Kriegsmarine surface ships are more aggressive in the Atlantic.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Who gets Madeira? And more importantly, the Cape Verde islands?

The battle for the islands. There's feed for a long discussion, research, and gaming it out.

[Peter89]

Who gets Madeira? And more importantly, the Cape Verde islands?

Seems like a minor point in comparison to the broad strokes of the Axis strategy we are discussing.

Not really... if the Germans can get Madeira, then the Azores is not the unsinkable carrier anymore. And if the British get Cape Verde islands, then Dakar is not much of use for the Germans.

[Peter89]

Who gets Madeira? And more importantly, the Cape Verde islands?

The battle for the islands. There's feed for a long discussion, research, and gaming it out.

[glenn239]

Not really... if the Germans can get Madeira, then the Azores is not the unsinkable carrier anymore. And if the British get Cape Verde islands, then Dakar is not much of use for the Germans.

In strategic terms, control of none of these island groups is going to decide the outcome to a war. The war is decided on what the USA and USSR decide to do, or not do, and that alone is the lens in which the merits of an Axis naval strategy is judged. What does such a strategy have to say about the prospects for US neutrality? What does it have to say on Soviet offensive options? How do Soviet decisions impact American decisions, and vice versa? Is there a point where the British, if facing the total dissolution of their empire, would seek peace? Those questions need answers, and I do not think the answers are to be found at Cape Verde.

[Lethl215]

Fleet forces in the Atlantic on the US side expanded from a training detachment of obsolescent ships in 1938 to a fleet larger in total ships than that in the Pacific on 7 Dec 41. The near constant political and military changes that occurred within that time frame are reflected in war planning and strategic priority - from a British lake which could be disregarded to the primary theater against Germany. ABC-1 and WPL-46 determined the organization, tasks, composition and dispositions of the Atlantic Fleet and all interim war plans, courses of action and contingency ops were built within this framework. After Pearl Harbor, the determinations made at ARCADIA still officially confirmed "Germany first" but one would be hard pressed to believe it from the naval side considering how the Atlantic Fleet was gutted over six months and the embarrassing successes of U-boats off the East Coast and within the Gulf of Mexico.

I sense a lot of strategic confusion among the Allies after ARCADIA, far beyond events in the Atlantic Fleet.

The tasks of escorting troop convoys and the buildup in Britain and other hemispheric outposts was quite successfully accomplished as was TORCH in 1942, but it took about everything we had remaining in the Atlantic until war production results were fully realized the following year. The lack of widely available documents for the Atlantic in 1940-41 online is, regrettably, discouraging.

Most of what I know comes from the books, & that from indirect sources. ie: the information about the US Army 3rd Division amphibious exercise comes from a bio of Mark Clark. He was the Operations officer of the 3rd 1939-1940. The navy Blue Books I've not examined in depth, but the parts I did were disappointing. Histories of the US preparation for war, like 'Roosevelts Secret War, or 'The Borrowed Years', and A Call to Arms, have a lot of scattered bits. Even the biography of the code expert Elizabeth Friedman had some fragments in it.

Concur.
Books I’d consider the best on the topic: Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, Heinrichs’, Threshold of War, Simpson, Adm Harold R Stark and Whitehill and Buell’s books on Fadm King. PHA volumes, of course, are loaded with material. NARA online is terrible and much isn’t digitized. FDR Map Room and Secretary Files are easier found through the FDR/Marist Library. Once I get to NARA College Park I’m just going to copy everything myself or pay someone to do it. Probably just stay with an old Academy company mate of mine who’s president of our class and pester some of my flag classmates chasing their tails around DC. Pretty much locked down where everything is as long as I have time and the archivists have everything that I request ready. The problem is, once a bunch of the guys get together, staying on task becomes harder.

[Peter89]

Not really... if the Germans can get Madeira, then the Azores is not the unsinkable carrier anymore. And if the British get Cape Verde islands, then Dakar is not much of use for the Germans.

In strategic terms, control of none of these island groups is going to decide the outcome to a war. The war is decided on what the USA and USSR decide to do, or not do, and that alone is the lens in which the merits of an Axis naval strategy is judged. What does such a strategy have to say about the prospects for US neutrality? What does it have to say on Soviet offensive options? How do Soviet decisions impact American decisions, and vice versa? Is there a point where the British, if facing the total dissolution of their empire, would seek peace? Those questions need answers, and I do not think the answers are to be found at Cape Verde.

