Bleed the dictators white: The Grand WI of 1943

[Carl Schwamberger]

Hello All :

Mr. Carl Schwamberger posted:

From 1942 the money was borrowed, the diversion of skilled labor into
unproductive military service made production less efficient than otherwise,
much of the new industrial plant was for production of no use in a peace time
market economy, that is no economic return. That plant had to be rebuilt,
retooled, and in some cases abandoned postwar.

I have to disagree with a few of these points.

First, during the War, workers who were employed in Defense related industries were given
a " Reserved Occupation Enlistment Status ", and were essentially exempt from the Draft as
long as they worked at that industry. If they quit, or went on strike, they would be drafted.
( This ensured Labor Peace during the War )

Exemptions for occupation was relatively small to demand. A total of 16,000,000 men & won=men served in the military, about ten million in 1943 & twelve million each year 1944-45. Another 17,000,000 jobs were created 1942-44. That adds up to a gross 33,000,000 total jobs to fill from vacancies for military service and new vacancies. Of 19,000,000 men selected for draft slightly over ten million were inducted. Of the nine million rejected 'most' were not selected for reasons of mental or physical defect. Im skeptical the occupational exemptions made up for the 30+ million vacancies. Note that the men accepted for service drew first from the highest category of mental ability and education.

As for the Industrial Plant that was built having no use after the War, just look at the example
of the Willow Run Aircraft Plant. It produced more B-24s than anyone needed or wanted, and
after the War, in the words of the much-maligned Wikipedia:

Ford built the factory and sold it to the government, then leased it
back for the duration of the war. When Ford declined to purchase the facility
after the war, Kaiser-Frazer Corporation gained ownership, and in 1953 Ford's
rival General Motors took ownership and operated the factory as Willow Run
Transmission until 2010. Willow Run Assembly operated from 1959 to 1992 on
a parcel to the south of the airport. The Fisher Body division also operated at
Willow Run Assembly until its operations were assumed by the GM Assembly
Division in the 1970s. In 2009, General Motors announced that it would shut
down all operations at the GM Powertrain plant and engineering center in the
coming year.

............ In 2014, the Yankee Air Museum moved into the bomber factory.

I think you will find that most of the factories built during the war were converted into other
uses right after the war. This may have meant that machinery had to be sold off or scrapped,
and new equipment purchased, and the buildings themselves may have undergone modifications,
but the basic installations remained, and this huge pool of available industrial plant went
a long way to making the U.S. the Post War industrial powerhouse that dominated the world
until the end of the 1960s.

Respectfully

Paul R. Ward

Again the numbers don't add up post war. To used the aircraft manufacturing as a example. 1943-1944 the US built over 180,000 aircraft. Post war the US aircraft industry built between 60,000 & 30,000 to 1950, depending on how you count. "Number of civil planes built in U.S. 1947-1950: Almost 30,000" https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/articl ... -aviation/

A larger issue was retooling from production of M4 tanks to locomotives or earth movers. Whirpool discarded most of the tools used to make the 107mm M1938 Mortar & refurbished that floor space for for household appliances. Aggravating this was that much of the wartime built industrial plant was hastily constructed & lacked durability & adaptability, necessitating additional refurbishment. ie: The two Plutonium production reactors at the Haniford Oregon site. Were shut down on the Japanese surrender and a extended 18 month rebuild program initiated to correct a long list of construction and planning defects. The final and perhaps largest was the massive change in labor force. Converting from making rifles to automobile suspensions required retraining.

Up to a point the war revived the US economy & reversed a long term decline dating back to the 1920s, or 1910s. & rebuilding the infrastructure was part of that. But, not all the war industry was a benefit, there were plenty of money pits among that. Perhaps more important that rebuilt infrastructure was the revival of the import/export market between Europe and the US, and the new global financial structure that was largely built to benefit the US.

The sooner the war ends in a US strategic victory the sooner the dead ends of war industry are ended, and the sooner you can get to a global market that benefitted the US.

[Peter89]

Up to a point the war revived the US economy & reversed a long term decline dating back to the 1920s, or 1910s. & rebuilding the infrastructure was part of that. But, not all the war industry was a benefit, there were plenty of money pits among that. Perhaps more important that rebuilt infrastructure was the revival of the import/export market between Europe and the US, and the new global financial structure that was largely built to benefit the US.

