The Army Ordnance Department plays a role in the outcome at Stalingrad.

[LachenKrieg]

One of the initial design specifications of what was meant to be Germany’s first main battle tank post WWI was that it be equipped with a 5.0 cm gun. This would however be opposed by the German Army Ordnance Department, and the first mass production Pz III’s to roll off the assembly line in 1939 were armed with the 3.7 cm KwK 36 anti-tank gun. The Panzer III would eventually be up-gunned with the 5.0 cm L/42 in the summer of the following year, but would also remain that way until after German forces on the Eastern front met up with Russian T-34, and KV tanks.

This WI scenario is built around two interconnected aspects of history that if altered, could have potentially changed the progression of Germany’s war effort, and the outcome at Stalingrad. The first being what if the Pz III was initially armed with the 5.0 cm L/42, and the second being what if the person, or persons responsible were capable of recognizing the visible dangers that were brewing on all fronts by the fall of 1941? Given the rapidly developing situation, the demand to take “not one step back” would soon prove to be an unworkable solution to the problem at hand.

The net effect of the WI scenario’s first alteration is that the Pz III is up-gunned with the 5.0 cm L/60 in 1940 before the start of operation Barbarossa. The net effect of the second is that German forces of Heeresgruppe B would be given the order to coordinate and take appropriate action in good time? Expanding the first alteration leads to the realization that continued production of the Pz III chassis with turreted versions after Germany’s invasion of Russia is fruitless and a waste of valuable resources. This would then in turn advance the need to develop the 7.5 cm L/43 six months earlier so that all Pz III chassis produced after September 1941 are utilized for what is to become the long barrel StuG III.

This historical alteration would represent a significant improvement in Germany’s fighting force, adding nearly 3000 more effective weapon systems to its armored vehicle inventory by the end of the war. The Pz III Ausf J & L are two of my favorite WWII armored vehicles, but by the end of 1941 the Pz III had been superseded by the rapid pace of Allied wartime technological advancements, and further production of these vehicles should have been halted. In contrast to Pz III tanks equipped with the 5.0 cm L/60 gun, the StuG III cost less, had slightly better armor with a lower profile, much better fire power, and proved itself on the battlefield to be effective as both an offensive and defensive weapon.

Even taking into account the serious losses in men and material that resulted from the fatal error of dividing Germany’s forces in the south between Stalingrad and the push for the Caucasus, an improved fighting force would have likely helped to decrease losses at the expense of the opposing Russian units fighting there. But without considering what impact an improved fighting force would have had on German losses as it advanced toward the Volga, using just the number of available vehicles at the start of the Russian counter offensive gives Heeresgruppe B alone some 200 additional 7.5 cm guns, while Heeresgruppe A would have had an additional 66 (source: Jentz, Panzer Truppen Vol 2).

These alterations would have not only augmented the firepower of Heeresgruppe B, but would have equally affected the German forces fighting capability in general. I propose these alterations could have significantly improved the ability of Heeresgruppe B to at least avoid encirclement of its 6th Army, while aiding German forces as a whole in their efforts to stabilize the quickly deteriorating Eastern Front.

What are your thoughts?

[T. A. Gardner]

First, the 50/42 was perfectly adequate for dealing with somewhere between 65 and 90% of Russian tanks up through Stalingrad. The T34 was very much in the minority throughout that period. Most tank brigades were somewhere between two-thirds and 100% composed of either older BT and T26 models, or light tanks like the T60 and T70.
The KV saw use in decreasing numbers once the war in Russia started. They took too many resources and were very problematic on the battlefield operationally, mostly due to poor automotive performance.

To deal with the T34, the Germans turned to improvisations of panzerjäger like the Marder series. These and other improvisations filled the gap until better designed vehicles and guns could be put into production.

Even at Kursk in 1943, many Russian tank brigades still were 50%+ T70's rather than T34's.

A simpler solution for the Germans would have been to tell Krupp they no longer had a monopoly on tungsten carbide. That would have allowed manufacturers to increase production of AP40 rounds that would have kept the 50/42 useful longer allowing a smoother transition to better guns as the war progressed.

[Richard Anderson]

The main problems with this idea are:

1) It was already done, to death, here: viewtopic.php?f=11&t=263884

To summarize, the actual decision was based on the quite simple fact that Germany had no 5cm gun in 1934. Yes, the decision was to build the ZW/Pz III with the existing 3.7cm gun, while pursuing development of the 5cm gun. The 5cm gun was completed by Rheinmettal and offered as the PaK 37 in 1938 but was rejected by HWA and development continued on it with a lengthened barrel, which became the PaK 38 in 1939, which was accepted. In the meantime development of the Panzer III stretched into 1939 as well for various reasons. The decision by HWA to then use the PaK 37 as the next tank gun in the Pz-III was to simplify mounting and for greater ammunition stowage but also because 5cm PaK 38 production was just beginning and was prioritized for issue to replace the 3.7cm PaK, which was already seen as inadequate.

Why did the decide to produce the 5cm KwK and 5cm PaK 38 at the same time? I suspect it was because the 5cm KwK could be more easily produced by converting 3.7cm production than by splitting production on the PaK 38 line but have never been able to confirm that. However, PaK 38 production was quite small when it began in March 1940 - 4 - and only averaged 54.75 per month in its first year of production. Choosing to arm the Pz-III with a 5cm gun in 1935 would only have resulted in a smaller number of Panzer III arriving with units later AND a smaller number of PaK 39 arriving with units later, which would not have improved matters on the Ostfront at all.

2) Prescience isn't really a thing. In essence, the Germans went with what they could precisely because they could not predict the future.

3) It is ordnance, not ordinance.

[LachenKrieg]

First, the 50/42 was perfectly adequate for dealing with somewhere between 65 and 90% of Russian tanks up through Stalingrad. The T34 was very much in the minority throughout that period. Most tank brigades were somewhere between two-thirds and 100% composed of either older BT and T26 models, or light tanks like the T60 and T70.
The KV saw use in decreasing numbers once the war in Russia started. They took too many resources and were very problematic on the battlefield operationally, mostly due to poor automotive performance.

To deal with the T34, the Germans turned to improvisations of panzerjäger like the Marder series. These and other improvisations filled the gap until better designed vehicles and guns could be put into production.

Even at Kursk in 1943, many Russian tank brigades still were 50%+ T70's rather than T34's.

A simpler solution for the Germans would have been to tell Krupp they no longer had a monopoly on tungsten carbide. That would have allowed manufacturers to increase production of AP40 rounds that would have kept the 50/42 useful longer allowing a smoother transition to better guns as the war progressed.

You are right,the 5 cm L42 could be used against a large majority of Russian tanks at the start of the invasion, but those tanks were not the problem and certainly weren't the reason the Tiger appeared just a little more than a year later. While the number of T34/KV tanks steadily increased throughout the war, it was already obvious at the start of the invasion that the problem would likely get worse and not better.

But this isn't really the point I was introducing in the WI scenario. There have been many discussion about whether Germany could have built more tanks, or better tanks to change the wars outcome, but there are a lot fewer discussions on how Germany might have been able to change the course of the war by simply making adjustments in the way it managed what it had.

