Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

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Richard Anderson
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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Richard Anderson » 11 Nov 2021 01:11

Cult Icon wrote:
10 Nov 2021 22:29
AETIUS 1980 wrote:
09 Nov 2021 14:48
The staggered arrival of units with training levels far from uniform could not promote the success of such an enterprise in the face of a multitude of bridgeheads having substantial means to adequately postpone the various actions carried out by the Germans.
Normandy 44' Zetterling has dug up information/short unit histories on the GHQ battalions, their arrival dates and other information. I should spend some time reading them but someone with more time than me should do it.
7. AOK had no artillery as Heerestruppen, they were all attached to corps.

LXXXIV. AK had:

ARKO 118 (bo) with E-Battr. 722 and E-Battr. 1./725
ARKO 474 (bo) with s.Art.-Abtl. 989 (attached to 716. Inf-Div) and Art.Regt.-Stab z.b.V. 621 with Art.Abtl. 456 and Art.-Abtl.457 (attached to 91. Inf-Div)

XXV. AK had:
ARKO 115 (bo) with H.Art.-Abtl. 1161 (bo), H.Art.-Abtl. 1162 (bo), H.Art.-Abtl. 1163 (bo)

Under Ob.West as Heerestruppen were various units, some of which made it to Normandy. Note that when these "school" units were mobilized for the front the training capability of the schools effectively disappeared.

Art.-Regt.-Stab z.b.V Suippes with leichte Art.-Abtl. 937 (besp) and H.Art.-Abtl. 1153 (mot) (-) (AKA I./Art.-Schule-Suippes)
Art.-Regt.-Stab z.b.V. Autun with H.Art.-Abtl. 1152 (besp) and 3./H.Art.-Abtl. 1153 (s.F.H.)
s.Art.-Abtl. 628 (mot)

From 15. AOK:
s.Art.-Abtl. 460 (mot)
H.Art.-Abtl. 1151 (mot)

From 19. AOK:
s.Art.Abtl. 992 (t-mot)
H.Art.-Abtl. 1192 (mot)
H.Art.-Abtl. 1193 (mot)
H.Art.-Abtl. 1194 (mot)
H.Art.-Abtl. 1198 (mot)
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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 11 Nov 2021 18:05

AETIUS 1980 wrote:
11 Nov 2021 00:44
This is what led the 352.Inf.Div to take into account part of the coastal sector of the 716.Inf.Div at the end of the month, an area renamed for the occasion K.V. Abschnitt H1 and H2. About the maritime font of Vierville, St Laurent and Colleville sur Mer, we will see the establishment of 2 companies of the II./Gr.Rgt.916 (initially from Gr.Rgt.915, plus two platoons of I./Gr.Rgt.914 on June 4th ), in the middle of 4 companies of I and III./Gr. Rgt.726.
I've gamed the absence of the 352 Div from the Calvados. No surprise it can make a difference. Tho oddly it was still difficult to reach the planned advance of 6th June. That had to do with movement rather than the weak opposition of the remaining defense. Also noticed th game pieces tended t pile up on the beach due to the movement rules. This reminds me of remarks by a couple of field grade officers present that the landing plan for O Beach was to ambitious and 'fast' contributing to the congestion.

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Richard Anderson » 11 Nov 2021 18:53

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
11 Nov 2021 18:05
I've gamed the absence of the 352 Div from the Calvados. No surprise it can make a difference. Tho oddly it was still difficult to reach the planned advance of 6th June. That had to do with movement rather than the weak opposition of the remaining defense. Also noticed th game pieces tended t pile up on the beach due to the movement rules. This reminds me of remarks by a couple of field grade officers present that the landing plan for O Beach was to ambitious and 'fast' contributing to the congestion.
Yes, the Allied assault plan, which was more or less the same on every beach, was abysmal. It assumed so many things that simply had no basis to support them.

The problems really began when the Germans began their beach obstacle construction program in late February and early March. Even though a landing conference in December identified that as the single most problematic thing the Germans could do, little or no thought was given to contingency planning or to modifications to the assault landing schedule.

