TMP Overall; German Options

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
paulrward
Member
Posts: 573
Joined: 10 Dec 2008 20:14

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by paulrward » 02 Jun 2022 23:30

Hello All :

Perhaps the solution to these problems is not so difficult after all......
by Huszar666 » 01 Jun 2022 10:52
4, to get Spain into the war, you would need a few clearly defined pre-requisites:
a, secure coal supply. Easiest, THAT Germany could have done without (much) of a problem
b, secure food supply. Not so easy, OTL it was done by plundering France and American imports.
c, secure oil supply. Very hard. The most convinient source would be... Iraq. For that, Germany
would have to take the Middle East (technically possible).
d, the Axis clearly on their way to win the war.

Spain would only enter the war, if ALL of points a-d were completed (in my ATL, around late 1941)
Not necessarily. In fact, Historically ( which will make our Historian happy ! ) Franco offered to join the
Axis, making contact with the German Government in Berlin on June 16th, 1940, and again on June 18th.
Franco wanted some significant concessions, which Hitler was unwilling to grant. However, as a very
wise man once said, ' LIfe is a Negotiation '. If Hitler were to supply Coal from the Ruhr, and some
Oil from Rumania, as well as forgiving the Spanish War Debt to Germany ( and get Mussolini to forgive
the debt to Italy ), as well as promising German assistance in helping Spain re-take Gibralter, it might
be enough to bring El Caudillo into the Axis Bullpen. And, while Spain might not be a Cy Young winner,
it was certainly a journeyman reliever, able to provide a few innings of good pitches.

by Huszar666 » 01 Jun 2022 10:52
5, to get Turkey into the war, you would need:
a, German-Italian troops in the Middle East
b, the axis clearly in their way to win the war.

In my rather conservative OTL that would be in late summer 1942 (and with Spain AND Turkey
in the war, that would also mean an active participation of Vichy-France)

Not Necessarily..... After The Great War, the Turks were VERY pissed off at having their Ottoman pulled
out from under them. A German promise to restore the Ottoman Empire, along with some parts of the
Southern USSR ( like, for example, those parts that were inhabited by ethnic Moslem majorities, ) might
be enough to get the Turks into the war after the start of Barbarrossa. A Turkish Army of about 100,000,
mostly infantry with some field artillery, cavalry, and some limited air support would certainly give
Stalin a pain in his Baku Region....... In return for their help, Turkey might end up with Syria, Lebanon,
Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and possibly Iran as well.


#15 by Richard Anderson » 02 Jun 2022 13:44
It's simple. TMP was just going to violate the French Armistice and put the 1+ million
French PW into forced labor. No Problem.

It's amazing how little History some people remember..... I call the attention of the Forum to the
events of July 3rd through the 7th, 1940. When the British Navy, without cause or provocation, cold
bloodedly attacked the French Navy at Mers-el-Kebir, sinking a battleship and slaughtering nearly 1300
French Sailors.

As a result of this gruesome example of Churchill's honor and loyalty,

" ......The British Empire and the French Republic, linked together in their cause and
in their need, will defend to the death their native soil, aiding each other like good comrades
to the utmost of their strength......"


the New French Government, under Petain, formally severed all relations with Britain on July 7th,
and handed over all British personnel then interned in France to the Germans.

In fact, it would have taken only a gentle push on the part of Berlin to have brought France into
the Axis on that date. The Massacre at Mers-el-Kebir is STILL an open wound with the people of
France. I can see an Aged but Angry Petain, who was a Rightist, joining with the Axis against a
Perfidious Albion to redeem the Honor of France in the Tradition of the Blessed St. Joan and
the Glorious Emperor Napolean !

This would mean that ALL of the French industrial complex, and the entire remaining French
Army and Air Force would join the Axis. And, the French industry was nothing to be sneezed
at. Michelin, Hispano Suiza, Dewoitine, Renault.... the list goes on - big factories, lots
of machine tools, ALL of which could go right back into production of French War equipment
that could be adapted to serve as second line equipment for the Heer -


And, if Vichy France had entered the Axis, along with Spain, it would have been a simple process
for the combined Italian Fleet and the remnants of the French Fleet ( three repaired battleships
and some cruisers and destroyers ), along with the Spanish Army, and some air units from Italy,
to overwhelm the garrison at Gibralter, and seal off the Western end of the Med. If Mussolini
then moves his fleet to the western side of Italy, there might be no Taranto..... And Spanish
naval bases re-supplying U-boats for the Atlantic would mean that they would have safe havens
out of range of the RAF bomber command, and be able to transit into and out of the Med out of
range of Coastal Command.

A Siege of Malta would follow, and it is possible that by the end of 1940, the Western Mediterranean
might be well on the way to becoming Mare Romanum....


#10 by Richard Anderson » 01 Jun 2022 13:04
Yes, only prescience is required.

Prescience is NOT normally part of the Skill Set for the average Historian - they spend their entire
lives looking Backwards at the Past, not looking Forward into the Future.....


In the Modern Classic Movie, Margin Call, Jeremy Irons portrays John Tuld , the CEO of a major Wall
Street Investment Bank that is heavily over-leveraged with Mortgage Backed Securities, right before
the Wall Street Meltdown of 2007-2008. There is a late night meeting with the Senior Partners of the
Firm, in which a Junior Analyst, Peter Sullivan, informs the Corporate Management that the entire
Real Estate Market is about to crater, and that this would wipe out the entire Firm. ( This is exactly
what happened to Lehman Brothers.... )

The following exchange takes place :

John Tuld: So, what you're telling me, is that the Music is about to stop, and we're going
to be left holding the biggest bag of odorous excrement ever assembled in the history
of ........ Capitalism.

Peter Sullivan: Sir, I not sure that I would put it that way, but let me clarify using your
analogy. What this model shows is the Music, so to speak, just slowing. If the Music were to
stop, as you put it, then this model wouldn't even be close to that scenario. It would be
considerably worse......

John Tuld: Let me tell you something, Mr. Sullivan. Do you care to know why I'm in
this chair with you all? I mean, why I earn the big bucks ?

Peter Sullivan: Yes.

John Tuld: I'm here for one reason and one reason alone. I'm here to guess what the Music
might do a week, a month, a year from now. That's it. Nothing more. And standing here
tonight, I'm afraid that I.... don't....... hear......a.....thing..... Just....... Silence.............

And John Tuld then gives orders for his Firm to Liquidate ALL of their holdings in Mortgage
Backed Securities, losing BILLIONS of dollars in a single day. And he saves his Bank.


This is called LEADERSHIP. Leaders have Vision, Insight, and Prescience. At least, Successful
Leaders do. People who lack those qualities end up as Historians......



More than four decades ago, while working as a Swing Shift Engineer, I made a decision to shut
down a piece of process equipment used on the production line I was responsible for sustaining.
As a result, a significant amount of manufacturing output was lost, but a subsequent examination
of the piece of equipment showed that it was, in fact, malfunctioning, and that any product that
would have been processed through this piece of equipment would have been reduced to scrap.

In a rather tense meeting the following day, I was forced to defend my position - a defense made
easier by the verbal report by the Line Maintenance Manager as to what his technicians had
discovered about the condition of the piece of equipment that I had shut down.

Attending the Meeting were the V.P. of Operations, the Fab Manager, the Engineering Manager,
the Production Manager, three Engineering Section Heads ( including my boss ) two Production
Supervisors, and the Line Maintenance Manager. And ...... ME.

