1943: The Allied victory that never was.

[Von Bock]

I just read the book '1943: The victory that never was' by John Grigg. Underlines exactly the arguments that are being made in other topics: The war should have been decided a lot earlier than May 1945 by the Western Allies. Its central thesis is that a cross-Channel Allied invasion might have been mounted in 1943, with a good chance of success. His basic arguments:

"But would it have succeeded? There is every reason to believe that it would. The Germans had no more men to withstand it than they had a year
later, and the defences of the Atlantic Wall were, as we have seen, much less elaborate. Allied air superiority was already crushing, and it would
have been far easier to destroy the Luftwaffe over Normandy than over Germany.

Germany would have been much worse placed than in 1944 to fight the war on two fronts, because the two fronts would have been so much
farther apart. In July 1943 the Eastern Front was still deep inside Russia, with the Germans still holding Smolensk, Orel, Kharkov, and Taganrog. A
year later the front was, in the north, either close to, or across, the Polish border, and in the south at the approaches to Roumania, with Odessa in
Russian hands. By December 1944 the Red Army had occupied the Baltic States, Roumania, and Bulgaria, was at the gates of Warsaw, and had
captured Budapest. Clearly the Germans’ east-west communications would have been far more stretched if the Western Allies had landed in 1943, and if —as in 1944—there had been a winter campaign, the enemy’s interior lines would probably have been too extended to allow, for instance, Sepp Dietrich’s 6th S.S. Panzer Army to move, undetected, from Austria to a position threatening the Ardennes. The overall strategic dispositions would have
favoured the Allies more, the Germans less, than a year later."

Other points:

1. Tunis could well have been an economic gain for the Germans, since it delayed the Sicilian invasion by 6 months.
2. The Italian surrender was dramatically coordinated allowing Germans to take over.
3. Many encirclement opportunities were missed, especially Montgomery was not very good at this.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I've read Grigg extensively. Its mostly concerned with why the Allies made the decisions they did at the SYMBOL conference in January 1943. Only a single short chapter at the end of the book focuses on the actual questions of a 1943 Cross Channel attack. That and the other remarks or facts and guesses sprinkled through the book hardly touch the problems of the cross Channel operation, for either side. To digress: I'd not bother with Dunns study of the subject. These several distortions of fact in his arguments. ie: he presents the number of LST available at the end of 1943 as the number available for a midyear operation. I cant say if he is mendacious, or sloppy. Probably the latter. Either way I'd not waste the time or money on Dunns book

Getting back to Grigg. Its interesting & usefull for understanding the SYMBOL conference but I think Griggs arguments lack the depth for concluding anything pro or con. A lot of them I'd not even use as a starting point.

[Richard Anderson]

I've read Grigg extensively. ... I'd not bother with Dunns study of the subject. These several distortions of fact in his arguments.

All of these discussions simply ignore logistics and the logistical realities the Allies faced. I suspect the authors do not bother to research the subject since it is too wide-ranging and requires too much of a depth of knowledge that doesn't work with their simplified world views. Sort of like many posters on this site.

At the beginning of 1943 the SOS ETOUSA in Britain was essentially non-existent and heavily depended on limited depot space allocated from British Army resources. Given the number of divisions planned to stage in Britain, one of the major requirements was to create sufficient covered storage space for men, equipment, and munitions, and was a huge task. By 1 June 1944, 38 Engineer General Service Regiments, 2 Engineer Special Service Regiments, and an Engineer Construction Battalion, over 50,000 officers and men - all construction units - were in Britain, having built the necessary infrastructure for mounting the invasion over the previous eighteen months.

And that was solely for the Army Ground Forces, the buildup of construction units for the Army Air Forces was another order of magnitude.

For the most part those units did not even exist in 1942, they were mostly organized and trained in 1942, and about a quarter of them were organized and trained in 1943. They major effort began in mid 1943 and was still underway by 1 June 1943, the mission for 10 of the 38 General Service regiments on 1 June 1944 remained construction of facilities in Britain.

