Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

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Aida1
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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by Aida1 » 23 Sep 2023 09:19

KDF33 wrote:
23 Sep 2023 05:00
Konig_pilsner wrote:
23 Sep 2023 03:00
The goals outlined in Fuhrer Directive 41. You might not like Case Blue, and certainly it failed, but that does not make what was envisioned not sensible.
It wasn't sensible because:

1. To succeed, it required the Soviets to have minimal reserves and low force (re)generation.
2. If the Soviets lacked reserves and had low force (re)generation, then they could be defeated in detail.
3. If the Soviets could be defeated in detail, then Fall Blau was unnecessary.

Beyond that, Führer Directive 45 turned a bad strategy into an operational disaster.
Makes no sense at all. If the red army was as weak as you pretend then Fall Blau could succeed. The problem with Fall Blau was in the execution ,red army getting better and german logistical issues.

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Aida1
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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by Aida1 » 23 Sep 2023 09:26

Konig_pilsner wrote:
23 Sep 2023 04:26

You might have something there. It is possible that you weren't being dishonest, but in fact you are just ignorant.
You are clearly unable to grasp that somebody can disagree with you. :lol:
Anyway, the halt order remains fundamentally wrong because it completely takes away the necessary flexibility in military operations. There can always be instances where a planned retreat is necessary at whatever level and the decision for that cannot be at the top of the command chain. Planned retreats were done before the halt order and were perfectly feasible when necessary.

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Aida1
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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by Aida1 » 23 Sep 2023 09:31

Konig_pilsner wrote:
23 Sep 2023 04:26


..The reason why people debate Moscow or Kiev in 1941, Case Blue or Moscow 2.0 in 1942, is because no one will ever know for sure and it is a complex puzzle. Not so much for Hitler's December 18th Halt Order. In recent years it has been called into question, not because some new Russian files were released, but because a new narrative was spun to sell books, get attention, or just to bash Hitler. That is dishonest.
There has been debate about the halt order for decades and even some german commanders agreed with it so what you say is 100% wrong. You cannot grasp somebody would honestly disagree with the halt order.

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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by Princess Perfume » 23 Sep 2023 11:26

Palpatine (Hitler is in the mix of his character's influences) is also an unqualified civilian but he has access to the almost magical powers of the "Force". Hitler was merely a seriously disturbed human.

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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by KDF33 » 23 Sep 2023 19:57

Aida1 wrote:
23 Sep 2023 09:19
Makes no sense at all. If the red army was as weak as you pretend then Fall Blau could succeed.
No.

Fall Blau dissipated German offensive power, thus foreclosing the possibility of the Ostheer inflicting a series of devastating defeats on the RKKA.
The problem with Fall Blau was in the execution ,red army getting better and german logistical issues.
There was no major problem with the German execution of the operation, whereas there is precious little evidence that the RKKA was improving in any significant manner. As for logistical difficulties, they were caused by Fall Blau's overextension.

***

Edit: Spelling
Last edited by KDF33 on 23 Sep 2023 22:54, edited 1 time in total.

Peter89
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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by Peter89 » 23 Sep 2023 22:13

KDF33 wrote:
23 Sep 2023 19:57
Aida1 wrote:
23 Sep 2023 09:19
Makes no sense at all. If the red army was as weak as you pretend then Fall Blau could succeed.
No.

Fall Blau dissipated German offenvise power,
Correct,
KDF33 wrote:
23 Sep 2023 19:57
thus foreclosing the possibility of the Ostheer inflicting a series of devastating defeats on the RKKA.
but this one is a mere theory at best.

KDF33 wrote:
23 Sep 2023 19:57
The problem with Fall Blau was in the execution ,red army getting better and german logistical issues.
There was no major problem with the German execution of the operation, whereas there is precious little evidence that the RKKA was improving in any significant manner. As for logistical difficulties, they were caused by Fall Blau's overextension.
The RKKA possessed strategic depth, which would dissipate German (in reality: Axis) offensive power in any direction.