Instead of stretching out the landing and preceding the main landing with a comprehensive plan to clear the obstacles, the decision was made to create ad hoc clearance units timed to land eight minutes after the initial DD tanks and just two minutes after the initial covering infantry landed. The gapping teams then had between five and twenty-seven minutes to clear their gaps. Add in various serials landing at the wrong place due to the rip currents, loss of control vessels, smoke obscuring landmarks, and simple miss-identification of landmarks and the result, even when German resistance was minimal as on some of the British beaches, was chaos.

The chaos compounded initial errors, such as overloading the assault infantry with so much unnecessary gear as to make them barely capable of a brisk waddle across the beach, as well as the decision to make direct assaults on the strongpoints guarding natural exits from the beaches rather than the areas between the strongpoints, and the results should have been predictable.

Of course, all this urgency had a reason, which was the fears of a German armored counterattack in the initial 48-hours. Thus, the exits had to be seized so as to enable the advance inland of the antitank units that would prepare to repel such an attack. In hindsight it is obvious that, except at SWORD, the possibility of such a German counterattack in less than 72 hours was remote. That was especially true at OMAHA, which was shielded by terrain and the location of the German armored reserves, from any possible south-to-north or west-to-east counterattack. Only west-to-east was practicable, which is why the mission of the 26th Infantry landing on the second tide was to establish a defensive position around Formigny, controlling the N13. Of course, logically, any such German counterattack would also have to get past JUNO and GOLD, which makes the necessity for those actions at OMAHA questionable.

The root problem then may simply have been the over-stylized nature of the Allied planning. Each beach was treated more or less exactly the same as the other with regards to anticipating German reactions, instead of being treated as a separate tactical problem. For example, would it have been better on OMAHA to use the assets scheduled to land the 635th TD Bn (T) on the 2d/3d tides to land additional armor or infantry?
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by stg 44 » 11 Nov 2021 22:45

Richard Anderson wrote:
10 Nov 2021 18:28
stg 44 wrote:
09 Nov 2021 17:29
That was the assault schedule, you're forgetting all the non-assault follow on units that needed the beach time and space to land. If the 1st or 29th division land at Utah or Gold, which other historical division that landed would be displaced?
Why would they be displaced? The problem was not beach space for landing, it was assault landing craft. However, the Follow-On Forces B and L were not landed in assault craft, the LCA, LCVP, LCT-5, and LCT-6, they were landed in LST, LCT-III, and LCT-IV. The only real commonality between the Assault and Follow-On force shipping were the LST and LCI.
Because there was limited beach space and not only reinforcements were to be landed, supplies/replacements/equipment had to be moved in and of course wounded evacuated when possible. Assault landing craft were necessary for assault landings, other vessels could be and were used to move in the rest once the beaches were secured. And again there were already schedules set up for the landing of follow on waves of troops, so who are you displacing from the historical landing schedule? I'm willing to accept even with the weather limitations the extra vessels available due to no V corps landing at Omaha would allow faster landing of men and material on the beaches so the historical schedule of landings could be sped up, but it isn't just the beach space it is also places inland to deploy new units. If Omaha isn't taken and that means Sword/Gold/Juno are more hemmed in than they were historically there may not even be the space to deploy V corps units inland for a while.
Richard Anderson wrote:
10 Nov 2021 18:28
Weather and loss of landing craft prevented landings on time at Gold. Trying to add extra divisions on top of that, especially when the bridgehead area was still restricted and landing divisions had to compete with landing supplies and wounded being shipped out.
I love Wiki. Its like it is the last resort of the perennial what-iffer. The mixing up of source remarks is always entertaining. Yes, the 24th Lanzers and 61st Reconnaissance were due to land on the Second Tide and were delayed, but it had nothing to do with a loss of LCT. They were on American LST, not LCT, and were delayed, but not due to the lack of room on the beach. The 12 LST of the serial bringing in various elements of 8th Armoured Brigade and 50 Division towed five Rhino ferries, which proved problematic in the weather during the crossing. At least one departed tow entirely and all caused problems, slowing the serial. That was not unique to GOLD, but happened on all the beaches.

BTW, 37 LCT were lost and damaged on GOLD, not 34.
So provide a better source that shows the schedule of reinforcement landings and clearing of the beaches if you don't like wikipedia. So far I'm the only one who has bothered to source such.