I was being closely questioned by the Production Manager as to the reasons for my shutting
down a major portion of HIS Production Line, and I was forced to confess that I had not a
shred of test data or hard evidence that the system had been malfunctioning, but that I
had shut down the system based on my experience and intuition that it was malfunctioning.

The Production Manager jumped on this, and asked me, " So you shut us down last night
based on your INTUITION ? "

The Conference Room was absolutely silent. You could hear a pin drop. And then, I
responded:

" Intuition ... is a series of Logical Deductions and Decisions, using Sub-Conscious Reasoning,
based on Knowledge and Information that a person is not aware they possessed. "


The room remained silent - and then the V.P. of Operations leaned forward, and said, " Mr.....
Ward ? Could you please write that down for me ? "

I told him, " Yes, Certainly " I tore out the last page of my notebook, wrote it down, and handed
it down the table to him. He folded up the piece of paper, grinned at us all, said, " Thank you.
I think we've got a handle on it now ! Let's all get back to work ! " And as we all left the
conference room, he pointed his finger at me, and said, " I'm gonna remember that ! "


Paul R. Ward
Information not shared, is information lost
Voices that are banned, are voices who cannot share information....
Discussions that are silenced, are discussions that will occur elsewhere !

Peter89
Member
Posts: 1702
Joined: 28 Aug 2018 05:52
Location: Spain

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by Peter89 » 03 Jun 2022 09:28

paulrward wrote:
02 Jun 2022 23:30
Hello All :

Not necessarily. In fact, Historically ( which will make our Historian happy ! ) Franco offered to join the
Axis, making contact with the German Government in Berlin on June 16th, 1940, and again on June 18th.
Franco wanted some significant concessions, which Hitler was unwilling to grant. However, as a very
wise man once said, ' LIfe is a Negotiation '. If Hitler were to supply Coal from the Ruhr, and some
Oil from Rumania, as well as forgiving the Spanish War Debt to Germany ( and get Mussolini to forgive
the debt to Italy ), as well as promising German assistance in helping Spain re-take Gibralter, it might
be enough to bring El Caudillo into the Axis Bullpen. And, while Spain might not be a Cy Young winner,
it was certainly a journeyman reliever, able to provide a few innings of good pitches.
Hello Paul,

It was unlikely to "convince" Franco to join the war for multiple reasons - and it wasn't Germany's best interest either. Germany could not supply Spain with the necessary resources to prompt Franco to join the war. Thus, there was no need to rush to join the war. Also Spain was in no position to protect itself or negotiate from a position of power if it allowed Germans into Iberia. Indeed, the only thing they could exploit was their strategic position and neutrality - and that they did.
paulrward wrote:
02 Jun 2022 23:30
Not Necessarily..... After The Great War, the Turks were VERY pissed off at having their Ottoman pulled
out from under them. A German promise to restore the Ottoman Empire, along with some parts of the
Southern USSR ( like, for example, those parts that were inhabited by ethnic Moslem majorities, ) might
be enough to get the Turks into the war after the start of Barbarrossa. A Turkish Army of about 100,000,
mostly infantry with some field artillery, cavalry, and some limited air support would certainly give
Stalin a pain in his Baku Region....... In return for their help, Turkey might end up with Syria, Lebanon,
Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and possibly Iran as well.
The Turkish Army was a magnitude greater, some 1,000,000 men and although Turkey did not have an industry to maintain active combat, they were more than capable of exploiting the narrow, rugged terrain around the straits. However, offensive capabilities were by and large out of the question. It is also questionable how Turkey could rule over an empire you just described; Persia alone was on par with Turkey; the Levant was a Vichy territory, Iraq and Palestine revolted for independence and Saudi Arabia was independent. Such an empire would antagonize many (potentially) anti-British political powers and would be very hard if not impossible to maintain. Also the Germans wanted these resources and bases for themselves, not for the Turks, who already refused to join or support them.
paulrward wrote:
02 Jun 2022 23:30
And, if Vichy France had entered the Axis, along with Spain, it would have been a simple process
for the combined Italian Fleet and the remnants of the French Fleet ( three repaired battleships
and some cruisers and destroyers ), along with the Spanish Army, and some air units from Italy,
to overwhelm the garrison at Gibralter, and seal off the Western end of the Med. If Mussolini
then moves his fleet to the western side of Italy, there might be no Taranto..... And Spanish
naval bases re-supplying U-boats for the Atlantic would mean that they would have safe havens
out of range of the RAF bomber command, and be able to transit into and out of the Med out of
range of Coastal Command.
Most of the French fleet took orders from Vichy (even the units outside of the Mediterraneum), and there is no indication if the Vichy government decides to deepen relations with the Germans, they wouldn't follow suit, especially if it involved shooting at the Royal Navy (they bombed Gibraltar after all). However it wasn't three repaired battleships and some cruisers and destroyers but a fleet comparable in size to the Italian Navy, even without those interned in Alexandria.

Making a seaborn invasion on Gibraltar would make no sense if Spain joined the war.
paulrward wrote:
02 Jun 2022 23:30
A Siege of Malta would follow, and it is possible that by the end of 1940, the Western Mediterranean
might be well on the way to becoming Mare Romanum....
And the French and Spanish would fight for that?

We shouldn't exaggerate the yields of such a strategy. The Germans probably had to invade Iberia or at the very least seriously threaten it with military force; and in this case, the Azores, Madeira and potentially the Canaries would be lost. And with that, huge quantity of merchant shipping that fled there. The yields would be minerals, the denial of ship-efficient imports to Britain and the possibility to link up the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets.
On its own, it would probably cause more problems than help.

Turkey was a much more interesting target, because it had a good agricultural surplus, minerals and key strategic bases. Incorporating Turkey into the German sphere of influence would be much more sensible than to do the same with Iberia. However, the Soviets would be antagonized if Turkey became an Axis foothold: it might provoke war, something the Germans should have been trying to avoid if they embarked on a southern strategy. By my estimation, the most they could do was to force the Turks to use their infrastructure (like that of Sweden) and increase trade in key items.

Other than that, Germany did not have a clear vision what it wanted in the Middle East: the support of Arab nationalism was only good as long as they shared their antipathy for the Jews and the British.

The true yields of such moves would not be some "knock-out blow" or anything like that; it would create a perimeter that the Anglo-Saxon powers could not easily challenge, because their nearest bases with infrastructure would be in Pakistan and Kenya. Thus, it might easily prompt a premature invasion of mainland Europe with big political consequences.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

historygeek2021
Member
Posts: 631
Joined: 17 Dec 2020 06:23
Location: Laniakea

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by historygeek2021 » 03 Jun 2022 17:40

paulrward wrote:
02 Jun 2022 23:30
This is called LEADERSHIP. Leaders have Vision, Insight, and Prescience. At least, Successful
Leaders do.
Even if we accept that Germany theoretically could have defeated the Soviet Union with better leadership, the level of leadership would have to be near perfect for them to have any chance. And it still would have depended on all of Germany's enemies making colossal mistakes:
  • Britain failing to make an army before the war
  • France failing to stop the reoccupation of the Rhineland
  • Britain and France allowing the annexation of the Sudetenland
  • France failing to prepare a full scale invasion force ready to strike the moment Germany attacked Poland
  • Belgium remaining neutral despite the fact that Germany would obviously invade them (they even received the German invasion plans)
  • The Netherlands remaining neutral despite Oster giving them the exact details of the impending German invasion
  • Norway refusing to mobilize despite a clear escalation of belligerent activity in its waters
  • France deploying 7th Army to the Netherlands instead of keeping it in reserve
  • France focusing its counter-attacks on Stonne instead of Bouvellemont
  • France caving in to the Nazis' armistice instead of continuing to fight
  • Stalin ignoring all intelligence warning of a German invasion
If even one of these mistakes by the Allies had been avoided, Germany would have had no chance whatsoever. If Belgium had simply invited French troops into their country in January 1940 after a plane delivered German invasion plans into their laps, then Germany would have had no chance of breaking through the Ardennes. The level of leadership needed by any of the Allies to nip the Wehrmacht in the bud is so far below that needed by Hitler to have any chance at all, the difference is that between rational, informed decision making and blink luck.

