What if Crete had held out?

[ljadw]

It would take months to transfer RAF squadrons and army units to the Middle East,it would also be an additional burden for the Navy and the Merchant Fleet and, how to supply tens of thousands of men in Crete ?
Every month thousands of men and thousands of tons of supplies left the UK for the ME, for North Africa and for the Far East .
I doubt that it would be possible to transport thousands of men and thousands of tons of supplies to Crete .
About the 8 AF: If I am not wrong, she was not operational in 1942. Besides, I doubt that Washington would agree with the transfer of 8 AF to the Balkans .
And, what would be the utility of Crete for Britain ?The same for the utility of the Balkans .

[Carl Schwamberger]

Was Hitler convinced by the man who never was ?

Yeah, okay, even as I was typing that I was wondering if I was being too specific, but somebody sure put a lot of stuff into the Balkans that would have been better placed in Italian territory in 1943.

Holt in his 800+ page of the deception operations 'The Decievers'. identifies a large package of deception ops aimed at the Balkans. Those were connected to the ongoing SOE ops & support of partisan ops in the Balkans, and the German concern about keeping mining operations and the Danube river traffic secure.

A side note is the Deception committee & their staff made much use of the Bletchley Park ULTRA information. They trawled through messages originating with OKW and other top HQ for connections to the false information they were planting. They used that to refine the deception plans and cater to German or rather Hitlers fears and try to compound those.

[Carl Schwamberger]

About the 8 AF: If I am not wrong, she was not operational in 1942.

That was originally stood up in the UK February 1942. For that year it was mostly involved in planning, setting up the airbase infrastructure, and conducting small raids into France and Belgium. In January 1944 all the US air forces in the UK were reorganized & there was a considerable shuffling of staff and commanders.

Besides, I doubt that Washington would agree with the transfer of 8 AF to the Balkans .
And, what would be the utility of Crete for Britain ?The same for the utility of the Balkans .

Quite right. since other US air forces were stood up in the MTO. The earliest was the Halverson Project. In early 1942 a group of B24 bombers were sent to Egypt & with British support were sent of a test raid on Ploesti 11 June 1942. 13 bomber were launched & four were lost, interned in Turkey after they made emergency landings there. Subsequently the HALPRO Group was expanded to the 1st Provisional Bombardment Group with a B17 group added. Then the 376 Heavy Bombardment Group. In 1942 this mix bag flew 450 more sorties vs Axis targets in Lybia and Italian navy bases. These were part of the British operations in the Med.

Col Halversons command was designated the USAMEAF & Bereton assumed command. In November 1942 the HQ US 9th AF was moved from the US to Egypt and replaced USAMEAF. Aircraft continued to flay in from the US, or arrive crated on cargo ships. At the end of 1942 9th AF strength stood at 370 aircraft of all types, based in Egypt & Lybia. In August 1943 the 9th AF was amalgamated with the 12th & 15th AF & select command personnel along with the flag were transferred to England.

On 22 August 1943 the following groups were transferred from the Ninth Air Force to the Twelfth Air Force:

12th Bombardment Group (Medium) at Gerbini, Sicily with B-25s
57th Fighter Group on Sicily with P-40s
79th Fighter Group on Sicily with P-40s
324th Fighter Group at El Haouaria, Tunisia with P-40s and
340th Bombardment Group (Medium) at Comiso, Sicily with B-25s

Twelfth AF was stood up in Algeria 9 November 1942 under Maj Gen Dolittle. Air Grpis fly with the 12th 1942-43 included:

Arrow 12th Bombardment Group
17th Bombardment Group
27th Fighter Group
310th Bombardment Group
319th Bombardment Group
320th Bombardment Group
321st Bombardment Group
324th Fighter Group
340th Bombardment Group
3rd Reconnaissance Group
42d Bombardment Wing
57th Bombardment Wing
57th Fighter Group
64th Troop Carrier Group
79th Fighter Group
86th Fighter Group
87th Fighter Group
87th Fighter Wing
XII Bomber Command
XII Tactical Air Command
XXII Tactical Air Command

The 15th AF stood up 1 November 1943 under Maj General Doolittle. The Fifteenth Air Force drew its operational forces from heavy bombers of the IX Bomber Command, the strategic bomber command of the Ninth Air Force and by a diversion of groups originally intended for the Eighth Air Force.