The point was the L60 could have been made available in 1940, and had the Pz III been armed with it before the start of Barbarossa, the need to find an alternative could have been concluded on much sooner. Hind sight is always 20/20, but this is a WI scenario, and it asks what if the Germans did the right thing here and abandoned efforts to maintain turreted versions of the Pz III after September 1941. In terms of its combat value, the Pz III was extremely limited in comparison to weapon systems like the StuG Ausf F - G. Accepting this reality could have led Germany to a viable solution, all that would have to change in this WI scenario is development of the 7.5 L43 gets advanced 6 months earlier then it actually was.

To your point on how the Germans dealt with the T34, IMO they spent too much time filling gaps with things like the L60 equipped PzIII. According to Jentz, Heeresgruppe B had 208 long barrel PzIII's, and just 78 long barrel PzIV's before the Russian counter offensive begins. Heersgruppe A had 66 PzIII's, vs 17 PzIV's. This issue is obviously attached to production capacity, but it only adds reason to support the notion that Germany should have abandoned the Pz III in favor of the StuG III as a viable way to improve its fighting force with what it already had.

[LachenKrieg]

The main problems with this idea are:

1) It was already done, to death, here: viewtopic.php?f=11&t=263884

To summarize, the actual decision was based on the quite simple fact that Germany had no 5cm gun in 1934. Yes, the decision was to build the ZW/Pz III with the existing 3.7cm gun, while pursuing development of the 5cm gun. The 5cm gun was completed by Rheinmettal and offered as the PaK 37 in 1938 but was rejected by HWA and development continued on it with a lengthened barrel, which became the PaK 38 in 1939, which was accepted. In the meantime development of the Panzer III stretched into 1939 as well for various reasons. The decision by HWA to then use the PaK 37 as the next tank gun in the Pz-III was to simplify mounting and for greater ammunition stowage but also because 5cm PaK 38 production was just beginning and was prioritized for issue to replace the 3.7cm PaK, which was already seen as inadequate.

Why did the decide to produce the 5cm KwK and 5cm PaK 38 at the same time? I suspect it was because the 5cm KwK could be more easily produced by converting 3.7cm production than by splitting production on the PaK 38 line but have never been able to confirm that. However, PaK 38 production was quite small when it began in March 1940 - 4 - and only averaged 54.75 per month in its first year of production. Choosing to arm the Pz-III with a 5cm gun in 1935 would only have resulted in a smaller number of Panzer III arriving with units later AND a smaller number of PaK 39 arriving with units later, which would not have improved matters on the Ostfront at all.

2) Prescience isn't really a thing. In essence, the Germans went with what they could precisely because they could not predict the future.

3) It is ordnance, not ordinance.

Richard, thanks for the correction. I made the edits to address your point 3.

To your point 2, this WI scenario has nothing to do with predicting the future, so I am not sure where that is coming from. I believe the German's were pretty confident about the observations they made while visiting Russia in the summer of 1941. There were no predictions, it was simply a fact that German armament was not up to the task.

To start with your point 1, I read that thread and it has nothing in common with the WI scenario I proposed. The OP is suggesting that the Pz III could have been improved by making it bigger, slopping its armor, and adding a better gun. While some might confuse that with the Panther tank that eventually does arrive on the scene, I am suggesting that Germany should have abandoned all attempts at newer turreted versions of the PzIII after September 1941.

But I feel like you might have also misread, or misunderstood me. As we are all aware, the Pz III saw many changes/improvements to its design over the course of its development. But not in terms of its armament. So my point wasn't what gun the Pz III had in 1935, but what it went into final production with.

Had it started with the L42, the chances that the actual real upgrade it saw in 1940 would have had to be the L60. This WI would ensure that the L60 was tested in battle at the beginning of Barbarossa. The importance of this in terms of a WI scenario is that it provides the drive to find an alternative instead of filling a gap with a losing proposition. Sure they could still try things like mounting a PzIV turret on the III, but I think we all know what happens in the end.

[Richard Anderson]

You are right,the 5 cm L42 could be used against a large majority of Russian tanks at the start of the invasion, but those tanks were not the problem and certainly weren't the reason the Tiger appeared just a little more than a year later. While the number of T34/KV tanks steadily increased throughout the war, it was already obvious at the start of the invasion that the problem would likely get worse and not better.

Yes, but Tiger I did not appear because it was a response to the problem of increasing numbers of T34.KV tanks on the Ostfront. Tiger I was a response to a May 1941 HWA requirement for a heavy contracted through In 6 to Henschel and Porsche. A month before BARBAROSSA began and the T34/KV tanks were encountered.

But this isn't really the point I was introducing in the WI scenario. There have been many discussion about whether Germany could have built more tanks, or better tanks to change the wars outcome, but there are a lot fewer discussions on how Germany might have been able to change the course of the war by simply making adjustments in the way it managed what it had.

I dunno, but it seems to me that about 90 percent of the topics started in this What If section are regarding adjustments Germany could have employed to win the war. The other 10 percent are the same but for Japan.

The point was the L60 could have been made available in 1940, and had the Pz III been armed with it before the start of Barbarossa, the need to find an alternative could have been concluded on much sooner. Hind sight is always 20/20, but this is a WI scenario, and it asks what if the Germans did the right thing here and abandoned efforts to maintain turreted versions of the Pz III after September 1941. In terms of its combat value, the Pz III was extremely limited in comparison to weapon systems like the StuG Ausf F - G. Accepting this reality could have led Germany to a viable solution, all that would have to change in this WI scenario is development of the 7.5 L43 gets advanced 6 months earlier then it actually was.

No, it could not have been made available in 1940, at least in any meaningful numbers. Again, just 408 PaK 38 were completed in 1940. Of course they could have developed a mounting for it in the Panzer III Ausf F, but its still would have taken the historical eight-odd months from inception to production to get it into service.

Abandoning a turreted version of the Panzer III in September 1941 would mean no supply of replacement tanks to the Panzer divisions except for the Panzer IV, which production was already inadequate to fill actual requirements. While the StuG-III could be substituted with the 7.5cm StuK37 L24 a StuK 40 version would still not be around until March 1942.

Development of the 7.5cm PaK 40 began in April 1938 for German FY 1939 but was not completed until February 1942 when the first 15 were delivered to the HZA. Why would Germany conceive a requirement for such a gun in FY 1938, i.e., c. April 1937?

To your point on how the Germans dealt with the T34, IMO they spent too much time filling gaps with things like the L60 equipped PzIII. According to Jentz, Heeresgruppe B had 208 long barrel PzIII's, and just 78 long barrel PzIV's before the Russian counter offensive begins. Heersgruppe A had 66 PzIII's, vs 17 PzIV's. This issue is obviously attached to production capacity, but it only adds reason to support the notion that Germany should have abandoned the Pz III in favor of the StuG III as a viable way to improve its fighting force with what it already had.

If Germany had abandoned the Panzer III, then it would have been c. six to nine months before those plants already funded and tooled to produce the Panzer III could have been refunded and retooled to produce the Panzer IV. It is the same dilemma encountered when the decision to produce the Panther was made by retooling Panzer III production lines. The time required meant that instead of converting Panzer IV production as well that capacity had to be retained, otherwise there would have been a gap of six to nine months with little or no tank production of any type. Well, except for Henschel, which was already planned to convert from Panzer III production to Tiger and Alkett, which was already planned to convert from Panzer III production to StuG III production.

