

In Normandy, 7. AOK had just three ARKO, one - 118 at Château de Chiffrevast - controlling two Eisenbahn Batterien , and the other - 474, which was borrowed from LXXIV AK, at Le Parc de la Mare (Monts-en-Bessin, west of Caen) - controlling the artillery along the LXXXIV AK seafront. The third - 115 - was at Brest. All were bodenständiges. none were associated with an Artillerie-Regiments-Stab z.b.V., so relied on the divisional artillery staff for support. For observation, met, and measurement, 7. AOK depended on a single Feuerleitbatterie, Vermessungs-Kompanie, and a single Beobachtungs Abteilung in the zone of LXXXIV AK.

Its American opponent, First U.S. Army, in each corps a complete Observation Battalion, a Corps Artillery HQ&HQ Battery, and:

Under Army control - one FA Brigade and five Artillery Group HQ&HQ Battery (analogous to the Artillerie-Regiments-Stab z.b.V.)
V Corps - three Artillery Group HQ&HQ Battery
VII Corps - two Artillery Group HQ&HQ Battery
XIX Corps - two Artillery Group HQ&HQ Battery
VIII Corps - two Artillery Group HQ&HQ Battery