If you want to talk about bold, prescient leadership, talk about what FDR could have done to rally the American people against the Nazi peril in the 1930s. The big bad isolationists stood in his way? That's what LEADERSHIP is for. Real leaders overcome opposition to do what is right.

So, why does internet alternate history ignore all of these colossal mistakes by the Allies, and focus only on what perfect decisions Germany could have made to [possibly have a chance to] win the war? Why do we have threads on "What if Germany mobilized earlier" but not "What if Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, the Soviet Union and the United States mobilized earlier?" Could it be that a generation of Americans have been brainwashed by the History Channel into thinking that the Wehrmacht was a slick war machine that only failed because of the Russian winter, and for some reason can't let go of this trope despite all the books that have been written to debunk it?

paulrward
Member
Posts: 573
Joined: 10 Dec 2008 20:14

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by paulrward » 03 Jun 2022 19:13

Hello All :
historygeek2021 wrote:
02 Jun 2022 18:22
I conceded that it is theoretically possible to produce the tanks necessary for this ATL
No you conceded that One more Panzer Group could have been produced, not just tanks:
historygeek2021 wrote:
27 Jul 2021 22:13
I'm not denying that Germany could have raised army production by the amount needed to create an
extra panzer group for Barbarossa in your ATL.
As I recall, your disagreement with Mr. TheMarcksPlan regarded whether, after defeating the USSR,
Germany would have increased production for the war against the West.
historygeek2021 wrote:
02 Jun 2022 18:22
TMP's increased production depends entirely on (1) mobilizing foreign workers and (2) blowing through
raw material stocks with no regard for future needs.
Mr. TheMarcksPlan argues with evidence and clarity that more labor would have meant more raw
materials - at least in the case of steel, coal, etc. I think this point should be addressed, as
it is crucial to the entire premise. And, besides steel, please explain which other raw materials
would have prevented Mr TheMarcksPlan's concept, and why.

Readers should note the Mr HistoryGeek2021 and Mr. TheMarcksPlan have already discussed rubber.
Mr. TheMarcksPlan's main argument was that Germany obtained something like 100,000 trucks from
occupied Europe after Barbarossa failed. It is therefore obvious that enough rubber existed
in occupied Europe for the ~20k trucks required by his ATL, even if the additional looted trucks are
only cannibalized for tires. That's a lot of tires, and a lot of trucks.

In addition, Mr.TheMarcksPlan also argued - but did not rely upon - that German rubber supply was
greater than commonly supposed.
historygeek2021 wrote:
02 Jun 2022 18:22
It's not clear where these foreign workers would come from.
What isn't clear? Mr.TheMarcksPlan states that, instead of giving generous unemployment benefits
for the millions of Western Europe's unemployed, Germany does not give unemployment benefits
and emphasizes the recruitment of foreign workers. His citation from Herbert's Hitler's Foreign
Workers

established several years ago
already that Germany did not go all out on Recruitment :
the promotion of the autumn [1940] campaign to recruit civilian workers in the West remained
low-key in France and Holland. In April 1941 there only 25,000 French civilian workers in the Reich;
by September, just under 50,000.
Image

In August 1944, 1.25mil French civilians worked in Germany - a 5000% increase over April 1941. The
only thing that is not clear is how anyone can believe that Germany could not have had more
French civilian workers in 1940-41.
historygeek2021 wrote:
02 Jun 2022 18:22
There were already over 1 million Polish laborers in Germany by the time Barbarossa started, so that
leaves western Europe.
I have to disagree. Mr.TheMarcksPlan has also argued that (mostly forced) recruitment of Polish
workers would have been increased, as it did after Barbarossa failed. He showed that Polish labor
increased by over 600,000 between 1941 and 1943:

Image

Mr. TheMarcksPlan also argued that retaining Dutch PoW's (200,000) for work - instead of releasing
them - would alone have made "one more panzer group" possible.
historygeek2021 wrote:
02 Jun 2022 18:22
I don't think I ever conceded that truck production could be increased (given the shortage of rubber
identified in the main thread), only that the civilian economy could be purged of more trucks. But
those civilian trucks would probably be worthless on the poor roads of Ukraine where this ATL takes
place, and taking trucks from the civilian economy would weaken it further.
Mr. TheMarcksPlan showed here that the German truck industry was running at about
50% capacity per USSBS, so your "civilian trucks" notion is a red herring. Germany could easily have
been making more military trucks than OTL, as it did after Barbarossa failed. Germany made more
trucks even while switching truck factories to other production. (see TMP's post for details)

Mr. TheMarcksPlan presented extensive documentation in support of his argument. I feel it might
be valuble if you went back and gave it another look.
historygeek2021 wrote:
02 Jun 2022 18:22
There is also the issue of fuel, discussed earlier. Germany blew through its stock of fuel early
in Barbarossa.
Please provide any evidence that "Germany blew through its stock of fuel early in Barbarossa."
As MrTheMarcksPlan has stated several times, the fuel for ~20k more trucks means 3% more fuel
consumed during Barbarossa. Is there any evidence that Germany could not have consumed 3%
more fuel?
historygeek2021 wrote:
02 Jun 2022 18:22
Another point occurred to me: Did Hitler not take France and Britain seriously in 1939?
Perhaps you could expand on this question, as to how it relates to our current line of
discussion. I would be very interested.
  • Army production was rapidly increasing prior to France, it declined prior to and during
    Barbarossa.
  • After France's fall, Hitler had more political capital (he was probably the most popular
    German ever at that point) and could have mobilized Germany to a greater degree for 1941
    than he had for 1940. After all Victory has a Thousand Fathers, Defeat is an Orphan....
historygeek2021 wrote:
02 Jun 2022 18:22
According to Mr. TheMarksPlan's own source, the Reichsbahn had no clue how the Soviet
railways worked:

In 1940 the Heer (German Army) planners asked the Reichsbahn liaison for information on
Russian railways and was told that it did not possess such information, as they had never
been told that the Soviet Union was a target, so local information had to be gathered by
the FED in Poland, and there was a total lack of knowledge of the network, even which
stations existed and none about operating procedures, facilities, or timetables.
https://www.hgwdavie.com/blog/2018/3/9/ ... operations
-in-the-russo-german-war-19411945
Davie's point there is that Germany didn't understand how the network operated, not that
the DRB didn't know it was cold in Russia and that its locomotives were larger. Again, the
DRB built/designed Soviet locomotives, so they knew about these basic facts.

Regardless of what the DRB knew about how the SOVIET system worked, the DRB would have
known that a GERMAN system operating in Russia would need preparations for winter and for
creating/rebuilding the fundamentals of operating a railway. As TMP proved in the already-linked
post, the DRB told Goering in August that the Winter Crisis was going to happen if the campaign
continued.