[Richard Anderson]

Richard, thanks for the correction. I made the edits to address your point 3.

Thank you.

To your point 2, this WI scenario has nothing to do with predicting the future, so I am not sure where that is coming from. I believe the German's were pretty confident about the observations they made while visiting Russia in the summer of 1941. There were no predictions, it was simply a fact that German armament was not up to the task.

Since the Germans reacted based upon their observations in the Soviet Union in summer 1941, then how do they speed up the transition any faster than they actually did?

To start with your point 1, I read that thread and it has nothing in common with the WI scenario I proposed. The OP is suggesting that the Pz III could have been improved by making it bigger, slopping its armor, and adding a better gun. While some might confuse that with the Panther tank that eventually does arrive on the scene, I am suggesting that Germany should have abandoned all attempts at newer turreted versions of the PzIII after September 1941.

Yes, I meant that the idea of going with a single tank type earlier - be it Panzer III or IV, with or without "improvements" - has the same problems associated with it whichever tank is selected for replacement.

But I feel like you might have also misread, or misunderstood me. As we are all aware, the Pz III saw many changes/improvements to its design over the course of its development. But not in terms of its armament. So my point wasn't what gun the Pz III had in 1935, but what it went into final production with.

Had it started with the L42, the chances that the actual real upgrade it saw in 1940 would have had to be the L60. This WI would ensure that the L60 was tested in battle at the beginning of Barbarossa. The importance of this in terms of a WI scenario is that it provides the drive to find an alternative instead of filling a gap with a losing proposition. Sure they could still try things like mounting a PzIV turret on the III, but I think we all know what happens in the end.

Um, the L60 was tested in battle at the beginning of Barbarossa as the 5cm PaK 38. It was found wanting and was replaced by the PaK 40, which requirement was actually expressed three years earlier in 1938 but did not come to fruition until one year later in 1942...and as late as two years later in 1944 the Heer was still using both the PaK and KwK 38, albeit in very small numbers.

So what alternative did the Germans have that could have gotten around the time and cost limitations imposed by research, development, and retooling of what was already an over strained industrial complex?

[LachenKrieg]

Richard, thanks again for your comments. Before responding to your last posts, I would like to clarify that I am happy Germany didn't win the war, and this is not a thread about how they could have. The question was more about what would have happened if Germany had managed its resources differently? Would a more potent tank force be enough to avoid encirclement at Stalingrad, and would that have allowed them to re-stabilize the Eastern Front long enough to continue the war?

Regarding the Tiger, seems to me I read somewhere that Germany had been working on a heavy breakthrough tank as early as 1937, but that it was the early encounters with Russian tanks in 1941 that really spurred things along. At any rate, both of the prototypes that were demonstrated in April 1942 had supposedly been completed in less than a year, and by August of that same year 4 completed Tiger tanks were apparently delivered and waiting in a staging area near Leningrad. Combat operations supposedly started in September. If its true, that is an incredible feat considering the amount of work completed in such a short time.

Regarding the availability of the L60, according to Spielberger in his book Panzer III & Its Variants, the L60 was not only available in 1940 but was personally requested in a memo from the little guy with the funny mustache. The Waffenamt went with the 5 cm L42 instead. Spielberger goes on to explain how the weakness of German tank guns was quickly revealed upon meeting the T34/KV tanks at the start of Barbarossa. He is referring to the 5 cm L42.

But again, you have either misread or misunderstood something I wrote because this WI scenario is not about making a single tank, or retooling a factory to make PzIV's, or just up and blindly abandoning Pz III production without a replacement.

The WI scenario suggests that turreted versions of the Pz III be abandoned after September 1941, to be replaced with StuG III's. The same factory would still continue to make the same Pz III chassis needed to make the same StuG, but with a long barrel. The 7.5 L43 was ready for testing in February 1942. What ever date they started working on developing it, the WI scenario calls for the work to be urgently sped up because of the recent T34/KV encounter so that the gun is ready for testing in September 1941. Even if the gun could only be ready for testing in November, so just 4 months earlier, the second series of Pz III J's with the L60 would only just be starting production. There is no need to continue manufacturing the PzIII after encountering the T34 in the summer of 1941, and the WI scenario is asking what would have happened if Germany had been able to come up with a viable solution to replace it with long barrel StuG's within 4 to 5 months following the event?

[T. A. Gardner]

But this isn't really the point I was introducing in the WI scenario. There have been many discussion about whether Germany could have built more tanks, or better tanks to change the wars outcome, but there are a lot fewer discussions on how Germany might have been able to change the course of the war by simply making adjustments in the way it managed what it had.

I've made a suggestion like that on more than one occasion. That is, the Germans adopt more mechanization in their construction engineer units. This doesn't have to be full mechanization, just more than they had. That is, their engineers are not mainly equipped with hand tools to do their jobs.
Add to this the Germans adopt pre-fab buildings of the sort the British and US used like the Nissan hut or Quonset hut. Built of wood, these buildings are shipped by rail forward. The railway engineers likewise are given specialized trains that assist them in repairing and re-gaging Russian railroads.

The whole of this is intended to allow the German army to repair and improve the transportation and other infrastructure in Russia faster and better than they did historically. This in turn becomes a force multiplier as the rail system can handle more trains per day and the trains can move faster over the rail system. With somewhat better roads, trucks hauling supplies don't wear out as fast meaning they have to be replaced fewer times over a given period. With pre-fabricated buildings, the Germans can set up more locations that are sheltered from the elements. This improves morale and performance of their troops.

This was an area that the German military largely ignored. Their construction battalions and follow-on Organization Todt workers were more often working with nothing but hand tools. One bulldozer, loader, would replace 20 men with shovels and wheel barrows, or more. That means more manpower can be sent to the front or used on other tasks.

[Richard Anderson]

Richard, thanks again for your comments. Before responding to your last posts, I would like to clarify that I am happy Germany didn't win the war, and this is not a thread about how they could have. The question was more about what would have happened if Germany had managed its resources differently? Would a more potent tank force be enough to avoid encirclement at Stalingrad, and would that have allowed them to re-stabilize the Eastern Front long enough to continue the war?

Oh, I wasn't commenting on you specifically but instead on the general thrust of too many what ifs.

First you have to get to a "more potent tank force" before you can get to what it might accomplish and I don't think you are there yet.

Regarding the Tiger, seems to me I read somewhere that Germany had been working on a heavy breakthrough tank as early as 1937, but that it was the early encounters with Russian tanks in 1941 that really spurred things along. At any rate, both of the prototypes that were demonstrated in April 1942 had supposedly been completed in less than a year, and by August of that same year 4 completed Tiger tanks were apparently delivered and waiting in a staging area near Leningrad. Combat operations supposedly started in September. If its true, that is an incredible feat considering the amount of work completed in such a short time.

