What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

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Von Bock
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What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#1

Post by Von Bock » 05 Feb 2023, 22:03

What if Germany doesn't start the summer offensive towards the Caucasus in the summer of 1942 but instead focuses on clearing the Leningradpocket?

It was quite an 'easy' target at the time and a victory would have made the frontline a lot shorter and would cost the Soviets a million soldiers.

In the original timeline the siege tied up enormous German resources that could have been used elsewhere. And in the original timeline Fall Blau did not result in anything useful.

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Re: What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#2

Post by Konig_pilsner » 05 Feb 2023, 22:18

Sure Germany could have cleaned up the mess in the North and Center after the Russian winter offensive, but they needed oil to continue the war. Hitler was right they had to go South.


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Re: What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#3

Post by KDF33 » 05 Feb 2023, 23:26

Von Bock wrote:
05 Feb 2023, 22:03
What if Germany doesn't start the summer offensive towards the Caucasus in the summer of 1942 but instead focuses on clearing the Leningradpocket?
It would have been a better option than Fall Blau, although it still would have been sub-optimal compared to a strategy of sequential offensives on a south-to-north axis.
It was quite an 'easy' target at the time and a victory would have made the frontline a lot shorter and would cost the Soviets a million soldiers.
A figure of 1 million KIA/POW is too high. In early May 1942, the Leningrad Front had 438,334 active personnel, plus 45,100 patients in Front-level hospitals.

Even providing for subsidiary combat involving the neighboring Volkhov Front, a total tally of half-a-million irrecoverable Soviet casualties is the conceivable ceiling for your proposed operation.
In the original timeline the siege tied up enormous German resources that could have been used elsewhere. And in the original timeline Fall Blau did not result in anything useful.
Although Fall Blau was a flawed concept that ultimately led to catastrophe for Germany, to say that it didn't 'result in anything useful', at least early on, is excessive. The operation smashed a substantial part of the reconstituted Soviet tank force and led to the capture of 326,491 POW in July and a further 180,933 in August.
Konig_pilsner wrote:
05 Feb 2023, 22:18
Sure Germany could have cleaned up the mess in the North and Center after the Russian winter offensive, but they needed oil to continue the war. Hitler was right they had to go South.
Although additional oil sources would have been beneficial, to say that the Germans needed it to continue the war is incorrect. They ultimately failed to procure the oil of the Caucasus, and yet they kept fighting for another two-and-a-half years.

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Re: What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#4

Post by Kingfish » 06 Feb 2023, 03:16

KDF33 wrote:
05 Feb 2023, 23:26
Although additional oil sources would have been beneficial, to say that the Germans needed it to continue the war is incorrect. They ultimately failed to procure the oil of the Caucasus, and yet they kept fighting for another two-and-a-half years.
Yes, but were they fighting on their own terms?
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Re: What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#5

Post by KDF33 » 06 Feb 2023, 04:25

Kingfish wrote:
06 Feb 2023, 03:16
Yes, but were they fighting on their own terms?
No. Would you assert that this was due to a lack of oil?

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Re: What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#6

Post by Von Bock » 06 Feb 2023, 11:10

KDF33 wrote:
05 Feb 2023, 23:26
Von Bock wrote:
05 Feb 2023, 22:03
What if Germany doesn't start the summer offensive towards the Caucasus in the summer of 1942 but instead focuses on clearing the Leningradpocket?
It would have been a better option than Fall Blau, although it still would have been sub-optimal compared to a strategy of sequential offensives on a south-to-north axis.
It was quite an 'easy' target at the time and a victory would have made the frontline a lot shorter and would cost the Soviets a million soldiers.
A figure of 1 million KIA/POW is too high. In early May 1942, the Leningrad Front had 438,334 active personnel, plus 45,100 patients in Front-level hospitals.