First of all, these questions are both unpredictable and volatile, and second, the people who had to assess these informations were often misinformed or did not believe evidence at all. We have written evidence about politicians, generals and the such to declare a vision in public or in professional circles, then acted completely differently.

The Soviets and the Germans struck the Molotov-Ribbentrop deal, but the Soviets did not abide to it before Barbarossa. The Germans attacked the SU when they received key materials from there. FDR said again and again and again that he will not send Americans into foreign wars, and in about a year that's exactly what he did. The Germans declared war on the US when it was absolutely not necessary, thereby hastening the bomber campaign and the collapse in the MTO, but maybe even the D-Day. The Germans received reports about the industrial potential of the US and the SU yet did not act accordingly.

Also the British Empire was nowhere near collapsing. The territories in the Germans' reach were not nearly enough to bring about a collapse of the British economy, navy or air force - and the political system stood firm. Would the Brits ever seek terms with the Axis? Churchill said it himself that they won't; however, it could easily be a politician's speech to show resolve. Besides, he was a PM and not a dictator, thus what he wanted was irrelevant as soon as the electorate and other power houses wanted it otherwise. How could we answer such a question? Without the loss of India, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the British economy is not going to collapse as long as the merchant ships can sail the seas. The German surface fleet is never going to be able to challange the Royal navy vis-á-vis, and even if they'd be able to assemble a fleet some 60-70% of the British fleet, they might still lose on the strategic level (see Jütland), and the merchant fleet (greatly bolstered by the Norwegian, Dutch and Greek merchant ships) could continue its operations. Thus: the Germans had very slim chances to collapse the British Empire, and all of those chances are not coming straight down from predictable actions.

As for the US, they started to support the British very early on (21/09/1939 cash and carry, 02/09/1940 destroyers for bases, 11/03/1941 Lend-Lease) and it is likely that the British would never run out of American matériel. And it is also very much likely that after building the largest fleet and the largest air force the world has ever seen and developing the nukes, the US would not be interested in giving a chance to Germany/Axis to control any relevant part of the sea lanes (= world economy).

I also find it very unlikely that the Soviets would ever attack the Axis. Historically, the Soviets / Russians have never attacked deep into Europe on their own initiative. The largest army the Russian Empire ever sent abroad was the one sent against Hungary in 1849 and even that formally happened after an invitation by Franz Joseph. Also historically, a failed foreign conflict was the most certain indicator of a Soviet / Russian ruler's downfall, thus Soviet / Russian leaders usually refrained from risky conflicts, especially with the Western powers. Historically, all major Soviet / Russian incursions deep into Europe were acknowledged by the Western powers (Napoleonic wars, Hungarian revolution, WW1, WW2, etc.), and if it wasn't, the Soviet / Russian overreach ended with Soviet / Russian defeat (Crimean war, Cold war, etc.). No sensible French would go and die for Bessarabia or Bucovina, but if the Soviet armor are threatening the Ruhr, Europe would immediately line up behind German leadership and defeat the Soviets. Thus in my opinion it had close to zero chance for a Soviet invasion against Europe; and if it was attempted, it would be defeated, probably with Britain's war effort.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Concur.
Books I’d consider the best on the topic: Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, Heinrichs’, Threshold of War, Simpson, Adm Harold R Stark and Whitehill and Buell’s books on Fadm King. PHA volumes, of course, are loaded with material. NARA online is terrible and much isn’t digitized. FDR Map Room and Secretary Files are easier found through the FDR/Marist Library. Once I get to NARA College Park I’m just going to copy everything myself or pay someone to do it. Probably just stay with an old Academy company mate of mine who’s president of our class and pester some of my flag classmates chasing their tails around DC. Pretty much locked down where everything is as long as I have time and the archivists have everything that I request ready. The problem is, once a bunch of the guys get together, staying on task becomes harder.

Thanks

[glenn239]

First of all, these questions are both unpredictable and volatile, and second, the people who had to assess these informations were often misinformed or did not believe evidence at all.

Any Axis WW2 strategy - it does not matter which - is to be evaluated on the basis of how the USA and USSR react to it. This is because no Axis strategy of any sort survives against those pair. The advantage of a naval strategy is that it reinforces the possibility of an alliance with the Soviet Union. The disadvantage is that naval wars in the Atlantic could lead to incidents with the US Navy.