Henschel was working on two Durchbruchwagen prototypes in 1937 and 1938 but neither was completed. Vk30.01(H) and VK 36.01(H) were both 7.5cm KwK 37 armed successors begun in 1939 but the turrets were never completed. The specification for what became VK45.01(H) were laid down in May 1941 but the design relied on the four years of experience in the earlier prototypes. The main specification changes were the increased armor and the requirement it mount an 8.8cm gun. The prototype hull, an enlarged VK30.01/36.01 was completed 3 January 1942, seven months later. The turret was finished 11 April and the first prototype was completed 17 April and presented to Hitler on his birthday 20 April 1942. Never mind that testing in May demonstrated major problems - the second hull suffered a complete steering failure - but 200 were ordered immediately. Eight were actually completed in August 1942, but average production was only 15 per month and they continued to have teething problems.

Yes, the first four saw combat in late August 1942 and did nothing.

Regarding the availability of the L60, according to Spielberger in his book Panzer III & Its Variants, the L60 was not only available in 1940 but was personally requested in a memo from the little guy with the funny mustache. The Waffenamt went with the 5 cm L42 instead. Spielberger goes on to explain how the weakness of German tank guns was quickly revealed upon meeting the T34/KV tanks at the start of Barbarossa. He is referring to the 5 cm L42.

Sure, supposedly in April 1941 at another birthday dog and pony show Hitler noticed the newly produced Panzer III 5cm was the L42 gun and went into a tizzy. So by that time only 770 5cm PaK 38 existed and it was November before the first went into a tank with 64 completed by the end of the year. It also resulted in a loss of about 100 in production during the changeover as the all time peak of 206 in November fell to 171 in December and 159 in January, before climbing back to 216 in February.

But again, you have either misread or misunderstood something I wrote because this WI scenario is not about making a single tank, or retooling a factory to make PzIV's, or just up and blindly abandoning Pz III production without a replacement.

The WI scenario suggests that turreted versions of the Pz III be abandoned after September 1941, to be replaced with StuG III's. The same factory would still continue to make the same Pz III chassis needed to make the same StuG, but with a long barrel. The 7.5 L43 was ready for testing in February 1942. What ever date they started working on developing it, the WI scenario calls for the work to be urgently sped up because of the recent T34/KV encounter so that the gun is ready for testing in September 1941. Even if the gun could only be ready for testing in November, so just 4 months earlier, the second series of Pz III J's with the L60 would only just be starting production. There is no need to continue manufacturing the PzIII after encountering the T34 in the summer of 1941, and the WI scenario is asking what would have happened if Germany had been able to come up with a viable solution to replace it with long barrel StuG's within 4 to 5 months following the event?

The StuG III was not a tank, it was an assault gun, an infantry support weapon, and when the Germans tried to use it as a tank in 1943 it proved unsuccessful.

The first 15 7.5cm PaK 40 were ready for issue as antitank guns in February 1942 and the first went into a Panzer IV in March - the only one completed that month. That conversion cost about 60 tanks. Anyway, the PaK/KwK design and testing was completed well before February 1942, 120 PaK guns had actually been completed in 1941, mostly in December, but there is a lag time getting such things into the hands of troops.

Its actually pretty remarkable that they managed to get the conversion done so quickly. Krupp didn't actually need the T34/KV encounter to speed things up, they were already test fitting pre-production PaK 40 L40 in the StuG III in March 1941 so much of the groundwork was already there. It was November 1941 when the real work on fitting it in the Panzer IV began, so essentially it was four months to do it.

The Panzer divisions needed tanks, not assault guns. If the Panzer III production ceases in November 1941, the only outfits manufacturing the Panzer IV are Krupp (39), Vomag (12), and Nibelungenwerk (1). Eliminating Panzer III production in say November 1941 means that instead of 258 replacement tanks produced there are only 52. Who produces the additional Panzer IV needed?

[LachenKrieg]

First you have to get to a "more potent tank force" before you can get to what it might accomplish and I don't think you are there yet...

The StuG III was not a tank, it was an assault gun, an infantry support weapon, and when the Germans tried to use it as a tank in 1943 it proved unsuccessful...

The Panzer divisions needed tanks, not assault guns...

Well I can't really disagree with a lot of what you wrote because that seems to be the history behind the story, or at least my understanding of it from what I read. But I can't say that you are making good use of the history in your argument either.

But before going on, I am also a little puzzled to say the least on what it is exactly you expect from a "What If" section on a forum dedicated to WWII history. I mean think about it for even just a moment Richard. Germany lost the war.... Were you hoping for more "What if the Allied forces won the war" type threads? I never said your comments were directed specifically at me, but you seem to have jumped ahead and grouped this thread into a category before fully understanding what it was even about.

Going back to your use of history, I cant say that I understand the point your trying to make, or how the historical facts you used are suppose to tie into it.

In my WI scenario, I am asking what would have happened had Germany shifted away from turreted versions of the Pz III as battle tanks months before it actually did. You then cited a bunch of dates regarding the development of various guns, implying that my WI scenario doesn't work because it doesn't follow history. This is the WHAT IF section. You can't build and argument against a WI on the premise that it doesn't follow history. The whole purpose of a WI is to introduce an alternate history. There is nothing unrealistic in suggesting that Germany finished developing a gun 6 months before it actually did. Germany does the exact thing my WI scenario calls for, only a few months later.

Your suggestion that Germany couldn't have developed the L43/L48 months before it actually did is baseless, and I raised the discussion about the rapid Tiger tank development to demonstrate this point. You claim Krupp didn't need the T34 encounter to speed things up, pointing to the historical fact that they were already working on weapon systems before the event. Fun fact... The entire German industry attached to the military was working on one military project or another. Your right, Krupp probably didn't need the T34 encounter to be in the business it was in, but the fact that Germany realized the Russians had gained an advantage certainly set the tone and level of urgency to the situation.

And yes, the StuG was initially designed for infantry support as an assault gun. But that was when it was equipped with the short barrel 7.5 cm gun. This WI scenario is not discussing the StuG's role as an assault gun, it is discussing the up-gunned version that was put in a tank hunter role. But I would like to see your reference to the StuG being unsuccessful. My understanding is that StuG crews chalked up more tank kills than Panzer crews did. Can you provide me with your reference, because I am really interested to see what it is.

So I will take the opportunity at this point to disagree with you on your assertion that the Panzer Divisions needed tanks and not assault guns. First off, NO, what they needed was more firepower! Firepower the Pz III L didn't have. What matters more than the color of the jacket is that you are actually able to defeat the enemy. And more importantly, what Panzer Divisions needed more than anything by the Winter of 1942/43 was resupply of men and material. By this time, a lot of the German Panzer/Infantry Divisions were Divisions in name only. By the time the 6th Army reaches Stalingrad, most of its Infantry Divisions were at about 60-70% strength. The attempt to blockade the lower Volga and capture the Caucasus by dividing his forces turned out to be a fatal error. Being tasked with taking Stalingrad street by street, something it was ill equipped to do, the 6th Army had to approach the city without its spearhead. So we not only see a situation where the German combined arms forces were split up, but they were already suffering under sever losses due to attrition. Adding further insult to this injury is the fact that the largest percentage of tanks they had on hand (Pz III L) were ineffective as battle tanks.