Even providing for subsidiary combat involving the neighboring Volkhov Front, a total tally of half-a-million irrecoverable Soviet casualties is the conceivable ceiling for your proposed operation.
In the original timeline the siege tied up enormous German resources that could have been used elsewhere. And in the original timeline Fall Blau did not result in anything useful.
Although Fall Blau was a flawed concept that ultimately led to catastrophe for Germany, to say that it didn't 'result in anything useful', at least early on, is excessive. The operation smashed a substantial part of the reconstituted Soviet tank force and led to the capture of 326,491 POW in July and a further 180,933 in August.
Konig_pilsner wrote:
05 Feb 2023, 22:18
Sure Germany could have cleaned up the mess in the North and Center after the Russian winter offensive, but they needed oil to continue the war. Hitler was right they had to go South.
Although additional oil sources would have been beneficial, to say that the Germans needed it to continue the war is incorrect. They ultimately failed to procure the oil of the Caucasus, and yet they kept fighting for another two-and-a-half years.
Interesting. But how many Germans/Finns were deployed around the city of Leningrad in 1942? Wikipedia says 725.000 German and allied troops.

When considering the loss of troops elsewhere on the Eastern Front, it is safe to say that they would have lost at least 100.000 troops during the taking of the city. I think they would have needed at least 100.000 occupation troops as well, but that could still have freed up half a million of fresh troops for the frontline elsewhere.

I am interested in the ratio of Wehrmacht versus Red army losses during Case Blau. (let's say the full losses of Fall Blau on both sides, including Stalingrad and Third battle of Charkov. So June 28, 1942 until March 15, 1943) Although I think the Soviet losses are at twice as high, a 1:5 losses ratio was needed for the Germans. Something they actually realized during Barbarossa but not during the 1942 and 1943 offensives.

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Re: What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#7

Post by Aida1 » 06 Feb 2023, 12:23

Von Bock wrote:
05 Feb 2023, 22:03
What if Germany doesn't start the summer offensive towards the Caucasus in the summer of 1942 but instead focuses on clearing the Leningradpocket?

It was quite an 'easy' target at the time and a victory would have made the frontline a lot shorter and would cost the Soviets a million soldiers.

In the original timeline the siege tied up enormous German resources that could have been used elsewhere. And in the original timeline Fall Blau did not result in anything useful.
You would not shorten the line much as you would still need to hold the front to the east of Leningrad. And you can expect strong russian counteratacks from the east to take Leningrad back.
Giving up the Rshev salient in 1942 instead of 1943 would shorten the line much more.

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Re: What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#8

Post by Kingfish » 06 Feb 2023, 12:52

KDF33 wrote:
06 Feb 2023, 04:25
Kingfish wrote:
06 Feb 2023, 03:16
Yes, but were they fighting on their own terms?
No. Would you assert that this was due to a lack of oil?
One of many factors.

The point here is every strategic decision is based on either improving or maintaining the war effort in terms favorable to that side, so Germany's decision to go for the Caucasus oil should be viewed in that light.

That Germany continued fighting for another 2.5 years is irrelevant. One could argue that the Japanese garrison at Rabaul continued "fighting" right up to VJ day, yet once bypassed and its supply lines severed it had almost no means of influencing the Japanese war effort.
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Re: What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#9

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 06 Feb 2023, 16:03

Kingfish wrote:
06 Feb 2023, 12:52
KDF33 wrote:
06 Feb 2023, 04:25
Kingfish wrote:
06 Feb 2023, 03:16
Yes, but were they fighting on their own terms?
No. Would you assert that this was due to a lack of oil?
One of many factors.

The point here is every strategic decision is based on either improving or maintaining the war effort in terms favorable to that side, so Germany's decision to go for the Caucasus oil should be viewed in that light.

That Germany continued fighting for another 2.5 years is irrelevant. One could argue that the Japanese garrison at Rabaul continued "fighting" right up to VJ day, yet once bypassed and its supply lines severed it had almost no means of influencing the Japanese war effort.

Ellis in 'Brute Force' spends a lot of time trying to identify the strategic effects of resources available on strategy choose, strategic outcome, and touches occasionally on operational effects. From his many charts & tables you can get at least a general sense of the effects of resources on each side and how far the increases needed to be to have any significant effect in anything. ie: Ellis notes the reduction in flight hours for training rookie fighter pilots. By mid 1943 the flight hours in initial training had been reduced from over 250 hours to 170. This is attributed to fuel shortages, so increasing the flight training hours from 170 to 300 or 340 of the uS AAF or the RAF would in simplistic terms requires a 44% to 50% increase in training fuel.