You claim they weren't delayed due to the beach space, but provide no sources nor alternate explanation for the delay beyond weather, which my source already referenced. So given that weather was the limiting factor even to you then how do you propose speeding up the landings to add extra divisions? You sure type out a lot, but say little relevant to the topic at hand.
Richard Anderson wrote:
10 Nov 2021 18:28
As to Utah the 90th infantry were landing on June 6th-8th
Sigh...I have considerable knowledge about what happened in the 90th Inf Div landings, since I'm writing a book about it right now. :roll: An increment, Groups A and AA, of the division were attached to the 4th Inf Div and constituted part of the Second Tide landing. It was not delayed in landing.

Group A & AA, 90th Inf Div - 1stand 3d Bn, 359th Inf, Det, Co C, 315th Engr C Bn, and Det, Co C, 315th Engr C Bn.

The division was also supposed to land an Advance Detachment to prepare the assembly areas for the arrival of the division and to take over command of Groups A and AA once it completed its assault mission. It was "delayed" in landing because its transport, the Susan B. Anthony, was mined and sunk, not because of any beach congestion.

Advance Detachment - Det, HQ, 90th ID, 90th Signal Co, 359th Inf (- Gp ‘AA’, and ‘A’ att to the 4th Inf Div), Co C, 315th Engr C Bn (-), Co C, 315th Engr C Bn (-), 90th Recn Tp, and Adv Det, 90th Inf Div Arty
Good for you. That doesn't prove your point since not only have you not provided any proof of your claims, just a bunch of units names as if that means anything. Your response is the text equivalent of pointing and shouting 'Hey look over there!'.

Mentioning the second tide though hints at a problem you don't want to grapple with, since it screws up your talking points: the tides limited when things could land on the beach as well.
Richard Anderson wrote:
10 Nov 2021 18:28
The 82nd Airborne were finally relieved by the 90th Infantry Division, who began disembarking at 16:00 on D-Day and were all ashore by June 8.
Nope. The 90th Inf Div did not relieve the 82d A/B Div, it came into line adjacent to it and attacked in concert with it, although parts of the 90th Inf Div artillery did provide fire support for the 82d before the division completed landing.
Semantics.
Richard Anderson wrote:
10 Nov 2021 18:28
BTW, the last elements of the 90th closed in the beachhead on 9 June, not 8 June.
Semantics.
Ok, it took even longer than 2 days to land the entire division. Not helping your argument that you could easily slip in another division on top of the 90th at the same time.
Richard Anderson wrote:
10 Nov 2021 18:28
They were followed by the 9th division:
After being sent to England for further training, the division landed on Utah Beach on 10 June 1944 (D plus 4)
The division landed on 9-10 June. The Division Headquarters opened in the beachhead on 10 June.
Nitpick that does nothing to actually refute the point you're trying to argue against.
Richard Anderson wrote:
10 Nov 2021 18:28
And then were followed by the 79th division:
After training in the United Kingdom from 17 April 1944, the 79th Infantry Division landed on Utah Beach, Normandy, 12–14 June and entered combat 19 June 1944
Gee, was there a five day delay from when the division opened in the beachhead to when it entered combat because of beach congestion?
Beach or lack of room inland to actually deploy it.

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Futurist » 11 Nov 2021 22:53

stg 44 wrote:
08 Nov 2021 23:29
What would the consequences of the landings at Omaha Beach failing? The specific reason why isn't really important, so take your pick either Bradley loses his nerve (he apparently strongly considered calling off the attack after the first waves were largely destroyed) or Kampfgruppe Meyer is correctly routed to the beach instead of chasing phantoms. Let's say the attack is cancelled around 11:30 am. It seems that rerouting the remaining troops of V Corps was not possible for some days due to the tight schedule of landings at the other beaches, so 1st and 29th infantry divisions are effectively out of the battle for a few days. The 352nd division is also locked down defending it's section of the beach, so isn't able to be rerouted either.

