TMP Overall; German Options

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pugsville
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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by pugsville » 04 Jun 2022 09:37

paulrward wrote:
02 Jun 2022 23:30
It's amazing how little History some people remember..... I call the attention of the Forum to the
events of July 3rd through the 7th, 1940. When the British Navy, without cause or provocation, cold
bloodedly attacked the French Navy at Mers-el-Kebir, sinking a battleship and slaughtering nearly 1300
French Sailors.

As a result of this gruesome example of Churchill's honor and loyalty,

" ......The British Empire and the French Republic, linked together in their cause and
in their need, will defend to the death their native soil, aiding each other like good comrades
to the utmost of their strength......"


the New French Government, under Petain, formally severed all relations with Britain on July 7th,
and handed over all British personnel then interned in France to the Germans.
It was a Brutal attack, But not without provocation, French had broken it's treaty with Britain.
paulrward wrote:
02 Jun 2022 23:30
In fact, it would have taken only a gentle push on the part of Berlin to have brought France into
the Axis on that date. The Massacre at Mers-el-Kebir is STILL an open wound with the people of
France. I can see an Aged but Angry Petain, who was a Rightist, joining with the Axis against a
Perfidious Albion to redeem the Honor of France in the Tradition of the Blessed St. Joan and
the Glorious Emperor Napolean !
Many in Vichy were actually quite willing to enter the War on the Side of Germany, but would require an actual peace treaty. Removal of Germany soldiers for French soil, return of POWs. etc.
paulrward wrote:
02 Jun 2022 23:30
This would mean that ALL of the French industrial complex,
Only if Germany made good the oil and coal imports that the French industry relied upon. Did not take all the rolling stock, trucks, workers, and oil stocks, Substantially reducing German production,
paulrward wrote:
02 Jun 2022 23:30
and the entire remaining French
Army and Air Force would join the Axis. And, the French industry was nothing to be sneezed
at. Michelin, Hispano Suiza, Dewoitine, Renault.... the list goes on - big factories, lots
of machine tools, ALL of which could go right back into production of French War equipment
that could be adapted to serve as second line equipment for the Heer -
French equipment would be for the French army. They would not be an excess.

PunctuationHorror
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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by PunctuationHorror » 04 Jun 2022 11:25

historygeek2021 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 04:37
USSBS chart showing 1940 was nadir of rubber imports/production:

USSBS Rubber Production.png

USSBS chart showing rubber stocks exhausted in 1940:

USSBS Rubber stocks.png

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... &skin=2021
Where is the data for 'captured rubber', the loot from Netherlands, Belgium, France? The beautiful tables do not provide this information. They also do not provide the most important information: rubber consumption. And we need the numbers for the rubber consumption that went into the production of tires.
Imports, production and stocks give no reliable data about consumption.
If rubber production equals the consumption, stocks can be zero and there is still NO shortage. Actually, stocks can be any number in that case because 'rubber production' does not mean 'rubber imports'.

This is no argument, only a proof of analytical illiteracy or an attempted 'Haha, look how I fooled these idiots with a picture of sth somehow related while the actual information is lacking.'
historygeek2021 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 04:37
USSBS oil division chart showing production, consumption and stocks of motor gasoline: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... &skin=2021

The chart shows that average gasoline production was approximately 180 thousand tons per month, and Germany tried to maintain stocks of about 400 thousand tons, roughly 2 months production. Military consumption at the start of Barbarossa exceeded 260 thousand tons per month. This was partially offset by the apparent capture of Soviet stocks. Add in the fuel needed for another panzer group to make a lunge from northern Romania and you're looking at a possible 25% increase in fuel consumption in June and you're looking at total fuel consumption approach 380,000 tons, out of an existing stock of 540 thousand on June 1. This would take stocks down to 340 thousand on July 1, which is lower than Germany ever allowed stocks to reach except for the Fall Blau campaign, when Germany blew through its stocks in July and August but then was forced to curtail consumption. So, this ATL has the potential to reduce stocks of gasoline to a level Germany did not find acceptable at any point in the war other than the desperate Fall Blau campaign, which, given that it was intended to capture oil fields, probably explains why Germany was willing to allow stocks to fall that low.
The chart shows that total consumption of gasoline roughly equaled total production (1) and that total consumption very rarely exceeded total gasoline production by 20% (2), which was buffered by the stocks. Total consumption, which is military and civilian consumption added.

'Military consumption at the start of Barbarossa exceeded 260 thousand tons per month.' - This is June 1941. And by July 1941 it was back on 180kt. Can you explain that? Why should they suddenly need a third less gasoline in June? On the same offensive? That went on since June, 22 - whole 9 days in June? Besides: The consumption in June 1941 is the peak of consumption in the entire war, both peak military consumption and total consumption. Military consumption of June 1941 is the consumption of the entire Wehrmacht. Luftwaffe, 21 Panzerdivisions, 15 Mot and the whole Heer with 158 Infantry divisions and the whole Kriegsmarine.
'possible 25% increase in fuel consumption in June and you're looking at total fuel consumption approach 380,000 tons ' - I don't know how a 25% increase of 260k tons makes 380k tons. Some kind of special arithmetic?
Where do these 25% inrease come from?

Further, the chart shows that the time 'when Germany blew through its stocks' was actually between November 1940 and March 1941 (Why was that? What happened then?) and again after June 1944.

Again, like with the rubber, this analysis of the gasoline chart is proof of analytical illiteracy, blatant misunderstanding or an nice try of 'Haha, look how I fooled them with distractions.'

Towards the argument of sth along ''It was not possible to field five more PD and five more Mot':
According to https://www.axishistory.com/list-all-ca ... ns-by-type, there were 21 PD and 15 Mot in June 1941. There were 28 PD, 4 Mech and 15 Mot in Nov 1942. By Sept 1943 they had 26 PD and 21 Mech. How did they manage to fuel these divisions, where did they get rubber for them? How did they manage to rebuild these division after all the losses?

