An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

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Peter89
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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by Peter89 » 05 Sep 2023 21:41

Avalancheon wrote:
05 Sep 2023 11:25

Huszar666. You might recall that Hungary was conquered by the Ottoman Empire and occupied for over 150 years. Historically, culturally, and geographically, Hungary is part of the Balkans. Just like all the other Balkan states, Hungary was deeply impacted by centuries of Turkish rule. You have the hot temper that is typical of other Balkanites.
Your (false) historical example is very important, because it underlines your attitude towards history. For the sake of a childish personal argument you bent facts and created a self-serving ATL.

You might recall that Hungary (unlike Greece, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, BiH and Serbia) was never conquered by the Ottoman Empire, only parts of it. I find it very hard to believe that you have no idea of this fact.

Your comment stating that historically, culturally and geographically, Hungary is part of the Balkans shows a dismaying ineptitude in the said fields.

Historically, Hungary was defending itself from dangers coming from the direction of the Balkans.

Culturally, Hungary (unlike Balkans countries) chose western Christianity in 1000 and integrated with Western European royal families, statecraft, laws, politics, societies and economy.

Geographically, the usual northern border of the Balkans peninsula is the Danube-Sava-Kupa river line, but in no sense does the Balkans peninsula include the Carpathian Basin.

I for one love the Balkans, especially the former Yugoslavia; the landscape, the food, the music, the literature, etc. but Hungary is simply not part of it. Which is evident as soon as one gets into a car in Budapest and drives to Sofia.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Sep 2023 06:12

Avalancheon wrote:
05 Sep 2023 13:13
In OTL, Rustungsprogram B was based on the need to equip 200 nominal divisions (209 actual). In ATL, Rustungsprogram B was based on the need to equip 220 nominal divisions (231 actual).
I am so tired of the ongoing dishonesty behind these replies that I'm only going to reply to this.

Bullshit. Rüstungsprogramm B was based on the need to equip 42 additional divisions, not "200 nominal" or "209" actual. It failed. Now by waving the magic wands of "rationalization" and "mobilization" you want to pretend that they will succeed in equipping 62 to 73 additional divisions.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

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Avalancheon
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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by Avalancheon » 06 Sep 2023 12:43

Course of Operations

By early August, the Red Army had sustained heavy losses as its 1st and 2nd strategic echelons were decimated by the Wehrmacht. Although the situation seemed desperate, salvation was at hand. The massive mobilisation efforts that had begun in June-July were finally starting to bear fruit. The Soviets transferred roughly 30 divisions from the Eastern USSR to the Western USSR. Moreover, they mobilised some 50 new divisions in July and deployed them to the frontlines. This brought relief to the decimated ranks of the Red Army, bringng up the number of formations to a level not much lower than when the war started. Although Western and SouthWestern Fronts had both been destroyed in the intense fighting of July, the mobilisation efforts enabled the Russians to reconstitute these fronts. This by itself invalidated the German hopes for a victorious summer campaign and a short war. It was now apparent to the OKH that the Red Army was far larger than they had anticipated; the pre-war estimates that put their strength at only 227 divisions were grossly mistaken.

Soviet-forces6.png

After the battle of Smolensk, Army Group Center conducted an operational pause. They had outrun their supply lines and were forced to come to a halt, so that the Russian railways they depended on could be regauged. It would take time before the trains could resume their delivery of supplys to the frontlines. More time would be needed to build a supply stockpile enabling them to resume the offensive to the East. In early August, the OKH was already planning to launch an attack on Moscow; General Franz Halder had been scheming this for an entire year. His plans were dashed by the commander in chief, however. Adolf Hitler observed how the progress on Army Group Centers flanks were lagging, and how this compromised the OstHeers offensive goals. Army Group North was bogged down in Estonia and on the Luga river, while Army Group South was stuck on the Dnieper river. The Fuhrer planned to rectify this situation by dispatching elements of Panzer Group 2 and 3 to clear the flanks and eliminate the Soviet resistance. Halder protested this decision, but it was to no avail. The Panzer Groups would be given 10 days to refit, and would then be sent on their way. Meanwhile, Army Group Center was busy tying up loose ends all across the front. They launched a local offensive against Roslavl, taking the city and battering 28th Army in the process. Further north, they were fending off counter-attacks along the Smolensk-Moscow highway. Stavka was determined to halt the German attack on the capital city that they felt was imminent. 30th and 24th Armys went on the offensive at Yartsevo and Yelnia, but these isolated efforts made no headway.