Note bolded line. This was somewhat controversial within Hap Arnolds staff & elsewhere in the US senior command. A trade off between striking at German mostly from the UK and weakly from the south, or more evenly from two directions.

What all this shows is there was some US air strength in the MTO in 1942 and a fairly strong presence in 1943. It is not necessary to 'base' heavy bombers in Crete. Those based in Africa could be stage through Crete airfields when long range raids in the Balkans were planned. That was a common procedure during the war elsewhere where very long range missions were flown. Fighter groups & perhaps some medium bomber groups would be permanently based on Crete, as well as some reconissane and maritime operations air units.

[Kingfish]

The most difficult thing, I fear, would have been prying offensive aircraft (bombers) away from Harris. The very thing that would have made Crete most valuable would have been the hardest to get, politically.

Valuable in what sense?
Aside from Ploesti what other target of strategic importance would justify basing a bomber force on Crete?

[ljadw]

Was Hitler convinced by the man who never was ?

Yeah, okay, even as I was typing that I was wondering if I was being too specific, but somebody sure put a lot of stuff into the Balkans that would have been better placed in Italian territory in 1943.

The question remains :WHY did the Germans put a lot of stuff in the Balkans that would have been better placed in Italy in 1943 ,followed by the question :would it had made a difference if this stuff had been placed in Italy ?
On the first question one can answer that the Balkans (which is here Greece and Yugoslavia )were vulnerable to the partisans and that a successful allied landing would have bad results for the German relations with Turkey and the imports of chrome from Turkey .
On the second question : I don't know the answer , no one does, but, IMO, it is doubtful that it would have made a difference ,given the allied superiority .

[AnchorSteam]

The most difficult thing, I fear, would have been prying offensive aircraft (bombers) away from Harris. The very thing that would have made Crete most valuable would have been the hardest to get, politically.

Valuable in what sense?
Aside from Ploesti what other target of strategic importance would justify basing a bomber force on Crete?

Trade arteries connecting the 3rd Reich with Turkey come to mind, both rail and shipping. I recall that Turkey was under a lot of pressure from the Allies to cut off the Chrome and other strategic materials. Striking at Railways in Bulgaria or ports in Greece would have been a major temptation.
Several Balkan countries have significant reserves of copper, lead, zinc, chromite, manganese, magnesite, and bauxite.
Bombing the cities of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia would have severaly shaken the morale' of those minor axis allies.... or that is probably an argument that would have been made at the time.

[AnchorSteam]

Was Hitler convinced by the man who never was ?

Yeah, okay, even as I was typing that I was wondering if I was being too specific, but somebody sure put a lot of stuff into the Balkans that would have been better placed in Italian territory in 1943.

The question remains :WHY did the Germans put a lot of stuff in the Balkans that would have been better placed in Italy in 1943 ,followed by the question :would it had made a difference if this stuff had been placed in Italy ?
On the first question one can answer that the Balkans (which is here Greece and Yugoslavia )were vulnerable to the partisans and that a successful allied landing would have bad results for the German relations with Turkey and the imports of chrome from Turkey .
On the second question : I don't know the answer , no one does, but, IMO, it is doubtful that it would have made a difference ,given the allied superiority .

Well, even in a small scale, an island-hoping campaign up the Aegean (sort of a miniature version of the Pacific war) could have been interesting, and it would not have taken much to pull it off. The only major German naval unit in the area was the repaired Destroyer Hermes (I think?) and that was not available until 1943.
However, the swift German reaction to the Italian surrender and their counter-attack to British landings during that same year does give one pause....

One thing seems certain; with Crete the UK would not have needed help from Carriers to seal the Aegean off from the rest of the Med.

[EwenS]

Britain didn’t have carriers “to seal the Aegean off from the rest of the Med” after the Battle for Crete anyway.

Eagle was withdrawn to the Indian Ocean in April 1941. Formidable was bombed and put out of action on 26th May, right at the start of the Crete battle, and had to be sent for repairs in the USA. In mid 1943 she returned to Alexandria for 3 months to cover convoys from Egypt for Operation Husky and took a single swipe at Crete in the process.