And: Trucks can be produced without rubber tires. Engines, frames, drivetrains/transmissions, cabs, ... do not require rubber and can be stored until rubber/tires become available (again).

As I said in the other thread, oil and rubber were not the obstacles for 5 additional PD and 5 add Mot before Barbarossa. This endless circle becomes tiresome.
Last edited by PunctuationHorror on 04 Jun 2022 12:35, edited 3 times in total.

Huszar666
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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by Huszar666 » 04 Jun 2022 11:34

Morning,

@paulrward: could you please stop naming "Mr. TheMarksPlan" every other paragraph? Thank you
Yes, it is obvious they were collected in sufficient number, but whether or not it was sufficient numbers of the correct sizes, with modifications, working engines, and so forth is a bit less obvious. Anyway, I thought your new date was 10 September rather than the end of the month?
"My" data is the 10th September (or a few days earlier, if possible). But, with the known 10-days-run-up the barges and stuff (at least for the 1st and 2nd Staffel in German diction) would have to sit in the harbours on the 1st September or a few days earlier.
The barges sitting in the harbours OTL End of September were already modified.
Why note it when it is incorrect? The Bodan-Werft PiLaBo Typ A, the prototype PiLaBo 39 (sometimes known as the PiLaBo 38), was completed by Roland-Werft and delivered on 16 July 1940. A total of four were delivered by Bodan-Werft in 1940, so I am unsure how a "shitload" could be available by the end of September.
Actually, you are talking about two different landing boats. The PLB 38 was built in 1938, and was sold to the civilian sector after testing. The PLB 39 was basically the same boat, only that it could be splitted lenghtwise for rail transport. THAT one was completed in July 1940.
So, the PLB 38 was ready for manufacturing in January/February 1940, when the pioneers asked for some. "Shitload" is maybe a bit overselling it, but around 50-100 would be possible till Early September in my opinion.
However, I'm NOT planning on having more than a handfull, so...
They were followed by the 1. Staffel, which was the main body of the initial landing force, sometimes split into two. They were the tugs towing a powered barge and an un-powered barge followed by various "pusher" motorboats.
Actually, no.
According to the GErman dicition, 1st Staffel was the whole thing not on the freighters, including Vorausabteilungen (Ist Gruppe) the main landing from the barges (2nd Gruppe) and some barges from the freighters (3rd Gruppe). The stuff on the freighters (and probably most of their barges) were the 2nd Staffel. Everything else from the initial Divisions left in France was the 3rd Staffel. The initial Divisions being the 1st Treffen.
In theory it would have been great if all the barges were powered, but in truth the power of the powered barges was pretty marginal, thus the provision of tugs and pusher boats. There probably wasn't much of an advantage at putting all the powered barges together and some downsides...at least the combination of tugs, motorboats, powered barges, and un-powered barges had some redundancy built in.
The provision for pusher boats was because of the unpowered barges. Later in the planning, pusher boats were eliminited completely, the powered barges having the task to help the unpowered land.
About 800 barges were motorized, About 733 were required for the 1, Staffel, so, yeah, in theory enough, but that left no powered barges for the 2. Staffel and later.
As I stated earlier, the loading plan is and was "concerning" to say the least. When I did my loading plan I arrived at around 400 Peniche and 140 Kampinen (exluding Abschitt E and not counting the barges brought in by the freighters), and with a bit of shifting around, there would probably be even less need. Unfortunately the newest version is in the office, at home I have only the older one.
If we assume there being around 800 powered barges, with around 130 of them without having a useable engine, that would leave 670 units.
As for the 3rd Staffel having no powered barges allocated at first... I think it is more important to get the 1st Staffel on land with as many fighting troops as possible from as many barges that can move on their own power.
So what "200 not-motorised ones with the aircraft engines" are those"? The B-Fähre were never considered suitable for cross-Channel operations, which leaves the c. 25-30 sS "Siebel" Fähre and the 22 Herbert Fähre were all available, but at the end of September and early October.
No, they were not the different Ferries, but normal unpowered barges with two BMW aircraft engines on deck. There were 200 modified this way (150 Peniche and 50 Kampinen) and were called Type AF. Theoretically they were able to move with 6-7 Kn.
(with the around 130 powered barges left over and the 200 Type AF you would have 330 powered barges for the 3rd Staffel and 2nd Treffen. Plus whatever comes back from the other side of the Chanel)
Well, 341 horse in the entire 1. Staffel, but that would mostly be from the offloading of the transports during the night of the first day. The bulk of the horses would land with the 2. Staffel,4,427 of them. That was the basic issue of the German Heer, it was horse-based and it wasn't a simple matter of just saying "here, take a truck and give us four horses". The limbers and carts for horse draft couldn't be motor drawn, so they would all have to be replaced as well. Then you need the trained drivers and mechanics.
Actually, No. 1st Staffel are the barges, not the transports - those being the 3rd Staffel.
For the 341 horses for the 1st Staffel, I'm assuming, you are referencing page 226 in Schenk (German version). Do note, however, that that list is for only one division, and next to the 341 horses there are also 300 "Karren" (for me it is not exactly clear if these are Infanteriekarren or the Feldwagen), 93 light cars, 34 trucks, 135 motorcycles and 46 MC-combinations. Please don enlighten me, why do you need so much transport for establishing, enlarging and securing of a not-so-deep bridgehead. And why do you need all these from the very first moment.
As for getting enough motor transport.
Each division had six supply columns (30t), from those half were mot and half horse-drawn. You don't have to do anything but relocate mot columns from the divisions that are not participating to the ones that do. One horse-drawn column had 46 wagons, one motorised 11 trucks.
As for the light (15t) columns for each regiment you could do two things:
a, get 33 light trucks for each division (297 units total) from somewhere - French booty, for example - and organise a driving camp for, say, 500 soldiers total.
b, get normal (30t) columns from divisions that are not participating, and attach half a column to each regiment.
More problematic would be the trains on Company and Battalion Level. Those had 4 wagons each, or two trucks. For a division (36 companies and 9 Btl = 45 in total) you would need 90 trucks, or 810 for all nine divisions (counting the two mountain divisions as "full" division). Assuming, InfDiv 1. Welle had only horses and wagons and no trucks at all. That point is a bit hazy.
Would it be possible to get around 800 further light trucks from somewhere and teach around the same number of soldiers how to drive in, say, two month?
Since the whole point of TMP was that is was possible to get enough trucks for 10 further fst divisions in less than a year...
Sure, but the actual assault plan was worse. They literally were placing entire divisions into what were essentially fire sacks with little means of getting off the beach, like at Cuckmere Haven or even worse at Newhaven
This is exactly what I'm talking about. Cuckmere Haven was an idiotic idea to begin with (Newhaven not so much), and there were other points too that I simply can not understand. For example, no landing at or near the only place that could be called a habrour (Folkstone), the deployment of the Vorausabteilung that violated every notion of Schwerpunkt, and so forth.
Possible, but the likelihood was that large numbers of those barges would be beached and would never be extricated, which makes getting the 2. Staffel and the follow-ups impossible to get ashore. There really wasn't a good solution for the simple fact that they were trying to run an incredibly complex and large amphibious operation off the cuff with jury-rigged vessels of widely varying quality.
That's the 3rd Staffel or the 2nd Treffen, but I know, what you mean.
HOWEVER.
Even if we assume the whole 1st, 2nd and 3rd Staffel is a total loss (a bit on the optimistic side for the UK) that would still leave around 1200 barges still sitting in French ports.