The sooner the war ends in a US strategic victory the sooner the dead ends of war industry are ended, and the sooner you can get to a global market that benefitted the US.

The way this war was fought by the US does not mean it should have been fought this way. Mass manufacturing of weapons was necessary because the US wanted to be the Arsenal of Democracy. The L-L alone costed the Americans a stellar amount of resources, and it fueled the Soviet advance to Berlin and the Japanese collapse.

The conversion between civilian and military production is not as clear cut as you describe. The Americans could have used more general machining tools and could have reversed what the Germans were doing: they could have built aircrafts which could be converted to civilian use, just as Liberty ships helped to restore global maritime trade. Approximately the same could be done with heavy machines like locomotives and agricultural machinery.

The US production procedures emphasized effectiveness, and they perfectly fit into the narrative you describe: a short war in which the material superiority will overwhelm the enemy with the lesser production. But in this WI the main theme is that the Wallies do not necessarily outproduce the Axis in such a manner as they did OTL, because they could hardly translate that to postwar global hegemony. They left the Eurasian landmass with too large blocs of power when they had 1. no means to defend themselves, 2. were at a terrible war with each other.

If the Wallies turn down their production rates from 1943 onwards, they could wage war years more, just as you have wrote they expected to have to. The Germans could not defeat the Soviets from 1943 onwards, and the Soviets could hardly defeat the Germans if the Germans could only focus on the Eastern front. Undoubtedly they could push them back, but not in the manner they did from mid-1943 to spring 1944. That could drag on for 2 or 3 years with both sides continuing what they have done since 1941: attacking the other everywhere and everytime they could until both of them exhaust themselves.

It just doesn't seem to be a prudent choice to end the war with Beijing / Nanking and Moscow not occupied or demolished with nuclear bombs. The economic cost is irrelevant as long as the long term yields of the division of Eurasia is magnitudes higher.

[Peter89]

Hi, Peter
You idealize the surrounding reality.
I suggest we go down to the sinful earth

On November 30, 1943 took place on the territory of the USSR Embassy in Tehran the first meeting between the most cruel tyrant of all time and peoples comrade Stalin and the greatest democrat of all time and peoples Mr. Roosevelt.

As you think, which empire did the cruel tyrant and the great democrat divide at this meeting: the British Colonial Empire or the Third Reich?
In order not to bother you with searches, I will answer right away: The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the US president divide the British collonial Empire, the prime minister of which was there in Tehran on the territory of the British Embassy.
At the end of the meeting, Comrade Stalin said: If Churchill finds out what we were talking about here, he will kill us.
Mr. Roosevelt declares: The content of this part of the conversation will remain secret and he will not tell Churchill anything.

And here is the answer to the following question: why did the leaders of states with different political systems divide the empire of their ally? try to find it yourself.
When the answer is found, it will become clear to you that the mutual exsanguination of the USSR and the Third Reich was not beneficial to the American model of monopolistic capitalism. One of these two should be the winner. And again, from the point of view of the American model of capitalism, the USSR should be the winner.

Hello Yuri,
Do you have a source for this conversation?

In any case, I believe it could have happened, because the primary concern of the US was to abolish the colonial system and introduce a free market system. The Soviets were not interested in either of those.

Yet, it was exactly Iran where the US-led bloc pushed the Soviets out in 1946, so it is possible that FDR didn't actually mean a word of what he said, if he ever actually said it. It wouldn't be the first time anyway.

[Yuri]

Hello Yuri,
Do you have a source for this conversation?

In any case, I believe it could have happened, because the primary concern of the US was to abolish the colonial system and introduce a free market system. The Soviets were not interested in either of those.

Hello, Peter
Unfortunately, I did not find the full texts of the negotiations on the web. Only excerpts.
As far as I remember, it was this conversation that Stalin and Roosevelt ended with the above words. That is, the conversation took place on November 28, and not on November 30, as I indicated.
I have all the volumes of all three conferences. I am not at home right now, however, I believe that I will be able to review and clarify in the near future.

The Tehran Conference. November 28 – December 1 , 1943
Recording of a conversation between I.V. Stalin and F.Roosevelt
November 28, 1943 at 15 o'clock.


