Peter89 wrote:So the trick is whether the Brits could either hold their ground, which I think is unlikely, or counterattack effectively before the naval reinforcements would arrive.
I'm throwing out the possibility of a British counter from Malta only to be aware of possible contingencies - I just don't see how it could happen. Any amphibious capability would have to built up; this would be identified ("hey there's landing craft in the Grand Harbor") and interdicted/defeated.
Why do you assume there's a lag between naval and air forces? I'd expect near-simultaneous air/sea assault. Meanwhile the RM and LW are blasting at Malta, seeking to prevent the island's mobile artillery from redeploying to fire on the gathering Axis forces. If the landing is in February/March as I suggest then Force K is still around to sortie. But that seems a momentary annoyance to the concentrated RM and LW.
I see the most difficult Axis period being after the departure of the RM's main body: It's probably infeasible to land and place sufficient artillery to dominate Malta in the few days that RM can stick around. That means the Axis takes the worse of an attritional artillery dual for a week or so, which seems tolerable given the strategic stakes.
Peter89 wrote:As for the runway, it is a stupid idea, because a few well-placed artillery shells would destroy any Axis aircraft.
Nobody likes this idea.
...nonetheless I'm not willing to surrender quite yet.
The airfield is, to repeat, not a base with planes lined up around it at all times. It's a place for planes damaged over Malta to land, and for fighters to pick up enough fuel for the 60 mile hop back to Sicily (after an extended dwell over Malta enabled by the airfield).
As it's situated outside of Malta's line of sight, and only used when Axis is exercising aerial dominance over Malta, there's no way for Malta's gunners to spot shellfire on a few planes briefly stopping by. If the garrison wants to use its scarce shell supply on low-probability blind firing against an area target, that alone might justify building the airfield.
As you can see, the benefit I envision from this airfield is a very small element of the Gozo plan so feel free to ignore it. Or to rebut my above suppositions regarding its vulnerability.