An Anglo-Canadian Battle of the Bulge: better or worse than the US troops?

[Empiricist]

Do the British manage to hold out at Bastogne like the Americans? Does the 6th Airborne get dropped on Bastogne?

Never.

What was needed in order to supply and rescue Bastogne was only Patton's mentality, Patton's tankers determination, unique courage of the IX TCC aircrews (almost NOE flights with gliders on tow and almost without visibility), (positive) madness of Lt. Abraham Jaffe and unique (positive) gang of Filthy Thirteen airborne pathfinders. For the British all their activities to rescue Bastogne would be unimaginable and first of all "against the regulations" as always. What rescuing Bastogne required was open-minded mentality without any fossilized templates. The American aviation law and flight safety procedures did not exist during Operation Repulse but it was very effective and nobody died for this reason.

The RAF also never had such a man as Col. Joel Crouch. Thanks to his inventors of the IX TCC the airdrop of supplies for Bastogne was for the first time in WWII such accurately-aimed. The British and RAF never had in their C-47s roll-in/roll-out system for immediate dropping the supplies with the highest possible accuracy. Generally speaking, the British has always been addicted to huge USAAF IX TCC potential in airborne operations.

[antwony]

Do the British manage to hold out at Bastogne like the Americans? Does the 6th Airborne get dropped on Bastogne?

Never.

What was needed in order to supply and rescue Bastogne was only Patton's mentality, Patton's tankers determination, unique courage of the IX TCC aircrews (almost NOE flights with gliders on tow and almost without visibility), (positive) madness of Lt. Abraham Jaffe and unique (positive) gang of Filthy Thirteen airborne pathfinders. For the British all their activities to rescue Bastogne would be unimaginable and first of all "against the regulations" as always. What rescuing Bastogne required was open-minded mentality without any fossilized templates. The American aviation law and flight safety procedures did not exist during Operation Repulse but it was very effective and nobody died for this reason.

The RAF also never had such a man as Col. Joel Crouch. Thanks to his inventors of the IX TCC the airdrop of supplies for Bastogne was for the first time in WWII such accurately-aimed. The British and RAF never had in their C-47s roll-in/roll-out system for immediate dropping the supplies with the highest possible accuracy. Generally speaking, the British has always been addicted to huge USAAF IX TCC potential in airborne operations.

Indeed, drinking tea and not being suitably caffeinated ensured Britain were always completely ineffective militarily.

You should perhaps read up on the operations of the Chindits. Actually, I think the Australian's during Kokoda may have been the first military campaign to depend on being supplied by air.

Although, both my points and all of your nonsense are completely irrelevant. Any cut off Allied ground forces in NWE in 1944-45 wouldn't be purely relying on RAF Transport Command. Resupply would be a joint effort.

So, at the North end of the front would be 3 or 4 Infantry divisions with a cavalry reece regiment holding the front. At the southern end of Eisenborn ridge would be a territorial division that hasn't seen much combat (replaces the 99th ID).
Next, would be another cavalry reece regiment holding the front that 14th Cavalry Group had.
Below that is a territorial infantry division that is either brand new or has just had a heavy influx of replacements. It's been in position for a week at most.

Whether a British unit had been TA in August 1939 had long ceased to have any signifance by the Bulge. To be fair, US National Guard unit have no equivalent to any non US unit in NWE.

That's reasonable. And, the manpower issue had become a huge one for the British. They were simply running out of men, so there was every reason to be cautious in that respect. The US Army by contrast, had a temporary shortage of replacements in the ETO in mid to late 1944, due more to planning reasons than lack of manpower to fill the ranks.

The Canadians are the same way. Their manpower was limited to troops that volunteered for overseas service so they had limited numbers of replacements available.

The British were running out of men to such an extent they were sending conscripts to work in coal mines.

Both the USA and the UK were running down their forces in Europe. The US due to a realignment to the PTO, the British due to having too much kit i.e. too many capabilities i.e. RN, RAF, etc.. to man properly.