Peter89
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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by Peter89 » 04 Jun 2022 12:25

PunctuationHorror wrote:
04 Jun 2022 11:25
historygeek2021 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 04:37
USSBS chart showing 1940 was nadir of rubber imports/production:

USSBS Rubber Production.png

USSBS chart showing rubber stocks exhausted in 1940:

USSBS Rubber stocks.png

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... &skin=2021
Where is the data for 'captured rubber', the loot from Netherlands, Belgium, France? The beautiful tables do not provide this information. They also do not provide the most important information: rubber consumption. And we need the numbers for the rubber consumption that went into the production of tires.
Imports, production and stocks give no reliable data about consumption.
If rubber production equals the consumption, stocks can be zero and there is still NO shortage. Actually, stocks can be any number in that case because 'rubber production' does not mean 'rubber imports'.

This is no argument, only a proof of analytical illiteracy or an attempted 'Haha, look how I fooled these idiots with a picture of sth somehow related while the actual information is lacking.'
historygeek2021 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 04:37
USSBS oil division chart showing production, consumption and stocks of motor gasoline: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... &skin=2021

The chart shows that average gasoline production was approximately 180 thousand tons per month, and Germany tried to maintain stocks of about 400 thousand tons, roughly 2 months production. Military consumption at the start of Barbarossa exceeded 260 thousand tons per month. This was partially offset by the apparent capture of Soviet stocks. Add in the fuel needed for another panzer group to make a lunge from northern Romania and you're looking at a possible 25% increase in fuel consumption in June and you're looking at total fuel consumption approach 380,000 tons, out of an existing stock of 540 thousand on June 1. This would take stocks down to 340 thousand on July 1, which is lower than Germany ever allowed stocks to reach except for the Fall Blau campaign, when Germany blew through its stocks in July and August but then was forced to curtail consumption. So, this ATL has the potential to reduce stocks of gasoline to a level Germany did not find acceptable at any point in the war other than the desperate Fall Blau campaign, which, given that it was intended to capture oil fields, probably explains why Germany was willing to allow stocks to fall that low.
The chart shows that total consumption of gasoline roughly equaled total production (1) and that total consumption very rarely exceeded total gasoline production by 20% (2), which was buffered by the stocks. Total consumption, which is military and civilian consumption added.

'Military consumption at the start of Barbarossa exceeded 260 thousand tons per month.' - This is June 1941. And by July 1941 it was back on 180kt. Can you explain that? Why should they suddenly need a third less gasoline in June? On the same offensive? That lasted since 22. June, for 9 days in June? Besides: The consumption in June 1941 is the peak of consumption in the entire war, both peak military consumption and total consumption. Military consumption of June 1941 is the consumption of the entire Wehrmacht. Luftwaffe, 21 Panzerdivisions, 15 Mot and the whole Heer with 158 Infantry divisions and the whole Kriegsmarine.
'possible 25% increase in fuel consumption in June and you're looking at total fuel consumption approach 380,000 tons ' - I don't know how a 25% increase of 260k tons makes 380k tons. Some kind of special arithmetic?
Where do these 25% inrease come from?

Further, the chart shows that the time 'when Germany blew through its stocks' was actually between November 1940 and March 1941 (Why was that? What happened then?) and again after June 1944.

Again, like with the rubber, this analysis of the gasoline chart is proof of analytical illiteracy, blatant misunderstanding or an nice try of 'Haha, look how I fooled them with distractions.'

Towards the argument of sth along ''It was not possible to field five more PD and five more Mot':
According to https://www.axishistory.com/list-all-ca ... ns-by-type, there were 21 PD and 15 Mot in June 1941. There were 28 PD, 4 Mech and 15 Mot in Nov 1942. By Sept 1943 they had 26 PD and 21 Mech. How did they manage to fuel these divisions, where did they get rubber for them? How did they manage to rebuild these division after all the losses?

And: Trucks can be produced without rubber tires. Engines, frames, drivetrains/transmissions, cabs, ... do not require rubber and can be stored until rubber/tires become available (again).

As I said in the other thread, oil and rubber were not the obstacles for 5 additional PD and 5 add Mot before Barbarossa. This endless circle becomes tiresome.
I think both of you should be very careful with analysing the USSBS' unrefined numbers. First of all, it included captured stocks, and second, it included them after their capture. Not to mention the expenditure: for example, the fuel allocation for pilot training was very different in 1941, 1942 and 1943. Also the job the motor vehicles had to accomplish was very different in 1939, 1940 and 1942 onwards.