Your correct assessment - that the Axis had to attack closer to its logistic hubs - does not support a theory that the RKKA could or would be destroyed decisively nearer to the June 1942 front line.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by KDF33 » 24 Sep 2023 00:04

Peter89 wrote:
23 Sep 2023 22:13
but this one is a mere theory at best.
The theory was put to the test in the spring and early summer of 1942, though, and the results showed that, between May 1 and July 31:

1. The Ostheer captured slightly over 1 million PoW in a series of battles of annihilation.
2. The combined manpower of the Red Army and Navy fell from 11,787,122 (May 1) to 10,881,553 (August 1), a net loss of 905,569 personnel, i.e. 7.7% of the total force at the start of the period.
3. The active Fronts more-or-less maintained their manpower strength throughout the period, but only by absorbing very large reinforcements in the form of the Soviet strategic reserve. By late July, said reserve was mostly tapped out.

Fortunately for the Soviets, by late July the Germans stopped focusing on attriting the Red Army, and instead embarked on an unrealistic drive to capture far-flung objectives. The rest of the summer saw lower absolute Soviet losses, a higher share of recoverable Soviet casualties, and a more favorable (albeit still very disproportionate) loss exchange ratio between the Red Army and the Ostheer.
The RKKA possessed strategic depth, which would dissipate German (in reality: Axis) offensive power in any direction.
Why / how?
Your correct assessment - that the Axis had to attack closer to its logistic hubs - does not support a theory that the RKKA could or would be destroyed decisively nearer to the June 1942 front line.
The Soviets were in the process of being attrited down in the May - July period. With a quarterly net loss of almost 1 million men, I can't see how the Red Army would have avoided a cascading failure sometime in 1943.

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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by Aida1 » 24 Sep 2023 07:07

KDF33 wrote:
23 Sep 2023 19:57
Aida1 wrote:
23 Sep 2023 09:19
Makes no sense at all. If the red army was as weak as you pretend then Fall Blau could succeed.
No.

Fall Blau dissipated German offensive power, thus foreclosing the possibility of the Ostheer inflicting a series of devastating defeats on the RKKA.
The problem with Fall Blau was in the execution ,red army getting better and german logistical issues.
There was no major problem with the German execution of the operation, whereas there is precious little evidence that the RKKA was improving in any significant manner. As for logistical difficulties, they were caused by Fall Blau's overextension.

***

Edit: Spelling
Your own unsupported opinion. Nobody in the german army including Hitler shared your rosy view so one went for the oil.
Anyway, Fall Blau failed for the reasons i indicated which which is what any historian will tell you.
You may choose to believe the red army had learned nothing but it had. It had learned you needed to retreat instead of getting surrounded.
Your own ideas about operations have nothing original and are doomed to fail. :lol:

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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by Aida1 » 24 Sep 2023 07:19

KDF33 wrote:
24 Sep 2023 00:04
Peter89 wrote:
23 Sep 2023 22:13
but this one is a mere theory at best.
The theory was put to the test in the spring and early summer of 1942, though, and the results showed that, between May 1 and July 31:

1. The Ostheer captured slightly over 1 million PoW in a series of battles of annihilation.
2. The combined manpower of the Red Army and Navy fell from 11,787,122 (May 1) to 10,881,553 (August 1), a net loss of 905,569 personnel, i.e. 7.7% of the total force at the start of the period.
3. The active Fronts more-or-less maintained their manpower strength throughout the period, but only by absorbing very large reinforcements in the form of the Soviet strategic reserve. By late July, said reserve was mostly tapped out.

Fortunately for the Soviets, by late July the Germans stopped focusing on attriting the Red Army, and instead embarked on an unrealistic drive to capture far-flung objectives. The rest of the summer saw lower absolute Soviet losses, a higher share of recoverable Soviet casualties, and a more favorable (albeit still very disproportionate) loss exchange ratio between the Red Army and the Ostheer.
The RKKA possessed strategic depth, which would dissipate German (in reality: Axis) offensive power in any direction.
Why / how?
Your correct assessment - that the Axis had to attack closer to its logistic hubs - does not support a theory that the RKKA could or would be destroyed decisively nearer to the June 1942 front line.
The Soviets were in the process of being attrited down in the May - July period. With a quarterly net loss of almost 1 million men, I can't see how the Red Army would have avoided a cascading failure sometime in 1943.
You are still unwilling to see that inflicting disastrous losses on the red army implies deep penetrations encircling large enemy forces which is what you do not even intend to do. And was not possible anymore anyway on the scale of Barbarossa.
Should have been attempted in the first phase of Blau but you would not even try it.
You are clearly also in the misreprenting business where the description of events is concerned. And far underestimate the capability of the red army to absorb losses. It did for example suffer a lot of losses in its own succession of offensives against army group center.