I think we need to examine the idea that the greater distance between water stations means the
Germans could not have operated more trains during Barbarossa, had they actually planned for
decent rail support of Ostheer. Is the argument that ALL German trains were doomed to run out
of water somewhere between watering stations? Obviously that's not what happened - Ostheer
was getting trains, just not enough.

Mr. TheMarcksPlan's Alternate Time line means the DRB starts shifting resources Eastwards
immediately when Barbarossa starts (and prior), rather than only doing so belatedly in late Fall
when it's too late. Whether they'd have known about water stations in advance or not is therefore
irrelevant to whether they'd have built more water stations (etc.) during Barbarossa, as DRB
(and OT, RDV's, HBD's, etc.) would have had the resources to do so.

***************************************************************************

Mr. TheMarcksPlan extensively-documented his postings using both Primary and Secondary Sources.
Is this why certain individuals had such a problem with his ideas ?

***************************************************************************
by Peter89 » 03 Jun 2022 01:28 wrote: ↑
It was unlikely to "convince" Franco to join the war for multiple reasons
Go back and Re-read my posting. Franco, between June 16th and 18th, VOLUNTEERED TO JOIN
THEAXIS ! Hitler didn't need to recruit him or draft him ! Given a few benefits, Franco was
already on board with going to war of the side of the Axis ! And, in my opinion, that means
GIBRALTER !

The only Germans that Franco would have needed to allow into Spain would have been a few
squadrons of Maritime Patrol aircraft ( FW 200 Condors ) and a few squadrons of JU88s to keep
the Straights closed. It would have been no different than it was a few years earlier with the
Condor Legion.

And, there is no need for a seaborne invasion of Gibralter. You just have the French and Italian
Fleets bombard it with gunfire, while the Spanish and Italian Air units bomb it from the air, and
then the Spanish Army goes in for a victorious conquest of the Rock. It could all over by the end
of August, while Britain is still fighting off the Luftwaffe over Southern England.

As for Malta, Spain and France don't have to fight for it~ With the Straits of Gibralter closed,
and Gibralter taken, that means Malta is under siege. A few weeks of bombing by Italy, and
then a seaborne invasion using Italian troops,

by Peter89 » 03 Jun 2022 01:28 wrote: ↑
The Turkish Army was a magnitude greater, some 1,000,000 men and although Turkey did not
have an industry to maintain active combat, they were more than capable of exploiting the
narrow, rugged terrain around the straits. However, offensive capabilities were by and large
out of the question.
In early 1918, the Turks sent an Army of 100,000 men ( the Islamic Legion ) into Southern Russia,
and they were in the process of crossing the Caucasus when the Germans, under pressure from
Lenin, called them off. With Stalin suffering a severe attack of Barbarrossa, they could do the
same thing with a large, clumsy, WW1 style army, moving up the strip of land between the Black
and Caspian Seas. And remember, they don't have to WIN - they just have to keep Soviet Armies
pinned down !

Now, if you have SECRET meetings with the Turks, and they don't strike at the Soviets until AFTER
Barbarrossa begins, then it doesn't matter how angry Stalin gets ! This whole thing is like sex -
timing is everything ! And, you can used some of the Turkish Food Surplus to feed the Spanish !
This is called Synergy !


historygeek2021 » 03 Jun 2022 09:40 wrote:
"What if Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, the Soviet Union and the United States
mobilized earlier?"
then Hitler would have been a footnote in history, and a lot of people wouldn't have died horrible,
useless deaths that left the entire human race much poorer.


Paul R. Ward
Information not shared, is information lost
Voices that are banned, are voices who cannot share information....
Discussions that are silenced, are discussions that will occur elsewhere !

Michael Kenny
Member
Posts: 7301
Joined: 07 May 2002 19:40
Location: Teesside

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by Michael Kenny » 03 Jun 2022 19:23

15 name-checks in one post? Perhaps to make sure those searching a certain name are swamped with hits?

Michael Kenny
Member
Posts: 7301
Joined: 07 May 2002 19:40
Location: Teesside

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by Michael Kenny » 03 Jun 2022 19:33

historygeek2021 wrote:
03 Jun 2022 17:40


So, why does internet alternate history ignore all of these colossal mistakes by the Allies, and focus only on what perfect decisions Germany could have made to [possibly have a chance to] win the war? Why do we have threads on "What if Germany mobilized earlier" but not "What if Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, the Soviet Union and the United States mobilized earlier?" Could it be that a generation of Americans have been brainwashed by the History Channel into thinking that the Wehrmacht was a slick war machine that only failed because of the Russian winter, and for some reason can't let go of this trope despite all the books that have been written to debunk it?
'What If' posters are overwhelming concerned with re-running WW2 to find ways that Germany could win it. Everything revolves around finding ways to correct or negate German mistakes. The deeply ingrained belief that the Germans came so close to winning encourages a hope just a few minor tweeks will soon correct the errors of history.

Huszar666
Member
Posts: 129
Joined: 18 Dec 2021 14:02
Location: Budakeszi

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by Huszar666 » 03 Jun 2022 19:51

Morning,

Spain:
Yes, Franco did contact Hitler for an alliance and entry into the war. And he presented a list, what he wanted for that entry.
Coal, which Germany could not supply at that date. Having coal laying around the Ruhr od in Schlesien does not mean that you could transport it to Spain. Not enough trains to supply Italy AND Spain. As for ships... Well, there was an enemy country on the other side of some narrow straits.
Oil, which Germany could not supply at that date (or at any given time). Germany (and Italy) did not have any meaningfull surplus to give to Spain. And not enough trains and shipping falls out because...
Foodstuff, which GErmany could not supply at that date. The only way to do THAT would be to plunder France (Vichy and oppupied).
Colonies, which Germany could not supply at that date. If I recall correctly, Franco asked for (Vichy-France held) Morocco and parts of Algeria. You have either a "neutral" Vichy-France or an allied Spain, you can't have both.

Threatening Spain or even invading it, would mean more trouble than benefits. More troops to garrison, more investments to get Spain working, etc, etc. Oh, do you know, what the common German-Spanish border looked like and how long it was prior to the occupation of Vichy-France? :wink:

OTL the Spanish could get stuff only from Souther America, since the UK, for some strange reason did not want Spanish ships calling in the UK or the Levante.
If Germany could not supply Spain with stuff (which Franco probably knew very well), the situtation would have to such that Spain could get stuff on its own from either Southern America... OR the Mediterranean.

If it IS possible to get stuff AND the axis is obviously winning the war (i.e. the UK has fallen, the Levante is taken), I would very much wager that Franco would enter the war. If not for Morroco, than for some British colonies laying around somewhere in Africa.

Turkey:
They hedged their bets and played both sides. Even if Germany was winning the Eastern Campaign - more so than OTL - that would still leave an UK presence on their southern borders. The Turkish had in ww1 experience with fighting a... "multiple" front war, and I don't really thing they were eager to repeat the experience. Sure, Germany would have to promise some kind of compensation. Like...Cyprus, the kurdish parts of Syria (and maybe Iraq) and Georgia.

France:
With Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Japan and Thailand in the war, all having designs on French territory, plus the not-so-friendly actions of the UK, AND the Axis clearly winning the war, I would say that a re-entry of France would be almost obligatory. To be on the winning side and have some British colonies in Western Africa as blackmail potential.