On August 5, Panzer Group 2 and 3 withdrew from the frontlines and commenced their refit. During this time of relative stability, Army Group Center brought up its reserves, deploying 2nd Army along its southern flank. The Soviets had relatively few troops within the Pripyat marshs, and were unable to prevent the capture of Gomel. This move alarmed the Red Army, prompting them to pull 5th Army out of the Pripyat marshs in order to shorten their front. They also deployed 34th Army to the area to reinforce them. By this time, they had a total of 4 Armys in the region of Kiev, which had formed into a salient. New Armys were being hastily mobilised. Joseph Stalin wanted the Ukrainian capital to be held as long as possible, in order to forestall an attack on Moscow. Contrariwise, Adolf Hitler wanted to capture Kiev for economic reasons; the arable land and the iron and coal mines of the Ukraine were of great importance. General Halder continued to try and delay the implementation of the Fuhrers edict; due to a favourable turn of events, he was partly successful. Army Group North had renewed its advance on Leningrad, and would no longer require any assistance to reach its objectives. Panzer Group 3 would therefore not be redeployed to the north. However, Army Group South still needed support to destroy the Kiev salient with a pincer movement. As a result, Panzer Group 2 would still embark on its planned detour to the south. By August 15, they had completed their refit and were ready for action. General Heinz Guderian ordered his troops on the march, and they arrived at Starodub by the next day. It was then that the real fighting began.

After the battle of Vinnitsia and Nikolaev, Army Group South had secured a dominant position in the Ukraine, chasing the battered remnants of the Red Army up to the Dnieper river. Although Kiev remained in Soviet hands, other citys on the Dnieper were taken after minimal fighting. Panzer Group 1 spearheaded the attack and captured Kremenchuk on August 8; Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporozhye fell soon after. Panzer Group 5 took Kherson against a rearguard, and the infantry Armys raced to catch up with them. Army Group South was in a very secure position, with multiple bridgeheads along the river, and numerical superiority over the Russians. Their rapid march had overstretched their supply lines, however, forcing them to come to a halt. This gave the infantry Armys a chance to catch up, but it also gave the enemy time to rebuild SouthWestern Front. General Ewald Von Kleist wanted to cross the Dnieper river with Panzer Group 1, but was hamstrung by shortages of fuel and ammunition. They were forced to wait until the logistical situation rectified itself. 17th and 11th Army took up positions along the Dnieper, while 6th Army continued its attack on Kiev with renewed ferocity. Although the Soviets had demolished all the bridges near the capital, many of the other citys had been captured with their bridges still intact. This facilitated the expansion of the bridgeheads in preparation for an attack. By this time, Panzer Group 2 was now making a strong push into the Ukraine, with 2nd Army securing its flank along the Pripyat marshs. They were more than a match for the Russian forces opposing them, who were unable to hold back the assault. The armored spearheads made a succesful crossing of the Desna river.

The encirclement of the Kiev salient was now underway, and Stavka realized its peril. They plan to withdraw SouthWestern Front to a more defensible position, but Joseph Stalin refuses to authorise this. The capital would be held at all costs. The situation rapidly spirals out of control. On August 23, Panzer Group 1 went on the offensive from its bridgehead at Kremenchuk. They quickly broke through enemy lines and drove into the vacuum, conducting a nearly unopposed march. Panzer Group 2 continues its sweep to the south, capturing Konotop on August 25. On the same day, 6th Army crosses through the Pripyat marshs to take Kiev from behind. German troops fight their way into the streets of the capital itself, and the Soviets detonate huge mines in the city. On August 28, Panzer Group 1 captures the city of Lokhvitsa. Only 60 km remains between the two spearheads, as they close in to cut the salient at its base. By this point, it is apparent that the fall of Kiev is imminent, as is the encirclement of its six Armys. Guderian and Von Kleists troops link up at Lokhvitsa on August 30, and with that, the forces of SouthWestern Front are surrounded. The Russians try to launch counter-attacks from both inside and outside of the pocket, but their efforts are uncoordinated. Stavka finally issues an order authorising a retreat, but by then it is too late. Desperate fighting continues for a week. The battle of Kiev ends on September 8 with the surrender of 450,000 soldiers. It is the largest prisoner haul of the war. 5th, 16th, 19th, 34th, 37th, and 38th Armys are destroyed. A huge gap has been torn in the Red Armys frontlines. And the Eastern Ukraine is now ripe for the taking.