Both the US and the UK were finding creative ways to get battle casualty replacements to infantry battalions.

There were similiarities between the two, but for me, you're trying too hard and either ignorant, or prejudiced, in regards to the British.

[Empiricist]

Indeed, drinking tea and not being suitably caffeinated ensured Britain were always completely ineffective militarily.

You should perhaps read up on the operations of the Chindits. Actually, I think the Australian's during Kokoda may have been the first military campaign to depend on being supplied by air.

Although, both my points and all of your nonsense are completely irrelevant. Any cut off Allied ground forces in NWE in 1944-45 wouldn't be purely relying on RAF Transport Command. Resupply would be a joint effort

Thank you very much for your unique, merit-based and highly valuable remarks.

Read documents of the Quadrant Conference, "Project 9" book and "Air Commandos Against Japan" book -- you will know anything on supplies for the Chindits and who delivered them for the 2nd Chindit Expedition.

[antwony]

Indeed, drinking tea and not being suitably caffeinated ensured Britain were always completely ineffective militarily.

You should perhaps read up on the operations of the Chindits. Actually, I think the Australian's during Kokoda may have been the first military campaign to depend on being supplied by air.

Although, both my points and all of your nonsense are completely irrelevant. Any cut off Allied ground forces in NWE in 1944-45 wouldn't be purely relying on RAF Transport Command. Resupply would be a joint effort

Thank you very much for your unique, merit-based and highly valuable remarks.

Read documents of the Quadrant Conference, "Project 9" book and "Air Commandos Against Japan" book -- you will know anything on supplies for the Chindits and who delivered them for the 2nd Chindit Expedition.

Thanks for the book recommendations. Assume it describes how the Americans learnt how to operate like RAF's 31 squadron.

Still, you shouldn't be thanking for my "highly valuable remarks". I was pointing how ridiculous and irrelevant your archly chauvinistic opinions are.

[Empiricist]

Indeed, drinking tea and not being suitably caffeinated ensured Britain were always completely ineffective militarily.

You should perhaps read up on the operations of the Chindits. Actually, I think the Australian's during Kokoda may have been the first military campaign to depend on being supplied by air.

Although, both my points and all of your nonsense are completely irrelevant. Any cut off Allied ground forces in NWE in 1944-45 wouldn't be purely relying on RAF Transport Command. Resupply would be a joint effort

Thank you very much for your unique, merit-based and highly valuable remarks.

Read documents of the Quadrant Conference, "Project 9" book and "Air Commandos Against Japan" book -- you will know anything on supplies for the Chindits and who delivered them for the 2nd Chindit Expedition.

Thanks for the book recommendations. Assume it describes how the Americans learnt how to operate like RAF's 31 squadron.

Still, you shouldn't be thanking for my "highly valuable remarks". I was pointing how ridiculous and irrelevant your archly chauvinistic opinions are.

Archly chauvinistic opinions? Are you normal or abnormal? Read "Out of The Blue. A Pilot With The Chindits" book by Australian pilot flying for Chindits.

Small quotation on the US K rations:

"They came in neat packages marked Breakfast, Dinner, and Supper, each one about the size of a brick sliced in half, wrapped in waxed brown waterproof security that kept the bright contents in all their pristine splendour – shiny little tins of pressed meat, of chopped ham and egg, of processed cheese, varieties of biscuits, sealed packets of coffee, of milk, of suger, lemon drink powder, cellophane-wrapped cigarettes of world famous brands, silver-wrapped candy bars and other delicious sweets, all sparkling new and crisp and fresh in their tightly sealed packets and sending us into excited cries of delight. We were like children opening our presents on Christmas Day as we showed one another our treasures, for there were minor differences in each of the packages that made opening a thrill of anticipation in novelties to come; this variation not only kept interest alive for many weeks but also introduced all the fun of the market place in the development of barter values for the different items."

[antwony]

Archly chauvinistic opinions?