Then there is the issue of getting those forces on shore in mid 1943, as you say, most either take the end year craft and ship availability and pretend they were the same six months earlier, or simply take the construction acceptances, which for most craft were two to four months prior to when they were actually operational with a trained crew. TORCH actually provides a good example of what happened when hastily trained boat crews were used in operations...at Fedala alone more than half of the landing craft, 272 of 378, few of them to French action.

[Carl Schwamberger]

The only useful in-depth study of a early invasion of NW Europe I've read is Michael Gimarras essay on a 1942 British plan for seizing the Cotientin peninsula in the Autumn of the year. Guimarras analysis is useful for understanding the limits, & how the planners proposed to neutralize them. Since this planning staff knew nothing of Overlord their thinking was not influenced by it as our hindsight does.

[EwenS]

Did you mean Michael Gimarras or Gary Guimarra?

The latter posted a video about Sledgehammer which attracted some attention in 2021 and raised its head again earlier this year over on the ww2talk site. He certainly challenged the orthodoxy about the potential success or failure of such an operation in Sept/Oct 1942 and has clearly thought about the logistics involved in that. But I was left wondering where does a landing on the Cotentin Peninsula in late 1942 actually lead.

Anyway for what it is worth the thread is here
http://ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/sl ... 942.90247/

[Carl Schwamberger]

Did you mean Michael Gimarras or Gary Guimarra?

Same author. Full name is Gary Micheal Giumarra https://www.jstor.org/stable/community.32212674

But I was left wondering where does a landing on the Cotentin Peninsula in late 1942 actually lead.

That question is better covered in the essay. My quick look at the video lecture would leave me with a lot of questions as well, had I not read the essay. The strategic goal of the 1942 plan was to size a major port and viable lodgment on the Cotientin peninsula. This in the lexicon of the late 20th Century military language I had to learn would be a enabling objective, or intermediate goal. The longer term goals were: Open the Second Front, thus drawing Axis reserves into new campaign. Second, would be a expanding enclave that would grow into a multi army group expanding into France in 1943. Giumarra does not go much further into that or its effects elsewhere. He focuses on the operational part of the plan for achieving its initial goals.

When examining the viability of the plan one important point is the limits of its operational & strategic goal. Its not Op OVERLORD, or NEPTUNE. The plan was intended to fit the capabilities of the British Army in the summer/autum of 1941, specifically the forces in the UK. What really interesting is the US Army is notable by its absence. Theres a implication that a few of the eleven ground combat divisions allocated are from the US Army, but a US role is not clearly identified. In Giumarras presentation it appears a all British show.

Anyway, with 10-12 Allied divisions barricaded in the Cotientin and the port of Cherbourg secured the Allied amphib fleet such as it was at the end of 1942 is free for use elsewhere. I cant say what ground forces would be available to combine with that fleet. It would very likely be spring or summer before another large landing force could be assembled. But, Hilter was easily bemused. Some smaller corps size littoral operations here or there during the winter or spring might be useful.

One of the questions a successful lodgment presents is to Petains government, and to the remaining pro Allied or anti Axis French leaders in the colonies. OTL the invasion of Algeria and Morocco triggered a number of French leaders to oppose the Axis. ie: Barre refused to confine his Tunis garrison to barracks & withdrew into defense positions in the tunisian hills, then fought the Axis invaders at Medjeb al Bad. A couple other generals in Metropolitan France mobilized their commands to oppose the Germans. Petain had to dismiss them and order their soldiers back into their barracks.

The Axis have a lot of options yet have some large limits. They can attack the Cotientin enclave, reinforce the coasts against additional Allied incursions, reinforce their armies in Lybia, execute the current plan against Malta, neutralize the French Metropolitan Army, intervene against turn coat French in Tunisia or Algeria. The trick is they cant do all these things. Hilter has to focus, set some clear priorities, & evaluate each situation correctly.

I've worked through this one on the game board a few times & both sides can take it in any of several directions. The historical narrative we are familiar with is definitely off the table. Only the resource or logistics restraints of both sides remain, and those start deviating as the calendar advances to the end of 1943. The limits or resources are were clearly illustrated in the game system I was using. In late 1942 neither side has the ground forces, or material of 20 months later in June 1944. On paper Italy is still in the game, but despite numbers Italy can field only one competitive field army out of that, and a air force with a sharp but brittle maritime strike capability.

