Bleed the dictators white: The Grand WI of 1943

[Peter89]

The core theme of this WI is to examine the decisions taken by the Wallies, the Axis, the collaborating regimes and the Soviets in 1943.

What if the Wallies followed Truman's line of thought in his famous speech, in which he welcomed the German-Soviet war and advocated for supporting the losing side?

What if the Wallies realized that an Eurasian conflict benefited them on the long term?

What if the Wallies, having secured their positions all over the world, knowing that they outproduce the Germans and the Soviets (perhaps both of them combined), simply wait long enough to bleed both totalitarian regimes white, finish off Japan and march into Europe only to reap the spoils of war?

The Soviet successes in the second half of 1943 are partially the direct result of the division of forces by the Germans, the frictions inside the German leadership (OKW-OKH-Hitler) and the turning of the Axis-collaborators.

In this WI, the Wallies take a similar stance as the two totalitarian regimes. After taking Africa, the Wallies advance no further; put less pressure on mainland Europe and do not land in Italy. They approach the Germans in May 1943, decreasing the pressure on German cities and the German industry. Although they eliminate the U-Boot threat as in OTL, they do allow more blockade runners through. They also keep the Soviets guessing with raids, probing attacks and small scale invasions like the Dodecanese campaign.

They also make some changes to the Lend-Lease. Instead of products that could enhance the Soviet war machine, the Wallies send food, household items, prefab houses and the such to the SU.

What if the Germans, realizing that there was no danger on the coasts of Norway, France, Italy and the Balkans, could focus their forces against the Soviets? Could they hold the Panther-Wotan line?

What if the the Germans, having a relatively secured shoreline and skies around and above mainland Europe, focused their air effort against the SU?

What if the minor Axis nations, collaborators and exposed neutrals realized that Western Allied help will not come? What would they do?

What if the Soviets realized the Wallies' intentions? Could they stop the war with Germany? Or would they, really? The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact meant nothing, apparently, and the Soviet Union could not profit much from a truce at the present borders, either.

What if the Soviets, kept alive but somewhat betrayed by everyone, focused on something less ambitious in 1943? Could they hold the line?

I welcome all of you to debate about arguably the most difficult year of the war; 1943.

***

As an extension for this WI, the Wallies secure the sea lanes in the Pacific by 1944 as in OTL, but do not starve Japan's war economy and left Japan in possession of the DEI, the Philippines and Indochina. The Japanese air force and the navy was crushed, but the following advance towards the Home Islands did not take place. Japan focused all its effort against China.

[Carl Schwamberger]

What if the Wallies realized that an Eurasian conflict benefited them on the long term?

Not sure how this can be argued. The US economic system depended on trade with Europe. Between the loss of regular trade while the war was going on, the economically dysfunctional ideas of the Axis nations, and the compounding distortions of keeping up a war economy into 1945. 1946, or beyond a extend war is bad for the US. The faster its over with and settled to the US advantage the better for any likely US leaders. Ditto for Britain.

The USSR could not keep going on its own, and considerable assistance was necessary to maintain equilibrium. That was not a trivial cost & it adds up.

The economic gain to the US from arms sales to foreign nations had run out in 1941. The largest, the French market was gone. A few of the minor nations still had gold and currency reserves, but sales to them was small. Britains Sterling Zone imperial economy meant it was not a useful source of revenue past 1941. So, from 1942 on the US is subsidizing anyone fighting the Axis.

The US economy had benefitted all it was going to to by early 1943. Some infrastructure rebuilding went on into 1946, but that was steadily shrinking.

There was no guarantee the Axis would not benefit from long term control of Europe labor and industry. We could not predict in 1942, or 1944 the German war economy would start to collapse in 1944 or 1945. This strategy would be a gamble that might backfire.

How little participation by the US and Britain is enough? The strategic bombing campaign was expensive to keep up. It did draw off Axis resources, and eventually had a serious effect of Axis industry in the last year of the war. If the Anglo US Allies don't keep up this massive bombing campaign then it increases the risk of the Axis economically surging this Eurasian war.