Seelöwe:
OTL the barges were collected and dislocated in enough quantity end of September. To have them ready in early September, a start only 3 weeks earlier would be needed. The complete TMP-universe hinges on the idea, that Hitler decides 1 year before Barbarossa that he needs more troops. In contrast to the TMP-universe, the Huszar-universe does not need any extra economical effort, since the stuff was build in the OTL too, in the same quantity. The Huszar-universe needs only a decision 3 weeks earlier.
Please note, that I did not planned with having a shitload of PiLaBo 38 (that WERE ready in 1939 and in February 1940 it WAS proposed to build a lot of them).

As for only motorised barges in the 1st wave (1st wave in my reading being the barges, not the Vorausabteilungen), in Schenk it is clearly stated that a pair would consist of ONE motorised and ONE not-motorised barge for the 1st wave (if I'm not mistaken, that was for the OCTOBER-planning). Despite there being enough motorised barges for the complete 1st wave. Not even counting the around 200 not-motorised ones with the aircraft engines.

The figures in Schenk leads to the suspicion that nothing much was done to change hot to mot. There were a LOT of horses and horse-carts to be transported over and filling up the scarce available shipping space.

The loading plan was and is still bogus. I have tried multiple times to fit the earmarked troops into the number of earmarked barges, and I was not able to. There were barges left over in quite a number. That leads me to the conclusion that either the barges were not filled up to capacity, or the scarce shipping space was squandered on un-neccessary stuff. Or both.
Even if we assume the Vorausabteilungen being the very first wave, the troops on the barges would still need to establish, enlarge and secure the actual beachhead. Having company-trosse and such land in the first few hours would only mean that a, you put un-neccessary stuff on the barges instead of fighting troops and/or b, the company-trosse and such would have to land while the beachhed is not established, enlarged and secured (and are so in danger to be shot up)

So, while trying to understand the logic on loading, I've came to the realisation that
a, you would need LESS barges for the earmarked number of fighting troops for the 1st wave
OR
b, you could fit MORE fighting troops into the earmarked number of barges.
In BOTH cases, you would be able to use motorised barges for the 1st wave exclusively.

historygeek2021
Member
Posts: 631
Joined: 17 Dec 2020 06:23
Location: Laniakea

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by historygeek2021 » 04 Jun 2022 00:09

paulrward wrote:
03 Jun 2022 19:13

No you conceded that One more Panzer Group could have been produced, not just tanks:
You are looking at a summary statement I made in a thread where I was focusing on a different subject (TMP's claim that Germany could have doubled Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine production - on top of equipping 5 extra panzer divisions and 5 extra motorized divisions). My summary statement was based on my long exchange with TMP in his "One More Panzergruppe" thread, where we got into the details of what Germany would have to sacrifice to get the extra equipment (i.e., reduce Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine production to get more tanks). Would it have been a wise tradeoff? In my amateur opinion, yes it would have. I personally think the Kriegsmarine and most Luftwaffe bombers were a waste of the Reich's resources, and Germany would have done far better in the war if it had concentrated production on the army. But even then, there are still major obstacles to getting an extra 10 functional mobile divisions, like:
TheMarcksPlan's main argument was that Germany obtained something like 100,000 trucks from
occupied Europe after Barbarossa failed. It is therefore obvious that enough rubber existed
in occupied Europe for the ~20k trucks required by his ATL, even if the additional looted trucks are
only cannibalized for tires. That's a lot of tires, and a lot of trucks.
Ok, maybe Germany could have requisitioned more trucks before Barbarossa. Since they'd be useless on Ukraine's poor roads, they would have to be broken down for parts and materials, mainly tires. Can you take a tire from a civilian truck designed only for well paved roads, slap it onto a military truck intended for use on poorly maintained dirt roads, and expect the military truck to get very far? Sounds like a good research question.
In addition, Mr.TheMarcksPlan also argued - but did not rely upon - that German rubber supply was
greater than commonly supposed.
The flaws in the article he cited were exposed at length in the main thread.
Mr.TheMarcksPlan states that, instead of giving generous unemployment benefits
for the millions of Western Europe's unemployed, Germany does not give unemployment benefits
and emphasizes the recruitment of foreign workers
The economies of occupied western Europe were devastated by the German occupation, due to the British blockade and Germany doing things like seizing their trains and trucks (but not enough, apparently). Germany had millions of unemployed newly conquered subjects. Hitler could either (a) give them the Newt Gingrich treatment and tell them to pick themselves up by their bootstraps, and thereby invite strikes, riots, partisans and revolution, or (b) pacify them with subsistence unemployment rations, then slowly increase the pressure for them to work for the Reich, starting by recruiting the workers most willing to work for the Reich, produce good products, and not commit sabotage. Even if Hitler choose option (a), it still takes time to set up an administration for conscripting workers, transferring them to Germany, finding them housing, then teach them how to manufacture a panzer or a truck and check their work for sabotage.
He showed that Polish labor
increased by over 600,000 between 1941 and 1943
Yes, if there's one thing that's clear from studying the German economy in WW2, it's that things increased gradually over time, not all at once. That just seems to be the way things work in the real world.
Mr. TheMarcksPlan also argued that retaining Dutch PoW's (200,000) for work - instead of releasing
them - would alone have made "one more panzer group" possible.
Enslaving the soldiers of a newly conquered country that you are trying to get to collaborate raises a lot of issues, besides the hope that the slaves will churn out the (definitely not sabotaged) equipment needed for 5 panzer divisions and 5 motorized divisions in less than a year.

the German truck industry was running at about
50% capacity per USSBS, so your "civilian trucks" notion is a red herring. Germany could easily have
been making more military trucks than OTL, as it did after Barbarossa failed.
German truck production declined at the start of the war because the British blockaded their rubber imports and the synthetic rubber industry couldn't make up the difference. Synthetic rubber quantity and quality increased in later years, allowing for greater truck production to be resumed. USBBS is clear that 1940 was the nadir for German rubber supplies, and that Germany blew through its stocks of rubber that year.

Please provide any evidence that "Germany blew through its stock of fuel early in Barbarossa."
As MrTheMarcksPlan has stated several times, the fuel for ~20k more trucks means 3% more fuel
consumed during Barbarossa. Is there any evidence that Germany could not have consumed 3%
more fuel?
I discussed this at length in the main thread. There is a chart in USSBS oil section report showing German stocks of gasoline. It peaked after the seizure of stocks from western Europe and then quickly declined during the Balkans campaign and Barbarossa. Stocks then reached a relatively stable level for the rest of the war, indicating that this was the minimal safe level of stocks needed to keep on hand to keep the economy and the Wehrmacht running. So yes, increase the number of panzer/motorized divisions by a third, send them along a route where there is no seperate rail line, and I think any sensible military planner wouldn't gamble the war on a back of the envelope calculation of "it's just 3%".
Again, the
DRB built/designed Soviet locomotives, so they knew about these basic facts.
According to the article, some German firms built Soviet trains in 1922. According to the same article, that gave the DRB precisely zero information about the Soviet rail system in 1941.
As TMP proved in the already-linked
post, the DRB told Goering in August that the Winter Crisis was going to happen if the campaign
continued.
The quote says that the Germain rail network was physically incapable of handling the demands being placed on it. How do you get from that to: "Germany could have solved all its rail problems if they had just thought harder about it."?
Is the argument that ALL German trains were doomed to run out
of water somewhere between watering stations? Obviously that's not what happened - Ostheer
was getting trains, just not enough.
Water stations were just one issue. There is also the fact that German trains were too heavy for poor quality Soviet rails and rail beds. Germany had to scrounge up WW1 era light trains to send into the USSR. I'm not a railway engineer, but the Ostheer wasn't getting close to enough trains during the summer of 1941, so apparently these and other issues were significant.
lot of people wouldn't have died horrible,
useless deaths that left the entire human race much poorer.
So why does online alternate history consist almost exclusively of "What could Germany have done differently to win the war?" instead of "How could the world have gotten its head out of its ass in the 1930s and sent Hitler to a retirement home on Saint Helena?" Why do people enjoy imagining the Nazis conquering Europe and murdering millions of Jews instead of imagining ways the world could have stopped them?

