Will Germany keep the Ostgebiete if the Allies capture the Arnhem bridge?

[Von Bock]

So...

Stalin is just going to meekly acquiesce to this new agreement - one that he would be kept from knowing - and everyone goes home?

Again. The original 'deal' was made in February 1945, when the Soviets were already close to Berlin. The fact that they already occupied some of the Ostgebiete gave them great negotiation opportunities.

What else could the Allies do when the Soviets already occupied parts of Germany? It was quite obvious that the Allies wouldn't be the first in Berlin.

So the agreement would have been different had the Allies been closer to Berlin in February 1945.

It's not that hard to understand.

A conscious decision on Ike's part he didnt want the casualty lists inherent, where Stalin couldnt care less about his men then or before

Well, that seems to be a fair answer to me. Stalin's total war mindset gave him the East of Germany. The Allies were not willing to offer so many casualties.

Ironically all of the conquered territories are not part of Russia anymore nowadays.

[Carl Schwamberger]

November indeed. That is still 3 months before the 'borderdeal' with Stalin was basically made. Everything was possible by then. If the Allies had liberated Holland already and progressed towards the Elbe, that would give them an advantage over Stalin in the negotiations. Remember that the US and UK didn't want Germany to lose that much territory.

Which circles back around to why the 21st & 12th AG did not carry on across the Rhine in November as the supply problem began to recede.

I don't get it. We both agree that the supply problem was pretty much over in November, right?

Not quite. They were able to supply X number of divisions or corps in November, but needed Y to break the multi layered defense along the Reichs frontier. I've been told the schedule for shipping combat formations from the US was stepped up from August, but it doesn't look like the supply shipment schedule kept up into the winter.

We also agree that the Western Allies were not enthusiastic about Russian/Polish annexations. So why wait until March 1945? A simple avoidance of casualties?

I see two different levels of attention there. Churchill & other politicians were concerned, but they never able to dictate what the armies in the field could actually do. Part of that was Marshal and Brooke were protecting Eisenhower from political pressure as best they could. More important were things Ike had to deal with directly. The autumn & winter weather was a big obstacle. That appears to have boosted the supply requirements along with slowing tactical operations significantly. The Division Slice or size of the support echelon per division increased as well. ie: the 9th Air Force joined the 5th Tactical Air Force ashore in Europe & the RAF increased its air groups in Europe as well. Theres also the question of lesser training among the US
reinforcement formations arriving from August.

[Von Schadewald]

With days to spare, the Germans get wind of the Market Garden plan, and lay a trap to let the 30,000 Anglo-American lightly-armed patroopers land up to 60 miles behind their lines, and then bar them any retreat. The whole lot get killed, wounded or go in to the bag.

Could the Germans have assembled enough forces to entrap 3 airborne divisions?

What would have been the effect on Allied morale and future planning of the loss of 3 entire divisions of their toughest soldiers?

[T. A. Gardner]

Could the Germans have assembled enough forces to entrap 3 airborne divisions?

Short answer = No. Longer answer = what would they use to do this? As it was they rounded up the entirety of what they called 1st Parachute Army (mostly launched by 2nd Parachute Corps) to attack into the flank of the 82nd Airborne and couldn't manage a tactical victory over a single Allied parachute division. That's because that "Army" amounted to roughly a poorly organized infantry division in reality. In other places a hodgepodge of miscellaneous units were tossed at the Allies to no effect. Units in the area were in such poor shape they had little chance of doing anything useful.

[Peter89]

The Allies were about to reshape the world and they will not give Germany a chance to create its own future under any circumstances. A separate peace might have been possible before Casablanca or maybe before Teheran, but definately not in 1944/1945 when Allied victory was inevitable.

[Von Schadewald]

American units had slightly heavier firepower than British. If it had been the lither troops of the 82nd landing at Arnhem, would their Garands, M3s, rocket grenades and bazookas have been able to hold off the Germans enough to allow XXX Corps to arrive in time, any better than the British 1st's Lee-Ens, Stens, hand grenades and PIATS?

Why weren't Tetrarchs or Locusts including in the landing?