Yep, the underlined parts.

Do the British manage to hold out at Bastogne like the Americans? Does the 6th Airborne get dropped on Bastogne?

Never.

What was needed in order to supply and rescue Bastogne was only Patton's mentality, Patton's tankers determination, unique courage of the IX TCC aircrews (almost NOE flights with gliders on tow and almost without visibility), (positive) madness of Lt. Abraham Jaffe and unique (positive) gang of Filthy Thirteen airborne pathfinders. For the British all their activities to rescue Bastogne would be unimaginable and first of all "against the regulations" as always. What rescuing Bastogne required was open-minded mentality without any fossilized templates.

Enjoy your time on the forum, I can't be bothered corresponding with you anymore.

[Empiricist]

I can't be bothered corresponding with you anymore.

It's a shame.

Learn about the Chindits -- you will not lecture other people in an arrogant way.

Learn about Trident Conference -- you will know how much the British logistics in Burma was inefficient. Learn about Quadrant Conference -- you will know how much the British needed huge US help in Burma in the field of logistics. Learn about Combined Chiefs of Staff -- you will know why Gen. Arnold wanted to give the British 200 to 300 C-47s with the USAAF aircrews for the 2nd Chindit Expedition. Learn about Orde Wingate -- you will know how long and much he asked Americans for any form of air logistics including air medevac by hospital gliders (unknown in the British Army), by medevac L-Birds and helicopters (unknown in the British Army) as well as medical support by three-seat gliders with doctor on board (unknown in the British Army).

Regards.

[T. A. Gardner]

The British were running out of men to such an extent they were sending conscripts to work in coal mines.

Both the USA and the UK were running down their forces in Europe. The US due to a realignment to the PTO, the British due to having too much kit i.e. too many capabilities i.e. RN, RAF, etc.. to man properly.

Both the US and the UK were finding creative ways to get battle casualty replacements to infantry battalions.

There were similiarities between the two, but for me, you're trying too hard and either ignorant, or prejudiced, in regards to the British.

The British / Commonwealth problem with manpower was they simply didn't have more to draw on. The US had plenty more where their troops came from, but getting them from the US to Europe took time. The only manning crisis the US faced was in the months right after D-Day where the US Army had grossly underestimated the number of infantry casualties they'd suffer in the ETO. Their quick fix was to disband units they didn't need, like antiaircraft and send the men to infantry divisions as replacements.

The USN and Marines never had to rely on a draft during the war either. Both got almost entirely enough men volunteering that they could pick and choose who they took.

So, the problem was different from the British one, being far more one of logistics and transport than shortages of actual warm bodies. The warm bodies were available, just not where they were needed.

[Richard Anderson]

The British / Commonwealth problem with manpower was they simply didn't have more to draw on.

Essentially correct. Canadian manpower was mostly limited because service outside Canada was restricted to volunteers.

The US had plenty more where their troops came from, but getting them from the US to Europe took time.

Time was not an issue but manpower allocations were. The U.S. was the least mobilized of the major powers in terms of manpower utilization. Deferments were relatively easy, especially prior to 1943 when a medical deferment was routine for any number of issues.

The only manning crisis the US faced was in the months right after D-Day where the US Army had grossly underestimated the number of infantry casualties they'd suffer in the ETO.

The problem with infantry replacements became an issue in early 1943 and was caused by many things, including the gross underestimate of requirements partly driven by an overestimate of the casualties the new "technical" combat arms like the Armored Force and Tank Destroyers would incur.

Their quick fix was to disband units they didn't need, like antiaircraft and send the men to infantry divisions as replacements.

That actually began in late 1943 on the Z/I but existing units in theater did not begin conversion until the real crunch hot in the fall and winter of 1944.

The USN and Marines never had to rely on a draft during the war either. Both got almost entirely enough men volunteering that they could pick and choose who they took.

Solely volunteer enlists ended in December 1942. The Navy Department, including the Marine Corps, began taking in selectees in January 1943.