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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by KDF33 » 24 Sep 2023 07:55

Aida1 wrote:
24 Sep 2023 07:07
Your own unsupported opinion.
My opinion is supported by the evidence.
Nobody in the german army including Hitler shared your rosy view so one went for the oil.
Evidence? Because Hitler set the parameters of the campaign early on. Neither OKW nor OKH did a detailed study of their alternatives.
Anyway, Fall Blau failed for the reasons i indicated which which is what any historian will tell you.
Fall Blau failed because it was unrealistic.
You may choose to believe the red army had learned nothing but it had. It had learned you needed to retreat instead of getting surrounded.
The Soviet South-Western Front didn't successfully retreat.

It was annihilated.

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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by Aida1 » 24 Sep 2023 09:40

KDF33 wrote:
24 Sep 2023 07:55
Aida1 wrote:
24 Sep 2023 07:07
Your own unsupported opinion.
My opinion is supported by the evidence.
Nobody in the german army including Hitler shared your rosy view so one went for the oil.
Evidence? Because Hitler set the parameters of the campaign early on. Neither OKW nor OKH did a detailed study of their alternatives.
Anyway, Fall Blau failed for the reasons i indicated which which is what any historian will tell you.
Fall Blau failed because it was unrealistic.
You may choose to believe the red army had learned nothing but it had. It had learned you needed to retreat instead of getting surrounded.
The Soviet South-Western Front didn't successfully retreat.

It was annihilated.
You clearly think you know better than a lot of historians and commanders. :lol:
And you really underestimate the OKH. At least it had a far more realistic view of the reduced german abilities in 1942.
You will never understand what totally annihilating enemy forces actually means. Will certainly not happen in your un ambitious scheme. :lol:

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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by KDF33 » 24 Sep 2023 09:51

Aida1 wrote:
24 Sep 2023 09:40
You clearly think you know better than a lot of historians and commanders. :lol:
Correct.
You will never understand what totally annihilating enemy forces actually means.
The Soviet forces facing Blau were almost entirely destroyed. The vast majority of the formations of the Stalingrad Front came from the Reserve Armies and the Fronts facing Japan.
Will certainly not happen in your un ambitious scheme. :lol:
My "scheme" is properly calibrated to play to German strengths. I have no idea why you keep calling it "unambitious".

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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by PunctuationHorror » 24 Sep 2023 10:14

KDF33 wrote:
24 Sep 2023 00:04

The theory was put to the test in the spring and early summer of 1942, though, and the results showed that, between May 1 and July 31:

1. The Ostheer captured slightly over 1 million PoW in a series of battles of annihilation.
2. The combined manpower of the Red Army and Navy fell from 11,787,122 (May 1) to 10,881,553 (August 1), a net loss of 905,569 personnel, i.e. 7.7% of the total force at the start of the period.
3. The active Fronts more-or-less maintained their manpower strength throughout the period, but only by absorbing very large reinforcements in the form of the Soviet strategic reserve. By late July, said reserve was mostly tapped out.

Fortunately for the Soviets, by late July the Germans stopped focusing on attriting the Red Army, and instead embarked on an unrealistic drive to capture far-flung objectives. The rest of the summer saw lower absolute Soviet losses, a higher share of recoverable Soviet casualties, and a more favorable (albeit still very disproportionate) loss exchange ratio between the Red Army and the Ostheer.
This. Exactly this. I agree.
KDF33 wrote:
24 Sep 2023 00:04
The RKKA possessed strategic depth, which would dissipate German (in reality: Axis) offensive power in any direction.
Why / how?
Your correct assessment - that the Axis had to attack closer to its logistic hubs - does not support a theory that the RKKA could or would be destroyed decisively nearer to the June 1942 front line.
The Soviets were in the process of being attrited down in the May - July period. With a quarterly net loss of almost 1 million men, I can't see how the Red Army would have avoided a cascading failure sometime in 1943.
To benefit from strategic depth in the proposed situation, highly mobile forces are needed. The defender must be able to outmaneuver the attacker, that is: withdraw faster and maybe counter attack in the flanks or the rear of the attacker.
Secondly, the attacker must let himself be drawn into the depth. If he doesn't, the strategic depth doesn't matter.
Therefore, strategic depth is a rather hollow point - in this situation.