The next time carriers deployed operationally to the eastern Med (other than on transit to the Suez Canal and the Far East) was in Sept / Oct 1944 for Operation Outing I & II which involved 7 escort carriers in strikes around the Aegean. This was when the Germans were withdrawing from Greece.

[Carl Schwamberger]

The most difficult thing, I fear, would have been prying offensive aircraft (bombers) away from Harris. The very thing that would have made Crete most valuable would have been the hardest to get, politically.

Valuable in what sense?
Aside from Ploesti what other target of strategic importance would justify basing a bomber force on Crete?

Trade arteries connecting the 3rd Reich with Turkey come to mind, both rail and shipping. I recall that Turkey was under a lot of pressure from the Allies to cut off the Chrome and other strategic materials. Striking at Railways in Bulgaria or ports in Greece would have been a major temptation.
Several Balkan countries have significant reserves of copper, lead, zinc, chromite, manganese, magnesite, and bauxite.
Bombing the cities of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia would have severaly shaken the morale' of those minor axis allies.... or that is probably an argument that would have been made at the time.

Judging from the relative success of anti transportation campaigns elsewhere, sea lanes to Tunisia, Op STRANGLE in Northern Italy, the Transportation Plan in NW Europe, Op CLARION & others in Germany 1945, it would make sense to do this in the Balkans. The railway net is thin, bridges fewer, river barges time & resouce consuming to replace. Disrupting the movement of Rumanian oil, Turkish Wolfram, Balkan Manganese & Chromite supports the Allied cause better than dehousing German civilians. It also aids the Partisans of the region & weakens German defense against Allied conventional forces.

... Would Bomber Harris have even been interested in Ploesti, or brush it off as a "panacea" as he later did when asked about concentrating on oil?

Success in the Balkans at transportation & oil attacks might have led to Harris being told to stuff it. He argued against handing over two or three dozen VLR bombers to Coastal command & lost that one in early 43. If early raids enabled by possession of Crete show results in 1942 & early 43 Harris might be told to shut up a follow orders transferring support echelon and air strength to the MTO.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Well, even in a small scale, an island-hoping campaign up the Aegean (sort of a miniature version of the Pacific war) could have been interesting, and it would not have taken much to pull it off. The only major German naval unit in the area was the repaired Destroyer Hermes (I think?) and that was not available until 1943.
However, the swift German reaction to the Italian surrender and their counter-attack to British landings during that same year does give one pause....

Reduce or avoid the Italian campaign provides the resources. The down side is it encourages Churchill to mark up his maps with yet more blue crayon arrows for fantastical ground campaigns. Avoid that & it helps Allied deception ops directing Hitlers attention to the Balkans.

[Sheldrake]

Here are a couple of possible outcomes:

1. Safety for Egypt. Allied occupation of Crete would protect the Libya and Egyptian coast and offshore. This would hinder axis attempts to invade Egypt.



If the Allies hold Crete it is likely that there would have been a series of allied operations in the Balkans, perhaps diversions: perhaps not.

1 Why would British occupation of Crete protect Libya and Egypt ?
One can easily argue the opposite :the occupation of Crete would demand additional forces,who were needed in Libya .
2 Not likely, but maybe and IMHO unlikely : where would Britain get the forces for operations in the Balkans ?

Crete was a base for German aircraft to operate against Libya and Egypt and shipping in the Eastern Mediteranean.
The British were sufficiently peed off with the Ju88s operating from Crete to mount a special forces operation against Heraklion.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Albumen
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joachim_Helbig

Churchill looking at manpower statistics for the Middle East saw a huge number of soldiers compared to a small number of fighting troops. As far as he was concerned there was a huge manpower reserve in the Middle East. Churchill and Hitler's interest in the Balkans was not shared by Roosevelt or the US Chiefs of Staff, which would have limited any offensive operations by the Allies.

The British operations against Rhodes and the Deodecanese Islands largely foundered through the logistic and operational difficulties of projecting airpower from Cyprus. It would have been much easier to support from Crete. I do not think it would have altered the outcome of WW2. I doubt if the Turks would have been any readier to get involved.

