Oh, f***, where to start...
@Avalancheon: Ok, I will assume, you are not TMP - while you are making the same arguments, partially word-for-word - or one of his cultists - yes, I do know, what a cultist is, and TMP had some, ruminating his arguments word-for-word. I won't react to your slurs, because I'm just a stupid Balkanboo (FYI: Hungary isn't part of the Balkans, and the Romanians says, they aren't either), and we have enough backbone not to take slurs of some Zombie, who doesn't even know, where the respective countries ARE, seriously. Just a hint: if you ever come to the "Balkans", take extra care with slurs. It can result in broken jaws.
You really expect everyone to believe the Germans didn't do the slightest bit of research before deploying an entire Army of 14 divisions to Romania?
We are talking about the same Germans, who were surprised by the non-existence of roads in Russia proper, or that there are mud seasons twice a year in Russia proper, or that is winter in Russia proper, or thought, it is a wise idea to lunch a spring offensive somewhere, that is called Sárrét (i.e. Muddy Plains) for a reason? Despite the locals telling them, what the translation was. Or are we talking about other
The entire purpose is to create counterfactual scenarios. My ATL involves the German Army raising more divisions than it historically did. The extra forces are inherent to the scenario.
Yes, that is the inherent problem of your scenario. That, and deploying extra divisions to places, where the wasn't enough logistical background.
All of you types (Peter89 included) love to point to the poor roads and railways and lazily conclude that it precludes the deployment of large military forces. But none of you are ever able to substantiate this with any hard evidence. You don't discuss the tonnage of supplys needed for each division per day, or what tonnage the railways could transport per day. All you profer is unsubstantiated fluff
I did had the pleasure to drive around lower Romania (and Erdély for that matter) in 2004, 64 years AFTER your date. Even THEN, the road situation wasn't exactly glorious. What I saw there and then, the MAIN ROADS were comparable to Hungarian tertiary
ones. Yes, I drove around in the MORE DEVELOPED parts of Romania, and the North-Eastern parts were considered as deep, underdeveloped countryside. In 2023, 2004, in 1940 and in 1914.
If you are interested in contemporary pictures:
You have to use Hungarian namings, but you can find a LOT of pictures of pre-war pictures there. If you know, what you are looking for, the road situation can be inferred. (Use the search word "Erdély" and look for pictures post-1935)
I do know, that there was ONE paved road South from Budapest even in 1944 (the Road Nr. 5 from Budapest to Szeged), and almost NONE in Northern Erdély. Please note, that Erdély was considered a quite developed part of Romania.
So yes, saying, that the road situation in NE-Romania was WORSE in 1940, than that in Hungary in 1940 is most probably true. The road situation in lower Romania (that is and was considered more developed than NE-Romania even today) was WORSE in 2004, than it was in Hungary. Where there were "issues" in 2004 and are still present in 2023.
Looking at the PRESENT Street-View-Pictures, the road situation in 2022/2023 in NE-Romania isn't glorious either.
At any rate, the bad roads did not preclude the deployment of 12th Army to Romania, or its redeployment to Bulgaria. The roads were not the insurmountable obstacle you make them out to be.
If you try to push up a dozen+ Division on only one main road - that was most probably only a dirt track back then, and isn't much better TODAY - it IS an obstacle. As Germany found out later, in Russia proper.
Correct. There is one rail line running from Bucharest to Botosani, with a branch to Iassi. There is also another rail line running through the Carpathian mountains, with a very small gap at Suceava. This gap could be easily bridged with minimal effort; it may have been done after 1938. (Perhaps the war diarys of the divisions in the 11th Army could verify this) If so, this would provide two rail lines to Botosani.
Both of these railways would be single track lines. Generally, those can run about 12 train pairs per day, but the exact numbers depend on variables.
I'm certain, you know, that the Germans asked the Hungarian not to do anything funny because that would impede the already strained transport situation on the other (trans-Carpathian) rail line. That would mean, the Germans were pushing as many trains through that trans-Carpathian rail as it was possible. Hint: take a look at the Street-View pictures TODAY. And the old ones from the link above.
I would wager, the same was done with the Romanian main line Bukarest-Botosani.
And yes, you can run around 12 trains per day on a single-track line. You seem to forget, though, that it was a Romanian line under Romanian jurisdiction. Maybe
, just maybe
, the Romanians would like to run civilian trains on that line too? Say, one or two pairs per day?
Of course, we can assume, the Romanians are good Balkanboos, and are bending over to shine the boots of their German overlords.
A typical German supply train would carry around 450 tons of cargo. Thus, 12 trains per day down a single track line will yield about 5400 tons of supplys at their destination. According to this site: http://www.mnstarfire.com/ww2/history/l
... ision.html Infantry divisions need about 150 tons of supplys a day, while panzer divisions need around 300 tons a day. That doesn't include ammunition. 11th Army has 12 infantry divisions. 5th Panzer Group has 3 panzer, 2 motorised, and 2 infantry divisions. 14 infantry divisions require 2100 tons of supplys per day, while 5 panzer/motorised divisions require 1500 tons of supplys per day. Thats 3600 tons per day for all 19 divisions. The railways can cover that with enough of a surplus to build a supply stockpile. So logistically, there is no problem.