Roosevelt asks what is the situation on the Soviet-German front.
Stalin replies that recently our troops have left Zhytomyr, an important railway junction.
Roosevelt asks what the weather is like at the front.
Stalin replies that the weather is favorable only in Ukraine, on the other sectors of the front-the mud and soil have not frozen yet.
Roosevelt declares that he would like to divert 30-40 German divisions from the Soviet-German front.
Stalin replies that if it is possible to do it, it would be good.
Roosevelt notes that this is one of the issues on which he will give his explanations in the coming days. Americans face the task of maintaining troops of 2 million people located at a distance of 3 thousand miles from the American continent.
Stalin says that transport is needed and that he fully understands this.
Roosevelt declares that ships in the United States are being built at a satisfactory pace.
He says that later he would like to talk with Marshal Stalin about the post-war period and about the distribution of the merchant fleet of Great Britain and the United States in such a way that the Soviet Union would be able to begin the development of merchant shipping. Britain and the United States will have too large a merchant fleet after the end of the war, and he, Roosevelt, expects to transfer part of this fleet to other United Nations.
Stalin replies that it would be good. If the United States wants it, they can do it. He should say that Russia will be a big market for the United States after the war.
Roosevelt says that Americans will need a large amount of raw materials after the war, and therefore he thinks that there will be close trade ties between our countries.
Stalin agrees with this and says that if the Americans will supply us with equipment, then we will be able to supply them with raw materials.
Roosevelt states that he had very interesting conversations with Chiang Kai-shek. He, Roosevelt, was very careful and wanted to avoid the presence of the Chinese at his meeting with Churchill and Marshal Stalin. He, Roosevelt, thinks that the Chinese are satisfied with the decisions they have made.
Stalin notices that Chiang Kai-shek's troops are fighting badly.
Roosevelt agrees with this and says that the Americans are now equipping 30 Chinese divisions in South China. When these divisions are ready, the Americans will equip another 30 Chinese divisions.
Stalin asks what is happening in Lebanon, who is to blame for the events.
Roosevelt replies that the French National Committee is to blame. The British and French guaranteed Lebanon's independence. The Lebanese got their constitution and a president. But they wanted to change the constitution a little. However, the French refused them this and arrested the President and the Cabinet of Ministers of Lebanon. Everything is fine in Lebanon now.
Stalin asks whether peace has come to Lebanon after the British ultimatum.
Roosevelt answers in the affirmative and says that if Marshal Stalin had met with de Gaulle, he would not have liked de Gaulle.
Stalin says that he personally does not know de Gaulle.
Roosevelt declares that, in his opinion, the French are a good people, but they need absolutely new leaders no older than 40 years who did not hold any posts in the previous French government.
Stalin notes that this will take a lot of time.
Roosevelt agrees with this. He says that now the Americans are arming 11 French divisions. Giraud is a very nice and good general, but he is ignorant of civil administration and politics in general.
Stalin says that some of the leading strata in France want to be smarter than all the allies and think to deceive the allies. They apparently think that the allies will present them with France ready-made, and do not want to fight on the side of the allies, but prefer to cooperate with the Germans. They are heading for cooperation with the Germans. As for the French people, they are not being asked.
Roosevelt replies that Churchill thinks that France will be completely reborn and will soon become a great power. He, Roosevelt, does not share this opinion. He thinks it will be many years before that happens. If the French think that the allies will present them with a ready-made France on a platter, then they are mistaken. The French will have to work hard before France really becomes a great power
Stalin replies that he does not imagine that the Allies shed blood for the liberation of Indochina and then France would receive Indochina to restore the colonial regime there. He thinks that after what the Japanese have done with the idea of independence in Burma and Tai, we need to think about how to replace the old colonial regime with a more free regime. He thinks that the acts in Lebanon are the first steps towards replacing the old colonial regime with a new one. He thinks that Churchill is in favor of a freer regime in Lebanon. He, Stalin, believes that the same should be done with Indochina.
Roosevelt says he agrees with this one hundred percent. He was very happy to learn that Chiang Kai-shek did not want Indochina. The French have been in charge of Indochina for 100 years and the welfare of the people there is now lower than 100 years ago. Chiang Kai-shek said that the people of Indochina are not ready for self-government. Then he, Roosevelt, gave an example with the Philippines, which also a few years ago were not ready for self-government. By now, thanks to the help of the Americans, the Filipinos have prepared for self-government, and the Americans have promised to provide it to them. He, Roosevelt, believes that 3-4 trustees could be appointed over Indochina and in 30-40 years prepare the people of Indochina for self-government. He, Roosevelt, believes that the same position is true of the other colonies. Churchill does not want to act decisively with regard to the implementation of this guardianship proposal, as he is afraid that this principle will have to be applied to his colonies as well.
Stalin replies that, of course, Churchill will not be pleased.
Roosevelt states that when Hall was in Moscow, he had with him a document drawn up by him, Roosevelt, on the creation of an international commission on colonies. This commission would have to inspect colonial countries in order to study the situation in these countries and possible improvements to this situation. The entire work of this commission would be made widely public.
Stalin replies that it would be good to do so. Complaints, requests, etc. could be addressed to this commission.
Roosevelt declares that it is better not to talk to Churchill about India, since he, Roosevelt, knows that Churchill has no ideas about India. Churchill believes to leave the solution of this issue until the end of the war.
Stalin says that India is Churchill's sore spot.
Roosevelt agrees with this. However, he says, England will have to do something in India. He, Roosevelt, expects to talk to Marshal Stalin about India sometime. He thinks that a parliamentary system of government is not suitable for India and that it would be better to create something like a Soviet system in India, starting from the bottom and not from the top. Maybe it would be a system of advice.
Stalin replies that starting from the bottom means following the path of revolution.
Roosevelt says that people who stand aside from the question of India can solve it better than people who are directly related to this issue.
Stalin says that, of course, people who stand apart from India will be able to look at things more objectively.