[Fatboy Coxy]

Retaining Crete would be a massive boost to the British in 1941-42, I do see it acting as a kind of shield for Egypt, but more importantly, the resupply to Malta becomes a bit easier, abet, all those supplies have still got to be shipped down and around the cape. Re its garrison, well you don't have to garrison Cyprus as heavily, so a lot of that could go to Crete. And for that matter, maybe defensive forces provided for Alexandria, the Palestine and Lebanon coasts may be reduced too. I don't see British submarine operations being changed by much though.

Regarding using it as an offensive platform, I simply don't see the British having the resources to do much in 1941-42, so maritime strike operations only for Italian supply convoys to North Africa. Come 1943, then things would change, with interdiction of Axis supply routes, and a USAAF build up to target Ploesti. A major problem with the maintenance of forces in Crete however, is all their useful ports are on the northern side of the island.

Would the Luftwaffe mount air campaigns over Crete in 1941-42? I suppose that's answered by how much trouble is it giving them, ie its offensive operations, which if limited, would suggest to me that the area may become a bit of a backwater, and certainly not a hotly contested one.

The other things that are thrown up from retaining Crete, and I'm sure have been discussed before are, the saving of 12,000 Allied troops from being POWs, a recruiting base for the Greek army, and what loss of RN ships are there, presumably with no evacuation, the Mediterranean Fleet isn't bled badly, a help going forward

And lastly, how does this fair for the operational use of large numbers of paratroopers for all nations going forward.

[Cantankerous]

Here are a couple of possible outcomes:

1. Safety for Egypt. Allied occupation of Crete would protect the Libya and Egyptian coast and offshore. This would hinder axis attempts to invade Egypt.



If the Allies hold Crete it is likely that there would have been a series of allied operations in the Balkans, perhaps diversions: perhaps not.

1 Why would British occupation of Crete protect Libya and Egypt ?
One can easily argue the opposite :the occupation of Crete would demand additional forces,who were needed in Libya .

Libya was a colony of Italy for 30 years when the Germans began preparing for the invasion of Crete, so the Royal Air Force could have sent warplanes from airbases in Egypt to shoot down Luftwaffe planes which set out to attack Royal Navy warships. It could have been easier for the British to help Crete defend itself from an Axis invasion if Hitler had chosen not to invade the Balkans and the Regia Aeronautica had dispatched combat aircraft from airbases in Libya to attack British bases in Crete just because Mussolini agreed with the Roman emperors that the Mediterranean Sea was the domain of Italy.

[ljadw]

Here are a couple of possible outcomes:

1. Safety for Egypt. Allied occupation of Crete would protect the Libya and Egyptian coast and offshore. This would hinder axis attempts to invade Egypt.



If the Allies hold Crete it is likely that there would have been a series of allied operations in the Balkans, perhaps diversions: perhaps not.

1 Why would British occupation of Crete protect Libya and Egypt ?
One can easily argue the opposite :the occupation of Crete would demand additional forces,who were needed in Libya .

Libya was a colony of Italy for 30 years when the Germans began preparing for the invasion of Crete, so the Royal Air Force could have sent warplanes from airbases in Egypt to shoot down Luftwaffe planes which set out to attack Royal Navy warships. It could have been easier for the British to help Crete defend itself from an Axis invasion if Hitler had chosen not to invade the Balkans and the Regia Aeronautica had dispatched combat aircraft from airbases in Libya to attack British bases in Crete just because Mussolini agreed with the Roman emperors that the Mediterranean Sea was the domain of Italy.

The RAF could and did sent aircraft to shoot down LW aircraft,without the a British occupation of Crete .
And without a German invasion of the Balkans,there was no need for Britain to defend Crete .
There is also no proof that Italy intended to /had the strength to attack bases in Crete ,Greek bases,as there would not be British bases in Crete if there was no German invasion of Greece .
If the Germans occupied Greece , Britain could not hold Crete.
If the Germans did not invade Greece, there was no reason for Britain to send forces to Greece/Crete .
I like also to see the number of RN ships attacked by LW aircraft starting from Crete .