How does this impact the rest of the campaign with the Germans holding several dozen miles in between Utah and Gold beaches? For the sake of argument the other beaches play out as they did historically on D-Day up to the cancellation of the Omaha landings.
Somewhat on-topic, but I have a question for you: Why exactly was Omaha Beach much more of a bloodbath for the Western Allies on D-Day in comparison to the four other beaches?

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by stg 44 » 11 Nov 2021 23:04

Futurist wrote:
11 Nov 2021 22:53
stg 44 wrote:
08 Nov 2021 23:29
What would the consequences of the landings at Omaha Beach failing? The specific reason why isn't really important, so take your pick either Bradley loses his nerve (he apparently strongly considered calling off the attack after the first waves were largely destroyed) or Kampfgruppe Meyer is correctly routed to the beach instead of chasing phantoms. Let's say the attack is cancelled around 11:30 am. It seems that rerouting the remaining troops of V Corps was not possible for some days due to the tight schedule of landings at the other beaches, so 1st and 29th infantry divisions are effectively out of the battle for a few days. The 352nd division is also locked down defending it's section of the beach, so isn't able to be rerouted either.

How does this impact the rest of the campaign with the Germans holding several dozen miles in between Utah and Gold beaches? For the sake of argument the other beaches play out as they did historically on D-Day up to the cancellation of the Omaha landings.
Somewhat on-topic, but I have a question for you: Why exactly was Omaha Beach much more of a bloodbath for the Western Allies on D-Day in comparison to the four other beaches?
Better beach defenses than the other beaches, a better division manning the position, failed US bombardment plans. That and the US intel was flawed since they didn't know the beach was defended by the 352nd division, which was thought to be deeper inland as a reserve. They thought they were just dealing with the overstretched 716th coastal division that was also manning the Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches.

Great book on the topic:
https://www.amazon.com/Omaha-Beach-Flaw ... B00CF4FIEW

Likely though if a similar quality division had been manning the Gold/Juno sector it would have likely turned into a bloodbath too. Utah was largely as successful as it was due to the airborne attacks leading to confusion and the very weak defenses in that sector, since apparently the Germans thought the 91st Air Landing division was enough to hold the area when coupled with the flooded fields behind the beaches in case the fortifications failed. Well that and nearly all the principle commanders being away at a war game due to the weather seeming like it would make an invasion impossible (also why Rommel was gone), so when the 91st division's commander tried to return he got ambushed and killed by US airborne troops. Obviously that impaired the response to the invasion.

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Futurist » 11 Nov 2021 23:05

stg 44 wrote:
11 Nov 2021 23:04
Futurist wrote:
11 Nov 2021 22:53
stg 44 wrote:
08 Nov 2021 23:29
What would the consequences of the landings at Omaha Beach failing? The specific reason why isn't really important, so take your pick either Bradley loses his nerve (he apparently strongly considered calling off the attack after the first waves were largely destroyed) or Kampfgruppe Meyer is correctly routed to the beach instead of chasing phantoms. Let's say the attack is cancelled around 11:30 am. It seems that rerouting the remaining troops of V Corps was not possible for some days due to the tight schedule of landings at the other beaches, so 1st and 29th infantry divisions are effectively out of the battle for a few days. The 352nd division is also locked down defending it's section of the beach, so isn't able to be rerouted either.

How does this impact the rest of the campaign with the Germans holding several dozen miles in between Utah and Gold beaches? For the sake of argument the other beaches play out as they did historically on D-Day up to the cancellation of the Omaha landings.
Somewhat on-topic, but I have a question for you: Why exactly was Omaha Beach much more of a bloodbath for the Western Allies on D-Day in comparison to the four other beaches?
Better beach defenses than the other beaches, a better division manning the position, failed US bombardment plans. That and the US intel was flawed since they didn't know the beach was defended by the 352nd division, which was thought to be deeper inland as a reserve. They thought they were just dealing with the overstretched 716th coastal division that was also manning the Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches.

