Er, no. I am not focused "solely to industrial capacity and the labour force", I am focused upon measurable outputs rather than bullshit buzzwords. Yes, I know that the bogus business about the Panzer III reposted ad nauseum from one alt-history site to another.Avalancheon wrote: ↑31 Mar 2023 07:10A production economy can be thought of as a triangle. On one side, you have industrial capacity and a labour force. On another side, you have supplys of raw materials. And on another side, you have the organisation of the economy itself.
Your focus is limited solely to industrial capacity and the labour force, and is therefore one dimensional. If you need real world examples of how rationalisation can lead to increased production, I will provide you with one. The Panzer III originally needed 4000 man hours of labour to produce, but after the introduction of flow production techniques, the labour needed was cut in half to 2000 man hours. That is the kindof results brought about by industrial self-responsibility, by the sharing of knowledge between firms, etc.
In German FY 1939 (April 1938-March 1939) MIAG's Ammenwerk tank assembly plant employed 4,872 persons and built zero Panzer III (not a complete waste though, they did complete around 39 Pz II Ausf C). In FY 1940 it employed 6,657 and built 32 Panzer III. In FY 1941 it employed 6,530 and built 156 Panzer III, In FY 1942 it employed 6,681 and built 390 Panzer III. In FY 1943 it employed 7,342 and built 734 Panzer III and StuG. In FY 1944 it employed 6,808 and built 1,598 Panzer III, StuG, and Jagdpanther. In FY 1945 it employed 5,791 and built 1,281 StuG and Jagdpanther.
So yes, while the number of persons in the assembly plant remained essentially the same (6,383 average over the eight years) the production output rapidly increased, Going from 39, to 32, to 156, to 390, to 734, to 1,598, before understandably decreasing to 1,281. Output doubled year-to-year in 1941-1942, 1942-1943, and 1943-1944. A steady increase over time rather than a sudden doubling of output measured as man-hours after 1943. So why?
Well, the Panzer III was a troubled design from the beginning, partly because in many ways it was cutting edge technology, especially its transmission. Large numbers of additional workers were never introduced to the Ammenwerk. "Flow production techniques" were never introduced to the Ammenwerk. Some money for plant expansion was invested in FY 1939 (the same that resulted in the Nibelungenwerk construction and other assembly plant expansions).
So what, pray tell, is "industrial self-responsibility"? Aside from yet another buzzword invented by Simon Gogl?
"sharing of knowledge between firms"? Did that suddenly happen after Todt/Speer waved their magic wand? Panzer III was a shared design, shared contract, shared problem from the very beginning. DB was the prime, but Krupp produced turrets, relying itself on Wegmann, which was across the street from it. Maybach supplied engines for everyone and Zahnradfabrik did the same for transmissions - that was the major bottleneck to expanding production not lack of knowledge sharing, lack of industrial self-responsibility, and so on.
How do you explain that Nibelungenwerk, which was the only plant designed from the beginning for "flow production techniques" only began to meet its planned output in March 1944, five years after its construction was funded, and twenty-nine months after it produced its first tank? That it employed 4,800 workers by fall 1941 but they were exclusively engaged in repairing Panzer III and building suspension assemblies rather than Panzer IV and that the first one - literally one -was not completed until November 1941? In its official "opening" month of March 1942 it completed building zero Panzer IV. How many man-hours is that?