Meanwhile, Army Group North has made considerable progress in its sector. 18th Armys renewed attack into Estonia flattens the Soviets, who are surrounded at Tartu and defeated. The remnants fall back towards the capital of Tallin. A great evacuation from the port city begins, and the Luftwaffe exacts a savage toll of the rescue ships. With Estonia now cleared, German troops resume their march to Leningrad. Panzer Group 4 breaks out from the Luga river on August 10, capturing the ancient city of Veliky Novgorod along the way. The two Corps are able to encircle and destroy the Luga operational group that had held up their advance for a month. 18th Army pours in from the west, forcing the Soviets into retreat. The entire front is unravelling. Panzer Group 4 sweeps towards Leningrad in a powerful drive. The Red Army is hurriedly mobilising all available forces to try and stop the Germans before the city. They had precious few reserves, as most of the newly mobilised divisions had been deployed to Western and SouthWestern Fronts. Civilians drafted into labour battalions have been busy constructing defensive works around Leningrad. 8th Army is caught up in the headlong retreat and destroyed at Oranienbaum. Panzer Group 4 severs the last railway connection to Moscow, isolating the city. They march into Schlisselburg on September 2. With that, Leningrad and its population is now completely surrounded, and a terrible siege begins.


Summary

When the war began in June, the Soviets had a total of 6 Armys deployed in their 2nd strategic echelon. There was 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, and 24th Army, along with several Corps. Of these, 20th and 21st Armys were destroyed at Smolensk. 16th and 19th Armys were destroyed at Kiev. 22nd Army was destroyed at Veliki Luki. Only 24th Army remained, launching futile counter-attacks at Yelnia. Although the Red Army was able to mobilise roughly 50 new divisions in July and form 13 new Armys from them, it must be acknowledged that these newly raised divisions did not have the same fighting power as the pre-war divisions. As more and more of the 1st and 2nd echelons were destroyed in June, July, and August, the burden of carrying on the fight would increasingly fall on the 3rd echelon. These divisions were smaller and more poorly armed than the pre-war divisions, with inadequate training and leadership. And with the heavier losses experienced by the Soviet Union, even these plentiful reserves would not be enough to plug the gaps that were forming in their frontlines.

In the Ukraine, the Red Army was badly overstretched. They had endured staggering losses, and did not have enough forces to cover the front. They had no choice but to try to reconstitute SouthWestern Front in August, by mobilising three new Armys in the Kiev salient, and one new Army in the Crimea. They were also forced to transfer 44th and 47th Armys from the Caucasus, deploying them to the Dnieper river to reinforce Southern Front. They arrived in mid August, taking up position across from Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporozhye. The redeployment of these two Armys led to complications in the Soviets plans. They had agreed to launch an invasion of Persia in concert with the British, in order to secure the oil fields of that country and neutralise them as a potential Axis ally. But after the disaster in the Ukraine, the Red Army had no choice but to redeploy the two Armys that were to spearhead the invasion. They did not have any suitable forces in the Caucasus that could replace them, and Stavka was forced to postpone the Persian operation. The British warned that any delays would only jeopordise their position in the Near East; but for the time being, there was nothing that could be done.
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Kurt_S
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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by Kurt_S » 06 Sep 2023 19:16

Richard Anderson wrote:
06 Sep 2023 06:12
I am so tired of the ongoing dishonesty behind these replies that I'm only going to reply to this.