Like most historians Ellis touches only lightly on the problem of labor productivity. This had two major variables; skilled labor and motivated labor. The problems of both are oft remarked on in the literature, tho detailed analysis is thin. But, since this problem may have run deep it probably overshadowed the resource shortages in the aggregate. If that is correct it makes it more difficult to see simple addition of resources as game changing.

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Re: What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#10

Post by thaddeus_c » 19 Feb 2023, 17:43

is the failure to capture Leningrad tied directly to the division of forces in Case Blue, seems they might have managed to capture both Stalingrad and Leningrad and withstood counterattacks absent the venture into the Caucasus?

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Re: What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#11

Post by KDF33 » 19 Feb 2023, 18:42

thaddeus_c wrote:
19 Feb 2023, 17:43
is the failure to capture Leningrad tied directly to the division of forces in Case Blue, seems they might have managed to capture both Stalingrad and Leningrad and withstood counterattacks absent the venture into the Caucasus?
The failure to capture Leningrad is tied to the terrible campaign plan the Germans came up with in 1942, a plan in which they kept diluting their offensive power along several axes.

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Re: What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#12

Post by thaddeus_c » 20 Feb 2023, 15:48

KDF33 wrote:
19 Feb 2023, 18:42
thaddeus_c wrote:
19 Feb 2023, 17:43
is the failure to capture Leningrad tied directly to the division of forces in Case Blue, seems they might have managed to capture both Stalingrad and Leningrad and withstood counterattacks absent the venture into the Caucasus?
The failure to capture Leningrad is tied to the terrible campaign plan the Germans came up with in 1942, a plan in which they kept diluting their offensive power along several axes.
not sure that differs much from what I posted? while I understand the division of forces in Ukraine critically harmed their efforts in and around Stalingrad, I'm not enough in the weeds to know what was drained from AGN, and how much that harmed efforts there?

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Re: What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#13

Post by ChrisDR68 » 10 Mar 2023, 21:15

Von Bock wrote:
05 Feb 2023, 22:03
What if Germany doesn't start the summer offensive towards the Caucasus in the summer of 1942 but instead focuses on clearing the Leningradpocket?
With the benefit of hindsight the Germans needed to take Leningrad in order to get the port into operation as soon as possible which would have eased the strain on the railways by supplying the Ost Heer by ship through the Baltic Sea.

The also needed to eliminate the Rzhev salient with a double envelopment offensive which could have netted 5 Soviet armies and shortened Army Group Centre's front line. Then they may have considered another much larger double envelopment of Moscow which could have netted an enormous number of POW's and armaments factories plus the central intersection of the Soviet rail system.

And finally they needed to capture the Maikop and Grozny oil fields and get them into operation as soon as possible in order to motorise the Ost Heer properly.

After Barbarossa the Wehrmacht was so damaged that they couldn't do all these things in 1942 even if the tried to do one at a time in a phased manner.

The best they could hope for imo was to successfully complete the first two of these operations (capture Leningrad and eliminate the Rzhev salient in their favour). That would still leave them short of fuel for their panzers and at a strategic disadvantage as 1943 approached due to the 10 new field armies the Red Army spent most of 1942 putting together.

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Re: What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#14

Post by Peter89 » 11 Mar 2023, 20:26

ChrisDR68 wrote:
10 Mar 2023, 21:15
Von Bock wrote:
05 Feb 2023, 22:03
What if Germany doesn't start the summer offensive towards the Caucasus in the summer of 1942 but instead focuses on clearing the Leningradpocket?
With the benefit of hindsight the Germans needed to take Leningrad in order to get the port into operation as soon as possible which would have eased the strain on the railways by supplying the Ost Heer by ship through the Baltic Sea.

The also needed to eliminate the Rzhev salient with a double envelopment offensive which could have netted 5 Soviet armies and shortened Army Group Centre's front line. Then they may have considered another much larger double envelopment of Moscow which could have netted an enormous number of POW's and armaments factories plus the central intersection of the Soviet rail system.

And finally they needed to capture the Maikop and Grozny oil fields and get them into operation as soon as possible in order to motorise the Ost Heer properly.

After Barbarossa the Wehrmacht was so damaged that they couldn't do all these things in 1942 even if the tried to do one at a time in a phased manner.