So, again this event can lead off in a wide variety of strategic directions.

[Gooner1]

All of these discussions simply ignore logistics and the logistical realities the Allies faced. I suspect the authors do not bother to research the subject since it is too wide-ranging and requires too much of a depth of knowledge that doesn't work with their simplified world views. Sort of like many posters on this site.

At the beginning of 1943 the SOS ETOUSA in Britain was essentially non-existent and heavily depended on limited depot space allocated from British Army resources. Given the number of divisions planned to stage in Britain, one of the major requirements was to create sufficient covered storage space for men, equipment, and munitions, and was a huge task. By 1 June 1944, 38 Engineer General Service Regiments, 2 Engineer Special Service Regiments, and an Engineer Construction Battalion, over 50,000 officers and men - all construction units - were in Britain, having built the necessary infrastructure for mounting the invasion over the previous eighteen months.

And that was solely for the Army Ground Forces, the buildup of construction units for the Army Air Forces was another order of magnitude.

For the most part those units did not even exist in 1942, they were mostly organized and trained in 1942, and about a quarter of them were organized and trained in 1943. They major effort began in mid 1943 and was still underway by 1 June 1943, the mission for 10 of the 38 General Service regiments on 1 June 1944 remained construction of facilities in Britain.

With respect, US forces are unlikely to need as much base facilities in the UK as they had in June '44 if they were already in France by July '43. There would also be a lot more under-employed locals in newly liberated France (assuming there is much) than there was in the UK to help in construction.

As regards getting men and materiel overseas it is my understanding that it took twice as much shipping to move a division from the US to the Pacific theatre than it did from the US to the UK or later, France. Ditto Italy, it took considerably more shipping to move and support US forces in Italy than it dd the UK or France.
With no Italian campaign and perhaps economies on the forces sent to the Pacific, on paper at least, the US could have more troops overseas by Summer '44 than historically by landing in France in '43.

Then there is the issue of getting those forces on shore in mid 1943, as you say, most either take the end year craft and ship availability and pretend they were the same six months earlier, or simply take the construction acceptances, which for most craft were two to four months prior to when they were actually operational with a trained crew. TORCH actually provides a good example of what happened when hastily trained boat crews were used in operations...at Fedala alone more than half of the landing craft, 272 of 378, few of them to French action.

Scaling back the emphasis on the strategic bombing campaign and diverting manpower to the ship and boat yards would be the only way to get the number of landing craft desirable.

In June 1942 the UK employed 704,700 workers on orders for the Admiralty and 1,438,200 on orders for the Ministry of Aircraft Production. By June 1943 the number of Admiralty workers had increased by 82,100 to 786,800 and the numbers employed on orders for MAP had increased by 166,900 to 1,605,100.

[Von Bock]

The only useful in-depth study of a early invasion of NW Europe I've read is Michael Gimarras essay on a 1942 British plan for seizing the Cotientin peninsula in the Autumn of the year. Guimarras analysis is useful for understanding the limits, & how the planners proposed to neutralize them. Since this planning staff knew nothing of Overlord their thinking was not influenced by it as our hindsight does.

Do we need an in-depth study though? There are so many variables that it will always be difficult to determine, but the bottom line is this:

*The Germans never really had a chance against large invasion fleets from 1942-1944.
*The Allies obviously did not have enough ships for 3 invasions at the same time, but definitely for 1, especially in 1943.
*After January 1943, German aircraft had no chance on the Western Front.
*The Atlantic Wall was trash, especially in 1943.
*German troops were of inferior quality in France in 1943.

We don't need to know much more, in my opinion. I really don't see very good arguments against a 1943 invasion. A bridgehead would always have been established, and after that pretty much the same as in OTL would have happened.

[Michael Kenny]

With respect, US forces are unlikely to need as much base facilities in the UK as they had in June '44 if they were already in France by July '43.

The plan was to move just the initial US invasion force to the UK and then secure the Atlantic Ports so all the follow-up could be shipped directly from The USA. The success of the breakout meant they traded that simplified supply-chain for the liberation of France some 9 months ahead of timetable.