I am familiar with a lot of the Luftwaffe's and Lufthansa's numbers, but it is also very deceptive: if an airfield with a unit got X amount of fuel, there was practically no way to foretell how many sorties they could fly, because operational readiness more often than not changed within a day. So it wasn't simply a one-way dynamics: the available fuel could limit the number of sorties, but the operational readiness could limit it too. There is no way to say that 1000 sorties per day could be done with X amount of fuel, because X amount of fuel was available at a certain operation. What can be said is fuel would not limit 1000 sorties a day with X amount of fuel available.

Also it is obvious from the USSBS' numbers that during the early phase of Barbarossa, a great amount of Soviet stock was captured in motor fuel, thus the consumption - production numbers are actually more favourable in the operation-heavy months of 1941 than during the lull in 1940/1941. The stocks captured during the Weserübung and Westfeldzug were also crucial to start Barbarossa altogether. In fact, the stocks captured during these campaigns equalled the aviation fuel needs of an entire year's training program.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

historygeek2021
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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by historygeek2021 » 04 Jun 2022 17:22

paulrward wrote:
04 Jun 2022 07:44

Mr. TheMarcksPlan's thread on Scherner's recent research discusses German recycling, including
of rubber. That appears to address your objection.
Please provide the specific quotation and cite. I don't see anything in Scherner's or Schmelzing's articles stating that tires from civilian trucks could be swapped onto military trucks and endure the road conditions in the Soviet Union.
All articles have flaws, I think Mr. TheMarcksPlan's point was that German rubber supply has been
underestimated by exclusive reliance on the import stats, as military supply channel did not
go through import controls (as the article shows).

This leads to an interesting question: Do German import stats accurately reflect Germany's
supply of rubber ?
USSBS was aware of captured stocks of rubber (page 21). Schmelzing's article fails to provide reliable data on 1940 rubber supplies, since the focus of the article is the effect of strategic bombing. Whether imports of rubber from the Soviet Union arrived in 1940 or 1941 is therefore irrelevant to Schmelzing's thesis, so he spreads it out evenly over both years, which is a highly questionable assumption based on the article's own sources indicating most of the rubber arrived in 1941. Schmelzing's claim that there were "producing factories" in the west and east in 1940 is unexplained and unsubstantiated. In any event, Schmelzing states that French tire factories in unoccupied Vichy were producing for the Wehrmacht "from the first days of the occupation", so whatever unaccounted for rubber they had was already used in the OTL.
Another interesting question: Were the 1.25mil additional French workers in Germany by 1944
a net benefit ? And if they were, by how much ? Unless we can say that French sabotage somehow
negated these workers' output, I don't see how there's any conceivable argument that Germany didn't
benefit enormously.
Obviously they were ... in 1944. The question we're discussing is whether Hitler could have forcibly transferred hundreds of thousands of French, Belgian and Dutch workers to Germany in 1940 and expected them to produce enough serviceable panzers for 5 panzer divisions and 5 motorized divisions in less than a year.
You also need to determine whether the denial/reduction of unemployment benefits would have
caused French revolt. I personally think it hightly unlikely. Historically, Hitler did many things
that inflamed the French after the armistice. He began deportations from Alsace/Lorraine, for
example. He detached northeast France from Vichy authority, placing it under military occupation
amalgamated with Belgian territory. The French very pissed off by these actions, but did not revolt
(in fact, they barely even resisted ) .
Those are actions toward the Vichy government. Denial of unemployment benefits directly impacts millions of people in occupied territories. Since consumption was strictly curtailed, unemployment benefits provided them with basic necessities like food. Take food away from millions of people and you've got a bigger problem on your hands than an irritated 84 year old Petain.
An interesting argument, but the USSBS states :
There is NO EVIDENCE that the shortage of rubber
ever handicapped the Wehrmacht or essential
industries.
There were restrictions on rubber
products for the civilian market; there were fears
of future shortages, which might handicap the
prosecution of the war; but as far as can be
determined actual shortages were never severe
enough to impair the fighting power of the Wehr
macht. It would have been necessary to reduce
production by 70–80 percent to have a direct
effect on the war effort.
Now, I feel we all will agree that the USSBS is not infallible. So, is there any evidence that, in
this particular case, it is wrong ?
USSBS took a glib view toward Germany's truck situation. Further research has shown the Heer was already in dire straits for trucks before Barbarossa. From Stahel's Operation Barbarossa and Germany's defeat in the East, Chapter 3:
Confronting this problem in February 1940 Halder noted that the army possessed 120,000 trucks, which did not allow any to be held in reserve. There was already a shortfall of 2,668 trucks (more than 2 per cent109 of the overall total) which, added together with those trucks out of service due to maintenance or repair, created a deficit of more than 4 per cent of the total.110 Thus, the army was already some 5,000 trucks under strength. Even more worrying was the monthly loss of roughly 2,400 trucks (2 per cent) from accidents or simple mechanical wear, with a replacement figure per month of just 1,000 vehicles. The end result, as Halder recorded, was ‘a deterioration in the operational ability’.

Obvious possible remedies included increasing production, but owing to the limited availability of rubber a projected maximum of only 4,000 vehicles a month (for the whole armed forces, allowing 2,500–2,600 for the army) could be produced.

The infantry divisions were thus forced to shed an even greater share of motorised vehicles, finding themselves ever more dependent on horses and wagons.113 In the spring of 1941 the drain was somewhat offset by the expropriation of French war materiel, furnishing the Wehrmacht with 13,000 trucks114 and 341 trains.115 In addition, the army gained between 3,000 and 4,000 trucks from French North Africa116 and was able to purchase more from Switzerland.