The US managed to end the war quicker than anticipated. In 1942-43 it was thought it would drag on into 1946-47. And, the end of the war left things globally favoring the US politically and economically. The old imperial systems were crippled and end in sight, the US was able to raring or dictate a global financial system that favored it. The only down side was the expanded USSR & its questionable economics. Ending the war faster gets you to all that sooner. Plus the USSR may be less powerful post war. ie: no Iron Curtain nations. With Poland, Rimainia, and the others participating in the post war boom.

[T. A. Gardner]

The best way for the West to conduct a war as proposed above, in 1946 and onward, would have been to go nuclear. At the time, there was no real moral compunction against using nukes on cities or other targets. They were simply seen as bigger better bombs. The US was already set in England with three bases that could handle B-29 nuclear capable bombers. The Russians at that time had little real capacity to stop a nuclear armed B-29, particularly if it came at night.

The US, in particular, was well placed to develop and deploy an SRBM carrying a nuke by 1947. That makes for an unstoppable delivery system with about a 400 to 500 mile range. The West could have armed China and used their manpower to do much of the fighting against the Soviet Union. Russia was poorly placed to fight a two-front war given their losses in WW 2.

The biggest issue that would face the West is justifying to their populations why such a war was necessary. Soviet Union = Bad wouldn't cut it on its own. I also think there'd be considerable reluctance to use the Germans or Japanese as combat troops given WW 2.

On the other hand, such a war would see much of the Soviet Union in the Far East collapse quickly under a US-Chinese assault. Russian infrastructure and industry would be threatened wherever it was, unlike being safe against attack from the Luftwaffe. Once the USAF gets some B-36, and that would happen in a war production scenario sometime in mid 1947, nowhere in the Soviet Union would be safe from an aerial attack be it conventional or nuclear.

An early decision to proceed with such a war might see the West, and the US in particular, foot dragging by 1944 on deliveries of lend-lease materials to the Soviets in order to raise casualties and prevent them from gaining many vital technologies.

[wm]

The British and the American people wouldn't support a long war, even less a long cynical war. They wouldn't like the idea of their sons being mere cannon fodder for hegemonism.
The support for the war in Europe was lackluster, even without political cynicism.

[Peter89]

What if the Wallies realized that an Eurasian conflict benefited them on the long term?

Not sure how this can be argued. The US economic system depended on trade with Europe. Between the loss of regular trade while the war was going on, the economically dysfunctional ideas of the Axis nations, and the compounding distortions of keeping up a war economy into 1945. 1946, or beyond a extend war is bad for the US. The faster its over with and settled to the US advantage the better for any likely US leaders. Ditto for Britain.

The USSR could not keep going on its own, and considerable assistance was necessary to maintain equilibrium. That was not a trivial cost & it adds up.

The economic gain to the US from arms sales to foreign nations had run out in 1941. The largest, the French market was gone. A few of the minor nations still had gold and currency reserves, but sales to them was small. Britains Sterling Zone imperial economy meant it was not a useful source of revenue past 1941. So, from 1942 on the US is subsidizing anyone fighting the Axis.

The US economy had benefitted all it was going to to by early 1943. Some infrastructure rebuilding went on into 1946, but that was steadily shrinking.

There was no guarantee the Axis would not benefit from long term control of Europe labor and industry. We could not predict in 1942, or 1944 the German war economy would start to collapse in 1944 or 1945. This strategy would be a gamble that might backfire.

How little participation by the US and Britain is enough? The strategic bombing campaign was expensive to keep up. It did draw off Axis resources, and eventually had a serious effect of Axis industry in the last year of the war. If the Anglo US Allies don't keep up this massive bombing campaign then it increases the risk of the Axis economically surging this Eurasian war.

The US managed to end the war quicker than anticipated. In 1942-43 it was thought it would drag on into 1946-47. And, the end of the war left things globally favoring the US politically and economically. The old imperial systems were crippled and end in sight, the US was able to raring or dictate a global financial system that favored it. The only down side was the expanded USSR & its questionable economics. Ending the war faster gets you to all that sooner. Plus the USSR may be less powerful post war. ie: no Iron Curtain nations. With Poland, Rimainia, and the others participating in the post war boom.

The way I see it, the Wallies did not need to worry about the SU or the Axis, because neither of them had a proper fleet or air force to jeopardize Britain, let alone the US. How much the war costed to them, if they embarked on a no invasion policy?

