The Army Ordnance Department plays a role in the outcome at Stalingrad.

[Richard Anderson]

Are you trying to suggest that the StuG L/43-48 was not used to destroy enemy armor, or that it couldn't?

I am not "trying to suggest" anything. I am simply demonstrating, again, what the Germans thought about using a Sturmgeschütz as a Panzer, nearly two years before they did.

And what of the Pz III L/60 rich, was that the best weapon to deal with the growing T34 tank problem the Germans were facing? What happened when they threw all those Pz III's with their turrets at them?

Why yes, given the result is they destroyed Soviet tanks, of all types. Look at 23. Panzer and KG 3. Panzer at 2d Kharkov.

[Richard Anderson]

Yes that is sort of the idea behind a WI, using hindsight to provide an alternate history.

No, the "idea behind" a what if is not to use "hindsight to provide an alternate history". Counterfactual history is actually just a means of "conjecturing on what did not happen, or what might have happened, in order to understand what did happen." What you, and most inveterate what iffers do not get is by using hindsight to constantly tinker with scenarios you are simply creating an artificial set of circumstances that was unlikely to occur.

The course the German Ordnance Dept. set for its military left it ill prepared to deal with Russian tank production capacity after the war started.

Actually, no, the best evidence is that working from a common baseline of assumptions in developed militaries of the 1930s, the Germans reacted incredibly swiftly to the problems encountered in 1941 and were well on their way to match Soviet tank technology by mid 1942 and then exceeded it in 1943. However, they were unable to solve the problems of their relatively small tank industry infrastructure, especially the bottlenecks of vital sub-components such as engines and transmissions, and the labor shortage, along with bureaucratic competition for power and resources throughout government and industry, which limited plant expansion.

But where does your comment about replacing Pz III with Pz IV come from in the quote your using?

I did not make such a "comment". I suggested earlier a more likely development path that could have been followed, which is what the Germans were working on, a single 24-28 MT tank that would replace the two failed 10 and 15 MT designs.

I think Mr. Gardner was suggesting that the Pz III would be just as good as a Pz IV had Germany developed a lighter version of the L/48, not that it should replace the Pz IV.

As I mentioned long ago, the 7.5cm PaK/KwK 40 gun was already about as light weight as such a weapon could be. It was much lighter in construction than contemporary British and American designs and the Soviets were never capable of coming close to matching it in performance and weight.

[Richard Anderson]

In the April 1942 version it was changed to "The Sturmgeschütz may be successfully used against armored vehicles, and light and medium tanks.

Of course, mostly because of the improved performance of the PaK 40. Prior to that the only way to reliably defeating medium and heavy tanks was with Hohlading.

Where though does it say "The Sturmgeschütz may be successfully used as a Panzer"?

[Richard Anderson]

I am just pointing out the historical fact that they couldn't in the end because enemy numbers were too great, and that they lost the war.

You are quite correct. They couldn't in the end because enemy NUMBERS were too great, not because the number of enemy T-34 tanks were too great. The number of enemy T-60, T-70, Light M3, Light M5, Medium Me, Medium M4, Cruiser, and Infantry tanks were no great, not to mention the number of infantrymen, artillery guns and howitzers, mortars, combat aircraft, and ships. The number of their enemies were too great as well.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Gee whiz, I wonder what the Germans had to say about using Sturmgeschütz at the time...other than the experience reports already mentioned?...

To paraphrase a forgotten politician: 'Don't bother me with what the German panzer commanders thought, I made up my mind.'

[LachenKrieg]

Are you trying to suggest that the StuG L/43-48 was not used to destroy enemy armor, or that it couldn't?

I am not "trying to suggest" anything. I am simply demonstrating, again, what the Germans thought about using a Sturmgeschütz as a Panzer, nearly two years before they did.

And what of the Pz III L/60 rich, was that the best weapon to deal with the growing T34 tank problem the Germans were facing? What happened when they threw all those Pz III's with their turrets at them?

Why yes, given the result is they destroyed Soviet tanks, of all types. Look at 23. Panzer and KG 3. Panzer at 2d Kharkov.

Using StuG's to attack tanks is not using the StuG as a tank, it is using a StuG as a StuG. Where did it say that a StuG can/should/would be used as a tank? I think the text you posted said that StuG's can be used against light/medium tanks. How do you translate that into StuG = tank?