Bullshit. Rüstungsprogramm B was based on the need to equip 42 additional divisions, not "200 nominal" or "209" actual. It failed. Now by waving the magic wands of "rationalization" and "mobilization" you want to pretend that they will succeed in equipping 62 to 73 additional divisions.
Anderson's response here, apart from displaying odd emotional dysregulation, betrays a lack of knowledge regarding German strategy and production priorities. German army leaders were well aware that Rustunsprogram B was failing to meet the targets, as was Hitler. Their response, however, was not to be concerned. They would fill in the gaps with captured equipment and accept a suboptimal army configuration because the strategic plan - defeat Russia in a few weeks and then continue the pivot towards the Western powers - didn't require an optimal army armaments program.

Armaments programs usually fail to meet schedules, WW2 leaders were aware of this. Their strategic priorities inhere in how they respond to predictable failures, not solely in the schedules established. A Germany viewing X quantum of army production as necessary to victory would have behaved differently from a Germany viewing Y quantum as necessary. In Avalancheon's ATL, it is both economically possible and strategically necessary for Germany to ensure quantum X of German army equipment so X is probably built (in fact >X is probably built because the additional quantities are fairly minor relative to overall German production).

PunctuationHorror
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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by PunctuationHorror » 06 Sep 2023 21:55

Hi. Nice to see a detailed ATL :)

I dont want to entangle myself in the ongoing discussions, I just want to comment on a few things.
Avalancheon wrote:
15 May 2023 12:32

Agreed. There was almost no chance of the Soviet Union collapsing in 1941, regardless of how well the Germans performed. That by itself precluded the possibility of reaching the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line by a railway advance. The occupation phase described in the Marcks plan makes me think they were hoping to repeat what they had done in 1918 during Operation Faustschlag, when the Germans overran the collapsing Russians with train detachments.
Agree. They may have simply ignored the 20something years in between and thought that the Soviet Union was still just like the Russian Empire in 1918.
Avalancheon wrote:
15 May 2023 12:32
Anyway, the entire idea of a long war of attrition goes against the ethos of the German military, which was inherited from the Prussians. They exclusively preferred fast and decisive campaigns, resulting in wars that were short and lively (kurz und vives). Blitzkrieg was just a manifestation of this long military tradition.
This is highly questionable. Even though it is a beautiful tale, it is not clearly supported by actual history:
- De facto, Barbarossa was a war of attrition from July 1941 at the latest. Perhaps even from day one. Until 1945. Besides, ~ four years isn't particularly short. But vively it was.
- WW1 was the definition of attrition warfare and it doesn't qualify for a short war.
- Napoleonic Wars were anything but short.
- the Seven Years' War wasn't short either.

- If France had put up Soviet style resistance in 1940, Case Red would have become very nasty and unpleasant for the Whermacht, i.e attrittion warfare. German Army was lucky.

There are only three examples of short Prussian/German wars in the relevant period: 1864, 1866, and 1870/71.

Maybe the German military envisioned this kind of warfare and certainly they wished for it. However, often things turned out quite differently - and they got bitten by reality.
Avalancheon wrote:
15 May 2023 12:32

Precisely. If the Germans thought that they couldn't defeat the Soviets in one year, then they wouldn't have gone to war with them at all. Instead, they would have made a greater effort to either pacify them, or to bring them into the war on their side. Hitler would have went to the Axis-Soviet conference in November 1941 with a completely different attitude. This could have went one of two ways. 1) He could have offered the Soviets greater compensation for joining the Axis, possibly through the annexation of parts of Turkey (Kars province, and maybe the Bosporous). 2) He could have aimed for the less ambitious goal of simply maintaining the status quo between Germany and the Soviet Union.

If the OKH tells Hitler that the USSR cannot be defeated in a one year campaign, then he would have fundamentally changed his entire strategy. Germany would have embarked on a Mediterranean strategy, instead. Operation Felix is a certainty. An enlarged Afrika Korps is likely. A sequential invasion of Crete and Malta is likely. An invasion of Turkey is a distant possibility as well, although it would have to be done with Soviet participation (as they could sabotage the entire campaign).
Yep. Attacking the USSR was suicide. Imagine half of the tank and mot divisions deployed to the Soviet Union had appeared in the Middle East and Egypt instead...


I agree that a spearhead from Romania would have been beneficial. However, it likely would not have won this war. Perhaps the Soviets would lose 500,000 more men and the Wehrmacht would have a clear path - until they ran into the next soviet armies further east.