Also the CBO could be shut down for extended periods of time.

Looking at sheer numbers alone, by mid-1943 the Soviets gained a huge quantitative advantage over the Germans. If the Wallies stop pushing the Axis and stop helping the Soviets, equilibrium might have been achieved. I don't think that the war would end much later with this policy. By 1943, every minor Axis nations wanted to get out of the war. The neutrals slowly but steadily shifted towards the Allies. I think they could weaken the SU and Germany much more.

Also they did not use the atomic bomb trump card, wich could seal the deal in 1945 or 1946 anyway.

[Peter89]

The best way for the West to conduct a war as proposed above, in 1946 and onward, would have been to go nuclear. At the time, there was no real moral compunction against using nukes on cities or other targets. They were simply seen as bigger better bombs. The US was already set in England with three bases that could handle B-29 nuclear capable bombers. The Russians at that time had little real capacity to stop a nuclear armed B-29, particularly if it came at night.

The US, in particular, was well placed to develop and deploy an SRBM carrying a nuke by 1947. That makes for an unstoppable delivery system with about a 400 to 500 mile range. The West could have armed China and used their manpower to do much of the fighting against the Soviet Union. Russia was poorly placed to fight a two-front war given their losses in WW 2.

The biggest issue that would face the West is justifying to their populations why such a war was necessary. Soviet Union = Bad wouldn't cut it on its own. I also think there'd be considerable reluctance to use the Germans or Japanese as combat troops given WW 2.

On the other hand, such a war would see much of the Soviet Union in the Far East collapse quickly under a US-Chinese assault. Russian infrastructure and industry would be threatened wherever it was, unlike being safe against attack from the Luftwaffe. Once the USAF gets some B-36, and that would happen in a war production scenario sometime in mid 1947, nowhere in the Soviet Union would be safe from an aerial attack be it conventional or nuclear.

An early decision to proceed with such a war might see the West, and the US in particular, foot dragging by 1944 on deliveries of lend-lease materials to the Soviets in order to raise casualties and prevent them from gaining many vital technologies.

I think we underestimate the resolve of the Americans. Yes they probably didn't support the war wholeheartedly, but they also didn't suffer from it like European or Asian nations did. The end state of WW2 was not really a desired one. A totalitarian, expansionist regime was born with no checks or balances in Europe. Then China was not divided anymore. In fact, the Wallies did not do a thorough job with finishing matters in Eurasia once and for all.

I agree with the nuclear part, too.

[Peter89]

The British and the American people wouldn't support a long war, even less a long cynical war. They wouldn't like the idea of their sons being mere cannon fodder for hegemonism.
The support for the war in Europe was lackluster, even without political cynicism.

The point is that the British and American boys are not going to be cannon fodders. The Wallies balance the Axis and the Soviets to kill each other until they can A-Bomb both of them. This strategy would actually save British and American lives.

[thaddeus_c]

What if the Wallies realized that an Eurasian conflict benefited them on the long term?

There was no guarantee the Axis would not benefit from long term control of Europe labor and industry. We could not predict in 1942, or 1944 the German war economy would start to collapse in 1944 or 1945. This strategy would be a gamble that might backfire.

How little participation by the US and Britain is enough? The strategic bombing campaign was expensive to keep up. It did draw off Axis resources, and eventually had a serious effect of Axis industry in the last year of the war. If the Anglo US Allies don't keep up this massive bombing campaign then it increases the risk of the Axis economically surging this Eurasian war.

could the US (possibly?) predict a Communist China or a Soviet dominated India, and one or both of those be a rationale for a Japn First strategy? (beyond the benefits of the Nazi regime and the Soviets bleeding themselves white)

[Carl Schwamberger]

Depends on what you mean by 'predict'. A lot of people claimed they had predicted Communist take overs. Right wing anti Communist groups and individuals have been predicting Communist take overs from the 19th Century. As far as US policy goes into 1942 the prediction was the Red Army would be defeated and the Bolsheviks in Russian driven off into the wilderness. There was a very real fear into 1942 the US & Britain would be fighting the nazis on their own, without a viable Red Army in the east. Even into late 1943 there was a fear the exhausted USSR would not be able to put much pressure on the Germans, or advance much further. Things like the collapse of Army Group Center or the Red Arms charge into the Balkans were not foreseen.