By your interpretation, then it must mean that when a tank was destroyed by an AT gun, you would call it a tank? This is all part of the story you invented. The WI never claimed that StuG's were tanks, you invented it.

Regarding the Pz IIIL/60, compare how much Russian medium tank strength grew in 1942 to how much it grew in 1943. I never said the Pz III wasn't responsible for tank kills. The question was at what cost. Clearly the Pz III's turret was unable to turn the tide to the same degree the much enhanced German firepower seen in 1943 was able to.

[Richard Anderson]

To paraphrase a forgotten politician: 'Don't bother me with what the German panzer commanders thought, I made up my mind.'

Some of the replies qualify as pure comedy gold.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I seldom read into them to that level. Get annoyed then depressed first.

[LachenKrieg]

No, the "idea behind" a what if is not to use "hindsight to provide an alternate history". Counterfactual history is actually just a means of "conjecturing on what did not happen, or what might have happened, in order to understand what did happen." What you, and most inveterate what iffers do not get is by using hindsight to constantly tinker with scenarios you are simply creating an artificial set of circumstances that was unlikely to occur.

So you mean hindsight isn't used while formulating an alternate history? You mean I can't use what I know from historical events to formulate what could have been a feasible alternate path? Like your entire contribution here isn't based on hindsight? Really

Actually, no, the best evidence is that working from a common baseline of assumptions in developed militaries of the 1930s, the Germans reacted incredibly swiftly to the problems encountered in 1941 and were well on their way to match Soviet tank technology by mid 1942 and then exceeded it in 1943. However, they were unable to solve the problems of their relatively small tank industry infrastructure, especially the bottlenecks of vital sub-components such as engines and transmissions, and the labor shortage, along with bureaucratic competition for power and resources throughout government and industry, which limited plant expansion.

And there is the problem rich, the one you keep avoiding. The WI isn't about how swiftly the Germans were able to react in 1941 after the war started, it is about the reaction they didn't have before the war started.

I did not make such a "comment". I suggested earlier a more likely development path that could have been followed, which is what the Germans were working on, a single 24-28 MT tank that would replace the two failed 10 and 15 MT designs.

Where does it say that you made such a comment. You are answering to a post directed at another poster.

As I mentioned long ago, the 7.5cm PaK/KwK 40 gun was already about as light weight as such a weapon could be. It was much lighter in construction than contemporary British and American designs and the Soviets were never capable of coming close to matching it in performance and weight.

Okay, same as above.

[LachenKrieg]

In the April 1942 version it was changed to "The Sturmgeschütz may be successfully used against armored vehicles, and light and medium tanks.

Of course, mostly because of the improved performance of the PaK 40. Prior to that the only way to reliably defeating medium and heavy tanks was with Hohlading.

Where though does it say "The Sturmgeschütz may be successfully used as a Panzer"?

That is a good question, where does it say that. I'm hoping you know, because what the WI is calling for are for StuG's to be used as StuG's as they attack and defeat enemy tanks from 1200+m away on the open Steppes of Southern Russia. Something their Pz III L/60 brethren couldn't do. And don't get too hung up on the place, because they could do pretty much the same thing in the North as well

[T. A. Gardner]

I am not overrating the presence of the T34, I am simply reciting the historical figure for the number that were there. And I am not underrating the capability of the Pz Divisions to deal with Russian armored forces, I am just pointing out the historical fact that they couldn't in the end because enemy numbers were too great, and that they lost the war. I don't know how you come to the conclusion you do, but they do brighten up my day

I think you need to look at the actual composition of units in mid-1942 in the Red Army. Tank brigades--at that time--were primarily composed of T60 and T70 light tanks with a 2 to 1 ratio to T 34's at best (one T34 command tank in a platoon, with two to four T60 or T70), and often just the company and battalion command tanks being T 34's. Production doesn't necessarily equal what's at the front.

That's what the Germans were observing at the time, and for that the Pz III with a 50/60 gun was adequate. Sure, they knew they needed better, that's why they developed the Panther.

[Richard Anderson]

So you mean hindsight isn't used while formulating an alternate history? You mean I can't use what I know from historical events to formulate what could have been a feasible alternate path? Like your entire contribution here isn't based on hindsight? Really

Nope, not at all, you are projecting a lot of your apparent bias onto what I said. The basis of a counterfactual history - a "what if" - is, by default, by hindsight. However, constantly massaging decision points through adding additional alternate paths to compensate for new issues is simply using hindsight to get to a desired end state, which is not the purpose of counterfactual history at all.