paulrward
Member
Posts: 573
Joined: 10 Dec 2008 20:14

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by paulrward » 04 Jun 2022 02:28

Hello All ;

Just a brief note - I have located a study relevant to the failure of the German Railways in Barbarossa.

https://medium.com/@themarcksplan/why-d ... b3dd05d810

The gist is: The German professionals in the military railways were telling their superiors about the need
for more resources prior to Barbarossa. As the primary document discussed shows, these professionals
concluded that their concerns weren't addressed because the leadership expected a short campaign.

Paul R. Ward
Information not shared, is information lost
Voices that are banned, are voices who cannot share information....
Discussions that are silenced, are discussions that will occur elsewhere !

historygeek2021
Member
Posts: 631
Joined: 17 Dec 2020 06:23
Location: Laniakea

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by historygeek2021 » 04 Jun 2022 04:37

USSBS chart showing 1940 was nadir of rubber imports/production:
USSBS Rubber Production.png
USSBS chart showing rubber stocks exhausted in 1940:
USSBS Rubber stocks.png
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... &skin=2021

USSBS oil division chart showing production, consumption and stocks of motor gasoline: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... &skin=2021

The chart shows that average gasoline production was approximately 180 thousand tons per month, and Germany tried to maintain stocks of about 400 thousand tons, roughly 2 months production. Military consumption at the start of Barbarossa exceeded 260 thousand tons per month. This was partially offset by the apparent capture of Soviet stocks. Add in the fuel needed for another panzer group to make a lunge from northern Romania and you're looking at a possible 25% increase in fuel consumption in June and you're looking at total fuel consumption approach 380,000 tons, out of an existing stock of 540 thousand on June 1. This would take stocks down to 340 thousand on July 1, which is lower than Germany ever allowed stocks to reach except for the Fall Blau campaign, when Germany blew through its stocks in July and August but then was forced to curtail consumption. So, this ATL has the potential to reduce stocks of gasoline to a level Germany did not find acceptable at any point in the war other than the desperate Fall Blau campaign, which, given that it was intended to capture oil fields, probably explains why Germany was willing to allow stocks to fall that low.
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 4866
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by Richard Anderson » 04 Jun 2022 05:18

Huszar666 wrote:
03 Jun 2022 19:51
Seelöwe:
OTL the barges were collected and dislocated in enough quantity end of September. To have them ready in early September, a start only 3 weeks earlier would be needed. The complete TMP-universe hinges on the idea, that Hitler decides 1 year before Barbarossa that he needs more troops. In contrast to the TMP-universe, the Huszar-universe does not need any extra economical effort, since the stuff was build in the OTL too, in the same quantity. The Huszar-universe needs only a decision 3 weeks earlier.
Yes, it is obvious they were collected in sufficient number, but whether or not it was sufficient numbers of the correct sizes, with modifications, working engines, and so forth is a bit less obvious. Anyway, I thought your new date was 10 September rather than the end of the month?
Please note, that I did not planned with having a shitload of PiLaBo 38 (that WERE ready in 1939 and in February 1940 it WAS proposed to build a lot of them).
Why note it when it is incorrect? The Bodan-Werft PiLaBo Typ A, the prototype PiLaBo 39 (sometimes known as the PiLaBo 38), was completed by Roland-Werft and delivered on 16 July 1940. A total of four were delivered by Bodan-Werft in 1940, so I am unsure how a "shitload" could be available by the end of September.
As for only motorised barges in the 1st wave (1st wave in my reading being the barges, not the Vorausabteilungen), in Schenk it is clearly stated that a pair would consist of ONE motorised and ONE not-motorised barge for the 1st wave (if I'm not mistaken, that was for the OCTOBER-planning).
Sorry, I agree the whole "wave" business gets confusing. I was speaking of "wave" as in the US/UK amphibious concept, which was a distinct group of landing vessels landing more or less in line near simultaneously,

The German assault was divided into the landing of the Vorausabteilungen, which were to land, more or less, three "waves" - Sturmboot, Gummiboot, and Typ AS Präahme. The Typ AS was the armored, powered barge, linked to an unarmored powered barge.

They were followed by the 1. Staffel, which was the main body of the initial landing force, sometimes split into two. They were the tugs towing a powered barge and an un-powered barge followed by various "pusher" motorboats.

In theory it would have been great if all the barges were powered, but in truth the power of the powered barges was pretty marginal, thus the provision of tugs and pusher boats. There probably wasn't much of an advantage at putting all the powered barges together and some downsides...at least the combination of tugs, motorboats, powered barges, and un-powered barges had some redundancy built in.
Despite there being enough motorised barges for the complete 1st wave. Not even counting the around 200 not-motorised ones with the aircraft engines.
About 800 barges were motorized, including both Spitsen or pinnace (typically 38.5 x 5.05 x 2.3 meters, 360 DWT or about 240 GRT) and the slightly larger Kempenaars (or French Campinois, typically 50.0 x 6.6 x 2.5 meters, 620 DWT or about 413 GRT). About 733 were required for the 1, Staffel, so, yeah, in theory enough, but that left no powered barges for the 2. Staffel and later.

So what "200 not-motorised ones with the aircraft engines" are those"? The B-Fähre were never considered suitable for cross-Channel operations, which leaves the c. 25-30 sS "Siebel" Fähre and the 22 Herbert Fähre were all available, but at the end of September and early October.
The figures in Schenk leads to the suspicion that nothing much was done to change hot to mot. There were a LOT of horses and horse-carts to be transported over and filling up the scarce available shipping space.
Well, 341 horse in the entire 1. Staffel, but that would mostly be from the offloading of the transports during the night of the first day. The bulk of the horses would land with the 2. Staffel,4,427 of them. That was the basic issue of the German Heer, it was horse-based and it wasn't a simple matter of just saying "here, take a truck and give us four horses". The limbers and carts for horse draft couldn't be motor drawn, so they would all have to be replaced as well. Then you need the trained drivers and mechanics. So what you really need, if you want to fully motorize the assault divisions, is use motorized divisions...oh, and a lot more ramped barges than what they had converted or that would work. I suspect one reason they kept so many horses was that if all else failed they could just push them over the side of the barge and let them swim in. :lol:
The loading plan was and is still bogus. I have tried multiple times to fit the earmarked troops into the number of earmarked barges, and I was not able to. There were barges left over in quite a number. That leads me to the conclusion that either the barges were not filled up to capacity, or the scarce shipping space was squandered on un-neccessary stuff. Or both.
Sure, but the actual assault plan was worse. They literally were placing entire divisions into what were essentially fire sacks with little means of getting off the beach, like at Cuckmere Haven or even worse at Newhaven, and they had essentially little more than a guess where the British defenses were or who was defending them.
Even if we assume the Vorausabteilungen being the very first wave, the troops on the barges would still need to establish, enlarge and secure the actual beachhead. Having company-trosse and such land in the first few hours would only mean that a, you put un-neccessary stuff on the barges instead of fighting troops and/or b, the company-trosse and such would have to land while the beachhed is not established, enlarged and secured (and are so in danger to be shot up)
Yeah and horses will be the least of their worries. The Vorausabteilungen are most likely going to be shot to pieces since the only thing stronger than a plywood assault boat or rubber raft is the concrete-armored barge. One thing the British knew very well how to do was site medium machine guns and they had a lot of them.
So, while trying to understand the logic on loading, I've came to the realisation that
a, you would need LESS barges for the earmarked number of fighting troops for the 1st wave
OR
b, you could fit MORE fighting troops into the earmarked number of barges.
In BOTH cases, you would be able to use motorised barges for the 1st wave exclusively.
Possible, but the likelihood was that large numbers of those barges would be beached and would never be extricated, which makes getting the 2. Staffel and the follow-ups impossible to get ashore. There really wasn't a good solution for the simple fact that they were trying to run an incredibly complex and large amphibious operation off the cuff with jury-rigged vessels of widely varying quality.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