From a strictly economic basis the Germany First policy makes immense sense. Admiral Starke did no put it directly in economic terms in the Plan Dog Memo, but its easy to see that thinking in it. Next, if you defeat Germany the other Facist regimes in Europe are headed for internal regime change. Hardly necessary to continue major campaigns against them.

When a 'bleed them' policy would be selected in 1941 or 1942 theres to many unknowns ahead for the Allies. The survival of the Red Army was in doubt, the weakness of the Axis were not very well understood, the US industrial mobilization was snarled by contradictory goals, an atomic weapon was a unknown in 1942 & all work to that point was theoretical lab bench stuff. The solutions for the practical application were unknown because the practical aspects were still unknown.

Heres a WI thats part of this overall question. If the Allies adopt a let them bleed policy in 1942 & determine not to do more than clear Africa what is the effect on the war in the east? OTL the German leaders decided to gamble on no invasion of France in 1943 & did little to reinforce the defense there. Similarly it was the invasion of Sicily that caused the offensives in the East to be postponed and the continued advance into Italy sealed that postponement. So, if the Allies are doing no more than token raids 1943 - 1944 how much does it change the war in the east?

[Peter89]

Depends on what you mean by 'predict'. A lot of people claimed they had predicted Communist take overs. Right wing anti Communist groups and individuals have been predicting Communist take overs from the 19th Century. As far as US policy goes into 1942 the prediction was the Red Army would be defeated and the Bolsheviks in Russian driven off into the wilderness. There was a very real fear into 1942 the US & Britain would be fighting the nazis on their own, without a viable Red Army in the east. Even into late 1943 there was a fear the exhausted USSR would not be able to put much pressure on the Germans, or advance much further. Things like the collapse of Army Group Center or the Red Arms charge into the Balkans were not foreseen.

From a strictly economic basis the Germany First policy makes immense sense. Admiral Starke did no put it directly in economic terms in the Plan Dog Memo, but its easy to see that thinking in it. Next, if you defeat Germany the other Facist regimes in Europe are headed for internal regime change. Hardly necessary to continue major campaigns against them.

When a 'bleed them' policy would be selected in 1941 or 1942 theres to many unknowns ahead for the Allies. The survival of the Red Army was in doubt, the weakness of the Axis were not very well understood, the US industrial mobilization was snarled by contradictory goals, an atomic weapon was a unknown in 1942 & all work to that point was theoretical lab bench stuff. The solutions for the practical application were unknown because the practical aspects were still unknown.

Heres a WI thats part of this overall question. If the Allies adopt a let them bleed policy in 1942 & determine not to do more than clear Africa what is the effect on the war in the east? OTL the German leaders decided to gamble on no invasion of France in 1943 & did little to reinforce the defense there. Similarly it was the invasion of Sicily that caused the offensives in the East to be postponed and the continued advance into Italy sealed that postponement. So, if the Allies are doing no more than token raids 1943 - 1944 how much does it change the war in the east?

The Bleed them white strategy could only be started in 1943, possibly around May, no sooner and no later. At that moment the Germans recuperated somewhat from their Eastern front defeats, the Soviets saw victory in the end and the Wallies were in no way threatened by the Germans anymore.

If the Germans don't begin to divide their forces heavily, the Ostheer might be able to hold the line and make minor concessions only, especially if the forces trapped on the Kuban could get back to Ukraine via Rostov. I see battles like that of 1942 in Army Group Center and North areas destroying both the German and Soviet reserves without significant gains.

[Carl Schwamberger]

The Bleed them white strategy could only be started in 1943, possibly around May, no sooner and no later. At that moment the Germans recuperated somewhat from their Eastern front defeats, the Soviets saw victory in the end and the Wallies were in no way threatened by the Germans anymore.