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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by ljadw » 07 Sep 2023 05:45

Half of the tank and mot divisions deployed to the Soviet Union could not appear in the Middle East and Egypt and if they still did, it would be a total wast ,as there was nothing in the ME that was interesting for Germany .
If the OKH would tell Hitler that the USSR could not be defeated in a one year campaign, they would be fired and Hitler would not have changed his entire strategy .
Even if he offered the Soviets greater compensation for joining the Axis, the Soviets would not have done it .They did not join the Axis after the defeat of France, why would they do it after the defeat of the LW in the Battle of Britain ?
Besides : Barbarossa was NOT conceived as a campaign of one year but as a campaign of a few months .
As was the Schlieffen Plan : the Emperor told his men that they would be back before the leafs would fall from the trees .
The longer the war,the less chance to win him .

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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by PunctuationHorror » 10 Sep 2023 10:53

ljadw wrote:
07 Sep 2023 05:45
Half of the tank and mot divisions deployed to the Soviet Union could not appear in the Middle East and Egypt and if they still did, it would be a total wast ,as there was nothing in the ME that was interesting for Germany .
Eh, nothing interesting? What about Mesopotamia and all the ancient cultural and archaeological sites? What about plenty of figs, dates, camels, exotic women and donkeys?
ljadw wrote:
07 Sep 2023 05:45
If the OKH would tell Hitler that the USSR could not be defeated in a one year campaign, they would be fired and Hitler would not have changed his entire strategy .
No. Hitler could not have fired his army high command in 1940 and early 1941. He did not have the power at that time. Only later, after half a year of failed Barbarossa and the catastrophe in the winter of 1941, was there a favorable opportunity for his coup.
ljadw wrote:
07 Sep 2023 05:45
Even if he offered the Soviets greater compensation for joining the Axis, the Soviets would not have done it .They did not join the Axis after the defeat of France, why would they do it after the defeat of the LW in the Battle of Britain ?
Why join if they could have reciprocal benefits of a tit-for-tat cooperation and a non aggressive coexistance? Probably based on military strength and deterrence.

These "What could the Third Reich have done to defeat the Soviet Union" discussions are getting somewhat boring.

Instead:
What could the Soviet Union have done to prevent this war, to stop Barbarossa more effectively and to avoid those terrible losses? What would the SU have looked like without this war?

The war set the Soviet Union back by many years in its development. People and society suffered badly. In some aspects it took well into the 1960s, maybe even longer, to recover the damage and return to pre-war conditions. Other damage was irreversible. Not only all the dead, but also the culture. The population west of the Urals was completely different after the war. People in western Russia, and their characteristics that had developed for centuries, as Tolsotj describes them, almost ceased to exist after that.

ljadw
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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by ljadw » 10 Sep 2023 17:54

PunctuationHorror wrote:
10 Sep 2023 10:53
ljadw wrote:
07 Sep 2023 05:45
Half of the tank and mot divisions deployed to the Soviet Union could not appear in the Middle East and Egypt and if they still did, it would be a total wast ,as there was nothing in the ME that was interesting for Germany .
Eh, nothing interesting? What about Mesopotamia and all the ancient cultural and archaeological sites? What about plenty of figs, dates, camels, exotic women and donkeys?
ljadw wrote:
07 Sep 2023 05:45
If the OKH would tell Hitler that the USSR could not be defeated in a one year campaign, they would be fired and Hitler would not have changed his entire strategy .
No. Hitler could not have fired his army high command in 1940 and early 1941. He did not have the power at that time. Only later, after half a year of failed Barbarossa and the catastrophe in the winter of 1941, was there a favorable opportunity for his coup.
ljadw wrote:
07 Sep 2023 05:45
Even if he offered the Soviets greater compensation for joining the Axis, the Soviets would not have done it .They did not join the Axis after the defeat of France, why would they do it after the defeat of the LW in the Battle of Britain ?
Why join if they could have reciprocal benefits of a tit-for-tat cooperation and a non aggressive coexistance? Probably based on military strength and deterrence.

These "What could the Third Reich have done to defeat the Soviet Union" discussions are getting somewhat boring.