[Sheldrake]

The only useful in-depth study of a early invasion of NW Europe I've read is Michael Gimarras essay on a 1942 British plan for seizing the Cotientin peninsula in the Autumn of the year. Guimarras analysis is useful for understanding the limits, & how the planners proposed to neutralize them. Since this planning staff knew nothing of Overlord their thinking was not influenced by it as our hindsight does.

Do we need an in-depth study though? There are so many variables that it will always be difficult to determine, but the bottom line is this:

*The Germans never really had a chance against large invasion fleets from 1942-1944.
*The Allies obviously did not have enough ships for 3 invasions at the same time, but definitely for 1, especially in 1943.
*After January 1943, German aircraft had no chance on the Western Front.
*The Atlantic Wall was trash, especially in 1943.
*German troops were of inferior quality in France in 1943.

We don't need to know much more, in my opinion. I really don't see very good arguments against a 1943 invasion. A bridgehead would always have been established, and after that pretty much the same as in OTL would have happened.

Can I refer you to the appreciation made for Operation Overlord by the COSSAC Planners.

1. The US Government determined that it would take a big army to take the field and beat the German armed forces in Europe, which is why they raised an army of 100 divisions. The numbers needed to defeat Germany are not far wrong. The allies fielded around 95 divisions and equivalents in May 1945. The maximum they had in the ETO and MTO theatre in 1943 was C 20 British divisions and C 6 US Divisions The Wehrmacht could not be chased to Berlin by the troops the British and US had available in 1943 even if led by dashing George Patton.

2. Op Overlord was intended to seize a lodgment in continental Europe, by an advance guard of C 30 divisions to seize an area copntaining ports so the remaining C 50 divisions could be shipped to ports, avoiding cross shipping into landing ships etc.

3. The majority of troops amd supplies used in Op Overlord were shipped in a year from June 1943, with over 50% in the first five months of 1944. This was on a much bigger scale than the build up to Op Torch.

4. Cancelling Op Husky or even Op Torch do not save the allies troops for a 1943 Op Roundup landing. Redirecting the C20 divisions employed in Italy is balanced by the extra 20 divisions the Germans would have available to defend France.

[Richard Anderson]

With respect, US forces are unlikely to need as much base facilities in the UK as they had in June '44 if they were already in France by July '43. There would also be a lot more under-employed locals in newly liberated France (assuming there is much) than there was in the UK to help in construction.

With respect, they have to start somewhere. Or are you planning on mounting the American half of the operation from the U.S., as in TORCH? However, even there, about half the force was mounted from the UK and supported by drawing down the few depots set up there. Furthermore, if you wish to do anything more than plant a few divisions to sit on the Cotentin...such as pursue the war in France with the Germans, then the buildup in the UK is required.

As regards getting men and materiel overseas it is my understanding that it took twice as much shipping to move a division from the US to the Pacific theatre than it did from the US to the UK or later, France. Ditto Italy, it took considerably more shipping to move and support US forces in Italy than it dd the UK or France.
With no Italian campaign and perhaps economies on the forces sent to the Pacific, on paper at least, the US could have more troops overseas by Summer '44 than historically by landing in France in '43.

It took more time, because of the greater distances, so yes, in a sense, but it was the same shipping taking longer rather than more shipping. Given that most of the forces committed to the Pacific, including a few divisions originally slated for England, were deployed in the emergency of the first half of 1942, I doubt there would be significantly more troops overseas by summer 1944.

That also does not negate the point I was making. Accelerating the deployment of forces to stage in the UK was affected by how quickly the facilities in England could be built up. That took a lot of manpower, material, and equipment and the buildup was still going on in June 1944. If you want to be prepared for am operation in October 1943, as is posited by Gary Giumarra, then October 1942 is probably the last date the full BOLERO could begin.

BTW, I simply love Giumara's argument that because the weather in October 1944 had no effect on cross-channel operations, then that means the Allies would know they could execute an amphibious assault on the Cotentin in October 1943. Let that soak in for a moment. Aside, from the notion the Allies had a crystal ball, he seems to have missed that beach unloading ended in the first week of October 1944...because of the weather conditions.

Scaling back the emphasis on the strategic bombing campaign and diverting manpower to the ship and boat yards would be the only way to get the number of landing craft desirable.

