What if Rommel defeats Crusader?

[Tom from Cornwall]

Guys, thank you all for your answers. I still find it hard to believe that British planners thought that they could freely mop up the entire Axis position in Africa. Aren't you talking about taking Lybia? Can you point me to the relevant documents?

Hi,

Not sure what you mean here to be honest. In 1941, the Axis position didn't include all of North Africa but just the Italian colonies.

I'll look out for some documents but it won't be immediate.

Regards

Tom

[Urmel]

There isn't really a path to a Gazala-style defeat that I can see.

I'm not entirely sure I'm totally in agreement with you here. I think I'm with those who consider that Rommel's "Dash to the Wire" occurred at a time when there were plenty of isolated British Commonwealth brigade groups scattered around begging to be tackled in detail.

Regards

Tom

But Tom. That's not an alternative timeline, that's the actual timeline as it happened historically.

1) Panzergruppe wins at Sidi Rezegh
2) Dash to the wire
3) Attempt to destroy 7 Indian Brigade (isolated) - fails
4) Attempt to take Capuzzo (isolated) fails
5) Run into 1 Army Tank Bde repairshop (isolated) - overrun

They finally managed, by accident, to overrun 5 NZ Bde at Sidi Azeiz when they moved back to Tobruk.

The key issue here is that there were many isolated Allied formations, but Panzergruppe lacked the intel and command structure (with HQ at El Adem and Rommel off with the fairies) to know where they were and to concentrate their remaining force against them. Also, given the losses experienced at Sidi Rezegh, I would argue that Panzergruppe on 24 November had the capacity to maybe destroy one more Allied brigade. There were however five roaming the desert (1 SA, 4, 5, 6 NZ, 7 Indian) plus the Tobruk breakout force, all supported by ca. 1.5-2 brigades worth of British tanks, with far far better reconnaissance capabilities than Panzergruppe had.

A realistic path for Panzergruppe to maintain the position at Tobruk would have been to do absolutely nothing for 3-4 days, while the Allies lick their wounds, collecting derelict tanks, building up strength again. But even that isn't going to give you an attack into Egypt and towards the El Alamein line.

[antwony]

Also, I believe that the fruits of the British strategy to tie up loose ends (ie eliminating Vichy control) coincided with German strategic exhaustion in late 1942. It could not happen before that.

Attemping to tie up loose ends in 1941 i.e. eliminating Vichy control of Syria and supporting Greece could be considered the reason why Britain didn't "pick any fruit" i.e. eliminate the Axis force in North Africa, in 1941.

[Urmel]

The "8th Army" did not not-clear the Axis from N-Africa because of some conspiracy theory of the deep state, but because every time (early 1941 and early 1942), they simply run away from their logistical support. In early 1941, they were barely able to bring enough supply up to Tobruk, and on the border of Tripolitania, they were waaaay ahead of any supply chain.
Same happened in early 1942.
If not for Torch, most likely it would have happened early 1943 too.

The same happened to the Axis in December 1940 at Sidi Barani, Summer/Fall 1941 at the border, and Summer/Fall 1942 at El Al.

I agree.

Also, I believe that the fruits of the British strategy to tie up loose ends (ie eliminating Vichy control) coincided with German strategic exhaustion in late 1942. It could not happen before that.

Crusader is approximately at the same time as the Battle of Gondar, and it was not clear how the Vichy French fleet would react with their considerable fleet with the German troops advancing near Moscow. Especially at the planning phase, I believe it was more like a general sketch rather than a detailed plan - but I am open to be convinced otherwise.

The Wallies also made plans to defend the ME from a northern thrust coming from the Caucasus or via Turkey. That does not mean these plans were based on a realistic approach of the situation or that they were plausible alternative scenarios. As Williamson Murray put it, the German campaigns of 1942 fooled historians and contemporaries as well.

I'm not sure how any of this is related to the objectives of CRUSADER?

Auchinleck's despatch (London Gazette) starts with these words:

Of the numerous problems of the Middle East Command two ranked high above all others: to destroy the enemy in North Africa and to secure the northern flank.
I had always conceived the former to be my prime task, for the presence of strong and well equipped Axis forces in Cyrenaica was a constant
menace to our ibase in Egypt. I planned to occupy -the whole of Libya, Tripolitania as well as Cyrenaica, so as to leave the enemy no foothold whence he anight, at some future date, revive the threat to Egypt. Moreover, it •was always possible that we might eventually launch an offensive against Italy herself, and as a stepping stone it seemed essential to capture Tripoli. This policy had the full approval of His Majesty's Government.

