Richard Anderson wrote: ↑17 Oct 2021 22:00
... It did participate in maneuvers with British units in June and July, but AFAIK those British units were
still following Home Army artillery doctrine rather than that adopted by the Eighth Army in Egypt in May 1942. Worse, the units of the 34th Infantry Division began concentrating on amphibious training in early August 1942 in preparation for TORCH, which also affected unit and division training in basic doctrine. So I doubt they had much exposure to what was essentially an Eighth Army method or much chance to practice such, given they did not have much time to practice American artillery doctrine other than range shooting..
Not what Im reading in either Pemberton, or the Journal of Royal Artillery. Reorganizing the 24 gun brigade in 1938, into two 12 cannon firing groups (now labeled batteries) was a early step in the effort to rapidly concentrate fires. Pemberton touches on the effort to concentrate larger multi battery groups, why they failed, and the perception of failure of the 12 gun battery in the 1940 campaign. The JRA paralleled this with a series of articles 1937-1940 relating the searcher rapid concentration capability. By 1941 I'm not seeing evidence of the artillerists back in England following any residual pre 1938 reform practice. ie: the article 'Organization of Counter Battery Work In Mobile Warfare By A Medium Brigade Allotted To a Division' Vol LXIII, No 2 Im seeing in some detail the methods for rapidly reinforcing the regiments fires with the other division artillery in practice in the UK in 1940-1941.
Conversely Pemberton from Chapter 4 describes the fragmentation or dispersion of the artillery fires in the Western Desert. Early on in 1940 he ascribes this to lack of regiments to concentrate, shortage of communications equipment, and lack of señor RA officers to form workable HQ above the regiment. Concentrations described were deliberate, taking hours from defects/shortages in survey, ready ammunition at hand, slow communications.
Pemberton goes on to describe the lack of a CCRA & efforts of uneven result for the Division CRA as a substitute for 1940- early 1941. @ Tobruk three regiment concentrations of nominally 36 guns were achieved through preparation and planning, but not in the hasty or rapid methods. For June 1941 Pemberton describes only four medium/heavy regiments in use against the Axis in the western desert, & those in separate locations too distant for mutual concentration. As mid 1941 passes the description of dispersal of the division and corps artillery continues, with reduced batteries of six guns farmed out to Jock columns and the idea the brigade should have their own regiment of 25lbrs, vs control by the Division CRA.
In direct contrast Pemberton describes the development or training in the direction of the 1938-1940 RA, where the concentration of battery, regiment, and division/corps groups was "speeded up". The adoption of "Quick Barrage" procedures to supplement existing deliberate setting up of regiment & division fire groups on a target came in the UK during 1941. (Part IV Chapter VII) Articles in the JRA describing the campaign in Belgium/France of 1940 lead in lessons learned to the desirability of large scale and speed in concentration. Later in Chapter VII 103 Pemberton describes the obsession in 8th Army with maximizing AT fires leading to the further fragmentation of regiments among the armored & infantry brigade components. Making common survey, communications, and overlapping range in conducive to fast concentration of fires.
The idea of success of the 25lbr as a AT weapon in the 8th Army of 1941 connects to these descriptions of the dispersion of division artillery fires. I'm just not finding much evidence of the development of rapid large scale concentrations of the division and reinforcing Corps RA. Not like I'm seeing described in the UK. The opening paragraphs of Chapter VIII of Pemberton repeats the previous description of a fragmented artillery in the division & corps. ie: A removal of the CRA from and command responsibilities of the division artillery, leaving the HQ as a training and supply agency. It was also proposed the CCRA be eliminated as the regiments under that HQ were farmed out to the divisions>brigades. Post Gazala period one starts to see the change. Attention to the role of the Div & Corps CRA & the idea of coordinated, rapid large concentrations starts returning. This solidified after the arrival of Montgomery & other senior officers from the UK.
There is possible cross pollination from the French. Their techniques for rapidly massing battalions and larger groups reach back before1937 & possibly the 1920s. French exchange officers were a thing at Ft Sill in the 1920s & 1930s. So, were exchange officers with the Japanese & German armies.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑17 Oct 2021 22:00
Well, yes, GPF, mils, and all that after all. However, the development of massed battalion fires, the creation of the FDC, and then massing of multiple battalion fires, is well documented by Fort Sill, and were initiated by Major Carlos Brewer when he became Director of the Gunnery Department in 1929, and expanded upon by Brewer’s successor Major Orlando Ward. See Boyd Dastrup, "History of the US Army Field Artillery School from Birth to the Eve of World War II: Part I of II", Fires, A Joint Publication for U.S. Artillery Professionals, (January-February 2011), p. 7–11. I also have an unpublished memoir of one of the officers involved in the development under Brewer, while others engaged in the work included Jake Devers and Jay MacKelvie (who was a competent artilleryman but a terrible division commander).
Were they aware of foreign developments in the field? Certainly. Did it have influence on their thinking? Of course.
Which was my point
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑17 Oct 2021 22:00
Were the TTPs developed by Brewer et al British, French, German, or Japanese in origin? No.
Well of course not TTP were unknown in that era, so those gentlemen would not have written any.
Judging from the US Army exchange officers account the lessons from the Japanese artillery of 1920s would be in what not to do.