By that time the US is deep into its industrial mobilization, and bleeding economically. Britain is in even worse shape. I don't see any benefit at all, & possible worse problems. Sustaining this level of military industrial output longer than OTL extends the losses, dialing back then ramping up again a few years later does not look any better. Up through 1941 the US benefitted from the transfer of Capitol from Europe for building up military production & the partial refurbishment of Depression neglected industrial structure. From 1942 the money was borrowed, the diversion of skilled labor into unproductive military service made production less efficient than otherwise, much of the new industrial plant was for production of no use in a peace time market economy, that is no economic return. That plant had to be rebuilt, retooled, and in some cases abandoned postwar. OTL the decision to start rolling back the war economy in the US came in 1944 with a target for most sectors in 1945 & final termination of a few residual items in 1946. In 1944 Britain was so far down the rabbit hole larger sectors were wrecked for the longer term. In 1943 the economies of Britain and the US were fully committed to maximum effort practical and aimed at earliest end of the war possible with military effort. To Adjust all that for a longer term strategy required the decisions and program to be made in late 1941 or very early 1942 before either nation is much further over the tipping point.

[Peter89]

The Bleed them white strategy could only be started in 1943, possibly around May, no sooner and no later. At that moment the Germans recuperated somewhat from their Eastern front defeats, the Soviets saw victory in the end and the Wallies were in no way threatened by the Germans anymore.

By that time the US is deep into its industrial mobilization, and bleeding economically. Britain is in even worse shape. I don't see any benefit at all, & possible worse problems. Sustaining this level of military industrial output longer than OTL extends the losses, dialing back then ramping up again a few years later does not look any better. Up through 1941 the US benefitted from the transfer of Capitol from Europe for building up military production & the partial refurbishment of Depression neglected industrial structure. From 1942 the money was borrowed, the diversion of skilled labor into unproductive military service made production less efficient than otherwise, much of the new industrial plant was for production of no use in a peace time market economy, that is no economic return. That plant had to be rebuilt, retooled, and in some cases abandoned postwar. OTL the decision to start rolling back the war economy in the US came in 1944 with a target for most sectors in 1945 & final termination of a few residual items in 1946. In 1944 Britain was so far down the rabbit hole larger sectors were wrecked for the longer term. In 1943 the economies of Britain and the US were fully committed to maximum effort practical and aimed at earliest end of the war possible with military effort. To Adjust all that for a longer term strategy required the decisions and program to be made in late 1941 or very early 1942 before either nation is much further over the tipping point.

I think when we are talking about the fate of world domination, a little longer conflict is not something that the Wallies couldn't afford. Yes, you are right that they were totally pushing themselves to the limit of their own setup, and your argument about the time schedule is sound.

However, in this WI, the Wallies do not need to deliver the L-L as in OTL; the CBO does not need to misfire in late 1943-early 1944. Also, they do not need to invade Italy. On the other side of the globe, the submarine war against Japan's trade was enough to keep them at bay and keep them engaged in China. This strategy would also weaken China, another Eurasian power seat that was not defeated or occupied by the Wallies.

The scale of the Wallied buildup was exceeding that of the Axis by a wide margin. The Eurasians had practically zero chance to build a competitve fleet, or make an alliance with each other by 1943.

But I appreciate your reasoning and let's assume that after the Wallies turn off their effort in May 1943, they simply play for time until mid-1944, when the Germans start shooting Britain with V-1 and V-2. Then the Wallies start their own offensives, not just in Normandy, but in Italy, Southern France, the Balkans, Norway, but also in the Caucasus and along the Persian Corridor. The Soviets and the Germans are helpless and when the first A-Bombs start to fall on Berlin and Moscow, they could do nothing but to give up.

Then the Wallies divide Eurasia in their usual manner, splitting countries along lines that will preserve conflict so none of them would ever be capable of having a nuclear weapon, or an army that is competitive with the Wallies' own.

[T. A. Gardner]

I would disagree with some of the above. The US in particular, with allied help should finish Japan off ASAP. This leaves them in control of the Pacific and China. The Russians have no chance to take ground or establish a larger communist presence in China, and none in Korea. They don't get the Kuriles. I could see them getting all of Sakhalin Island for the time being.
While doing that, they foot drag in Europe with secondary theater stuff like invading Italy mostly to take the Italians out of the war or gain them as an ally. They do Churchill's idiot Greece campaign, again to gain a spot for later driving in on Russia from a flank. Maybe a Norway campaign.
All of this is to ally Stalin's fear that they aren't doing their share to beat Germany while letting the Germans send more troops to fight the Russians. The West wants the meatgrinder going full tilt if possible.