The best they could hope for imo was to successfully complete the first two of these operations (capture Leningrad and eliminate the Rzhev salient in their favour). That would still leave them short of fuel for their panzers and at a strategic disadvantage as 1943 approached due to the 10 new field armies the Red Army spent most of 1942 putting together.
The German leadership did not lack aggressive, offensive spirit or megalomania. What they lacked were troops, resources and matériel.

For pinching off the Soviet troops at the shoulders of the Rhzev salient, the Germans had to attack from Demyansk which they could barely hold, thus could obviously not do. The southern option (Wirbelwind) got nowhere because the Soviets attacked in August, redirecting or destroying any German reserves put to field, much like at Leningrad / Sinyavino. In fact the Germans cleared the Rhzev salient's rear to July only.

The role of Leningrad as a port is overrated. Germany had ports in the Baltics already, and it was not an ultimate, jolly joker idea to carry the supplies to a port via train, put it on ships, then offload it, put it on trains and carry it to the troops. It made far more sense to carry the supplies directly from production to the supply network near the front.

There was exactly 0 chance to capture Moscow in 1942.

The Caucasian oil fields were important indeed, but the German line in 1942 lay quite far from the oil fields. The German forces at hand were incapable of capturing and taking the Caucasus.; not to mention their supply and maintenance situation.

Any realistic approach would start with shortening the line via retreats or local counteroffensives, or try to take something vital from the enemy. The German miscalculation was that they tried to do both at the same time (also in NA), without strategic retreats. One significant victory they could pull off was the capture of Leningrad. The other, megalomaniac plan was to take the Caucasus.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: What if the Germans attack Leningrad in 1942?

#15

Post by ChrisDR68 » 15 Mar 2023, 23:31

Peter89 wrote:
11 Mar 2023, 20:26
For pinching off the Soviet troops at the shoulders of the Rhzev salient, the Germans had to attack from Demyansk which they could barely hold, thus could obviously not do. The southern option (Wirbelwind) got nowhere because the Soviets attacked in August, redirecting or destroying any German reserves put to field, much like at Leningrad / Sinyavino. In fact the Germans cleared the Rhzev salient's rear to July only.
The strike force of Operation Blue was principally the 4th Panzer Army under Hoth and the 1st Panzer Army under Von Kleist. Under this alternate scenario one of these panzer armies would be positioned near Demyansk and the other near Rhsev to effect the double envelopment offensive. This operation would probably take place in June and July and so before the Soviet offensive in August.
The role of Leningrad as a port is overrated. Germany had ports in the Baltics already, and it was not an ultimate, jolly joker idea to carry the supplies to a port via train, put it on ships, then offload it, put it on trains and carry it to the troops. It made far more sense to carry the supplies directly from production to the supply network near the front.
The logistics of the Ost Heer was poor throughout the war on the eastern front. Capturing Leningrad and then getting the port into operation could have been important as it would have been near the front line greatly assisting the supply of war material to the troops in the field. The railways would still be the principal mode of transport for supplies though particularly for Army Group Centre and Army Group South.
The Caucasian oil fields were important indeed, but the German line in 1942 lay quite far from the oil fields. The German forces at hand were incapable of capturing and taking the Caucasus.; not to mention their supply and maintenance situation.
I agree. If the Germans were to go south in 1942 they had to secure their flank along the Don and the lower Volga first. That means reaching Astrakhan and ensuring no Soviet bridgeheads on the German side of those rivers. Operation Blue was a mess mainly due to their northern flank being left wide open to counterattack because they did neither of those things.

In my alternate timeline it would be the Rhsev double envelopment first then Leningrad second. The Germans would then likely be trying to fend off Soviet offensives for the rest of the year leaving no time to go south in any case.
Any realistic approach would start with shortening the line via retreats or local counteroffensives, or try to take something vital from the enemy. The German miscalculation was that they tried to do both at the same time (also in NA), without strategic retreats. One significant victory they could pull off was the capture of Leningrad. The other, megalomaniac plan was to take the Caucasus.
Ultimately any strategy the Germans chose from 1942 onwards would end in their defeat imo. Hitler's declaration of war on the USA in December 1941 ensured that. Without war against the United States they may have fought the Soviets to a standstill in 1943/44. Britain under Churchill was unlikely to invade northern France or Italy without a major ally at their side.

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