Stahel, David. Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories) (p. 130). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
And per GSSW Vol 4., p. 1119, to maintain the Heer’s fleet of lorries, 150,000 would need to be produced each year, but only 39,000 were produced in 1941.
As with your earlier water station argument, this would suggest German trains were unable to travel
at all in the Soviet Union. However, the historical evidence proves that to be incorrect. Rail pressure
is related to (1) weight and (2) the square of the speed of travel. German trains traveled more slowly
in the Soviet Union but that doesn't address whether more German train resources would have provided
more rail travel (at the same OTL slower speed).
Per Stahel, Chapter 8: "Soviet rail beds were sometimes so weak and their rails so feeble that the only German locomotives that could be used were light models dating from World War I."
It's worthwhile to note that Mr. H.G.W. Davies, the author of the article you cite, has substantially the
same view of Barbarossa railways as has Mr. TheMarcksPlan. Thus, it appears that Great Minds are
working in the same direction.
Please quote where Davies says Barbarossa's rail problems were foreseeable and solvable with Germany's limited resources.
If the preparations considered necessary by the railroad experts were not made, the reason could
be that the war would not come at all or would be very short.
How do we know that the preparations contemplated here, even if they were made, would have been adequate for the actual conditions that were subsequently encountered in Barbarossa? What would Germany have to sacrifice to provide the manpower and resources to make these preparations?
I am interested in why you feel that having 3% more trucks added to Barbarossa, plus ~750 tanks, would
cause a 25% increase in military fuel consumption. This seems somewhat excessive - do you have
some figures that would substantiate this ?
As the chart shows, military consumption tripled from May to June 1941 - from 90 thousand tons to 270 thousand tons. There were 4 main axes of advance in the OTL. In this ATL we are adding a fifth that is stronger than the other 4. How much fuel and ammunition from this new axis of advance will be consumed is impossible to calculate precisely, but a good guess is that it will consume at least as much as the other 4 on average, perhaps more, given that it is stronger and operating from a remote location in northern Romania far from German supply bases, so a tremendous, months-long build up of fuel and ammo will be required to have this new axis of advance ready to go.

Edits: typos
Last edited by historygeek2021 on 04 Jun 2022 17:56, edited 4 times in total.

historygeek2021
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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by historygeek2021 » 04 Jun 2022 17:37

PunctuationHorror wrote:
04 Jun 2022 11:25

Where is the data for 'captured rubber', the loot from Netherlands, Belgium, France? The beautiful tables do not provide this information.
USSBS took into account captured rubber. See page 21.
They also do not provide the most important information: rubber consumption.
I gave a link to the USSBS page showing rubber consumption: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... &skin=2021
'possible 25% increase in fuel consumption in June and you're looking at total fuel consumption approach 380,000 tons ' - I don't know how a 25% increase of 260k tons makes 380k tons. Some kind of special arithmetic?
25% of 260,000 is 65,000. Total (military + civilian) consumption in June 1941 was 320,000. 320,000 + 65,000 = 385,000.
Where do these 25% inrease come from?
From creating a new axis of advance from northern Romania that is stronger than the other 4.
Further, the chart shows that the time 'when Germany blew through its stocks' was actually between November 1940 and March 1941 (Why was that? What happened then?) and again after June 1944.
There was a seasonal decline in production of gasoline in the winter of 1940, 1941 and 1942. As the synthetic program reached maturity in 1943, this seasonal decline seems to have then disappeared. The increase in military consumption in the autumn through spring of 1940 above its baseline from before the Battle of France is likely due to the large-scale transfer of the Heer from France to Poland. Add in the transfer to northern Romania needed for this ATL, and consumption will be even higher.
According to https://www.axishistory.com/list-all-ca ... ns-by-type, there were 21 PD and 15 Mot in June 1941. There were 28 PD, 4 Mech and 15 Mot in Nov 1942. By Sept 1943 they had 26 PD and 21 Mech. How did they manage to fuel these divisions, where did they get rubber for them? How did they manage to rebuild these division after all the losses?
German military output increased over time. Everyone from USSBS to Tooze acknowledges that. Synthetic rubber production increased in both quantity and quality over time, allowing for more trucks to be made.
Again, like with the rubber, this analysis of the gasoline chart is proof of analytical illiteracy, blatant misunderstanding or an nice try of 'Haha, look how I fooled them with distractions.'
Everyone has been very civil in this thread. I would appreciate it if you could keep it that way and avoid insults in future posts.

Edit: typos
Last edited by historygeek2021 on 04 Jun 2022 22:17, edited 1 time in total.

Huszar666
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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by Huszar666 » 04 Jun 2022 17:53

Morning,

I would add my to Euro-Cents to this.
Please provide the specific quotation and cite. I don't see anything in Scherner's or Schmelzing's articles stating that tires from civilian trucks could be swapped onto military trucks and endure the road conditions in the Soviet Union.
Actually, not counting a few exceptions (mostly the half-tracks and the armoured cars), the Wehrmacht was using civilian tires by and large. Since most of the "military" trucks were basically civilian trucks.
The better question would be, if captured French (etc) tires were useable for German vehicles - even today, there is not much of standardisation on the tire market. I do not know, what tire-sizes there were in France (etc), but according to the Oswald, the following tire sizes were used in Germany:
heavy trucks: 9,75/20 (or 270/20)
medium trucks: 7,25/20 (or 190/20)
light trucks (Krupp Protze): 7,5/17
light vehicles: 5,25/18, 210/18, 190/18
BTW: supplying your front troops with used tires of questionable quality and durability... Yeah, you could do that in a pinch, but I for myself wouldn't count on getting far.
Obviously they were ... in 1944. The question we're discussing is whether Hitler could have forcibly transferred hundreds of thousands of French, Belgian and Dutch workers to Germany in 1940 and expected them to produce enough serviceable panzers for 5 panzer divisions and 5 motorized divisions in less than a year.
If we are talking about "contracting" them and not "rounding up everyone around the right age and deport them"... Well... Assume at least a few weeks to get the contracting started and a few month to have a passable number of "contractees" contracted and a few month, probably, to teach them how to do stuff the German way to trucks and panzers. Even if you start planning the recruiting on or shortly before the 1st July 1940, the new working force would be doing effective work in numbers before... Say, November or so. We are not talking about 1,25mi French workers (quite a large number went into the agricultural sector as it was, NOT industry), but maybe a few hundred thousand. Tops.