So what could this WI scenario offer to the very desperate situation described above? Can it address the poor judgment German leadership took to split its forces in the South? No it can't. Can it address the logistical nightmare of resupplying units that came as a bonus with the poor judgment? No it can't. But what it does offer is a plausible path to increased firepower of German forces, and more specifically in this case the firepower of Heeresgurppe B, by replacing 266 5.0 cm L60 guns with 266 7.5 cm L48 cannons. And in doing so, abandoning the Pz III L60 earlier than it did might have also helped slow/reduce Germany's battlefield losses of men and material. The number 266 is a product of the decision to split its forces, so had Germany abandoned PzIII L60 production in favor of StuG L48 production, it is possible the number of available units would be higher than 266 when the Russian counter offensive begins.

[Richard Anderson]

Well I can't really disagree with a lot of what you wrote because that seems to be the history behind the story, or at least my understanding of it from what I read. But I can't say that you are making good use of the history in your argument either.

But before going on, I am also a little puzzled to say the least on what it is exactly you expect from a "What If" section on a forum dedicated to WWII history. I mean think about it for even just a moment Richard. Germany lost the war.... Were you hoping for more "What if the Allied forces won the war" type threads? I never said your comments were directed specifically at me, but you seem to have jumped ahead and grouped this thread into a category before fully understanding what it was even about.

Going back to your use of history, I cant say that I understand the point your trying to make, or how the historical facts you used are suppose to tie into it.

Sorry, I was posting late at night and am suffering an extended bout of insomnia, so I tend to ramble in my thinking...too much stream of consciousness I suppose.

Anyway, yes I understand this is a what if but I must point out to you the basic rules of the what if: "The What If’s need to be a plausible variation on actual military/political events occurring up to the end of 1985 or viable alternatives in their conception. This is a vital pre-requisite to any What If thread, if they do not meet this requirement they will locked or removed." And: "When you post the thread, don’t just ask the question but give us the benefit of your viewpoint and information to back up your argument, as this helps to put the question into context."

I am trying to see how this is a plausible variation and what information you have that backs up your argument.

In my WI scenario, I am asking what would have happened had Germany shifted away from turreted versions of the Pz III as battle tanks months before it actually did. You then cited a bunch of dates regarding the development of various guns, implying that my WI scenario doesn't work because it doesn't follow history. This is the WHAT IF section. You can't build and argument against a WI on the premise that it doesn't follow history. The whole purpose of a WI is to introduce an alternate history. There is nothing unrealistic in suggesting that Germany finished developing a gun 6 months before it actually did. Germany does the exact thing my WI scenario calls for, only a few months later.

Sorry but suggesting a gun development is completed a few months earlier than in reality is hand waving away a historical time line. The Panzer IV with the 7.5cm KwK 40 L/43 was completed so incredibly quickly because the gun design and development was already complete and it was in production for four months, Krupp had already developed a suitable mounting for it in the StuG that was adaptable to the Panzer IV turret, working out those kinks nearly a year earlier, and yet it was still five months from project inception to completing the first tank. That is already incredibly quick and depended on a number of fortuitous events but now that gets accelerated even faster because of...what?

Your suggestion that Germany couldn't have developed the L43/L48 months before it actually did is baseless, and I raised the discussion about the rapid Tiger tank development to demonstrate this point. You claim Krupp didn't need the T34 encounter to speed things up, pointing to the historical fact that they were already working on weapon systems before the event. Fun fact... The entire German industry attached to the military was working on one military project or another. Your right, Krupp probably didn't need the T34 encounter to be in the business it was in, but the fact that Germany realized the Russians had gained an advantage certainly set the tone and level of urgency to the situation.

Sorry but again I wasn't be clear. I was suggesting that the Germans had already developed the 7.5cm PaK/KwK 40 (in L33, L40, and L43 variants) months earlier but it still took them time to get them into production and get them into the Panzer IV and yest still did it incredibly quickly, within four months of the November 1941 Panzer commission requirement. How/why does incredibly fast become super-humanely fast? The only way I can see that happening is if the 7.5cm PaK project gets backdated even earlier prewar.

And yes, the StuG was initially designed for infantry support as an assault gun. But that was when it was equipped with the short barrel 7.5 cm gun. This WI scenario is not discussing the StuG's role as an assault gun, it is discussing the up-gunned version that was put in a tank hunter role. But I would like to see your reference to the StuG being unsuccessful. My understanding is that StuG crews chalked up more tank kills than Panzer crews did. Can you provide me with your reference, because I am really interested to see what it is.

Sure. A good summary assessment of the organization and combat experience of the Panzer-Sturmgeschütze Abteilungen can be found in Jentz, Volume II of Panzertruppen, pp. 120-124 and seriatim. Much of that is based on an extended analysis in NARA RG242, Roll 621 but it'll take me some searching to track down the roll numbers. The experience in four different situations was:

1. Attacking in the first wave - no advantage except the smaller silhouette of the StuG, lack of an under-armor MG a major disadvantage as is lack of a turret in reacting to threats from the side.
2. Acting as flank protection for tanks in the first wave - slightly better than in 1 but lack of a turret is still felt.
3. Acting as support for dismounted Panzergrenadier - works the best but that basically precludes using them for exploitation, which is the role of tanks, doing 1. and 2.
4. In defense - very good but that does not win an offensive war.

So I will take the opportunity at this point to disagree with you on your assertion that the Panzer Divisions needed tanks and not assault guns.

Okay but it flies in the face of the German experience and desire. The Panzer-Sturmgeschütze Abteilungen were created for the three recreated "Stalingrad" Panzer divisions (14., 16., and 24.) in order to beef up armor strength by giving them a third battalion, which could not be filled out by tank production. The experiment was never repeated and instead, the Panzer-Sturmgeschütze Abteilungen were relegated to the Panzder-Grenadier divisions because of 3. and 4.

First off, NO, what they needed was more firepower! Firepower the Pz III L didn't have.

Nit the Panzer III with the 5cm L60 was easily able to handle most armor threats through later 1943. Yes, it would have been nice if they had been available in June 1941 but it is probably a stretch to say that would make a decisive difference in fall and winter 1941 when BARBAROSSA was halted.

What matters more than the color of the jacket is that you are actually able to defeat the enemy. And more importantly, what Panzer Divisions needed more than anything by the Winter of 1942/43 was resupply of men and material.

Why yes, indeed but they needed that by fall/winter of 1941. If they eliminate production of the Panzer III, accept the loss of production it entails, and soldier on with only the Panzer IV in the Panzer division, then who prosecuted the offensive that makes winter of 1942/1943 critical?

What they needed was not more firepower but more production, which was an insurmountable problem in 1939-1942.

Monthly production average for Panzer/StuG (incl JgPz):

1939 66/0
1940 129/15
1941 271/46
1942 350/69
1943 491/276
1944 703/774

By this time, a lot of the German Panzer/Infantry Divisions were Divisions in name only. By the time the 6th Army reaches Stalingrad, most of its Infantry Divisions were at about 60-70% strength. The attempt to blockade the lower Volga and capture the Caucasus by dividing his forces turned out to be a fatal error. Being tasked with taking Stalingrad street by street, something it was ill equipped to do, the 6th Army had to approach the city without its spearhead. So we not only see a situation where the German combined arms forces were split up, but they were already suffering under sever losses due to attrition. Adding further insult to this injury is the fact that the largest percentage of tanks they had on hand (Pz III L) were ineffective as battle tanks.