This is reflected in the operational planning for CRUSADER, which set out the following objectives for the offensive, as narrated by Gen. Cunningham in an 8th Army command conference on 6 October 1941.

The second phase referred to here started to move into active operational planning in October 1941, if not before. Here's the cover page of the planning document.

I hope that is sufficient to lay to rest the conspiracy theories.

[Tom from Cornwall]

The key issue here is that there were many isolated Allied formations, but Panzergruppe lacked the intel and command structure (with HQ at El Adem and Rommel off with the fairies) to know where they were and to concentrate their remaining force against them. Also, given the losses experienced at Sidi Rezegh, I would argue that Panzergruppe on 24 November had the capacity to maybe destroy one more Allied brigade. There were however five roaming the desert (1 SA, 4, 5, 6 NZ, 7 Indian) plus the Tobruk breakout force, all supported by ca. 1.5-2 brigades worth of British tanks, with far far better reconnaissance capabilities than Panzergruppe had.

Hi,

You are probably right. I'm not sure what intelligence the Panzergruppe had of British strengths and locations when the 'Dash to the Wire' was implemented. Any worse that the equivalent British assessments despite their 'far better reconnaissance capabilities'?

Regards

Tom

[Urmel]

The Axis intel picture is here:

https://rommelsriposte.com/panzerarmee- ... e-reports/

Check the daily reports for 23 and 24 November and you get the idea. It was reasonably complete, but, it wasn't at a level of clarity that would have enabled them to make better decisions with Rommel insisting on the dash (against Crüwell's strong advice).

The Allied recce assets weren't as much relevant to reconnaissance itself, but what they did to Axis recce. Throughout the operation you find complaints from German commanders that they simply couldn't penetrate the Allied armoured car screen.

What exactly Y-service told the British commanders we will probably never know.

Here's my preferred WI:

1) Crüwell prevails on the evening of 23 November and Rommel sees sense and doesn't dash for the wire.
2) The Germans spend a day cleaning up the Sidi Rezegh battlefield, maintaining their tanks, and combining Di Nisio column with the D.A.K. That gives them probably 200 medium tanks in concentration.
3) They now turn on the Tobruk breakout force, combining the army artillery, all the tanks and whatever infantry they can scrounge together, and use the breathing space they have because the remnants of the British armour are sorting themselves out to completely defeat this and push it back into Tobruk. Maybe with a bridgehead into the siege line.
4) All bets are now off. 8th Army is still vastly superior in infantry, and if it can concentrate about equal in tanks. But with the Tobruk breakout defeated, the Axis forces are again operating from a secure base. Basically, 8th Army is now the proverbial dog that caught the car. They cannot attack, as they are not strong enough, and they cannot retreat, because that gives the Axis the ability to finish off Tobruk.

Regardless of what Auchinleck now does, and how it ends, the Axis will not be able to pursue far into Egypt as it lacks the resources to do so, and Tobruk still has not been taken. If the Axis takes Tobruk they still won't have the resources to go into Egypt as i) it is costly to do so and ii) at the end of 1941 there were not as many supplies in Tobruk as in June 1942.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi,

Thanks for that information and for your great website.

Interesting, and good, point about impact of British Commonwealth recce screen on the ability of Germans to secure tactical intelligence. I’d never thought of that aspect before.

‘Crusader’ is such an interesting operation - on multiple levels and from many different aspects - no wonder we are still discussing it!

Regards

Tom

[Peter89]

The "8th Army" did not not-clear the Axis from N-Africa because of some conspiracy theory of the deep state, but because every time (early 1941 and early 1942), they simply run away from their logistical support. In early 1941, they were barely able to bring enough supply up to Tobruk, and on the border of Tripolitania, they were waaaay ahead of any supply chain.
Same happened in early 1942.
If not for Torch, most likely it would have happened early 1943 too.

The same happened to the Axis in December 1940 at Sidi Barani, Summer/Fall 1941 at the border, and Summer/Fall 1942 at El Al.

I agree.

Also, I believe that the fruits of the British strategy to tie up loose ends (ie eliminating Vichy control) coincided with German strategic exhaustion in late 1942. It could not happen before that.