In China, the US builds up a much larger Chinese army mostly under US leadership. There was historically at least one full Western-style Chinese army built that way. Use China's manpower to do the fighting with US leadership doing the organizing and training. That avoids the corruption much of the Chinese army had.

It also means that the West / US has the ability to project airpower into almost the entirety of Russia. That's necessary when they start nuking them. It also means the US / West can start sending ELINT and photo recon aircraft deep into Russia to map their defenses and industrial locations for later accurate targeting.

If the Germans do the V-1 and 2, the US copies the former, then returns the favor on the Germans by 10 to 1. On the latter, the USAAF and Army immediately start a crash program (like MX 774 Hiroc) to build a nuclear capable SRBM.

France can be invaded late in 1944 since the West plans on taking out the Soviets too in this scenario. The more ground they have to spread troops over to hold the better for the West.

[Yuri]

Hi, Peter
You idealize the surrounding reality.
I suggest we go down to the sinful earth

On November 30, 1943 took place on the territory of the USSR Embassy in Tehran the first meeting between the most cruel tyrant of all time and peoples comrade Stalin and the greatest democrat of all time and peoples Mr. Roosevelt.

As you think, which empire did the cruel tyrant and the great democrat divide at this meeting: the British Colonial Empire or the Third Reich?
In order not to bother you with searches, I will answer right away: The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the US president divide the British collonial Empire, the prime minister of which was there in Tehran on the territory of the British Embassy.
At the end of the meeting, Comrade Stalin said: If Churchill finds out what we were talking about here, he will kill us.
Mr. Roosevelt declares: The content of this part of the conversation will remain secret and he will not tell Churchill anything.

And here is the answer to the following question: why did the leaders of states with different political systems divide the empire of their ally? try to find it yourself.
When the answer is found, it will become clear to you that the mutual exsanguination of the USSR and the Third Reich was not beneficial to the American model of monopolistic capitalism. One of these two should be the winner. And again, from the point of view of the American model of capitalism, the USSR should be the winner.

[paulrward]

Hello All :

Mr. Carl Schwamberger posted:

From 1942 the money was borrowed, the diversion of skilled labor into
unproductive military service made production less efficient than otherwise,
much of the new industrial plant was for production of no use in a peace time
market economy, that is no economic return. That plant had to be rebuilt,
retooled, and in some cases abandoned postwar.

I have to disagree with a few of these points.

First, during the War, workers who were employed in Defense related industries were given
a " Reserved Occupation Enlistment Status ", and were essentially exempt from the Draft as
long as they worked at that industry. If they quit, or went on strike, they would be drafted.
( This ensured Labor Peace during the War )

I personally knew a friend of my father's, who was employed by Lockheed during the war, and,
in effect, sat out the war making BIG money building P-38s and later P-80s for the Army Air
Force. He saved enough to buy a house during the war, and after the war, had enough money
to finance his college education, taking evening classes until he got his degree and became
an Engineer at Lockheed.

As for the Industrial Plant that was built having no use after the War, just look at the example
of the Willow Run Aircraft Plant. It produced more B-24s than anyone needed or wanted, and
after the War, in the words of the much-maligned Wikipedia:

Ford built the factory and sold it to the government, then leased it
back for the duration of the war. When Ford declined to purchase the facility
after the war, Kaiser-Frazer Corporation gained ownership, and in 1953 Ford's
rival General Motors took ownership and operated the factory as Willow Run
Transmission until 2010. Willow Run Assembly operated from 1959 to 1992 on
a parcel to the south of the airport. The Fisher Body division also operated at
Willow Run Assembly until its operations were assumed by the GM Assembly
Division in the 1970s. In 2009, General Motors announced that it would shut
down all operations at the GM Powertrain plant and engineering center in the
coming year.

............ In 2014, the Yankee Air Museum moved into the bomber factory.

I think you will find that most of the factories built during the war were converted into other
uses right after the war. This may have meant that machinery had to be sold off or scrapped,
and new equipment purchased, and the buildings themselves may have undergone modifications,
but the basic installations remained, and this huge pool of available industrial plant went
a long way to making the U.S. the Post War industrial powerhouse that dominated the world
until the end of the 1960s.

Respectfully

Paul R. Ward