Great book on the topic:
https://www.amazon.com/Omaha-Beach-Flaw ... B00CF4FIEW

Likely though if a similar quality division had been manning the Gold/Juno sector it would have likely turned into a bloodbath too. Utah was largely as successful as it was due to the airborne attacks leading to confusion and the very weak defenses in that sector, since apparently the Germans thought the 91st Air Landing division was enough to hold the area when coupled with the flooded fields behind the beaches in case the fortifications failed. Well that and nearly all the principle commanders being away at a war game due to the weather seeming like it would make an invasion impossible (also why Rommel was gone), so when the 91st division's commander tried to return he got ambushed and killed by US airborne troops. Obviously that impaired the response to the invasion.
Thank you for this information! :)

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Richard Anderson » 12 Nov 2021 01:39

Futurist wrote:
11 Nov 2021 23:05
stg 44 wrote:
11 Nov 2021 23:04
Futurist wrote:
11 Nov 2021 22:53
stg 44 wrote:
08 Nov 2021 23:29
What would the consequences of the landings at Omaha Beach failing? The specific reason why isn't really important, so take your pick either Bradley loses his nerve (he apparently strongly considered calling off the attack after the first waves were largely destroyed) or Kampfgruppe Meyer is correctly routed to the beach instead of chasing phantoms. Let's say the attack is cancelled around 11:30 am. It seems that rerouting the remaining troops of V Corps was not possible for some days due to the tight schedule of landings at the other beaches, so 1st and 29th infantry divisions are effectively out of the battle for a few days. The 352nd division is also locked down defending it's section of the beach, so isn't able to be rerouted either.

How does this impact the rest of the campaign with the Germans holding several dozen miles in between Utah and Gold beaches? For the sake of argument the other beaches play out as they did historically on D-Day up to the cancellation of the Omaha landings.
Somewhat on-topic, but I have a question for you: Why exactly was Omaha Beach much more of a bloodbath for the Western Allies on D-Day in comparison to the four other beaches?
Better beach defenses than the other beaches, a better division manning the position, failed US bombardment plans. That and the US intel was flawed since they didn't know the beach was defended by the 352nd division, which was thought to be deeper inland as a reserve. They thought they were just dealing with the overstretched 716th coastal division that was also manning the Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches.

Great book on the topic:
https://www.amazon.com/Omaha-Beach-Flaw ... B00CF4FIEW

Likely though if a similar quality division had been manning the Gold/Juno sector it would have likely turned into a bloodbath too. Utah was largely as successful as it was due to the airborne attacks leading to confusion and the very weak defenses in that sector, since apparently the Germans thought the 91st Air Landing division was enough to hold the area when coupled with the flooded fields behind the beaches in case the fortifications failed. Well that and nearly all the principle commanders being away at a war game due to the weather seeming like it would make an invasion impossible (also why Rommel was gone), so when the 91st division's commander tried to return he got ambushed and killed by US airborne troops. Obviously that impaired the response to the invasion.
Thank you for this information! :)
Yeah, take it with a grain of salt I'm afraid. For one thing, a "similar quality division" was defending GOLD, the mix between the 352. and 716. Inf-Div defenders wasn't much different.

Nor was the "US bombardment plan" a failure, anymore than on any of the other beaches. The pre-landing naval bombardment was concentrated on know artillery battery positions and did as well as it could.

Nor was "US intel...flawed". The presence of the 352. Inf-Div was discovered, by Allied intelligence, and the information was disseminated to the First US Army and V Corps, but not until shortly before the invasion was launched. For better or worse, it was assessed that the information could not be acted on since it was too late to change plans and it was decided not to disseminate it below the army and corps staff.

91. Inf-Div was deployed in the Cotentin as a result of the German obsession with imagined Allied air landing capabilities under the apparent assumption they should set a fox to catch a fox...its also why 6. FJR was there. Nevertheless, they actually did a pretty poor job in their primary anti-parachute mission.

Major Lewis's book is unfortunately a very dated and flawed analysis. His assumptions and conclusions are almost entirely unsupported by the records. A much better analysis is https://www.amazon.com/Devils-Garden-Ro ... 0811712281

The reason for the events at OMAHA were (in no particular order):

The flawed design of the Allied landing plan, which was followed on all the beaches, but really came home to roost on OMAHA.
The terrain. Possibly the most important factor.
The rip currents offshore. UTAH was actually as much a success as it was not because of the actions by the 101st A/B Division to secure the causeways, but because of the rip currents in this case...and the loss of both a primary and secondary control boat at am opportune time. It resulted in the landings occurring about 1500 yards south of where it was intended, which took the landing force away from the major intact Stutzpunkte in the area. Add in the excellent bombing by the 9th AF Mediums and the result was very different.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Futurist » 12 Nov 2021 01:39

Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Nov 2021 01:39
Add in the excellent bombing by the 9th AF Mediums and the result was very different.
Can you elaborate, please?