Much of that is true but there is no evidence to suppose that changing the production mix between Panzer and StuG in late 1941 and early 1942, with the concomitant loss of production to major retooling, will change that at all.

BTW, no, in winter 1942/1943 the Panzer III with 5cm KwK 39 remained effective against the majority of Soviet tanks. There were 628 kurz Panzer III and 546 lang, with 246 kurz and 133 lang Panzer IV, along with 322 38(t) in the Ostheer as of c. 1 June 1942. So:

133 Pz-IV (l), 546 Pz-III (i), 1,196 other = 1,875

What they faced were:

Voronezh Front: 88 T-34, 24 KV, 69 T-60
Southwest Front: 65 T-34, 68 KV, 267 BT, T-26, T-60, T37/38, Mk II (Matilda), and Mk III (Valentine)
Southern Front: 42 T-34, 45 KV, and 127 T-60
Bryansk Front: 88 T-34, 24 KV, 69 T-60
4th TC: 26 T34, 29 KV, 90 T60/70
13th TC: 51 T-34, 8 KV, 104 T-60/Valentine
17th TC: 88 T-34, 23 KV, 68 T-60
23d TC: 38 T-34, 9 KV, 81 T-60/M3 Lt/M3 Med
24th TC: 48 T-34, 24 KV, 69 T-60/M4 Lt
21st A: 12 T-34, 3 KV, 86 BT, T-26, T-60, T37/38
5th TA: 228 T-34, 83 KV, 309 BT, T-26, T-60, T37/38, Mk II
Total 774 T-34, 340 KV, 1,339 = 2,453

Over one-third of that Soviet tank strength was lost within two to three weeks. The German Panzer forces in the entire east lost 198 tanks in July. Yjeu needed more tanks rather than less.

So what could this WI scenario offer to the very desperate situation described above? Can it address the poor judgment German leadership took to split its forces in the South? No it can't. Can it address the logistical nightmare of resupplying units that came as a bonus with the poor judgment? No it can't. But what it does offer is a plausible path to increased firepower of German forces, and more specifically in this case the firepower of Heeresgurppe B, by replacing 266 5.0 cm L60 guns with 266 7.5 cm L48 cannons. And in doing so, abandoning the Pz III L60 earlier than it did might have also helped slow/reduce Germany's battlefield losses of men and material. The number 266 is a product of the decision to split its forces, so had Germany abandoned PzIII L60 production in favor of StuG L48 production, it is possible the number of available units would be higher than 266 when the Russian counter offensive begins.

At the start of the Soviet counteroffensive, HG-B had:

78 Pz-IV (l), 154 Pz-III (l), and 105 III (5cm k & 7.5 k)/IV (k).38(t) = 337

I do not see where you get 266 Pz-III (l) from?

Switching production from Pz III to StuG III requires retooling production at DB, MIAG, Henschel, MAN, and MNH ([;ans to build Panzer III at FAMO Breslau had already been dropped). It requires eliminating and retooling production of the 5cm PaK/KwK to the 7.5cm PaK/KwK. It requires subcontractors building the suspension assemblies of the Panzer III to switch over to that of the Panzer IV. All that takes time, which the Germans did not have. Overall, the Germans would expect the loss of three to six months of production during that time, which, October 1941 through March 1942 means about 541 to 1,160 tanks, which would cripple the Panzerwaffe at the start of BLAU.

Hopefully that is a bit clearer.

[LachenKrieg]

I'm not sure there is any value in continuing this discussion in the direction it has taken. You have 5k+ posts on this forum, and after reading through some of them, it is clear that you are well versed, or at least invested in the related subject matter. So I mean no disrespect when I say this conversation has become almost laughable for me. I do appreciate your comments, and am happy to carry this discussion with you, but TBH I can't tell if you are serious, or if this is meant as some type of joke. I asked you to provide a source that can demonstrate/document that the StuG was unsuccessful, but instead you cited a section of a book that actually supports its use.

The information to back up this plausible variation is the fact that Germany was developing/expanding its military in the 1930's. By the 1930's, Germany had already designed and manufactured numerous guns/cannons, so it had the know how, the industry, and the resources to do it. An 88 mm gun had already been placed into service in 1936 for example. Documents also exist that show a long barrel 7.5 cm gun for the StuG was already being considered in 1939, so even the idea existed. There is also a memo from October 1939 that states further development of a 7.5 cm L41 is planned for May 1940. Saying something wasn't done earlier doesn't mean it couldn't have been given the right priority.

There is nothing unrealistic about Germany producing a long barreled gun for the StuG earlier than it actually did. I am sure you are well aware of Krupp's early efforts in this regard, and you should be equally aware after reading the history behind it that a considerable amount of development time went into the bureaucratic approval process. The amount of time spent on reviewing red-tape is known to dramatically decrease once a priority is established. Any argument that it doesn't would be nonsensical. The Tiger story is a good example. The fact that the first 4 units were essentially a failed demonstration of the weapon system speaks to the speed of the project, not the abilities of its design.

The title of this thread is actually a clue to another good example. What your arguing boils down to little more then the prioritization of the decisions that had to be made. Had the Heeres Waffenamt agreed with using a 5.0 cm gun in the PzIII for example, it's possible the PzIII could have started its career with the L/60. A decision to do so could have also affected the AT weapon being issued to infantry as a standardization measure, and in doing so would have dramatically increased the need to ramp up production of the gun and its ammunition. The fact that a decision was taken to stay with the 3.7 cm ammunition takes nothing away from the possibility of the alternative.

Regarding the information you cite from Jentz, there is nothing there to even remotely suggest the StuG was unsuccessful, but quite the opposite actually. And I should point out that those reports are from Panzer crews. Although nothing in them suggest the Stug was unsuccessful, most would recognize that an individual's loyalty to the group he/she is associated with is a thing in real life. You might want to read and compare them to reports from StuG crews. I think you will find they say pretty much the same thing, but through the eyes of a StuG crew. You should also notice that the PzIII is not part of the discussion in these reports. I can't actually recall a Panzer crew, or any other crew for that matter making the claim that the PzIII L60 was better at killing T34 tanks then the StuG III F - G, can you?

And BTW, the suggestion here is not to change the production mix between Panzer and StuG even though you keep trying to state it as such. The suggestion here is to change the mix of the type of armament used in German armored vehicles. In other words, decrease the number of ineffective guns, and increase the number of effective guns. Turns out removing the turret from the Pz III allows its chassis to carry a bigger more effective gun. Please lets keep the discussion real and quite misstating the WI being suggested. The evidence: When you strike a T34 1000 m away with a round from a 7.5 L48 it blows up, not quite the same effect when using the 5.0 cm L60.

But aside from constantly underestimating the effect the T34/KV tanks had on the thinking used to conduct Germany's war effort, where your use of history is most misrepresented is where you use it to prop up the argument that requires retooling of factories and missed production.