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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by historygeek2021 » 04 Jun 2022 18:08

Huszar666 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 17:53

Actually, not counting a few exceptions (mostly the half-tracks and the armoured cars), the Wehrmacht was using civilian tires by and large. Since most of the "military" trucks were basically civilian trucks.
I guess that explains why only 15% of the Ostheer's trucks were fully serviceable by November 1941 (GSWW Vol IV/II p. 1137).
according to Oswald
Full source info please.
If we are talking about "contracting" them and not "rounding up everyone around the right age and deport them"
Germany did undertake a voluntary recruitment campaign for workers from the occupied territories in 1940, so contracted workers are already taken into account in the OTL. This was a smart way to do it - better to start by letting the Nazi sympathizers self-select so you can put them to work in the most vital areas of the economy and not have to worry about sabotage. It was only in 1942 that Germany started conscripting workers from the occupied west. This ATL is based on compulsory labor conscription beginning as soon as France falls in 1940.

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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by Huszar666 » 04 Jun 2022 18:34

Full source info please.
Oswald, Werner: Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Reichswehr, Wehrmacht und Bundeswehr ab 1900, Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart, 17. Auflage, 2004
I guess that explains why only 15% of the Ostheer's trucks were fully serviceable by November 1941 (GSWW Vol IV/II p. 1137).
Oh, and don't forget all the captured French vehicles that died out by October at the latest. They were utterly unsuitable to the Ostfront, and basically fell apart in 3-4 Month. At most.
This ATL is based on compulsory labor conscription beginning as soon as France falls in 1940.
Good luck with having a "motivated" workforce of any number before November 1940 or so :D
(not couting that OTL a large part of the French workforce went into agriculture, not industry. I've read an account of the distribution sometimes, somewhere, I remember something like 50%++ going into agriculture. No sure, though)

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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by ljadw » 04 Jun 2022 18:53

historygeek2021 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 18:08
Huszar666 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 17:53

Actually, not counting a few exceptions (mostly the half-tracks and the armoured cars), the Wehrmacht was using civilian tires by and large. Since most of the "military" trucks were basically civilian trucks.
I guess that explains why only 15% of the Ostheer's trucks were fully serviceable by November 1941 (GSWW Vol IV/II p. 1137).
according to Oswald
Full source info please.
If we are talking about "contracting" them and not "rounding up everyone around the right age and deport them"
Germany did undertake a voluntary recruitment campaign for workers from the occupied territories in 1940, so contracted workers are already taken into account in the OTL. This was a smart way to do it - better to start by letting the Nazi sympathizers self-select so you can put them to work in the most vital areas of the economy and not have to worry about sabotage. It was only in 1942 that Germany started conscripting workers from the occupied west. This ATL is based on compulsory labor conscription beginning as soon as France falls in 1940.
Compulsory labor conscription in France was a failure in 1942. It would not be different in 1940 .
Besides : there was no compulsory labor conscription in France before November 1942,as til that date Vichy France ( the non occupied zone ) existed .
Other point : those who worked voluntarily in Germany were NOT Nazi sympathizers . I have known someone who was a member of the International Brigades in Spain and who voluntarily went to Germany in the Summer of 1940 .
I also know the story of 2 non political persons who did the same ,to earn a living for their family .

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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by historygeek2021 » 04 Jun 2022 19:11

Huszar666 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 18:34

I guess that explains why only 15% of the Ostheer's trucks were fully serviceable by November 1941 (GSWW Vol IV/II p. 1137).
Oh, and don't forget all the captured French vehicles that died out by October at the latest. They were utterly unsuitable to the Ostfront, and basically fell apart in 3-4 Month. At most.
Yeah I think we can put this ATL to bed. Even if Germany somehow scrounged together the tanks, trucks and fuel to create a pincer out of northern Romania, it isn't going to change the outcome of the campaign if most of the Ostheer's vehicles have broken down by autumn. The campaign will still stall out somewhere around Moscow, and then in 1942 a weaker Ostheer will be left facing a Red Army that is twice as strong as it was in 1941. It turns out there was a good reason for needing to finish the campaign in a single season: the Red Army would surge in strength over the winter of 41-42, while the Ostheer would inevitably deteriorate.

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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by Huszar666 » 04 Jun 2022 20:00

Yeah I think we can put this ATL to bed. Even if Germany somehow scrounged together the tanks, trucks and fuel to create a pincer out of northern Romania, it isn't going to change the outcome of the campaign if most of the Ostheer's vehicles have broken down by autumn. The campaign will still stall out somewhere around Moscow, and then in 1942 a weaker Ostheer will be left facing a Red Army that is twice as strong as it was in 1941. It turns out there was a good reason for needing to finish the campaign in a single season: the Red Army would surge in strength over the winter of 41-42, while the Ostheer would inevitably deteriorate.
As I stated in the main thread, there are multiple weaknesses her.
Even IF we assume that Hitler for some reason realises the SU would be a harder nut to crack even before the SU elevated itself from "tentative ally" to "need to crush".
Even IF we assume that the 10 further fast divisions could be built up from scratch.
Even IF we assume, the 10 further fast division could be supplied till winter 1941.
We still have the problem of concentrating that 5th PzA PLUS the OTL 11th Army (plus further reinforcements) in North-Eastern Rumania with about ONE useable road and ONE marginally useable railway line. In time to make the Galizian Kessel happen.
Even IF all these do happen, much of the plan hanged upon the assumtion the STAVKA would conveniently shift troops from as far as Leningrad to the Ukraine.

(as an aside, I did lose track which of which reserve division should be converted into fast ones and which one should be redeployed to the South. It would be interesting to know WHAT those converted/redeployed divisions did OTL and how that would influence the respective front)

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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by Richard Anderson » 04 Jun 2022 23:09

Huszar666 wrote:
04 Jun 2022 11:34
"My" data is the 10th September (or a few days earlier, if possible). But, with the known 10-days-run-up the barges and stuff (at least for the 1st and 2nd Staffel in German diction) would have to sit in the harbours on the 1st September or a few days earlier.
The barges sitting in the harbours OTL End of September were already modified.
Okay that's where I thought you were going with c. 10 September.