Why would they scale back a campaign that was not really quite yet beginning? Why would FDR change his production proclamations? As an aside, those Presidential declarations had more effect on production planning than you might expect - they made a mess of tank production planning. And why would changing heavy bomber production affect landing ship and craft production? In reality, it was the decision to emphasize the war against the U-Boot that ha the greatest effect on landing ship and craft production. I don't see that changing between summer 1942 and spring 1943.

In June 1942 the UK employed 704,700 workers on orders for the Admiralty and 1,438,200 on orders for the Ministry of Aircraft Production. By June 1943 the number of Admiralty workers had increased by 82,100 to 786,800 and the numbers employed on orders for MAP had increased by 166,900 to 1,605,100.

Okay, but the necessary landing ship and craft production is going to come from the US. Reallocation labor to British yards will help, but it doesn't change that the British only converted three ships to LST and completed three LST-1 by October 1943. They would be wholly dependent on the 99 LST transferred through Lend-Lease prior to 30 June 1943, which would be about the latest to get them operational for an early October invasion. Add in eight LSI (H) converted in England or built in the States, ten LSI (M) and (S), and seven LSI (H) - those suffice for an assault force, but otherwise almost the entire force would be dependent on British-built LCT III and IV...I will have to try and dig up the operational availability of US LCT flotillas by mid 1943.

That also does not change the fact that the bulk of US ground and air force units do not become available to deploy until the second half of 1943, most of them from fall onward. Getting them into France is going to be tricky.

[Richard Anderson]

Do we need an in-depth study though?

Well sure, because superficial studies reveal so much? And going in depth is fun.

There are so many variables that it will always be difficult to determine, but the bottom line is this:

*The Germans never really had a chance against large invasion fleets from 1942-1944.

A chance at preventing the landing of the force? Probably not. Containing an inadequately prepared and supported force? Possibly, given SHINGLE.

*The Allies obviously did not have enough ships for 3 invasions at the same time, but definitely for 1, especially in 1943.

Probably.

*After January 1943, German aircraft had no chance on the Western Front.

That would surprise the RAF and USAAF.

*The Atlantic Wall was trash, especially in 1943.

Not near ports it wasn't...and forcing the defnders to rely on field fortifications may have been a good thing.

*German troops were of inferior quality in France in 1943.

Depends on where and when. France was the major training ground of the Heer during the war, where they rehabilitated worn out divisions, expanded and trained up former occupation divisions for service on the Ostfront, and where the Ersatzheer completed individual replacement training in the Reserve divisionen. So it all depends.

We don't need to know much more, in my opinion. I really don't see very good arguments against a 1943 invasion. A bridgehead would always have been established, and after that pretty much the same as in OTL would have happened.

There is the analysis I did many years ago, although it focuses on the more likely June 1943 invasion.

Comparison of the West June 1943 to June 1944 (hope its legible)

Number (incl. Schnell) June 1943/Number (incl. Schnell) June 1944
Total Western Front 60 (12)/91 (20)
(Total in France and Belgium) (47 (8))/(53 (10))
(Total in Holland) (5)/(6 (1))
(Total in Denmark) (4 (1))/(5 (2))
(Total in Italy) (4 (3))/(27 (7))

Total in Norway 14 (1)/12 (1)
Total in Finland 7 (0)/7 (0)
Total in Balkans 10 (1)/20 (2)
Total in Crete/Greece 2 (0)/1 (0)
Total in Germany 2 (0)/4 (1)
Total in Hungary 0/1 (0)
Total in Poland 1 (0)/2 (0)

Total Eastern Front 179 (28)/142 (25)

In terms of degrees of readiness, 6 of the 8 Schnell divisions in France in 1943 were either ready or nearly ready by 1 June 1943 (75%), although a lot of their assigned tanks were still in transit. In contrast in 1944 only 5 of the 10 Schnell divisions in France were either ready or nearly ready by June 1943 (50%).