Again Richard, the historical facts we're discussing here are more about priorities, and not about weather something was plausible. Daimler was so overloaded with work, that it was DECIDED to transfer production of the StuG to Alkett. Although plans were underway to make this happen, it was then DECIDED to delay the project once more for the higher priority need of converting Pz I vehicles into infantry gun carriers. Alkett completes the first StuG's in June 1940, which negates the need for retooling in September/November 1941. But still higher priority issues would continue to plague StuG production at Alkett's plant, such as the conversion of Pz III/IV's into submersible tanks for the planned operation Sealion. As I am sure you are aware, Daimler and Alkett were both contracted to build the Pz III/StuG, and as I have already pointed out, there is no retooling of factories necessary. What was required was little more than the decision to prioritize StuG Production. If the guy with the funny mustache had prioritized winning the war instead of driving across the English channel in tanks, then it's possible the top brass at companies like Daimler and Alkett would have received the order to kick StuG production into high gear when it became obvious that it should be. The same can be said for finalizing work on a long barrel gun for the vehicle.

There were more than 3000 long barrelled StuG IIIs (F-G) manufactured, and which made a significant contribution to Germany's war effort in terms of the number of tanks/AT guns/field guns knocked out. By accepting the reality of the situation and the fate of the Pz III as an effective AT weapon, Germany could have added close to 3k more effective weapon systems to compliment its Pz IV, V, VI tank units. This my friend is a more potent tank force!

[Richard Anderson]

I'm not sure there is any value in continuing this discussion in the direction it has taken.

Nor am I, since you seem focused on ad hominem now as well as misunderstanding what I am saying. To be frank, you now seem to have developed the attitude all too common among what-iffers that the purpose of what-ifs, counterfactuals, is so that you can bask in the adulation of your brilliant idea that no one else ever thought of, especially those ignoramuses running the war in real life.

The problem is the actual purpose of the counterfactual in historical analysis is to better understand why things happened the way they did.

I asked you to provide a source that can demonstrate/document that the StuG was unsuccessful, but instead you cited a section of a book that actually supports its use.

No, you asked me for a source that demonstrated/documented why the Germans did not consider the StuG and its variants as a suitable substitute for a Panzer. I did and was even nice enough to explain to you why they thought that way. Do you not understand what a Panzer is? It is a tank, which in the context of how that armored fighting vehicle had developed by World War II meant a fully-tracked (and yes, believe it or not I am aware of various countries that chose to designate wheeled AFV as "tanks"), turreted (and yes, believe it or not I am aware of the Swedish S-Tank), armored vehicle. The thing is the tank is an excellent multi-purpose vehicle. It works very well when:

1. Attacking in the first wave.
2. Acting as flank protection for tanks in the first wave .
3. Acting as support for dismounted infantry.
4. In defense.

You know, the four things where they evaluated the StuG was only really good at 4 and pretty good at 3?

The information to back up this plausible variation is the fact that Germany was developing/expanding its military in the 1930's. By the 1930's, Germany had already designed and manufactured numerous guns/cannons, so it had the know how, the industry, and the resources to do it. An 88 mm gun had already been placed into service in 1936 for example. Documents also exist that show a long barrel 7.5 cm gun for the StuG was already being considered in 1939, so even the idea existed. There is also a memo from October 1939 that states further development of a 7.5 cm L41 is planned for May 1940. Saying something wasn't done earlier doesn't mean it couldn't have been given the right priority.

Why yes, Germany had the know how and had the basic industry but its resources were severely constrained by its available labor forces, especially after mobilization, finances (the early overspending on the military led directly to the cutbacks of FY 1938 that carried over in FY 1939 in Germany), and limitations in the machine tool sector (Germany had a large lead in number of machine tools over even the US but its tools were primarily single function, which limited its ability to retool easily as American industry did).

Indeed, 8.8cm had been a staple caliber for German weapons since around the end of the 19th century and was the caliber chosen for the first heavy Flak gun of the Great War, which carried over to the early development of the Flak 18 in 1925 and then right through to World War II in it's development and manufacturing. However, 5cm was not the same case, development ended with the 5 cm Tbts KL/40 in 1913. That is why HWA overruled the request of the Schnelletruppen for a 5cm gun in the ZW development. They felt it would take too long and so went with what was already available. Yes, the decision was wrong but if they had given the go ahead they still would have waited until c. 1938 to have a 5cm tank gun and it is even odds whether or not they would have gone for the L42 or the L60 and there are various good reasons they would have gone with the L42.

See, hopefully this counterfactual exercise is illuminating some reasons why things went the way they did.

And yes, since I gave you the development dates of the 5cm and 7.5cm PaK/KwK I am well aware what state the development was in at various times and how long it took production to get going, which were all factors in why not.

There is nothing unrealistic about Germany producing a long barreled gun for the StuG earlier than it actually did. I am sure you are well aware of Krupp's early efforts in this regard, and you should be equally aware after reading the history behind it that a considerable amount of development time went into the bureaucratic approval process.

Actually again since I mentioned it already I would think you might realize I am aware of it? But in case it passed you by I'll repeat it.

The first 15 7.5cm PaK 40 were ready for issue as antitank guns in February 1942 and the first went into a Panzer IV in March - the only one completed that month. That conversion cost about 60 tanks. Anyway, the PaK/KwK design and testing was completed well before February 1942, 120 PaK guns had actually been completed in 1941, mostly in December, but there is a lag time getting such things into the hands of troops.

Its actually pretty remarkable that they managed to get the conversion done so quickly. Krupp didn't actually need the T34/KV encounter to speed things up, they were already test fitting pre-production PaK 40 L40 in the StuG III in March 1941 so much of the groundwork was already there. It was November 1941 when the real work on fitting it in the Panzer IV began, so essentially it was four months to do it.

The 7.5cm PaK project development began in 1939 prewar. Two years later pre-production pilots were available for experimenting with tank mountings and six months after that the production changeover began. Two to two-and-a-half years is actually pretty good, considering manufacture of the 5cm was a priority as well.

Yes, it could have gone into a StuG earlier but given that only Alkett was seriously engaged in its manufacture how many could there be until StuG chassis production increased?

And yet again, what the Schnelletruppen wanted was more tanks, mot more StuG.

The amount of time spent on reviewing red-tape is known to dramatically decrease once a priority is established. Any argument that it doesn't would be nonsensical. The Tiger story is a good example. The fact that the first 4 units were essentially a failed demonstration of the weapon system speaks to the speed of the project, not the abilities of its design.

Well, yes, if you can isolate the singular priority from the mass of competing priorities - HWA, In 6. the Schnelletruppen, the Artillerie, the Infanterie, just to name a few in the Heer alone, then the various industrialists, and so on. Sometimes prioritization worked but even the Tiger prioritization was fortuitous in that it built on three years of preceding work and the almost cavalier decision to arm it with the 8.8cm gun, months before anyone had any worries about T-34 or KV tanks.