Yes, the barges were modified by end of September - to Typ A standard for the bulk of them, so diagonal bracing and other strengthening, squared off bow and so forth to allow a ramp to be built. But the "build a ramp" idea would never work in combat, so they tried the portalramp, which was too complex and I doubt all were so modified because of the complexity. The solution for the ramp was eventually found in the double-folding ramp and the Rampengerät B, but that was in 1941, a bit late for a September 1940 landing I think?
Actually, you are talking about two different landing boats. The PLB 38 was built in 1938, and was sold to the civilian sector after testing. The PLB 39 was basically the same boat, only that it could be splitted lenghtwise for rail transport. THAT one was completed in July 1940.
They built a civilian sector pionier assault landing boat? Really? Why? I'm trying to figure out what civilians need assault boats, but thanks for the clarification.
So, the PLB 38 was ready for manufacturing in January/February 1940, when the pioneers asked for some. "Shitload" is maybe a bit overselling it, but around 50-100 would be possible till Early September in my opinion.
However, I'm NOT planning on having more than a handfull, so...
I don't understand why the pionier would be interested in a civilian sector craft, when they already had planned to militarize it as the PiLaBo 39? I also don't see that all that many, if any other than the prototype PiLaBo 38 were built? At least I can't find reference to any production at HMA?
Actually, no.
Yeah, thanks you're right, its been too long since I looked carefully at Schenk and the English translation unhelpfully uses "wave" for everything - Staffel, Welle, Treffer...
The provision for pusher boats was because of the unpowered barges. Later in the planning, pusher boats were eliminited completely, the powered barges having the task to help the unpowered land.
Really? In Schenk's last chapter he refers to the pusher (AKA motorboats) being kept on a one-for-one basis with the number of barges retained. I don't see anywhere where he says they were eliminated, which would be problematic given the unreliability and lack of power in many of the "powered" barges.
As I stated earlier, the loading plan is and was "concerning" to say the least.
Frankly, every bit of the "plan" was concerning to say the least. :lol:
No, they were not the different Ferries, but normal unpowered barges with two BMW aircraft engines on deck. There were 200 modified this way (150 Peniche and 50 Kampinen) and were called Type AF. Theoretically they were able to move with 6-7 Kn.
I forgot about the AF. However, 128 only were available by 1 October, with another 22 completed by 7 October and 25 more "a few days later" with 201 in total converted in the end. So if they were converted 22-25 every "few days" to a week, I would guess that c. 10 September perhaps a few dozen were ready? Especially given the type does not appear in the lists prior to 3 September, while the Typ A1,A2, AS1, AS2, B, and C do?
Actually, No. 1st Staffel are the barges, not the transports - those being the 3rd Staffel.
Yep, my bad, sorry.
For the 341 horses for the 1st Staffel, I'm assuming, you are referencing page 226 in Schenk (German version). Do note, however, that that list is for only one division, and next to the 341 horses there are also 300 "Karren" (for me it is not exactly clear if these are Infanteriekarren or the Feldwagen), 93 light cars, 34 trucks, 135 motorcycles and 46 MC-combinations. Please don enlighten me, why do you need so much transport for establishing, enlarging and securing of a not-so-deep bridgehead. And why do you need all these from the very first moment.
The Karren likely include those for the MG, 8cm Werfer, 7.5cm leIG, and so on. BTW, yes, it is page 160 of the English language edition by Greenhill Press.

But please don't ask me why "I" need so much transport, since I'm not one of the operations officers that laid out this plan. :D They seem to have thought it necessary except for the limited substitution of some French tracked vehicles as prime movers.
As for getting enough motor transport.
Oh, I understand. Sure, there are any number of "unnecessary" motorized columns hanging about France and Belgium that could have been "better" utilized, but for some reason the Ia, Ib, and Ic never thought of that? Maybe they were all idiots? No, unlikely.
Would it be possible to get around 800 further light trucks from somewhere and teach around the same number of soldiers how to drive in, say, two month?
Possible, sure, but they never considered it, so must be idiots...or they were wedded to an organization that they saw as a good compromise between motorization and horse draft that worked well for them in Poland, the Low Countries, and France, so saw little good reason to mess with it. They may have disliked allocating space for gasoline stocks or just didn't want to complicate an already complex operation even more by messing too much with standard organizations, TTP's, and doctrine?

Of course they also could have done the simple thing and just used the available Infanterie-Divisionen motorisiert for the assault.
This is exactly what I'm talking about. Cuckmere Haven was an idiotic idea to begin with (Newhaven not so much), and there were other points too that I simply can not understand. For example, no landing at or near the only place that could be called a habrour (Folkstone), the deployment of the Vorausabteilung that violated every notion of Schwerpunkt, and so forth.
Newhaven was pretty bad too given the lack of knowledge of the beach defenses. Essentially, the whole line of approaching barges would have been in perfect enfilade for the guns at Fort Newhaven.
Even if we assume the whole 1st, 2nd and 3rd Staffel is a total loss (a bit on the optimistic side for the UK) that would still leave around 1200 barges still sitting in French ports.
If the the first echelon (1. Treffer?) is a total loss, I don't think 1200 barges will do much good.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by Huszar666 » 05 Jun 2022 08:25