Of the other 39 divisions in France in 1943, 23 were infantry (including, 5 newly formed or reformed and 5 static), 1 was SS Grenadier, 10 were Reserve-Infantry, 2 were Fallschirm, and 3 were LW-Feld, so about 18 of the 39 (46%) were 'effective'. In 1944 the other 43 divisions included 31 Infantry (including 2 “reflagged” Reserve-Infantry, 14 newly formed, and 4 static), 7 Reserve-Infantry, 3 Fallschirm (all newly formed), and 2 LW-Feld, so about 13 of the 43 (30%).

In Britain there were Guards Armoured Division, 9th Armoured Division (so weak from providing drafts to the active divisions that it was disbanded in the spring of 1944), 11th Armoured Division, 42nd Armoured Division (soon to be disbanded as well), and 1st Polish Armoured Division (still forming). They were all equipped with a mixed bag of Covenantors, Cavaliers and Centaurs. Virtually all of the (slightly) better Crusaders had been sent to the Middle East to equip Eighth Army or with 6th Armoured Division in Tunisia with First Army. Cromwell production didn’t begin until October. At least the Canadians were in better shape, since the 4th and 5th Armoured Divisions at least had Rams and M3 Lees. Most of the few American armored units then in England at this time apparently had M3 Grants and Stuarts, since most of the M4 Shermans had apparently been sent to Eighth Army and to re-equip the US 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions in Tunisia and Morocco.

British Commonwealth Divisions in the ETO and MTO as of circa 1 May 1943.

In the UK:

Infantry Divisions
3rd, 15th (Lowland), 43rd (Welsh), 49th, 52nd (Lowland), 53rd, and 59th, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian
Armoured Divisions
9th (draft-finding), 11th, 42nd, 79th (Special), and Guards, 4th and 5th Canadian
Airborne Divisions
1st and 6th (forming)

Lower Establishment (training and draft finding and not combat capable) Divisions:
38th - Territorial division formed in 1939 and disbanded in 1944.
45th - Territorial division disbanded in 1944.
47th - Originally 2nd (London) Territorial Division. Disbanded in 1944.
48th - "South Midland" Territorial Division. Part of original BEF. Ceased to be a first-line division in 1942. Disbanded 1944?
54th - Territorial division based in West Lancashire. Retained in UK.
61st - Territorial division formed in 1939 and retained in UK.
66th - Territorial division formed in 1939 and disbanded in UK in 1940.
76th - Formed in 1941 and disbanded in 1944.
77th - Formed in 1941 and disbanded in 1944.
80th - Formed in 1943 and disbanded in 1944.

In the MTO:

Tunisia
Infantry Divisions
1st, 4th, 46th, 50th, 51st (Highland), 78th, 2nd New Zealand, 4th Indian
Armoured Divisions
1st, 6th and 7th

Palestine and Cyprus
Infantry Divisions
5th, 56th and 10th Indian
Armoured Divisions
10th

PAIFORCE (Iran and Iraq)
Infantry Divisions
6th and 8th Indian
Armoured Divisions
31st Indian

South Africa
Armoured Division
6th (forming)

US Forces available in the ETO/MTO circa mid 1943 (based upon TE).

1st and 2nd AD (232 medium, 158 light tanks, 42 M3/M8 assault guns each),
70th, 756th, 757th, 759th Tank Battalions (Light - 54 light tanks, 3 M3/M8 assault guns each),
191st, 751st, 752nd, 753rd, 755th, 760th Tank Battalions (Medium - 54 medium tanks each)
Total = 788 medium tanks + 197 reserve (est.), 532 light tanks + 133 reserve (est.), 96 M3/M8 assault guns + 24 reserve (est.)

As of 17 May 1944 there were in England or in the Troop Basis scheduled to arrive in England:
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 2nd (French) AD,
70th, 702nd, 707th, 709th, 712th, 735th, 737th, 741st, 743rd, 745th, 746th, 747th, 749th, and 761st Tank Battalions (Medium), 744th, and 759th Tank Battalions (Light), and 701st, 736th, 738th, 739th, 740th, and 748th Tank Battalions (Special), and 2nd, 4th, 6th, 15th, 102nd, 106th, 113th Cavalry Groups;

with 2308 medium tanks (M4 75mm) with units + 530 in reserve (memo), 113 medium tanks in reserve (M4 76mm) (memo), 57 medium tanks (M4 105mm) (memo), 1160 light tanks (TE) +266 in reserve (est.), 217 M8 assault guns (TE) + 54 reserve (est.) = 3742 + 959 reserve