[Yuri]

Yet, it was exactly Iran where the US-led bloc pushed the Soviets out in 1946, so it is possible that FDR didn't actually mean a word of what he said, if he ever actually said it. It wouldn't be the first time anyway.

Peter, Iran in 1946 is already the post-war era.
In addition, the USSR was really stalling with the withdrawal of its troops from Iran.
So the US claims had some grounds.

[Carl Schwamberger]

The way this war was fought by the US does not mean it should have been fought this way. Mass manufacturing of weapons was necessary because the US wanted to be the Arsenal of Democracy. The L-L alone costed the Americans a stellar amount of resources, and it fueled the Soviet advance to Berlin and the Japanese collapse.

Partially true, but my point was that the decision and action has to come long before 1943 as you wrote. A decision for all the actions you propose there can't come after the historical industrial mobilization occurs. It would need to come NLT than early 1942 or better 1941.

& none of this get around that the US economy was built on a free market structure trade with Europe. The longer a return to that is delayed the more long term damage occurs. OTL the damage from a centrally planned war economy was limited to about three years. The damage from the lack of trade with a blockaded Europe ran on 5-6 years depending on how you count. The damage from the lean years while the West European economy cranked back up dragged on at least five more years. Anything that keeps Europe closed to US trade levels of 1900, 1910, or 1925, retards US return to a balanced economy. recessions or another Depression are more likely. The massive war production kept the work force employed and cash circulating, scale that back without the revival of the European or global trade & you are back to the 1930s with stagnated exports & no foreign capitol flowing in as purchases and investment.

[Peter89]

The way this war was fought by the US does not mean it should have been fought this way. Mass manufacturing of weapons was necessary because the US wanted to be the Arsenal of Democracy. The L-L alone costed the Americans a stellar amount of resources, and it fueled the Soviet advance to Berlin and the Japanese collapse.

Partially true, but my point was that the decision and action has to come long before 1943 as you wrote. A decision for all the actions you propose there can't come after the historical industrial mobilization occurs. It would need to come NLT than early 1942 or better 1941.

& none of this get around that the US economy was built on a free market structure trade with Europe. The longer a return to that is delayed the more long term damage occurs. OTL the damage from a centrally planned war economy was limited to about three years. The damage from the lack of trade with a blockaded Europe ran on 5-6 years depending on how you count. The damage from the lean years while the West European economy cranked back up dragged on at least five more years. Anything that keeps Europe closed to US trade levels of 1900, 1910, or 1925, retards US return to a balanced economy. recessions or another Depression are more likely. The massive war production kept the work force employed and cash circulating, scale that back without the revival of the European or global trade & you are back to the 1930s with stagnated exports & no foreign capitol flowing in as purchases and investment.

Without debating how farther the US could go in war economy and popular support of war for a world order that suited its global position better (I believe there was more room to play than in OTL), Truman laid out his proposal in 1941 - within the time window you suggested - which could have led to a decision of grand strategy in 1943.

Note that the Germans would have attacked the SU in 1941 anyway. Also note that the Japanese would attack the USA and the Germans would declare war on the USA. Thus I think my timeline is appropriate.