Instead:
What could the Soviet Union have done to prevent this war, to stop Barbarossa more effectively and to avoid those terrible losses? What would the SU have looked like without this war?

The war set the Soviet Union back by many years in its development. People and society suffered badly. In some aspects it took well into the 1960s, maybe even longer, to recover the damage and return to pre-war conditions. Other damage was irreversible. Not only all the dead, but also the culture. The population west of the Urals was completely different after the war. People in western Russia, and their characteristics that had developed for centuries, as Tolsotj describes them, almost ceased to exist after that.
It is not ''what could the Soviet Union have done to prevent this war '' ,but what SHOULD the Soviet Union have done to prevent this war ,and WHY ?
An alliance of Poland and the Soviet Union was impossible, thus the SU could not have done anything and, there was no reason why the SU should have tried to prevent a German attack on Poland, as for the SU this would be a war between two capitalist countries that were enemies of the SU .
Besides :US also did nothing, thus why should the Soviets have fought to save Poland ?
Could the Soviets have done something to stop Barbarossa more effectively ? NO .
Besides :Barbarossa had failed already after a few weeks .
What is correct is that even in 1989 not all damage was recovered .But, this was caused not only by the enormous amount of these damages, but also by the nature of the Soviet regime : as to be expected, Marxism failed in the reconstruction proces of the country ,although there was a lot of change .

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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by PunctuationHorror » 11 Sep 2023 10:46

ljadw wrote:
10 Sep 2023 17:54
PunctuationHorror wrote:
10 Sep 2023 10:53
ljadw wrote:
07 Sep 2023 05:45
Half of the tank and mot divisions deployed to the Soviet Union could not appear in the Middle East and Egypt and if they still did, it would be a total wast ,as there was nothing in the ME that was interesting for Germany .
Eh, nothing interesting? What about Mesopotamia and all the ancient cultural and archaeological sites? What about plenty of figs, dates, camels, exotic women and donkeys?
ljadw wrote:
07 Sep 2023 05:45
If the OKH would tell Hitler that the USSR could not be defeated in a one year campaign, they would be fired and Hitler would not have changed his entire strategy .
No. Hitler could not have fired his army high command in 1940 and early 1941. He did not have the power at that time. Only later, after half a year of failed Barbarossa and the catastrophe in the winter of 1941, was there a favorable opportunity for his coup.
ljadw wrote:
07 Sep 2023 05:45
Even if he offered the Soviets greater compensation for joining the Axis, the Soviets would not have done it .They did not join the Axis after the defeat of France, why would they do it after the defeat of the LW in the Battle of Britain ?
Why join if they could have reciprocal benefits of a tit-for-tat cooperation and a non aggressive coexistance? Probably based on military strength and deterrence.

These "What could the Third Reich have done to defeat the Soviet Union" discussions are getting somewhat boring.

Instead:
What could the Soviet Union have done to prevent this war, to stop Barbarossa more effectively and to avoid those terrible losses? What would the SU have looked like without this war?

The war set the Soviet Union back by many years in its development. People and society suffered badly. In some aspects it took well into the 1960s, maybe even longer, to recover the damage and return to pre-war conditions. Other damage was irreversible. Not only all the dead, but also the culture. The population west of the Urals was completely different after the war. People in western Russia, and their characteristics that had developed for centuries, as Tolsotj describes them, almost ceased to exist after that.
It is not ''what could the Soviet Union have done to prevent this war '' ,but what SHOULD the Soviet Union have done to prevent this war ,and WHY ?
An alliance of Poland and the Soviet Union was impossible, thus the SU could not have done anything and, there was no reason why the SU should have tried to prevent a German attack on Poland, as for the SU this would be a war between two capitalist countries that were enemies of the SU .
Besides :US also did nothing, thus why should the Soviets have fought to save Poland ?
Could the Soviets have done something to stop Barbarossa more effectively ? NO .
Besides :Barbarossa had failed already after a few weeks .
What is correct is that even in 1989 not all damage was recovered .But, this was caused not only by the enormous amount of these damages, but also by the nature of the Soviet regime : as to be expected, Marxism failed in the reconstruction proces of the country ,although there was a lot of change .
I agree that the Soviet Union had no interest in keeping Poland alive. Which they haven't done anyway.
There is a misunderstanding. With "this war" I meant the one that started on 22.06.1941.
Yes, Barbarossa failed after a few weeks. However, most of the destruction was inflicted after Barbarossa had failed and millions were killed AFTER Barbarossa had failed.
Stalin probably did not expect that Hitler would turn against him. Or maybe he did and hoped to use this war to gain advantages in his domestic power struggle. For him the war was a good pretext to "change" and "clean" many things in Soviet Union. Getting rid of "unreliable elements" and "enemies of the people". Maybe he had overestimated the capabilities of the Red Army...