The title of this thread is actually a clue to another good example. What your arguing boils down to little more then the prioritization of the decisions that had to be made. Had the Heeres Waffenamt agreed with using a 5.0 cm gun in the PzIII for example, it's possible the PzIII could have started its career with the L/60. A decision to do so could have also affected the AT weapon being issued to infantry as a standardization measure, and in doing so would have dramatically increased the need to ramp up production of the gun and its ammunition. The fact that a decision was taken to stay with the 3.7 cm ammunition takes nothing away from the possibility of the alternative.

Indeed, but the HWA decision was made because of prioritization - it was a priority to build a tank quickly with the gun that was at hand, partly also because commonality of munitions eased production constraints, and they had no ability to foresee the extended development difficulties the tank would have. And changing the gun doesn't do anything to change that - it will still go through nearly five years of pre-production development. Nor can you say with certainty that it would be a L60 weapon, because the initial design was an L42 weapon and the reasons that was then adopted for the tank instead of the L60 weapon go down other paths that now seem odd - the muzzle of the gun cannot extend past the front of the chassis? What kind of nonsense is that? But they were thought to be real world constraints at the time until they weren't.

Regarding the information you cite from Jentz, there is nothing there to even remotely suggest the StuG was unsuccessful (snip)

That would have some relevance if I ever said the StuG was unsuccessful - I said it wasn't a tank and the Germans assessed that it was not a good substitute for a tank. You may not too that later developments that tried to sidle into service as tanks - such as the Pz-IV/70 (V) and (A) were also not tanks, even though Guderians Ente was called that. Over 400 were issued to Panzer divisions in the last six months of the war but most were used as SP antitank guns rather than tanks for very good reasons.

And BTW, the suggestion here is not to change the production mix between Panzer and StuG even though you keep trying to state it as such. The suggestion here is to change the mix of the type of armament used in German armored vehicles. In other words, decrease the number of ineffective guns, and increase the number of effective guns. Turns out removing the turret from the Pz III allows its chassis to carry a bigger more effective gun. Please lets keep the discussion real and quite misstating the WI being suggested. The evidence: When you strike a T34 1000 m away with a round from a 7.5 L48 it blows up, not quite the same effect when using the 5.0 cm L60.

Sorry but that is facile at best. Not producing Panzer III chassis as Panzer III but instead producing them as StuG III is in fact changing the production mix between Panzer and StuG. Aside from the first 36 StuG III Ausf A produced by DB in the first half of 1940, all StuG III production was initially vested in Alkett, which was one of seven manufacturers in that production pool. It was given that priority in June 1940 in which month the seven manufacturers produced 58 Panzer III and 12 StuG III. While the StuG III was relatively easier to produce, in 1940 Alkett working alone averaged 45 per month,

But aside from constantly underestimating the effect the T34/KV tanks had on the thinking used to conduct Germany's war effort, where your use of history is most misrepresented is where you use it to prop up the argument that requires retooling of factories and missed production.

Are you saying that switching manufacturing from Panzer to StuG and from 5cm to 7.5cm would not require retooling and what not entail loss of production? How do you arrive at that conclusion?

Again Richard, the historical facts we're discussing here are more about priorities, and not about weather something was plausible. Daimler was so overloaded with work, that it was DECIDED to transfer production of the StuG to Alkett. Although plans were underway to make this happen, it was then DECIDED to delay the project once more for the higher priority need of converting Pz I vehicles into infantry gun carriers. Alkett completes the first StuG's in June 1940, which negates the need for retooling in September/November 1941. But still higher priority issues would continue to plague StuG production at Alkett's plant, such as the conversion of Pz III/IV's into submersible tanks for the planned operation Sealion. As I am sure you are aware, Daimler and Alkett were both contracted to build the Pz III/StuG, and as I have already pointed out, there is no retooling of factories necessary. What was required was little more than the decision to prioritize StuG Production. If the guy with the funny mustache had prioritized winning the war instead of driving across the English channel in tanks, then it's possible the top brass at companies like Daimler and Alkett would have received the order to kick StuG production into high gear when it became obvious that it should be. The same can be said for finalizing work on a long barrel gun for the vehicle.

Daimler was so overloaded with work? Sure but then they all were. By June 1940, when the decision was made to make Alkett the prime producer of the StuG III, production of the last of the 5/ZW series (Ausf F) was winding down; DB's share of those 435 vehicles was 95, one less than MAN and 25 less than Henschel - the rest of the DB workload was producing the PzBefWg. The follow on 6/ZW series (Ausf G), introduced MNH as part of the production pool with 50 on contract versus 60 at DB. Only FAMO had a smaller allotment of 15. Everyone else had much more.

The 168 Tauchpanzer III conversions were done by Alkett, FAMO (the main reason they only produced 43 new Panzer III), DB, Henschel, and MAN - they had the same delaying effect on new Panzer III production on all of them. The conversions of the 202 4.7cm Pak(t) Sfl and 39 15cm sIG Sfl auf PzKpfw I ohne Turm were done by Alkett and Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz. Yes, the conversions took up time and resources but they were seen as priority requirements at the time. However, the 15cm sIG conversion could have no effect on Alkett converting to StuG III production in June 1940 because those conversions were done in February 1940. And of course, none of that has anything to do with the effect of converting from Panzer III to StuG manufacture at the five other plants left after Alkett and FAMO dropped out?

Anyway, the Tauchpanzer conversions were completed by the end of September 1940, as were the first series of "ohne Turm" vehicles. Alkett then had pretty much nothing to do except prioritize StuG III and in October increased production by 6 from 29 to 35. Then they produced 35 more in November and 21 in December. In 1941, they averaged 45 per month.

There were more than 3000 long barrelled StuG IIIs (F-G) manufactured, and which made a significant contribution to Germany's war effort in terms of the number of tanks/AT guns/field guns knocked out. By accepting the reality of the situation and the fate of the Pz III as an effective AT weapon, Germany could have added close to 3k more effective weapon systems to compliment its Pz IV, V, VI tank units. This my friend is a more potent tank force!

Yeah, slightly more than that - about 8,673 of them in fact but only about 330 in 1942. Just over 3,000 were completed by Alkett and MIAG in 1943. The problem is you need more tanks more than you need bigger guns, especially if to get the bigger guns you lose some vehicle production and the production that you do get are not tanks.

Anyway, my friend you keep ignoring that the function of a tank is to tank, not to be "an effective AT weapon", which was just one of its roles.

[Peter89]

If I may add something on the sidenote: the gun of a tank was an important equipment of course, but it was not a game-changer on the strategic scale.

All other things being equal, the most common element in victory was superiority in numbers. The qualitative improvement a better gun on Pz III tanks would offer, could not offset the Soviet superiority in numbers. When it comes to quality, almost nothing matters as much as training (including officier training in command, control and doctrine). When it comes to quantity, almost nothing matters as much as maintenance, including adequate supplies - most notably that of spare parts. The failure of the centralized maintenance system alone contributed to more operational non-availability than any "gun upgrade WI" could offset. Then comes the question of supplies, the lack of which also contributed to more loss of effective fighting power than any production priority decisions could influence realistically.

Tanks did not operate in an empty space either. The Battle of Arracourt showed that even supposedly superior German tanks could be defeated when they lack air cover, recon units, supporting infantry, anti-tank guns and so on. Changing a gun type on a certain type of tank will influence little in the strategic outcome of the war.