The US naval rearmament programmes of 1938 and 1940 were sealing the deal of the naval world domination. The aircraft production was so high in 1943 and 1944 that even half or third the effort could cut it. Even if Hitler would take the Caucasus and the Middle Eastern oil fields intact, he could not compete with American production. There was nothing that either the Soviets or the Germans could do in any sphere of technology or economy that could seriously challenge the Wallies' dominance. Thus in my opinion, the Wallies badly overshot the target, and sacrificed a full and durable victory for a quick one.

[Peter89]

Hello Yuri,
Do you have a source for this conversation?

In any case, I believe it could have happened, because the primary concern of the US was to abolish the colonial system and introduce a free market system. The Soviets were not interested in either of those.

Hello, Peter
Unfortunately, I did not find the full texts of the negotiations on the web. Only excerpts.
As far as I remember, it was this conversation that Stalin and Roosevelt ended with the above words. That is, the conversation took place on November 28, and not on November 30, as I indicated.
I have all the volumes of all three conferences. I am not at home right now, however, I believe that I will be able to review and clarify in the near future.

The Tehran Conference. November 28 – December 1 , 1943
Recording of a conversation between I.V. Stalin and F.Roosevelt
November 28, 1943 at 15 o'clock.


Roosevelt asks what is the situation on the Soviet-German front.
Stalin replies that recently our troops have left Zhytomyr, an important railway junction.
Roosevelt asks what the weather is like at the front.
Stalin replies that the weather is favorable only in Ukraine, on the other sectors of the front-the mud and soil have not frozen yet.
Roosevelt declares that he would like to divert 30-40 German divisions from the Soviet-German front.
Stalin replies that if it is possible to do it, it would be good.
Roosevelt notes that this is one of the issues on which he will give his explanations in the coming days. Americans face the task of maintaining troops of 2 million people located at a distance of 3 thousand miles from the American continent.
Stalin says that transport is needed and that he fully understands this.
Roosevelt declares that ships in the United States are being built at a satisfactory pace.
He says that later he would like to talk with Marshal Stalin about the post-war period and about the distribution of the merchant fleet of Great Britain and the United States in such a way that the Soviet Union would be able to begin the development of merchant shipping. Britain and the United States will have too large a merchant fleet after the end of the war, and he, Roosevelt, expects to transfer part of this fleet to other United Nations.
Stalin replies that it would be good. If the United States wants it, they can do it. He should say that Russia will be a big market for the United States after the war.
Roosevelt says that Americans will need a large amount of raw materials after the war, and therefore he thinks that there will be close trade ties between our countries.
Stalin agrees with this and says that if the Americans will supply us with equipment, then we will be able to supply them with raw materials.
Roosevelt states that he had very interesting conversations with Chiang Kai-shek. He, Roosevelt, was very careful and wanted to avoid the presence of the Chinese at his meeting with Churchill and Marshal Stalin. He, Roosevelt, thinks that the Chinese are satisfied with the decisions they have made.
Stalin notices that Chiang Kai-shek's troops are fighting badly.
Roosevelt agrees with this and says that the Americans are now equipping 30 Chinese divisions in South China. When these divisions are ready, the Americans will equip another 30 Chinese divisions.
Stalin asks what is happening in Lebanon, who is to blame for the events.
Roosevelt replies that the French National Committee is to blame. The British and French guaranteed Lebanon's independence. The Lebanese got their constitution and a president. But they wanted to change the constitution a little. However, the French refused them this and arrested the President and the Cabinet of Ministers of Lebanon. Everything is fine in Lebanon now.
Stalin asks whether peace has come to Lebanon after the British ultimatum.
Roosevelt answers in the affirmative and says that if Marshal Stalin had met with de Gaulle, he would not have liked de Gaulle.
Stalin says that he personally does not know de Gaulle.
Roosevelt declares that, in his opinion, the French are a good people, but they need absolutely new leaders no older than 40 years who did not hold any posts in the previous French government.
Stalin notes that this will take a lot of time.
Roosevelt agrees with this. He says that now the Americans are arming 11 French divisions. Giraud is a very nice and good general, but he is ignorant of civil administration and politics in general.
Stalin says that some of the leading strata in France want to be smarter than all the allies and think to deceive the allies. They apparently think that the allies will present them with France ready-made, and do not want to fight on the side of the allies, but prefer to cooperate with the Germans. They are heading for cooperation with the Germans. As for the French people, they are not being asked.
Roosevelt replies that Churchill thinks that France will be completely reborn and will soon become a great power. He, Roosevelt, does not share this opinion. He thinks it will be many years before that happens. If the French think that the allies will present them with a ready-made France on a platter, then they are mistaken. The French will have to work hard before France really becomes a great power
Stalin replies that he does not imagine that the Allies shed blood for the liberation of Indochina and then France would receive Indochina to restore the colonial regime there. He thinks that after what the Japanese have done with the idea of independence in Burma and Tai, we need to think about how to replace the old colonial regime with a more free regime. He thinks that the acts in Lebanon are the first steps towards replacing the old colonial regime with a new one. He thinks that Churchill is in favor of a freer regime in Lebanon. He, Stalin, believes that the same should be done with Indochina.
Roosevelt says he agrees with this one hundred percent. He was very happy to learn that Chiang Kai-shek did not want Indochina. The French have been in charge of Indochina for 100 years and the welfare of the people there is now lower than 100 years ago. Chiang Kai-shek said that the people of Indochina are not ready for self-government. Then he, Roosevelt, gave an example with the Philippines, which also a few years ago were not ready for self-government. By now, thanks to the help of the Americans, the Filipinos have prepared for self-government, and the Americans have promised to provide it to them. He, Roosevelt, believes that 3-4 trustees could be appointed over Indochina and in 30-40 years prepare the people of Indochina for self-government. He, Roosevelt, believes that the same position is true of the other colonies. Churchill does not want to act decisively with regard to the implementation of this guardianship proposal, as he is afraid that this principle will have to be applied to his colonies as well.
Stalin replies that, of course, Churchill will not be pleased.
Roosevelt states that when Hall was in Moscow, he had with him a document drawn up by him, Roosevelt, on the creation of an international commission on colonies. This commission would have to inspect colonial countries in order to study the situation in these countries and possible improvements to this situation. The entire work of this commission would be made widely public.
Stalin replies that it would be good to do so. Complaints, requests, etc. could be addressed to this commission.
Roosevelt declares that it is better not to talk to Churchill about India, since he, Roosevelt, knows that Churchill has no ideas about India. Churchill believes to leave the solution of this issue until the end of the war.
Stalin says that India is Churchill's sore spot.
Roosevelt agrees with this. However, he says, England will have to do something in India. He, Roosevelt, expects to talk to Marshal Stalin about India sometime. He thinks that a parliamentary system of government is not suitable for India and that it would be better to create something like a Soviet system in India, starting from the bottom and not from the top. Maybe it would be a system of advice.
Stalin replies that starting from the bottom means following the path of revolution.
Roosevelt says that people who stand aside from the question of India can solve it better than people who are directly related to this issue.
Stalin says that, of course, people who stand apart from India will be able to look at things more objectively.