Also the British Empire was nowhere near collapsing. The territories in the Germans' reach were not nearly enough to bring about a collapse of the British economy, navy or air force - and the political system stood firm. Would the Brits ever seek terms with the Axis? Churchill said it himself that they won't;

The British Empire did collapse after the war, so obviously it was not as strong as you'd like to imagine. Strong enough to hold the Axis at bay until the Americans came in? Historically, yes. Strong enough to defend against a more aggressive USSR in the Persian Gulf region? Probably not.

I also find it very unlikely that the Soviets would ever attack the Axis. Historically, the Soviets / Russians have never attacked deep into Europe on their own initiative.

By 1941 the Soviet Union was so powerful that only Barbarossa could prevent it from undertaking an endless series of adventures throughout Europe and Asia designed for its own self-aggrandizement. Churchill could say whatever he wanted about endless war, but if the facts on the ground were such that British war with Germany was leading to the USSR's endless advantage, this line would become increasingly difficult. We know from the Cold War that the United States could become invested in thwarting these types of activities, but that's the point, only a power of the scale of the United States could do so.

[Peter89]

First of all, these questions are both unpredictable and volatile, and second, the people who had to assess these informations were often misinformed or did not believe evidence at all.

Any Axis WW2 strategy - it does not matter which - is to be evaluated on the basis of how the USA and USSR react to it. This is because no Axis strategy of any sort survives against those pair. The advantage of a naval strategy is that it reinforces the possibility of an alliance with the Soviet Union. The disadvantage is that naval wars in the Atlantic could lead to incidents with the US Navy.

Those weren't really a pair...

Do we remember what Harry Truman said to the NY in “Our Policy Stated”, New York Times, June 24, 1941:

“If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don't want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances. Neither of them think anything of their pledged word.”

The Anglo-Saxon powers were not interested in the spread of communism or the spread of the Soviet influence on the seas. The Soviets chose the only sensible path, namely to connect Europe and Asia (which is in fact Eurasia) and its resources via land and to minimize trade. Hitler's Germany had to trade in order to raise foreign currency to buy raw materials - so they could produce industrial goods for sale and buy raw materials. The whole Hitlerian-German economic policy was about to circumvent the "continental blockade", which the Soviets have been doing for over a decade by then. It is questionable how many totalitarian countries could live in the Eurasian ecosphere without dependencies or conflicts, but for me it is obvious that the Soviet Union did not have to clash with Germany or with China/Japan for additional resources or better strategic positions. On the contrary, actually: I believe that the Soviets were quite statisfied with the German-Allied and the Japan-China wars, because those tied down the resources (note that naval warfare was really expensive and naturally led to an arms race) of capitalist naval powers.

You know, at a general strategic level, I tend to agree with you. Not just me, but many contemporaries as well. If Germany could maintain neutral-trading relations with the SU, it was great and probably the only major strategic achievement of the Hitlerian regime. However, in my mind, Germany / Axis might never be able to defeat the Anglo-Saxon powers on the seas. The air is very much different, and of course there is the question of rockets. Germany might never be able to defeat Britain, but it might be able to force Britain into a peace in which Britain could have her dying empire and the Axis could rule Europe.

Also the British Empire was nowhere near collapsing. The territories in the Germans' reach were not nearly enough to bring about a collapse of the British economy, navy or air force - and the political system stood firm. Would the Brits ever seek terms with the Axis? Churchill said it himself that they won't;

The British Empire did collapse after the war, so obviously it was not as strong as you'd like to imagine. Strong enough to hold the Axis at bay until the Americans came in? Historically, yes. Strong enough to defend against a more aggressive USSR in the Persian Gulf region? Probably not.

The Quit India Movement did not materialize because India wanted to be a Soviet puppet; also Pakistan would never be part of the Soviet sphere of influence (if ever, it wouldn't last), the same is true to Bangladesh. Without those regions, the British Empire would not collapse. If Persia and Afghanistan were taken by the SU (the only realistic path), the British Empire would still stand firm and probably would seek a compromise with the Soviets instead of opposing them. The Atlantic Charter signalled that the US is willing to help only if the colonial system is going to be over.