Morning,
Yes, the barges were modified by end of September - to Typ A standard for the bulk of them, so diagonal bracing and other strengthening, squared off bow and so forth to allow a ramp to be built. But the "build a ramp" idea would never work in combat, so they tried the portalramp, which was too complex and I doubt all were so modified because of the complexity. The solution for the ramp was eventually found in the double-folding ramp and the Rampengerät B, but that was in 1941, a bit late for a September 1940 landing I think?
Actually, if you don't have much in the way of wagons and motor vehicles in the 1st and 2nd Gruppe of 1st Staffel, only in the 3rd Gruppe and the 2nd and 3rd Staffeln, even the "series" type of ramp would be useable. Probably no direct enemy interference with the unloading, so the guys can bring out the ropes to fix the barges in place and unload the vehicles in peace.
They built a civilian sector pionier assault landing boat? Really? Why? I'm trying to figure out what civilians need assault boats, but thanks for the clarification.
+
I don't understand why the pionier would be interested in a civilian sector craft, when they already had planned to militarize it as the PiLaBo 39? I also don't see that all that many, if any other than the prototype PiLaBo 38 were built? At least I can't find reference to any production at HMA?
No, the PlB 38 was a military sector pionier assault boat, but was sold to private owners after the military trials. Why it was sold, and for what it was used later, I do not know, probably a normal commercial barge or a river ferry.
As for why the pioniere would be interested? It was a military craft after all, the plans were ready and the boats waiting to be built. The pioneers were shot down in January, probably because no one in the upper echelons saw an immediate need for such assault boats. That led to further refining the PLB 38 into the PLB 39 in summer 1940 (if I'm not mistaken, using un-official funds), and with all the Seelöwe-crazyness, they were ordered after all.
Really? In Schenk's last chapter he refers to the pusher (AKA motorboats) being kept on a one-for-one basis with the number of barges retained. I don't see anywhere where he says they were eliminated, which would be problematic given the unreliability and lack of power in many of the "powered" barges.
If I remember corretly, there were at least three stages in the planning:
1, every last barge gets a pusher boat (Stossboot) on its own, no matter if it's a powered or unpowered
2, only the unpowered ones get pusher boats, the powered ones are to land on their own
3, one Schleppzug (a pair of barges) consists of one powered and one unpowered barge, they are fixed together and the powered barge bring both on land. Maybe/probably there is still a pusher boat brought along for each Schleppzug, but they are primary there for the barges from the transports.
I would need to find the correct places, if I remember corretly, this evolution of the landing was described in different places as side notes.
Frankly, every bit of the "plan" was concerning to say the least. :lol:
:lol: :lol: :lol:
I forgot about the AF. However, 128 only were available by 1 October, with another 22 completed by 7 October and 25 more "a few days later" with 201 in total converted in the end. So if they were converted 22-25 every "few days" to a week, I would guess that c. 10 September perhaps a few dozen were ready? Especially given the type does not appear in the lists prior to 3 September, while the Typ A1,A2, AS1, AS2, B, and C do?
If the planning starts 3-4 weeks earlier, the conversion of the AF would also start earlier, with a bit more than 130 being ready on 10th September. :wink:
The Karren likely include those for the MG, 8cm Werfer, 7.5cm leIG, and so on. BTW, yes, it is page 160 of the English language edition by Greenhill Press.

But please don't ask me why "I" need so much transport, since I'm not one of the operations officers that laid out this plan. :D They seem to have thought it necessary except for the limited substitution of some French tracked vehicles as prime movers.
You are probably right with those being the Infanteriekarren. Just a quick calculation:
Each platoon had one, there was one for two heavy MG and two for each 8cm mortar, for a total of 27 for each Btl. Having 6 Btls landing that would mean 162 pieces. With the Radfahrabteilung, 189. However, the Btls should have landed with 2 companies, not three. Even if we assume the light trailers of the PAK and other stuff are considered "Karren", that would only add another 30 or so pieces. 100 or so trailer/carts are maybe a bit too much for other uses. What the at least 41 horses that don't have carts to pull were there for (probably more, if we assume, trailers were counted as KArren by Schenk), I have not the faintest idea.
Maybe 60 cars would be enough for pulling the PAK and such, but that would still leave 30 or so cars and 34 trucks (and all those MC) for some other uses.
I do feel, so many vehicles were not neccessary for the very first landing, while the beachhead wasn't even established...

As for why? Probably it had something to to with OKH's idea that a landing would be only made as a coup-de-grace (Dolchstoss) against a beaten enemy.

(just an aside: all those vehicles - exluding horses - would need around 40 Peniche to transport. You could put 40 platoons in the same number...)
Oh, I understand. Sure, there are any number of "unnecessary" motorized columns hanging about France and Belgium that could have been "better" utilized, but for some reason the Ia, Ib, and Ic never thought of that? Maybe they were all idiots? No, unlikely.
+
Possible, sure, but they never considered it, so must be idiots...or they were wedded to an organization that they saw as a good compromise between motorization and horse draft that worked well for them in Poland, the Low Countries, and France, so saw little good reason to mess with it. They may have disliked allocating space for gasoline stocks or just didn't want to complicate an already complex operation even more by messing too much with standard organizations, TTP's, and doctrine?
I wouldn't call them idiots, more likely not giving a damn about the whole issue. Since OKH though about the whole jazz as delivering a coup-de-grace against a beaten enemy, and not caring much for the whole operation, they probably didn't made the effort to think things through.
HOWEVER
There were a lot of Engineer Btls, bridging columns a the like that WERE stripped from their original Division for the landing...

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Re: TMP Overall; German Options

Post by Huszar666 » 05 Jun 2022 10:38

Morning,
I do not know, what tire-sizes there were in France (etc), but according to the Oswald, the following tire sizes were used in Germany:
heavy trucks: 9,75/20 (or 270/20)
medium trucks: 7,25/20 (or 190/20)
light trucks (Krupp Protze): 7,5/17
light vehicles: 5,25/18, 210/18, 190/18
Actually, I DO know the tire-sizes :D
According to Spielberger: Beute Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer
Citroen 23: 16/50
Citroen 45: 230/20
Laffy BS: 17/50
Peugeot DK 5: 15/50
Peugeot DMA: 6/20
Renault AHS: 6,5/20
Renault AHN: 210/20 or 34/7
Renault AHR: 230/20
Panhard 178: 42/9

Oh, however, these number only inform us about tire width and aspect ration, unfortunately not about wheel diameter...

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