Hello Yuri,

Thanks for the link! According to this bit, FDR was talking about the arming of 41-71 "divisions", in addition to deliveries to the SU, the Brtish Empire, other allies and his own troops. It means that the US president claimed they were plenty able to turn the tide of the war from South China through Eastern Europe to Western Europe. Thus it means they were able to play on the global and Eurasian scale, which quite supports this WI's narrative.

What does not support FDR is how the Free French troops were actually equipped in the Tunisian campaign... but politicians are not really known for their honesty, so using their speeches as sources of intent is tricky sometimes.

[History Learner]

The Bleed them white strategy could only be started in 1943, possibly around May, no sooner and no later. At that moment the Germans recuperated somewhat from their Eastern front defeats, the Soviets saw victory in the end and the Wallies were in no way threatened by the Germans anymore.

If the Germans don't begin to divide their forces heavily, the Ostheer might be able to hold the line and make minor concessions only, especially if the forces trapped on the Kuban could get back to Ukraine via Rostov. I see battles like that of 1942 in Army Group Center and North areas destroying both the German and Soviet reserves without significant gains.

Both sides in the Eastern Front recognized they were in a stalemate by then and were reluctant to act as they equally recognized that a misstep at this point would be fatal. In the context of this strategic situation, Stalin was willing to seek a compromise peace and repeatedly threatened to do so with the Anglo-Americans:

Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World War II
The Spectre of a Separate Peace in the East: Russo-German 'Peace Feelers', 1942-44

Besides the linked articles, A World At Arms by Gerhard L. Weinberg (1994) and Hitler's War by Heinz Magenheimer (1998) support it. I don't have access to Magenheimer, but I do have Weinberg and I'll quote from that.