I also find it very unlikely that the Soviets would ever attack the Axis. Historically, the Soviets / Russians have never attacked deep into Europe on their own initiative.

By 1941 the Soviet Union was so powerful that only Barbarossa could prevent it from undertaking an endless series of adventures throughout Europe and Asia designed for its own self-aggrandizement. Churchill could say whatever he wanted about endless war, but if the facts on the ground were such that British war with Germany was leading to the USSR's endless advantage, this line would become increasingly difficult. We know from the Cold War that the United States could become invested in thwarting these types of activities, but that's the point, only a power of the scale of the United States could do so.

I think you're overestimating the Soviets. They did not simply carry a flag, but an entirely new system as well: one that was despised by many ruling elites all around the world (communism can be translated to a change of ruling elites). Historically they overextended themselves in 1939-1945 and paid a very heavy price for it. If they overextended themselves on a waaay larger scale (which you suggest), the Soviet system would collapse waaay earlier. In fact, the Soviet system collapsed in Central Europe as early as 1953-1956-1968-1981. In fact, Soviets always relied on sheer and brute force to maintain their political systems. The only time they didn't, their system collapsed.

[glenn239]

You know, at a general strategic level, I tend to agree with you. Not just me, but many contemporaries as well. If Germany could maintain neutral-trading relations with the SU, it was great and probably the only major strategic achievement of the Hitlerian regime. However, in my mind, Germany / Axis might never be able to defeat the Anglo-Saxon powers on the seas.

An Axis naval strategy cannot possibly defeat the Americans in the Atlantic, so the intervention of the Americans in the war is pretty much the moment in time that signals that such a strategy will fail.

I think you're overestimating the Soviets.

The Germans could not fight the Americans or the Soviets, or they would lose the war. The British, for all Churchill's talk, would not fight the Nazis to the destruction of the British Empire. Since the Germans themselves could not threaten this, it follows that the logical strategy for the Axis was to assemble the coalition that could. The Axis fight a naval war to leverage the British to the peace table as the Soviets pick off neutral after neutral.

[Richard Anderson]

An Axis naval strategy cannot possibly defeat the Americans in the Atlantic, so the intervention of the Americans in the war is pretty much the moment in time that signals that such a strategy will fail.

An Axis naval strategy has about the same chance to defeat the British in the Atlantic too, so what is the point?

The Germans could not fight the Americans or the Soviets, or they would lose the war. The British, for all Churchill's talk, would not fight the Nazis to the destruction of the British Empire.

More like the Germans could fight the Americans or the Soviets or the British but fighting them in any combination was likely to mean they lose the war. Nor could the Germans control the actions of the Japanese or Hitler's predilections, so at some point the Germans would be fighting an Anglo-American coalition and probably sooner or later an Anglo-American-Soviet one, while it was unlikely for much the same reasons that the Germans and Soviets would ever have more than a one-way economic agreement.

Since the Germans themselves could not threaten this, it follows that the logical strategy for the Axis was to assemble the coalition that could. The Axis fight a naval war to leverage the British to the peace table as the Soviets pick off neutral after neutral.

Okay but then how do the Germans deal with the "neutrals" the Soviets want to pick off one after another are Finland, Romania, Hungary, and Japan? Or that the naval war that the Axis is able to fight is unwinnable by the Axis?

As ever, I am confused by your logic.

[Peter89]

You know, at a general strategic level, I tend to agree with you. Not just me, but many contemporaries as well. If Germany could maintain neutral-trading relations with the SU, it was great and probably the only major strategic achievement of the Hitlerian regime. However, in my mind, Germany / Axis might never be able to defeat the Anglo-Saxon powers on the seas.

An Axis naval strategy cannot possibly defeat the Americans in the Atlantic, so the intervention of the Americans in the war is pretty much the moment in time that signals that such a strategy will fail.

The Americans intervened, that's the problem. Even before the DoW. So what you're saying is basically that Germany never stood any chance in the Atlantic battle. Which leads us back to the questions regarding how to defeat Britain - and we still have no good answers.

I think you're overestimating the Soviets.

The Germans could not fight the Americans or the Soviets, or they would lose the war. The British, for all Churchill's talk, would not fight the Nazis to the destruction of the British Empire. Since the Germans themselves could not threaten this, it follows that the logical strategy for the Axis was to assemble the coalition that could. The Axis fight a naval war to leverage the British to the peace table as the Soviets pick off neutral after neutral.

