I'm unsure about the accuracy of using "immense superiority" to describe the Soviet situation around the Rzhev bulge in August 1942.Peter89 wrote: ↑25 Sep 2023 09:02The Soviet force disposition in April 1942 was different than the one in early August 1942. You can not prove that your projected attack would break the Soviet positions around the Rhzev bulge, as they had an immense superiority, and Model was very close to throw in the towel. Essentially, the Soviet attack was barely repulsed by stripping the air support from AGN, redirecting reinforcements, including part of the 11th Army to this sector.
If that were the case, they ought to have done much better than what they actually did.
For the Soviet part, they transferred 8 divisions from the reserve armies to bolster the attack. In addition to a sizeable number of tank brigades. The interesting question in KDF33's scenario is whether most of those units would have to be sent south to face the German offensive instead. That doesn't seem unlikely.
For the Germans and the 9th Army – of course it hurts to be on the receiving end of a major attack.
Especially when several of their own units where heading south to take part in Wirbelwind at the time.
But while Model was screaming for reinforcements – suffering a bit more than 30k casualties in August – the neighbouring 3rd Panzer Army (12k casualties in August) and 4th Army (2k casualties in August) which also held part of the Rzhev bulge seem to have fared much better.
With regards to reinforcements from the outside, I'm aware that the 72nd ID was sent to Rzhev at the end of August – instead of following the bulk of 11th Army to Leningrad. But the end of August is after the main attack had been repulsed, isn't it?
Which other parts of 11th Army was sent to Rzhev? Or was it only the one division?
I'm also aware that they sent the GD regiment to the Rzhev bulge – also arriving at the tail end of the battle.
Were any other major units transferred from the outside to face this immensely superior Soviet force?