Page 609:

Until access to Soviet archives enables scholars to see more clearly into these murky episodes, this author will remain convinced that it was the shock of German military revival so soon after the great Soviet victory at Stalingrad which reinforced Stalin's inclinations during 1943 to contemplate the possibility of either a separate peace with Hitler's Germany or with some alternative German government. With the road to Berlin so obviously a difficult one, the temptation to sound possible alternatives was enormous. Surely by now the Germans must realize that their hopes of defeating the Soviet Union were illusory. The German government had had sense enough in 1939 to work out an accommodation with the Soviet Union on terms both sides had found advantageous; the same people were still in charge in Berlin. In the winter of 1940-41 they had refused to reply to the Soviet proposals for Russia to join the Tripartite Pact, but instead had insisted on attacking her; perhaps in the interim they had learned better in the hard school of war.​
​
As for the Soviet Union, she had demonstrated conclusively that she could defend herself, but this defense had been immensely costly. A new agreement with Germany would provide a breathing space for reconstruction and recovery, would remove German occupation without either further Red Army casualties or economic destruction, and would leave the Soviet Union dominant in all of Eastern Europe, especially in Poland where a Soviet puppet government would replace the pre-war regime. It may have been known to the Soviet government that there were elements in the German government and military apparatus who wanted an agreement with Moscow, and it was certainly known that Japan was very strongly in favor of a German-Soviet peace.​

Pg 610:

On the Soviet side, the position appears to have been that Germany must evacuate all the occupied territory, certainly to the 1941 border, possibly later on, after the Soviet victory in July 1943, back to the 1914 border (thus turning over central Poland to the Soviet Union). German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop appears to have been at least slightly interested in some compromise peace; he saw himself as the architect of the 1939 pact with the Soviet Union and had always given priority to the war against Great Britain. Joseph Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda, favored negotiations with Stalin and so advised Hitler, almost certainly much more strongly than von Ribbentrop. Hitler, however, was unwilling to have any negotiations with the Soviet Union. Some of the sources make a great deal out of his suspicions about a key intermediary in Stockholm being Jewish, but Hitler's explanations to Goebbels and Oshima go to the core of the issue: he wanted to keep territory, especially the Ukraine, which he was certain Stalin would not give up; and on this point, if no other, his assessment of the Soviet Union was certainly correct. While Stalin might have been willing to negotiate about territory to the west of the 1941 border of the country, he was certainly not about to leave the Germans in occupation of portions of it, least of all the rich agricultural and industrial areas of the Ukraine. The latter would, if necessary, be retaken in battle, and in the fall of 1943 and the winter of 1943-44 that is exactly what the Red Army did.​

The moment Stalin gets a hint of what the U.S. is doing, he will cut a deal even if on unfavorable terms, because it's better to have some of the USSR than none of the USSR and be dead. He can always wait for the Anglo-Americans to weaken themselves defeating Germany, should they choose to do so.

[Peter89]

The problem was that without the hoped resources from the SU (food, oil, etc) the Germans had no chance to challenge the Wallies. The Wallies did not have the land power to defeat the Germans without the Soviets. Besides, playing Germany against the Wallies was Stalin's game between 1939-1941 and it failed. The only plausible scenario is that the Wallies cut their support for the SU and close the dictators into Eurasia to weaken each other. Both regimes had ample of lust & reason to continue and to sacrifice millions. They might also enter into the mainland via Iberia, the Balkans, Italy or Scandinavia. They could pick off German allies one by one, but they could also threaten the Caucasus or Central Asia from the south.

[History Learner]

The problem was that without the hoped resources from the SU (food, oil, etc) the Germans had no chance to challenge the Wallies. The Wallies did not have the land power to defeat the Germans without the Soviets.

A separate peace with Stalin would thus solve the problem for Germany then. It could resume trading with the USSR and free up enough manpower to prevent the Allies from winning.

Besides, playing Germany against the Wallies was Stalin's game between 1939-1941 and it failed.

He took up playing it again in 1943 over frustrations concerning the Second Front that didn't materialize, and this was a very serious concern for the Anglo-Americans; unconditional surrender was meant as a way of preventing that.