If the Axis maintain the attrition of the Red Army in favorable ratios long enough without exhausting themselves in the process, the numbers become self evident. So I second KDFs assesment.

However, my guess is that the attrition would be probably kept up high in summer and fall, but in winter it would decline to lower levels. Or maybe not.
Because besides offensive attrition, there is also defensive attrition. Axis also could use that. See third Kharkov in early 1943.

In order to avoid such a strategy of the Axis, Soviets would have to reduce their attrition relative to the Axis. Maybe withdraw, avoid battles, put some expendables in the way to slow the attacker down, use multiple deep, heavily fortified lines of defense (Kursk '43 style) to grind down the Axis spearheads, reshift their forces and go to the offensive somewhere else, where they can inflict high(er) losses to the Axis. Attrition ratios would likely resemble those of Rzhev. but I don't know if that would be enough.

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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by Peter89 » 24 Sep 2023 11:28

KDF33 wrote:
24 Sep 2023 00:04
Peter89 wrote:
23 Sep 2023 22:13
but this one is a mere theory at best.
The theory was put to the test in the spring and early summer of 1942, though,
No, it wasn't put to test. The casualties you're quoting repeatedly in your time frame, do not prove that these were casualties the Axis might inflict over and over again. While there is plenty of hints for the contrary.
KDF33 wrote:
24 Sep 2023 00:04
The RKKA possessed strategic depth, which would dissipate German (in reality: Axis) offensive power in any direction.
Why / how?
I thought we agreed on this. If you advance, let's say 500 km with an army, your army gets weaker, even if it does not meet any enemy. Logistics, engine lives, lack of air cover, distance from supply depots, exhaustion, etc.

KDF33 wrote:
24 Sep 2023 00:04
Your correct assessment - that the Axis had to attack closer to its logistic hubs - does not support a theory that the RKKA could or would be destroyed decisively nearer to the June 1942 front line.
The Soviets were in the process of being attrited down in the May - July period. With a quarterly net loss of almost 1 million men, I can't see how the Red Army would have avoided a cascading failure sometime in 1943.
There is no evidence that would support this extrapolation. The Soviets suffered defeats, but there is no proof that they were in the process of being attrited down, because these words imply that what happened in May-July would be continued.

This is very TMP-ish. If the Soviets suffered 1 million men casualties in 3 months, it does not mean they would suffer 4 million in 12 months.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: Hitler doesn't intervene in military strategies/tactics/retreats

Post by Aida1 » 24 Sep 2023 13:11

PunctuationHorror wrote:
24 Sep 2023 10:14

If the Axis maintain the attrition of the Red Army in favorable ratios long enough without exhausting themselves in the process, the numbers become self evident. So I second KDFs assesment.

However, my guess is that the attrition would be probably kept up high in summer and fall, but in winter it would decline to lower levels. Or maybe not.
Because besides offensive attrition, there is also defensive attrition. Axis also could use that. See third Kharkov in early 1943.

In order to avoid such a strategy of the Axis, Soviets would have to reduce their attrition relative to the Axis. Maybe withdraw, avoid battles, put some expendables in the way to slow the attacker down, use multiple deep, heavily fortified lines of defense (Kursk '43 style) to grind down the Axis spearheads, reshift their forces and go to the offensive somewhere else, where they can inflict high(er) losses to the Axis. Attrition ratios would likely resemble those of Rzhev. but I don't know if that would be enough.
An attrition strategy will never work for the germans as they will suffer too much attrition themselves. You overrate the capabilities of the german Army of 1942 and underate the ability of the red army to sustain losses.0 :roll:

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