Mathematics - and logistics - is a science. You can justify 1+1=3 if you try hard enough.
The problems with your calculation are:
1, the Romanians are maybe, just maybe want to run civilian trains on that line too. At best
, you have NOT 12, but 10, probably fewer trains per day.
2, you assume, the railways in NE-Romania were able to accommodate 450t (net) trains. I confess I do not know the capacity of said lines, but what I saw in 2004 (and the pictures on Street-View) I do have some doubts. Be as it may, YOU are the one, who has to prove, the lines there could handle the 450t(net)-trains.
3, You assume, every last train is used to supply the 11th Army/"5thPzA", and the Romanian divisions (12 or so) North of Jassy are eating their boots and fighting with knives.
4, A division can survive with around 60t/day without fighting, 90t/day on garrison duty, but 120-150t/day is the very minimum for a defensive deployement. Heavy fighting can go upwards of 300t/day, easily. Not counting airforce demands - which you have to address in NE-Romania too.
Assuming a non-combat demand of only 90t/day, and 12 Romanian and 19 German divisions at or North of Iassy, you need 2790t/day just for to survive. Excluding Air Force demands. Even IF we assume, the rail lines could manage 10 military
trains of 450t (net) per day, AND Iassy and Botosani being able to handle that many trains, we would have a maximum capacity of 4500t/day. To stockpile enough stuff for an offensive, you have, at best
, 1710t/day. That's 55t/day per division, not counting Corps and Army troops and Air Force.
If we assume a conservative stockpile of 14 days of heavy battle (i.e. 300t/div) the reserve demand would be 92.000 or so tons total - excluding corps, army and airforce demands. 53 days
of running trains up to Botosani. Even if we count the trans-Carpathian rail, that would be 27 days. And again, without corps or army troops or Air Force
you can double the need if you include all those.
No, you don't need train yards to unload supplys. The trains can carry their own unloading equipment, even such simple implements as ramps. gebhk already explained this to you in detail, so I will not belabor the point again. Train yards are a luxury, not a necessity.
No, you need those, and no, they are not.
The Germans will have that, though. To a greater degree than they historically did. The operational reserve for the OstHeer in this ATL is 30 divisions, as opposed to just 24 divisions. Its not a major increase, but it matters. The larger reserves will allow them to compensate for the expanding funnel of the USSRs geography, and ensure there are enough divisions to hold the frontline in strength.
No, they will not have it. Even if they destroy 20-50 divisions more in the border battles, the soviets STILL have enough manpower and industrial capacity to put up another wave in September and another in December. And another in March, and another in June, and another in Late Summer 1942, and another, and another.
The Border Battles were a non-event in the greater picture.
A well-managed logistical apparatus would of course be highly advantageous in Russia. In practise, though, the Germans were undermined by their assumption of a short summer campaign. They did not put the maximum effort into improving their railways, because they assumed they would destroy the Red Army west of Dniepr-Dvina river. In their minds, there was no need to supply the bulk of the OstHeer that deep in the interior of Russia. They would just be mopping up what was left of the Soviet military.
But as for the matter of sabotage. If the Germans can make a faster advance through the Ukraine, that gives the Soviet destruction battalions less time to enact their scorched earth policys and destroy critical infrastructure. Especially bridges.
So, if Germany is thinking about a short, one-year-campaign, they wouldn't invest in proper logistical... investment either way, and just before the gates of Leningrad, Moscow and Rostow, they would stand there, with dicks in the hand, doing rhythmical movements.
Sorry, short, one-year-campaign and logistics beyond the D-D-Line are mutually exclusive.
There seems to be a misunderstanding. The point of departure for my ATL is a better assessment of the Red Armys capabilitys by the FHO (Fremde Heer Ost) during the summer of 1940. Specifically, they determine that the Soviets are only partially mobilised, and that they have the ability to arm and equip more divisions by the spring of 1941. This threat assessment leads to the Germans raising additional forces for the invasion of Russia, but not fundamentally changing their strategy. Thats the difference between my scenario and TMPs scenario. He proposed a change of German strategy from a one year campaign to a two year campaign against Russia, in contradiction to Hitlers rationale for the war. In that sense, it is less realistic than my ATL.
A better assessment of the RKKA's capabilities would lead to the realization, the su couldn't be defeated in a short, one-year campaign. As soon as it is realized, more, than one year would be needed, the whole idea behind the Eastern Campaign goes out of the window.
There is no way around it.
If the su is a more serious threat/has more capabilities than ALL of the Western world assumed - including the UK and the US - then NO one-year campaign is going to cut it.
Thats an entirely different scenario altogether from what I propose. I have no particular desire to explore any of the things you bring up. Especially since it involves a different POD.
Both TMP in his last cloud walking and you put the POD in May 1940 (or so). The inherent problem with both is, that if it is realized, that the su is a harder nut to crack, the whole idea for the Eastern Campaign is compromised. Even the OTL idea was borderline wishful thinking, add a more-or-less realistic assessment, and no one would be high enough on dope the propose a campaign in the East, while the UK is still around and kicking.
Accidentally, a POD in May 1940 would mean, Germany would have enough time to prepare for BoB and Seelöwe properly
I will refrain to answer points, that were directed and answered by Richard