Soviet Union could have done important things to prevent a war between European Axis powers and the Soviet Union:
Maybe they don't supply so much oil, raw materials and grain to the Nazis in the first place. Easy to do for the SU.
Maybe they occupy Romania in 1940 instead of the Baltic states while the German Army is busy in France. Without fuel, the Germans would be incapable of invading the Soviets. With the oil in Soviet control, they could give the Nazis just enough oil for their war against the WAllies.

Stalin played his own game. He saw an opportunity to use Hitler against his capitalist enemies in the West. And got fooled by Hitler who turned against him.

ljadw
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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by ljadw » 11 Sep 2023 13:54

1 Stalin was convinced that as Hitler could not defeat the USSR,he would not attack the USSR .But he underestimated the despair of Hitler .
2 He could do nothing to prevent Hitler from attacking him :
the oil ( 1 million ton only ),grain and raw materials he sold to Hitler were nor much more than peanuts for Germany .
The importance of the Romanian oil also is a myth, created during the Cold War .
In 1939 the division of Domestic Crude production, Domestic Synthetic Production and imports of oil was the following :
Crude 11 %,Synthetic 27 % , Imports 62 %
In 1940 :21 % for Crude,49 % for Synthetic, 30 % for Imports
1941 : 18%,49 %, 33%
1942 :18 %, 55 % ,27 %
1943 : the same
1944 :26 %,59 %, 15 %
In raw figures 1940-1944
Imports of oil : 11 million tons ( not all from Romania or the USSR )
Synthetic : 22 million
Crude : 7 million
Some 25 % of all German oil was imported, only 25 % .
Other points :
it was not only,or even mainly a problem of oil production , but also of oil refining and most important : of oil distribution .
and : more oil does not mean more operational ( or not ) tanks, trucks and aircraft or submarines .
In 1940 Germany ( including Czechia ) received 1,2 million tons of oil from Romania .That year Germany produced/imported 6,9 million of tons of oil .
And that most war deaths occurred in the USSR after the failure of Barbarossa is something irrelevant for this discussion .
The only way for Stalin to not be attacked by Hitler, was to attack Hitler first .But this was something he refused to do as he was impressed by the victories of Hitler, as he had not much faith in the offensive strength of the Red Army and as he feared that a preventive Soviet attack on a capitalist country (Germany ) would have as result the creation of an anti-communist coalition of Germany,Italy,Japan, UK and US as happened in 1920 .

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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by Onslow » 18 Sep 2023 00:43

Avalancheon wrote:
05 Sep 2023 13:13

Germany and the Second World War, Volume 5, details the number of workers employed in the armaments industry over the course of 1940. On August 1, 1940, Germany had 3.69 million workers in the armaments industry. 408 thousand were employed in ammunition production, 1.04 million in weapons production, 480 thousand in aircraft building, 226 thousand in shipbuilding, 367 thousand in motor vehicle construction, 130 thousand in communication equipment, and 1.04 million in general army equipment.

The most critical category for this ATL is the number of workers engaged in weapons production, of which there were only 1.04 million in August 1940. Any increase to the number of workers in this sector would lead directly to an increased production of weapons. That means more small arms, artillery, and tanks. This is the sector where the German rationalisation measures would be most intensely focused (with motor vehicle construction being a second priority). Starting in September 1940, these measures put into place by Fritz Todt would free up workers from other sectors of the economy and filter them into the armaments industry.