ljadw
Member
Posts: 13127
Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by ljadw » 04 Jun 2022 07:17

All this is Cold War redivivus .
Before 1914 Aufmarsch Ost was abandoned for obvious reasons .
In 1940, Aufmarsch Ost was decided,although the same obvious reasons were still there .
The reason why it was now decided was the total stalemate of the Third Reich .
And, notwithstanding what Halder and his heirs are saying : a successful Barbarossa depended more than mainly on what the Soviets could and would do .
The truth is that no one could defeat the Soviets .

paulrward
Member
Posts: 573
Joined: 10 Dec 2008 20:14

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by paulrward » 04 Jun 2022 07:44

Hello All :

A lot of very interesting comments.

historygeek2021 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 00:09
Ok, maybe Germany could have requisitioned more trucks before Barbarossa. Since they'd be
useless on Ukraine's poor roads, they would have to be broken down for parts and materials,
mainly tires. Can you take a tire from a civilian truck designed only for well paved roads,
slap it onto a military truck intended for use on poorly maintained dirt roads, and expect the
military truck to get very far? Sounds like a good research question.
Mr. TheMarcksPlan's thread on Scherner's recent research discusses German recycling, including
of rubber. That appears to address your objection.

historygeek2021 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 00:09
The flaws in the article he cited were exposed at length in the main thread.
All articles have flaws, I think Mr. TheMarcksPlan's point was that German rubber supply has been
underestimated by exclusive reliance on the import stats, as military supply channel did not
go through import controls (as the article shows).

This leads to an interesting question: Do German import stats accurately reflect Germany's
supply of rubber ?

historygeek2021 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 00:09
Hitler could either (a) give them the Newt Gingrich treatment and tell them to pick themselves
up by their bootstraps, and thereby invite strikes, riots, partisans and revolution, or (b) pacify
them with subsistence unemployment rations, then slowly increase the pressure for them to
work for the Reich, starting by recruiting the workers most willing to work for the Reich, produce
good products, and not commit sabotage. Even if Hitler choose option (a), it still takes time to
set up an administration for conscripting workers, transferring them to Germany, finding them
housing, then teach them how to manufacture a panzer or a truck and check their work for sabotage.
Another interesting question: Were the 1.25mil additional French workers in Germany by 1944
a net benefit ? And if they were, by how much ? Unless we can say that French sabotage somehow
negated these workers' output, I don't see how there's any conceivable argument that Germany didn't
benefit enormously.

You also need to determine whether the denial/reduction of unemployment benefits would have
caused French revolt. I personally think it hightly unlikely. Historically, Hitler did many things
that inflamed the French after the armistice. He began deportations from Alsace/Lorraine, for
example. He detached northeast France from Vichy authority, placing it under military occupation
amalgamated with Belgian territory. The French very pissed off by these actions, but did not revolt
(in fact, they barely even resisted ) .

If Hitler was more concerned with beating the SU than starting the Germanification of Alsace etc.
the Germans could easily have avoided other aggravations of France to offset/ameliorate the absence
of Nazi welfare policies.

historygeek2021 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 00:09
Yes, if there's one thing that's clear from studying the German economy in WW2, it's that things
increased gradually over time, not all at once.
So again, we have the question: Do things "gradually increase over time" on their own or is this
the result of business/policy decisions? If we assume it's the latter, then we would have to have an
objection to "earlier policy decisions (affecting business behavior) would have caused earlier increase."

historygeek2021 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 00:09
German truck production declined at the start of the war because the British blockaded their
rubber imports and the synthetic rubber industry couldn't make up the difference.
An interesting argument, but the USSBS states :
There is NO EVIDENCE that the shortage of rubber
ever handicapped the Wehrmacht or essential
industries.
There were restrictions on rubber
products for the civilian market; there were fears
of future shortages, which might handicap the
prosecution of the war; but as far as can be
determined actual shortages were never severe
enough to impair the fighting power of the Wehr
macht. It would have been necessary to reduce
production by 70–80 percent to have a direct
effect on the war effort.
Now, I feel we all will agree that the USSBS is not infallible. So, is there any evidence that, in
this particular case, it is wrong ?

We would also need some sort of evidence that Mr. TheMarcksPlan's ATL would meet the "70-80
percent" threshold, after which USSBS found an adverse impact on the war effort (of course, if
we can prove that the USSBS is wrong, then we could probably disregard this point).

historygeek2021 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 00:09
There is also the fact that German trains were too heavy for poor quality Soviet rails and rail beds.
As with your earlier water station argument, this would suggest German trains were unable to travel
at all in the Soviet Union. However, the historical evidence proves that to be incorrect. Rail pressure
is related to (1) weight and (2) the square of the speed of travel. German trains traveled more slowly
in the Soviet Union but that doesn't address whether more German train resources would have provided
more rail travel (at the same OTL slower speed).

It's worthwhile to note that Mr. H.G.W. Davies, the author of the article you cite, has substantially the
same view of Barbarossa railways as has Mr. TheMarcksPlan. Thus, it appears that Great Minds are
working in the same direction.

So I think the answer is that the German High Command expected the campaign to run like the
one in France, it was going to be a short campaign of 6-10 weeks,
the Red Army would be destroyed on the frontiers or before Smolensk within 600km of the frontier and
the fighting would be supported by the lorries of the Grosstransportraum of the Supply Department under
General Wagner. Railways were only an addition to this and their
development and use were a problem for the Occupying forces not the Invasion forces.
viewtopic.php?f=66&t=203286&start=15#p1842905

Furthermore, the head (?) official of HBD 3, responsible for Army Group Center in Barbarossa, also
expressed during 1942 exactly Mr. TheMarcksPlan's view of why the German railways failed:
If the preparations considered necessary by the railroad experts were not made, the reason could
be that the war would not come at all or would be very short.
https://medium.com/@themarcksplan/why-d ... b3dd05d810
historygeek2021 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 04:37
Add in the fuel needed for another panzer group to make a lunge from northern Romania and you're looking
at a possible 25% increase in fuel consumption in June

I am interested in why you feel that having 3% more trucks added to Barbarossa, plus ~750 tanks, would
cause a 25% increase in military fuel consumption. This seems somewhat excessive - do you have
some figures that would substantiate this ?