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Richard Anderson » 12 Nov 2021 01:57

stg 44 wrote:
11 Nov 2021 22:45
Because there was limited beach space and not only reinforcements were to be landed, supplies/replacements/equipment had to be moved in and of course wounded evacuated when possible. Assault landing craft were necessary for assault landings, other vessels could be and were used to move in the rest once the beaches were secured. And again there were already schedules set up for the landing of follow on waves of troops, so who are you displacing from the historical landing schedule? I'm willing to accept even with the weather limitations the extra vessels available due to no V corps landing at Omaha would allow faster landing of men and material on the beaches so the historical schedule of landings could be sped up, but it isn't just the beach space it is also places inland to deploy new units. If Omaha isn't taken and that means Sword/Gold/Juno are more hemmed in than they were historically there may not even be the space to deploy V corps units inland for a while.
Damn but you're a hoot. Have you actually read ANY of the primary source documentation on this subject?

There was no "schedule" beyond the timing of the assault on the "first tide". The 2d and 3d tide forces were "scheduled" to land then, at the turn of the tide, on order. Ditto the Follow-On Force B and L. The actual orders were to "land designated Army Troops on Vierville-Colleville (OMAHA) beaches (6491 to 6983} as directed by Commander Assault Force "O" [CG V Corps] and in a accordance with plan of landing developed by the Commanding General concerned. Be prepared to land in. emergency assault on either OMAHA or UTAH beaches." (OPERATION PLAN NO. 2-44 OF THE WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE, ALLIED NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE SHORT TITLE "ON WEST TWO", since we're playing the sources game. I've also used the operations plans of the Eastern Naval Task Force, as well as the plans made by V Corps, First US Army, Forces "U", "G", and "S", as well as the AAR for the same in my analysis.
So provide a better source that shows the schedule of reinforcement landings and clearing of the beaches if you don't like wikipedia. So far I'm the only one who has bothered to source such.
Just gave it to you Jack. Would you like the complete bibliography?