Lets assume for the sake of argument that 1 million workers could be re-allocated in this way over the course of about 1 year. Its reasonable to assume that the number of freed workers would be small at first, but gradually increase month over month. Weapons production would closely track with the number of workers employed in that sector, but not directly correlate. (There are lots of other factors influencing productivity, some of which are hard to measure) As stated before, there is a 9 month window of opportunity for increases in weapons production to have an impact on the opening phase of Operation Barbarossa.



Thats not true. There was an untapped pool of manpower between the ages of 30 and 40. Its just that they were exempted from conscription due to their supposed importance to the war economy. To draft them into the Wehrmacht merely requires a change to the system of deferrals. This actually was done historically, but only after the failure of Barbarossa. Men in this age group were drafted to fill out the 15 static divisions of the 15th wave. In the ATL, men in this age group are drafted to fill out the 15 occupation and 15 static divisions of the 14th and 15th waves.
I'm a bit late to this, and this is well out of any expertise I may have, but may I ask what section of production you were thinking of cutting back on in order to move the workers into weapons production? How would this cutback affect the sector from which the workers were taken, and therefore the war?

Secondly, if you conscript more of the 30 to 40 year olds from production work, what programmes are cut back and what does the reduction in those programmes do to the war effort?

ljadw
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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by ljadw » 18 Sep 2023 14:23

It is not so that an increase of workers for the weapons industry would result in an increase of he weapon production .
Other factors were as important,or more important and also needed .
Factors as raw materials :more workers without more raw materials would be useless .
Factors as training of these new workers, as place in the factories, as construction of new factories,as displacement of these workers from their heimat to an other place where there was a factory .
And, how would these additional weapons be transported to the front ?
Besides : more artillery and more tanks implies also more crew for these artillery pieces and tanks ,and as the training of more crew would demand more time than the construction of their weapons ..
And : it is too easy, much too easy to say that the Germans needed only more supplies or divisions,as in an other thread is claimed that the allies needed only more supplies after DDay to finish the war in 1944 .
The truth is that the Germans could have won with less supplies ,they lost with more supplies and that the allies could have been in Berlin in 1944 with less supplies than they had in the HTL ,because :
the failure or success of Barbarossa depended mainly on the Soviets and the failure of the allies to be in Berlin before 1945 was mainly caused by the Germans .
There are always two groups in a war .
Last point : there was NO window of opportunity for an increase of the weapon production for Barbarossa, as the Barbarossa decision was not taken in September 1940 ,but only in December 1940/January 1941 .

KDF33
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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by KDF33 » 19 Sep 2023 15:24

You are wrong, ljadw.

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Aida1
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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by Aida1 » 19 Sep 2023 19:46

ljadw wrote:
18 Sep 2023 14:23
It is not so that an increase of workers for the weapons industry would result in an increase of he weapon production .
Other factors were as important,or more important and also needed .
Factors as raw materials :more workers without more raw materials would be useless .
Factors as training of these new workers, as place in the factories, as construction of new factories,as displacement of these workers from their heimat to an other place where there was a factory .
And, how would these additional weapons be transported to the front ?
Besides : more artillery and more tanks implies also more crew for these artillery pieces and tanks ,and as the training of more crew would demand more time than the construction of their weapons ..
And : it is too easy, much too easy to say that the Germans needed only more supplies or divisions,as in an other thread is claimed that the allies needed only more supplies after DDay to finish the war in 1944 .
The truth is that the Germans could have won with less supplies ,they lost with more supplies and that the allies could have been in Berlin in 1944 with less supplies than they had in the HTL ,because :
the failure or success of Barbarossa depended mainly on the Soviets and the failure of the allies to be in Berlin before 1945 was mainly caused by the Germans .
There are always two groups in a war .
Last point : there was NO window of opportunity for an increase of the weapon production for Barbarossa, as the Barbarossa decision was not taken in September 1940 ,but only in December 1940/January 1941 .
The usual tactic of denying everything.

ljadw
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Re: An Alternate Timeline: Operation Barbarossa

Post by ljadw » 19 Sep 2023 20:18

Was the Barbarossa decision taken in September 1940 or December 1940 ?
I do not deny everything, but only the lies of Liddel Hart, Guderian and Manstein .
Last edited by ljadw on 19 Sep 2023 20:22, edited 3 times in total.

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