The only plausible scenario is that the Wallies cut their support for the SU and close the dictators into Eurasia to weaken each other. Both regimes had ample of lust & reason to continue and to sacrifice millions.

Not really, a fair amount of senior NSDAP officials by 1943 were in favor of cutting a deal; Goebbels, Ribbentrop and even Himmler for example. Stalin wasn't opposed, as long as his conditions were met. As I said, they aren't stupid, particularly Stalin; he'd rather rule the USSR in 1941 borders (or less!) than be dead.

They might also enter into the mainland via Iberia, the Balkans, Italy or Scandinavia. They could pick off German allies one by one, but they could also threaten the Caucasus or Central Asia from the south.

Which provokes the historical response to such by the Germans and gives Stalin added incentive to cut a deal since it's clear what the West is up to.

[Peter89]

The problem was that without the hoped resources from the SU (food, oil, etc) the Germans had no chance to challenge the Wallies. The Wallies did not have the land power to defeat the Germans without the Soviets.

A separate peace with Stalin would thus solve the problem for Germany then. It could resume trading with the USSR and free up enough manpower to prevent the Allies from winning.

No, it would not work like that. Germany would be dependent on the Soviets regarding these deliveries, while the Soviets would not be dependent on the Germans in any sense. By 1943, Germany did not hold any practical technological edge. Also Stalin knew that a ceasefire did not favour the Soviets, because they were winning and Germany was losing.

Besides, playing Germany against the Wallies was Stalin's game between 1939-1941 and it failed.

He took up playing it again in 1943 over frustrations concerning the Second Front that didn't materialize, and this was a very serious concern for the Anglo-Americans; unconditional surrender was meant as a way of preventing that.

The only plausible scenario is that the Wallies cut their support for the SU and close the dictators into Eurasia to weaken each other. Both regimes had ample of lust & reason to continue and to sacrifice millions.

Not really, a fair amount of senior NSDAP officials by 1943 were in favor of cutting a deal; Goebbels, Ribbentrop and even Himmler for example. Stalin wasn't opposed, as long as his conditions were met. As I said, they aren't stupid, particularly Stalin; he'd rather rule the USSR in 1941 borders (or less!) than be dead.

They might also enter into the mainland via Iberia, the Balkans, Italy or Scandinavia. They could pick off German allies one by one, but they could also threaten the Caucasus or Central Asia from the south.

Which provokes the historical response to such by the Germans and gives Stalin added incentive to cut a deal since it's clear what the West is up to.

Of course many German officials wanted a separate peace with either the Soviets or the Wallies. They were losing a multiple-front war. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union could only remain in an uneasy peace (up until it was broken, not afterwards), they could not be allies.

[Sheldrake]

This looks like some sort of scenario where the allies might eventually support the Nazi Germans against the Soviet Union.

I hate the dumb anachronastic term "Wallies." There were no Wallies in the war. After the US was brought into the war FDR and Churchill came up with a name for the alliance against the axis powers. It was called The United Nations. Into this the USSR was invited. There was an Anglo American coalition with a joint decision making structure. However, the US and British did not always see eye to eye and argued about what could be agreed with Stalin.

FDR's announcment of Unconditional Surrender does not seem to have been agreed or even discussed in advance with Churchill. This was a US led decision. However, it was probably intended to avoid one of the big risks in the war against Hitler: that Hitler and Stalin did a second deal. There have been some suggestions that there were feelers in 1943 between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. A result that left Western Europe under Nazi rule would have been a defeat for the Anglo American alliance.

It was far more likely that the dictators would do a deal than the British and Americans could go soft on support for the USSR. There was a lot of public support for the Soviet people and a public campaign in Britian to open a Second Front in 1942, According a Soviet tank commander, US workers would include gifts of bottles of Whiskey in the barrels of Lend Lease M4s shipped to Russia. The public and politicians would have seen through any cynical ploy that allowed the Nazis and Reds to simply wear each other out. However, the net result of WW2 was that both Germany and the Soviet Union were devastated by the war.

[wm]

Hitler attacked Russia because he had come to the (firm) conclusion that an honest deal with Stalin wasn't possible. Failed Barbarossa, and resulting peace couldn't change that, so peace wasn't possible.
On the other hand, such a defeat would have destroyed the Soviet Union by demonstrating that communism was seriously inferior and that Stalin wasn't a good leader.

And this is why real military support for Nazi Germany wasn't possible (September 1939, Life Magazine):