Crusader is approximately at the same time as the Battle of Gondar, and it was not clear how the Vichy French fleet would react with their considerable fleet with the German troops advancing near Moscow. Especially at the planning phase, I believe it was more like a general sketch rather than a detailed plan - but I am open to be convinced otherwise.

The Wallies also made plans to defend the ME from a northern thrust coming from the Caucasus or via Turkey. That does not mean these plans were based on a realistic approach of the situation or that they were plausible alternative scenarios. As Williamson Murray put it, the German campaigns of 1942 fooled historians and contemporaries as well.

I'm not sure how any of this is related to the objectives of CRUSADER?

Auchinleck's despatch (London Gazette) starts with these words:

Of the numerous problems of the Middle East Command two ranked high above all others: to destroy the enemy in North Africa and to secure the northern flank.
I had always conceived the former to be my prime task, for the presence of strong and well equipped Axis forces in Cyrenaica was a constant
menace to our ibase in Egypt. I planned to occupy -the whole of Libya, Tripolitania as well as Cyrenaica, so as to leave the enemy no foothold whence he anight, at some future date, revive the threat to Egypt. Moreover, it •was always possible that we might eventually launch an offensive against Italy herself, and as a stepping stone it seemed essential to capture Tripoli. This policy had the full approval of His Majesty's Government.

This is reflected in the operational planning for CRUSADER, which set out the following objectives for the offensive, as narrated by Gen. Cunningham in an 8th Army command conference on 6 October 1941.

Screenshot 2023-05-27 at 11.12.08 AM.jpg

The second phase referred to here started to move into active operational planning in October 1941, if not before. Here's the cover page of the planning document.

Screenshot 2023-05-27 at 11.29.51 AM.jpg

I hope that is sufficient to lay to rest the conspiracy theories.

Hello Urmel,

Thank you for your reply. I looked into it, and it seems I was wrong and you were right. The British in fact wanted to push the Axis out of NA in 1941.

A marginal thought, I do not know how did they imagine to get rid of the Vichy control there.

Also I wouldn't say I was presenting a conspiracy theory, I was merely following my own line of thought in absence of decisive sources.

[Urmel]

Sorry for the term, I just didn't quite know how else to refer to it when I posted, but realise 'musings' would have been more appropriate! Please accept my apologies.

[Peter89]

Sorry for the term, I just didn't quite know how else to refer to it when I posted, but realise 'musings' would have been more appropriate! Please accept my apologies.

Sure, no problem at all.

I always thought very well of you and your work, and I accept you as an authority in the Western Desert Campaign. Maybe you can recall a few exchange of sources in our private conversations as well. My interest, therefore my knowledge of the theatre is focused on the other side of the Suez (Iraq, Levant, Iran).

[Aber]

A marginal thought, I do not know how did they imagine to get rid of the Vichy control there.

A few examples

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gabon

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria%E2% ... n_campaign

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Madagascar

[Peter89]

A marginal thought, I do not know how did they imagine to get rid of the Vichy control there.

A few examples

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gabon

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria%E2% ... n_campaign

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Madagascar

Yes, I am aware of these campaigns and many more. However, the British could expect the Vichy forces to put up a resistance (as they did, even during Torch), and the Germans to show up in Tunisia and Vichy controlled zones. Before the Germans were defeated in the SU, the Germans landed an agreement with the Vichy government allowing them to use Vichy ports, airfields and the infrastructrure (Paris Protocols). It has been put to the test on the eve of Barbarossa, and the French authorities complied.

In my estimation, the British simply did not have the forces to push the Axis out of Africa in 1941, although as Urmel proved it, they did have the plans. First they had to get rid of the Axis influence in the Middle East, then from IEA, etc.

[Urmel]

Vichy North Africa is an interesting one. I don't think that M.E.H.Q. spent a lot of time on it, as covered by what Douglas Adams called an S.E.P. Field. IOW, let us deal with the Axis armies, and the politicos in London can deal with Vichy.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Vichy North Africa is an interesting one. I don't think that M.E.H.Q. spent a lot of time on it, as covered by what Douglas Adams called an S.E.P. Field. IOW, let us deal with the Axis armies, and the politicos in London can deal with Vichy.

SEP -

Not heard that before, thanks.

Regards

Tom

[Urmel]

Douglas Adams was a very witty observer of humanity.