Sources

Primary
Allied Landing Craft of World War II (originally published in 1944 with a subsequent
supplement as ON1226-Allied Landing Craft and Ships), Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, reprint 1985.
Army Operational Research Group. Report No. 16, Air and Ground Support in the
Assault of Boulogne.
________. Report No. 261 Casualties and Effects of Fire Support on the British Beaches
at Normandy, 21 April 1945.
________. Report No. 292, Comparison of British and American Areas in Normandy in
terms of Fire Support and its Effects. 14 August 1945.
Canadian Section, General Headquarters, 2nd Echelon. 99/15/STATS/1/A3, Casualties-
Enemy Action.
Canadian Army Headquarters (AHQ). Report No. 40, The Campaign In North-West
Europe, Information From German Sources. 28 April 1951.
________. Report No. 41, The German Defences in the Courseulles-St. Aubin Area of the
Normandy Coast. 20 July 1951.
________. Report No. 42, The Preliminary Planning For Operation “OVERLORD”:
Some Aspects of the Preparations for an Allied Re-entry to North-West Europe,
1940-1944. 5 March 1952.
________. No. 54, The Assault and Subsequent Operations of 3 Cde Inf Div and 2 Cdn
Armd Bde, 6-30 June. 30 June 1952.
Canadian Military Engineers. Customs and Traditions of the CME. A-JS-007-003/JD-
001, Annex A – Canadian Military Engineer Memorials, n.d.
Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ). Report No. 147. The Assault and subsequent
Operations of 3 Cdn Inf Div and 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 6-30 Jun 44. 3 December
1945.
Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe. The Invasion of Normandy, Operation
NEPTUNE, Administrative History, United States Naval Forces in Europe 1940-
1946. Vol. V, London: n.p., n.d.
Commonwealth War Graves Commission, http://www.cwgc.org/
The London Gazette, various.
The National Archives (UK):
ADM 179/458. Western Task Force, 1944 Mar-May.
ADM 179/504. Operation “NEPTUNE”, Report by Naval Commander, Eastern
Task Force, Enclosure “C”, Report of Proceedings of Force “S”.
ADM 179/505. Operation “NEPTUNE”, Report of the Naval Commander,
Eastern Task Force, Enclosure “D”, Report of Proceedings of Force
“G”.
ADM 179/506. Operation “NEPTUNE”, Report by Naval Commander, Eastern
Task Force, Enclosure “E”, Report of Proceedings of Force “J”.
AVIA 22/456. Armoured fighting vehicles: conversions and modifications, 1942-
1945.
AVIA 22/469. Armoured fighting vehicles: monthly returns of deliveries, 1939-
1941.
AVIA 22/576. Blacker Bombard (297 mm Spigot-Mortar) weapon: requirements,
1941-1943.
AVIA 22/511-514. Monthly Statistical Summaries nos. 1-46, 1942-1946.
AVIA 22/515-519. Statistical Summaries nos. 1-16 and Statistical Abstract,
December 1940-1945.
DEFE 2/40. War Diary, No. 4 Commando.
WO 162/297. Dieppe Casualties, 28 August 1942
WO171/102. 21 Army Group G.S., January-April 1944.
WO 171/155. Appendix ‘A’ to R.A. Branch Headquarters 21st Army Group War
Diary May 1944.
WO 171/234. Second Army R.A. Landing Tables.
WO 171/863. Staffordshire Yeomanry War Diary, Jan.-Dec. 1944.
WO 171/864. 2 County of London Yeomanry (Westminster Dragoons), Jun.-Dec.
1944.
WO 171/1797. No. 1 Assault Brigade War Diary, June-December 1944.
WO 171/1800. No. 5 Assault Regiment War Diary, June-December 1944.
WO 179/409. 3rd British Infantry Division, Operation Order No. 1, OVERLORD,
14 May 1944.
WO 205/405. 21st Army Group G (Operations), August, September 1944.
WO 205/636. A.F.V. States, Summaries at HQ 21 Army Group, June-July.
WO 205/1120. Report by Brig. Watkinson on Work of Assault RE in the Invasion.
WO 205/1159. 79 Armoured Division Final Report, 1943 Apr.-1945 July.
WO 205/1160. The Story of the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers, 1943-1945.
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Knock yourself out dude, spend the 20-odd years I've spent going through the documentation, primary and secondary, and then get back to me. In the meantime, forgive me if I treat you like you don't know what you're talking about, because you don't.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Richard Anderson » 12 Nov 2021 02:05

Futurist wrote:
12 Nov 2021 01:39
Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Nov 2021 01:39
Add in the excellent bombing by the 9th AF Mediums and the result was very different.
Can you elaborate, please?
Unlike OMAHA, GOLD, JUNO, and SWORD, where the aerial "beach drenching" was done by the Eighth Air Force, UTAH was struck by the medium bombers of Ninth Air Force, bombing visually below the cloud deck. While not perfect, the did nicely bracket WN 5, which is where the UTAH assault force was about to land. To quote from my book on the subject.
A few minutes before the first assault troops landed 277 B-26 Medium Bombers of the Ninth Air Force dropped a total of 4,414 250-lb. instantaneous-fused bombs with devastating accuracy on top of WN 5.
And, since we're playing the "sources" game, I referenced that from NARA RG 498, ETOUSA Historical Division Files, Box 73, Folder 359A, Notes on UTAH Beach and the 1st Engineer Special Brigade (compiled 20 October-7 November 1944), p. 58, although the assessment appears also in the Ninth Air Force Invasion Activities, Balkowski's excellent UTAH Beach, Cross-Channel Attack, and any number of other sources, so it isn't too much of a secret.
Last edited by Richard Anderson on 12 Nov 2021 02:13, edited 2 times in total.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Futurist » 12 Nov 2021 02:09

Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Nov 2021 02:05
Futurist wrote:
12 Nov 2021 01:39
Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Nov 2021 01:39
Add in the excellent bombing by the 9th AF Mediums and the result was very different.
Can you elaborate, please?
Unlike OMAHA, GOLD, JUNO, and SWORD, where the aerial "beach drenching" was done by the Eighth Air Force, UTAH was struck by the medium bombers of Ninth Air Force, bombing visually below the cloud deck. While not perfect, the did nicely bracket WN 5, which is where the UTAH assault force was about to land. To quote from my book on the subject.
A few minutes before the first assault troops landed 277 B-26 Medium Bombers of the Ninth Air Force dropped a total of 4,414 250-lb. instantaneous-fused bombs with devastating accuracy on top of WN 5.
And, since we're playing the :sources: game, I referenced that from NARA RG 498, ETOUSA Historical Division Files, Box 73, Folder 359A, Notes on UTAH Beach and the 1st Engineer Special Brigade (compiled 20 October-7 November 1944), p. 58, although the assessment appears also in the Ninth Air Force Invasion Activities, Balkowski's excellent UTAH Beach, Cross-Channel Attack, and any number of other sources, so it isn't tpoo much of a secret.
Thanks for this information, Richard! :)

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Richard Anderson » 12 Nov 2021 02:13

You're welcome.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by stg 44 » 12 Nov 2021 02:29

Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Nov 2021 01:39
Nor was the "US bombardment plan" a failure, anymore than on any of the other beaches. The pre-landing naval bombardment was concentrated on know artillery battery positions and did as well as it could.
Did you even read Zaloga's book? The first thing he cites is the same as Lewis: failure of the fire support plan. Next was the firepower of the defenders. Exactly as I said and as covered in Lewis' book.
Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Nov 2021 01:39
Major Lewis's book is unfortunately a very dated and flawed analysis. His assumptions and conclusions are almost entirely unsupported by the records. A much better analysis is https://www.amazon.com/Devils-Garden-Ro ... 0811712281
Nonsense if you've actually read both you'd know they say basically the same thing. I have both and read them before you mentioned either and they cover much the same ground. Zaloga rips off a substantial portion of what Lewis said in his earlier book.

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by stg 44 » 12 Nov 2021 02:36

Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Nov 2021 01:57
There was no "schedule" beyond the timing of the assault on the "first tide". The 2d and 3d tide forces were "scheduled" to land then, at the turn of the tide, on order. Ditto the Follow-On Force B and L.
The second second sentence undermines the first.
Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Nov 2021 01:57
The actual orders were to "land designated Army Troops on Vierville-Colleville (OMAHA) beaches (6491 to 6983} as directed by Commander Assault Force "O" [CG V Corps] and in a accordance with plan of landing developed by the Commanding General concerned. Be prepared to land in. emergency assault on either OMAHA or UTAH beaches." (OPERATION PLAN NO. 2-44 OF THE WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE, ALLIED NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE SHORT TITLE "ON WEST TWO", since we're playing the sources game. I've also used the operations plans of the Eastern Naval Task Force, as well as the plans made by V Corps, First US Army, Forces "U", "G", and "S", as well as the AAR for the same in my analysis.
Again, none of that actually addresses the point that divisions which landed following the initial assault divisions took several days to arrive in bulk and arrived sequentially. At no point have you demonstrated that it was possible to actually landing more than a single division at once, let alone a redirected division from Omaha.
Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Nov 2021 01:57
Damn but you're a hoot. Have you actually read ANY of the primary source documentation on this subject?

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______¬_. Box XXXXX, 304-1.3, 4th Infantry Division G-1 Journal File, June
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Knock yourself out dude, spend the 20-odd years I've spent going through the documentation, primary and secondary, and then get back to me. In the meantime, forgive me if I treat you like you don't know what you're talking about, because you don't.
I see you're up to your old debate tactics of throw out a bunch of unrelated titles and hope that distract from the actual argument.
Quote something from a couple of sources that supports your specific point rather than giving me a laundry list of titles of things that doesn't remotely deal with the specific question.
Last edited by stg 44 on 12 Nov 2021 13:52, edited 1 time in total.

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