So, the problem was different from the British one, being far more one of logistics and transport than shortages of actual warm bodies. The warm bodies were available, just not where they were needed.

It was quite a bit more complicated than the British experience. The British were more heavily mobilized and had little to no spare manpower. The US underutilized around 15% of its manpower, mostly people of color and made significant errors in mobilization and personnel sustainment in the interest of maximizing the number of units mobilized.

[antwony]

The British / Commonwealth problem with manpower was they simply didn't have more to draw on. The US had plenty more where their troops came from, but getting them from the US to Europe took time. The only manning crisis the US faced was in the months right after D-Day where the US Army had grossly underestimated the number of infantry casualties they'd suffer in the ETO. Their quick fix was to disband units they didn't need, like antiaircraft and send the men to infantry divisions as replacements.

So, the problem was different from the British one, being far more one of logistics and transport than shortages of actual warm bodies. The warm bodies were available, just not where they were needed.

I was trying to claim that while the reasons, and solutions, may have been different, both the Commonwealth and US forces had, for all intents and purposes, the same problem in NWE in late 1944-45. This being struggling to have enough rifleman at the front. Am pretty sure I've read the UK was also very much into "re-cap badging" Royal Artillery personal as Infantry as per your US antiaircraft example.

However, trying to remember where I got the idea that the US lacked infantry post Normandy breakout, I strongly suspect my source was "The Young Lions" which is a novel...

Also, I can't exactly remember where I read about the Pacific Theatre getting the bulk of replacements and the ETO being "drawn down", but suspect I might be slightly wrong with my dates vis- a- vis the Bulge. The actual history book i.e. not novel that I read that concerned shipping out of replacement troops from CONUS, may have given early 1945 as the date the draw down in Europe began, which is pretty much post Bulge. In addition, what I distinctly remember about the book was that the author didn't seem to like MacArthur very much and may have been making too much about the allocation of assets.

[Carl Schwamberger]

The USN and Marines never had to rely on a draft during the war either. Both got almost entirely enough men volunteering that they could pick and choose who they took.

Heres how a Marine assigned to recruiting duty in 1944-45 described it. He & his peers would go to the selective service examination station. They along with others, like the Navy or Coast Guard, Army Air Force, paratroops would set up a table, and work the lines of Selectees for volunteers. What needs to be understood is getting a Draft notice ordering reporting for induction did not place one in the Army, or the military in general. That happened after the screening process was completed and the individual found fit for service. The recruiters would work the intake lines and round out their quotas. Once the paperwork was complete they'd send the kid back into complete the medical exams and tests. There were also men approaching the recruiters outside the induction or draft system, but their numbers declined over time.

The former recruiter described one of his peers walking up to a group awaiting entry to the induction center and telling the largest fittest looking men to follow him. He guessed correctly none of the 18 year olds would refuse and filled his quota for the month in one morning.

[T. A. Gardner]

The British / Commonwealth problem with manpower was they simply didn't have more to draw on. The US had plenty more where their troops came from, but getting them from the US to Europe took time. The only manning crisis the US faced was in the months right after D-Day where the US Army had grossly underestimated the number of infantry casualties they'd suffer in the ETO. Their quick fix was to disband units they didn't need, like antiaircraft and send the men to infantry divisions as replacements.

So, the problem was different from the British one, being far more one of logistics and transport than shortages of actual warm bodies. The warm bodies were available, just not where they were needed.

I was trying to claim that while the reasons, and solutions, may have been different, both the Commonwealth and US forces had, for all intents and purposes, the same problem in NWE in late 1944-45. This being struggling to have enough rifleman at the front. Am pretty sure I've read the UK was also very much into "re-cap badging" Royal Artillery personal as Infantry as per your US antiaircraft example.

However, trying to remember where I got the idea that the US lacked infantry post Normandy breakout, I strongly suspect my source was "The Young Lions" which is a novel...

