You basically have to dissect what was there typically, because there is no real simple answer or breakdown. So, for example, in Normandy 7. AOK's Nachschubtruppen included four Kraftfahr-Kolonne, each with nominally 180-ton motorized capacity (60 3-ton LKW or equivalent). However, the bulk of its transport were in two Nachschub-Bataillonen with two motorized and eight horse-drawn Fahrkolonne, each of 30-ton capacity. Nominally a standard Fahrkolonne consisted of 92 officers and men, with 46 Ef. 40 wagons, each capable of hauling around 750 kg (6 were for the unit baggage and supply), but there was a lot of variation. Probably there were large numbers of the Hf. 1 to 7 series also used and apparently most of the manpower were probably HiWi (two of the Fahrkolonne had just 4 and 18 personnel, but the count was probably of Germans). Assuming all were full strength - rather a stretch - then the army had a capacity of 780 tons motorized and 240 tons horse-drawn. LXXXIV AK also had a Kraftfahr-Kolonne, but of just 30-ton capability, while the other corps probably only had access to Fahrkolonne, but the number remains murky.Sheldrake wrote: ↑02 Nov 2021 22:24TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑01 Nov 2021 03:45
Not a word about the horse vs. truck logistical distribution in either place.
Conceptual clarity, guys. It saves lots of wasted time. [Translation: Basic research guys. Do it for me please, it saves a lot of my time. There, fixed it for you.]Have a look at the FMS Study T-8 Problems of Supply in Far-Reaching Operations. By Generalmajor Alfred Toppe and others; 28 vols, 1152 pp, 61 illus; Army War College mimeograph; 1951. A series of studies covering all aspects of the supply problems arising from the unique conditions of Eastern Europe. Supply is treated at all levels, from the Army High Command down to the divisions.
Basically horse transport doesn't get a mention. It is for local distribution only, from depots to the units. German logistics centred on the railways, as they did in 1870 and 1914. The
The distance between the rail head and the front line depends on how many trucks are available. A modern army which is not limited in fuel will need to be prepared for large scale employment of motor transport in the event that railways are temporarily disrupted. German experience with non organic units suggests that a minimum of 30,000 tons capacity is required.
Hitler's decision to fight as close as possible to the beaches in Normandy was very counter productive logistically. There wasn't enough motor transport to support the army given the distance between the battlefield and the railheads. The Seventh army was starved of ammunition.
Yup Hitler had a blind spot when it came to logistics... .
Division transport also varied markedly. In the case of 352. Infanterie-Division, it had one Kraftfahr-Kolonne of 90-ton capacity and two Fahrkolonne, each of 60-ton capacity, so a nominal total of 90 motorized and 120 horse drawn tons.
Next, for artillery, you have to look at how ammunition was carried within the unit, which would vary between divisions and Heerestruppen. In a unit such as 352. Infanterie-Division in Normandy, it nominally had three battalions, each of 12 10.5cm leFH and one battalion of 12 15cm sFH. The Erste Muni-Ausstattung (effectively unit of fire or what the division carried organizationally was:
Each 10.5cm leFH battalion had 8,100 rounds of all types, 225 per howitzer, weighing 172.5 tons. Of those, 6 rounds per howitzer traveled with each piece in the battery limbers, so 72 per battalion (1.5 tons). Another 1,440 rounds traveled with the Muni-Staffel of each battalion (30.7 tons). The remaining 1,188 rounds per battalion (25.3 tons) traveled with the divisional Nachschubtruppen. Note that none of the battalions were motorized.
The 15cm sFH battalion had 1,800 rounds of all types, 150 per howitzer, weighing 98 tons. None traveled with the pieces, but were instead 720 rounds (39.2 tons) were held by the Muni-Staffel of the Abteilung and the rest by the divisional Nachschubtruppen. Again, the battalion was not motorized.
Normally, in combat, the battery would draw from the Muni-Staffel, using its horse-drawn limbers. The Muni-Staffel would be resupplied as needed by the divisional Nachschubtruppen, probably with motorized vehicles, drawing from temporary corps depots or the army's Muni-Lagern, while a combination of the motorized and horse-drawn army Nachschubtruppen would stock the army's Muni-Lagern from railheads and move the ammunition forward to the Muni-Staffel.
It has been calculated that the overall average consumption of the Heer was about 15.3 leFH rounds per piece per day and 11.4 rounds of sFH rounds per piece per day. However, anecdotally, the battalions of 352. Infanterie-Division apparently fired off its entire 1. Muni-Ausstatung in the first 24-hours or so of the invasion. So there was likely a lot of horse0drawn and motorized traffic moving ammunition, although through June and July IIRC, 7. AOK averaged about 500 tons per day of all artillery ammunition.