And there is the problem rich, the one you keep avoiding. The WI isn't about how swiftly the Germans were able to react in 1941 after the war started, it is about the reaction they didn't have before the war started.

Indeed, which tells us quite a bit about WHY they didn't, which is the whole point of historical counterfactuals. You persist on insisting that all they needed to do was basically think a little bit more about the future and thus correct their path before they got there through a highly suspect "simple" change that was pretty obviously not a simple change at all.

It is simply a variation of an ASB intervention.

Where does it say that you made such a comment. You are answering to a post directed at another poster.

Oh, so sorry, missed that. Yes, you are correct, the idea of just building Panzer IV rather than Panzer III prior to c. mid-1943 is as much as a nonstarter as is the idea of building all Sturmgeschütz rather than Panzer III in the same time frame.

Okay, same as above.

Ditto.

[LachenKrieg]

I am just pointing out the historical fact that they couldn't in the end because enemy numbers were too great, and that they lost the war.

You are quite correct. They couldn't in the end because enemy NUMBERS were too great, not because the number of enemy T-34 tanks were too great. The number of enemy T-60, T-70, Light M3, Light M5, Medium Me, Medium M4, Cruiser, and Infantry tanks were no great, not to mention the number of infantrymen, artillery guns and howitzers, mortars, combat aircraft, and ships. The number of their enemies were too great as well.

And you are quite incorrect in thinking that the WI has to account for every single factor that played out in the war. The WI proposes an increase in German firepower when they needed it most. It would account for some of the infantrymen, artillery guns, ect... Had the PzIII been able to maintain higher attrition rates of Soviet tanks (primarily of the T34 variety), it would have also helped to maintain the advantage gained by the Germans in 1943 by slowing the advancement of Soviet improvements.

[Richard Anderson]

And you are quite incorrect in thinking that the WI has to account for every single factor that played out in the war. The WI proposes an increase in German firepower when they needed it most. It would account for some of the infantrymen, artillery guns, ect... Had the PzIII been able to maintain higher attrition rates of Soviet tanks (primarily of the T34 variety), it would have also helped to maintain the advantage gained by the Germans in 1943 by slowing the advancement of Soviet improvements.

So then you are arguing that all the Germans needed to do to win the war was ensure that the Sturmgeschütz with 7.5cm StuK 40 replaced the Panzer III and Sturmgeschütz by 22 June 1941.

Neat.

Wouldn't it be simpler to ask "what if Hitler had a Leopard II in BARBAROSSA?" It could be a great Saturday Night Live sketch like "What if Napoleon had a B-52 at Waterloo?"

[LachenKrieg]

So you mean hindsight isn't used while formulating an alternate history? You mean I can't use what I know from historical events to formulate what could have been a feasible alternate path? Like your entire contribution here isn't based on hindsight? Really

Nope, not at all, you are projecting a lot of your apparent bias onto what I said. The basis of a counterfactual history - a "what if" - is, by default, by hindsight. However, constantly massaging decision points through adding additional alternate paths to compensate for new issues is simply using hindsight to get to a desired end state, which is not the purpose of counterfactual history at all.

And there is the problem rich, the one you keep avoiding. The WI isn't about how swiftly the Germans were able to react in 1941 after the war started, it is about the reaction they didn't have before the war started.

Indeed, which tells us quite a bit about WHY they didn't, which is the whole point of historical counterfactuals. You persist on insisting that all they needed to do was basically think a little bit more about the future and thus correct their path before they got there through a highly suspect "simple" change that was pretty obviously not a simple change at all.

It is simply a variation of an ASB intervention.

Where does it say that you made such a comment. You are answering to a post directed at another poster.

Oh, so sorry, missed that. Yes, you are correct, the idea of just building Panzer IV rather than Panzer III prior to c. mid-1943 is as much as a nonstarter as is the idea of building all Sturmgeschütz rather than Panzer III in the same time frame.

Okay, same as above.

Ditto.

The WI has been consistent from the start, and there is no messaging of ideas, but I am glad you now recognize that a WI is by default made from hindsight, which if you go back to my comment to Aida, is basically what I am reminding him of.

Indeed it tells us why your argument has failed. The Ordnance Dept. played a role is why they didn't. The notion that the Germans had to stay with a 3.7cm AT weapon is just simply not true rich!