Also, I can't exactly remember where I read about the Pacific Theatre getting the bulk of replacements and the ETO being "drawn down", but suspect I might be slightly wrong with my dates vis- a- vis the Bulge. The actual history book i.e. not novel that I read that concerned shipping out of replacement troops from CONUS, may have given early 1945 as the date the draw down in Europe began, which is pretty much post Bulge. In addition, what I distinctly remember about the book was that the author didn't seem to like MacArthur very much and may have been making too much about the allocation of assets.

The reasons between the two were very different. For the British and Commonwealth, they were running out of men to replace losses with. The manpower didn't exist for it.
With the US, the ETO as us Americans called it, was an exception rather than the typical case for infantry replacements. The US Army had the manpower to replace the losses, it simply wasn't where it could be accessed in a timely fashion. The supply and replacement chain had miscalculated the expected losses badly underestimating them. That created a shortage of infantry and other frontline combat troops in the ETO for several months after the Normandy landings. The Army improvised a solution in disbanding some units that were really luxuries that weren't badly needed and turned the manpower into infantry and armor crew replacements.

In the Pacific, units weren't in continuous combat like in Europe so they had time between combat actions to replace and assimilate new manpower into their units before being returned to combat. Again, the manpower was available to replace losses, the difference was in the PTO, there was time between actions to get things done unlike in the ETO.

In the MTO, the fighting was relatively steady state and the replacement system functioned, more or less, as it should feeding new men into units as they suffered losses.

[T. A. Gardner]

The USN and Marines never had to rely on a draft during the war either. Both got almost entirely enough men volunteering that they could pick and choose who they took.

Heres how a Marine assigned to recruiting duty in 1944-45 described it. He & his peers would go to the selective service examination station. They along with others, like the Navy or Coast Guard, Army Air Force, paratroops would set up a table, and work the lines of Selectees for volunteers. What needs to be understood is getting a Draft notice ordering reporting for induction did not place one in the Army, or the military in general. That happened after the screening process was completed and the individual found fit for service. The recruiters would work the intake lines and round out their quotas. Once the paperwork was complete they'd send the kid back into complete the medical exams and tests. There were also men approaching the recruiters outside the induction or draft system, but their numbers declined over time.

The former recruiter described one of his peers walking up to a group awaiting entry to the induction center and telling the largest fittest looking men to follow him. He guessed correctly none of the 18 year olds would refuse and filled his quota for the month in one morning.

At the same time, those eligible for the draft that were too valuable in some civilian position often were enlisted or commissioned into the military by the branch that they were doing stuff for. For example, technicians, engineers, and scientists at MIT were done that way given variously commissions or enlisted and insta-promoted to like First Sergeant then ordered back to the university to continue whatever research they were doing.

[Empiricist]

The British / Commonwealth problem with manpower was they simply didn't have more to draw on.

When it comes to Canada this problem is well-described in "The Price of Command. A Biography of General Guy Simonds" book.

[Richard Anderson]

However, trying to remember where I got the idea that the US lacked infantry post Normandy breakout, I strongly suspect my source was "The Young Lions" which is a novel...

Also, I can't exactly remember where I read about the Pacific Theatre getting the bulk of replacements and the ETO being "drawn down", but suspect I might be slightly wrong with my dates vis- a- vis the Bulge.

Using historical novels as sources may not be the best way to get facts on the subject. Those primary source nonfiction titles most relevant to the subject are:

Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, The Army and Industrial Manpower
Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops
LtCol Marvin A. Kreidberg and 1st Lt Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945
The General Board, U.S. Army Forces Europe, Reinforcement System and Reinforcements Procedures in the European Theater of Operations (General Board Report No. 3)

No, there was no "draw down" of replacements in the ETOUSA for the Pacific, rather the opposite in fact. The Battle of the Bulge resulted in some units originally slated for the Pacific going to the ETOUSA. Replacements of personnel, like equipment, were based upon replacement factors, so X number of replacements for Y number of personnel in theater.