Why would the Soviets do that?

At that moment the Axis was depending on Soviet deliveries and from a Soviet perspective it was the best. They could control Germany, and the Anglo-Saxons as well.

[nota]

the axis was not a real allied group

motley rag bag of nations with no real common goal

there is one way to win with the navy they had

the Nippon fleet in the Atlantic to attack england in 1940

not a sure win midway luck can still strike but the brits can't stop the air power
or the long lances so the best perhaps only way to win WW2 in 1940 or ever

and they never even thought of doing it
let alone a paper plan/study/proposal/idea

they had no group goal or even a planing meeting

heck of a way to fight a war

but if you guys can drop they they did not they would not BS
and really understand it could work in period with real on hand equipment

sure it is a long strange trip and they could lose the fleet and the war
but it actually has a chance unlike 99% of the other ideas that require things they just did not have
on like far too many things they had no way to get

boats sail long distances that is one thing they did do in that time
it is possible to do

the will in japan is not there the men and the ships are
but will can be changed and far faster then fleets built
esp the will of a very few heads

think before you scream no

[Peter89]

the axis was not a real allied group

motley rag bag of nations with no real common goal

there is one way to win with the navy they had

the Nippon fleet in the Atlantic to attack england in 1940

not a sure win midway luck can still strike but the brits can't stop the air power
or the long lances so the best perhaps only way to win WW2 in 1940 or ever

and they never even thought of doing it
let alone a paper plan/study/proposal/idea

they had no group goal or even a planing meeting

heck of a way to fight a war

but if you guys can drop they they did not they would not BS
and really understand it could work in period with real on hand equipment

sure it is a long strange trip and they could lose the fleet and the war
but it actually has a chance unlike 99% of the other ideas that require things they just did not have
on like far too many things they had no way to get

boats sail long distances that is one thing they did do in that time
it is possible to do

the will in japan is not there the men and the ships are
but will can be changed and far faster then fleets built
esp the will of a very few heads

think before you scream no

Seriously? Without screaming,

If the Japanese fleet leaves the Pacific, what is going to protect the Japanese merchant fleet, upon which the whole Japanese economy depended?

How would they refuel and more importantly, resupply the ammunition? The Axis had no bases in the Atlantic which was free of RAF torpedo/bombers.

How would this squadron steam to Britain? Where would they anchor? What if a ship has engine troubles? Also this squadron has to be pretty large, because the Royal Navy was still the world's largest navy in 1939 and the German fleet was crippled in the Weserübung.

Also why would the Japanese send their navy (thus subjecting themselves to German goodwill) to Europe in order to defeat Britain but not defeat the US which would still mortally threaten them?

Being allied for world domination is one thing, being an imbecile is another; the US did not serve British interests: they demolished the British Empire and the colonial system. The British did not serve US interests: in exchange for their empire, they wanted a disproportionately good seat at the table of the new world's order. The Soviets obviously neither served British nor US interests... in fact, nobody served others' interests.

Also in case of emergency the British could concentrate their fleet around the Home Islands (around which the RAF held a clear aerial superiority). Also the Japanese could hardly arrive for the beginning of September (the only suitable time for the invasion) without magical foresight. If the invasion does not materialize in 1940, then by 1941 the British fleet and the RAF were stronger than ever before.

[nota]

WHY INDIA plus other areas the english have far closer to japan then any other axis power HK sing ect
and only japan has the ability to move troops in the eastern areas

THEY CAN'T WIN ANY OTHER WAY yes it is hard and unlikely but there is no other real way

mid 1940 russia is semi allied with the axis at a minimum can be paid/trade to help
german ships did pass with russian ice breakers aid thru the arctic summer ice to japan going the other way is possible
our fleet did a round the world in pre 1900 ships are built to go long distances yes some may break and need fixing so what there are sea going tugs
oil tankers refuel the ships and supply can be shipped across the red rail system

the japan merchant fleet can also transport ammo parts and supply as needed
and the USA will not attack until war is declared IF THEN likely not even then we did not until actually attacked by them
and japan can get the land by peace treaty not conquest at far less risk of a USA attack
esp if quick the english knock out before the end of 1941 and a quick peace is axis granted with out occupation just colony losses
would we go to war if there is peace quickly ?