Could this be explained by the fact that you are using military fuel consumption as the baseline
instead of Barbarossa fuel consumption. If, so, there might be some room to discuss this difference.

historygeek2021 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 04:37
So, this ATL has the potential to reduce stocks of gasoline to a level Germany did not find acceptable at
any point in the war other than the desperate Fall Blau campaign
And here is an important question: Would Germany be so rigid in it's doctrine that it would not alter its
"acceptable" level of fuel stocks, were the alternative being defeated by the Soviet Union. Your argument
doesn't seem to show that dramatically lower stocks would ensue from 3% more trucks but, even assuming
it did, readers should be curious about why Germany would choose maintaining an arbitrary stock level
over winning the war. I have a feeling that reality would take precedence over doctrine in a case such
as this.


#27Post by ljadw » 03 Jun 2022 23:17
The truth is that no one could defeat the Soviets .

I think the Afghans might disagree with that statement. And, as for the Ukrainians, the Jury is still
out.....



Paul R.Ward
Last edited by paulrward on 04 Jun 2022 07:48, edited 1 time in total.
Information not shared, is information lost
Voices that are banned, are voices who cannot share information....
Discussions that are silenced, are discussions that will occur elsewhere !

pugsville
Member
Posts: 970
Joined: 17 Aug 2011 04:40

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by pugsville » 04 Jun 2022 07:47

paulrward wrote:
02 Jun 2022 23:30

Not Necessarily..... After The Great War, the Turks were VERY pissed off at having their Ottoman pulled
out from under them. A German promise to restore the Ottoman Empire, along with some parts of the
Southern USSR ( like, for example, those parts that were inhabited by ethnic Moslem majorities, ) might
be enough to get the Turks into the war after the start of Barbarrossa. A Turkish Army of about 100,000,
mostly infantry with some field artillery, cavalry, and some limited air support would certainly give
Stalin a pain in his Baku Region....... In return for their help, Turkey might end up with Syria, Lebanon,
Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and possibly Iran as well.
The Turks had no real desire to attempt to revive the Empire. The Lesson the Military elite who ran turkey drew form ww1 was getting involved in other people's wars only ends very badly for Turkey. They could not be bribed or cajoled into joining the war under any circumstances. Avoiding the war all together was their combined common goal. They would not be drawn in willingly.

The Soviet Union would also see any German intervention in Turkey as essentially hostile act, expect to get very little form the Soviets after that.

Peter89
Member
Posts: 1702
Joined: 28 Aug 2018 05:52
Location: Spain

Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by Peter89 » 04 Jun 2022 08:15

paulrward wrote:
03 Jun 2022 19:13
by Peter89 » 03 Jun 2022 01:28 wrote: ↑
It was unlikely to "convince" Franco to join the war for multiple reasons
Go back and Re-read my posting. Franco, between June 16th and 18th, VOLUNTEERED TO JOIN
THEAXIS ! Hitler didn't need to recruit him or draft him ! Given a few benefits, Franco was
already on board with going to war of the side of the Axis ! And, in my opinion, that means
GIBRALTER !
Even if Spain joins the Axis, the fundamental problem would not disappear (on the contrary, it would be more serious): Spain needed the exact same raw materials as Germany and its allies. By the way, could you please give me the source where Franco pledged himself for the Axis cause, but Hitler refused?
paulrward wrote:
03 Jun 2022 19:13
The only Germans that Franco would have needed to allow into Spain would have been a few
squadrons of Maritime Patrol aircraft ( FW 200 Condors ) and a few squadrons of JU88s to keep
the Straights closed. It would have been no different than it was a few years earlier with the
Condor Legion.
There are three problems with this: first, there were no "squadrons" of FW 200 Condors. In August 1940 there were only 9 of them, with 2-3 ready for operations. Even by December 1940, it operated 2 Staffels of 6 aircraft each, but the highest operational readiness came on 9 February 1941 when a staggering number (five) of Condors were sent into battle. Even in April 1941, the Condors did not fly more than 74 sorties.

Second, it is questionable whether the Condors could do more or less with a fallen Gibraltar: a sizeable chunk of their success happened to convoys inbound or outbound to Gibraltar. As the war went on, the Condors could only sink ships en route to or from Gibraltar. By 1943, they could not sink anything than ships on this route. And if Britain doesn't need to ship supplies and matériel en masse to the Suez, Malta, Cyprus and Gibraltar, it is likely that the defense of their remaining convoys would improve, rendering Condors (and most of the German anti-shipping operations) ineffective by early 1942.

Third, Portugal's stance would be an interesting one, because if they joined the British, the bases on the Azores and Madeira would effectively ruin not just the Condors' anti-shipping missions around those regions, but their maritime recon missions as well (not to mention other problems, like losing a lot of German merchant ships at a single stroke).

On the sidenote, the Condor was a terrible plane for this kind of operations. Out of the 133 lost between 1940 and 1943, 45 was lost to Allied actions and 88 to other causes.

Image
paulrward wrote:
03 Jun 2022 19:13
And, there is no need for a seaborne invasion of Gibralter. You just have the French and Italian
Fleets bombard it with gunfire, while the Spanish and Italian Air units bomb it from the air, and
then the Spanish Army goes in for a victorious conquest of the Rock. It could all over by the end
of August, while Britain is still fighting off the Luftwaffe over Southern England.

As for Malta, Spain and France don't have to fight for it~ With the Straits of Gibralter closed,
and Gibralter taken, that means Malta is under siege. A few weeks of bombing by Italy, and
then a seaborne invasion using Italian troops,
I very seriously doubt that the Italians could pull that off with their limited amphibious capacities and extremely poor interservice cooperation.
paulrward wrote:
03 Jun 2022 19:13
by Peter89 » 03 Jun 2022 01:28 wrote: ↑
The Turkish Army was a magnitude greater, some 1,000,000 men and although Turkey did not
have an industry to maintain active combat, they were more than capable of exploiting the
narrow, rugged terrain around the straits. However, offensive capabilities were by and large
out of the question.
In early 1918, the Turks sent an Army of 100,000 men ( the Islamic Legion ) into Southern Russia,
and they were in the process of crossing the Caucasus when the Germans, under pressure from
Lenin, called them off. With Stalin suffering a severe attack of Barbarrossa, they could do the
same thing with a large, clumsy, WW1 style army, moving up the strip of land between the Black
and Caspian Seas. And remember, they don't have to WIN - they just have to keep Soviet Armies
pinned down !
Now, are we talking about a Southern or an Eastern approach? Because the two can not coexist (as history proved): Axis resources were simply inadequate for that. Turkey's army was incapable to wage war against the much better equipped and trained Soviet forces. I also doubt that they could pin down substantial Soviet forces in the Caucasus, where the terrain decisively favoured the defender.
paulrward wrote:
03 Jun 2022 19:13
Now, if you have SECRET meetings with the Turks, and they don't strike at the Soviets until AFTER
Barbarrossa begins, then it doesn't matter how angry Stalin gets ! This whole thing is like sex -
timing is everything ! And, you can used some of the Turkish Food Surplus to feed the Spanish !
This is called Synergy !
I don't really get this; if the Soviet Union is attacked with Turkish help, then why would anyone use Turkish food surplus to feed Spain? Besides, the Turks stopped grain export and began to stockpile it; it could be taken away from them by force, but they would not trade it. They traded with figs, tobacco and these kind of food items.

If Spain joined the Axis and Turkey would be occupied, then the food situation in Spain could be mitigated, but not much before the Mediterranean came under the control of the Axis.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

Return to “What if”