In the Med (TE):
1st AD (232 medium, 158 light tanks, 42 M8 assault guns),
191st, 751st, 752nd, 753rd, 755th, 756th, 757th, 760th Tank Battalion (Medium - 53 medium, 17 light tanks, 3 M8 assault guns each), 759th Tank Battalion (Light - 54 light tanks, 3 M8 assault guns), and 91st and 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons (18 Light Tanks each)

Total = 656 medium + 151 in reserve (est.), 347 light + 80 in reserve (est.), 69 M8 assault guns (TE) + 16 reserve (est.) = 1072 + 247
Grand Total ETO = 4814 + 1206 reserve

As of June 43 available for European operations (ETO and MTO), US forces would have had the following:

2 armor divisions
6 infantry divisions
1 airborne division
The situation in the air was much worse. The USAAF in theaters facing Germany were radically weaker in June 43, compared to June 44. The number of aircraft on hand (operational and in repair) for June 43 and June 44 were as follows:

June 43/June 44
HB – 1308/4492
MB – 1051/1749
LB – 203/557
Ftr – 2413/5102
Recon – 237/529
Trans – 585/2036

For the Luftwaffe, in June 1943, there were 1,439 day-fighters facing the Western Allies. In June 1944, the total day-fighter strength of the Luftwaffe was 1,532. Also, in June 43 a total of 163 USAAF fighters were lost to enemy action, 173 German fighters were lost to enemy action in the west during the same period. When British fighter losses are factored in, the overall exchange rate of fighters was more than two to one in favor of the Germans. When bomber losses are factored in (which were relatively small in the west for the Germans), the overall exchange rate grows even higher in favor of the Germans.

For the USAAF, the transport situation in June 43 should be enough to give one pause. In June 44, with four times as many transport aircraft available in the ETO and MTO, the USAAF was unable to execute complete lifts of the two available airborne divisions (effectively, five parachute RCTs were lifted IIRC). So in June 43 you can count on an airborne invasion executed by little more than a single parachute RCT (about what was lifted for HUSKY curiously enough). Also, think about the transportation plan, the purview of the light and medium bombers, being executed with about one-half the number of aircraft available. It took about three months historically to get into gear…does that mean that in June 43 it would have been half-complete – or would it have taken six months?

Other items that need to be quantified are the availability of landing craft for the Allies in mid 1943. US production through the end of the 1st Quarter 1943 (the latest that any could be commissioned and to the ETO - and that was a stretch) of all types was 9,202, with 16,020 more built through the first quarter of 1944! British landing craft built totaled just 1,324 through 1st QTR 43 and then 1,432 more through 1st QTR 44. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there would have been only a fraction of the lift capacity available to the Allies in 1943 as in 1944.

Balancing that though is the dearth of completed German defenses along the beaches in 1943. The most important of those probably being the obstacles. But then, with a lesser Allied commitment to the Med even the German intelligence services would have probably recognized the threat and allowed for an increase in construction Jan-Jun 43 comparable to that of Jan-Jun 44, although without Rommel ruthlessly pushing the troops it is uncertain what the situation would have been.

[Gooner1]

Redirecting the C20 divisions employed in Italy is balanced by the extra 20 divisions the Germans would have available to defend France.

The campaign in Italy was, at least until late 1944, a net economic gain for the Germans. The value of Italian food, textiles, raw materials, motor vehicles and armaments the Germans looted was greater than the expense of fielding those 20 divisions.

The Italian situation if the Allies invaded France in 1943 is an interesting one. Most likely Il Duce still gets overthrown and the Fascists and the King still look for a way out of the war and they have some useful cards in their hands, not least the 75,000 Allied POWs they are keeping.

[OpanaPointer]

https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_15.htm

[Gooner1]

With respect, they have to start somewhere. Or are you planning on mounting the American half of the operation from the U.S., as in TORCH? However, even there, about half the force was mounted from the UK and supported by drawing down the few depots set up there. Furthermore, if you wish to do anything more than plant a few divisions to sit on the Cotentin...such as pursue the war in France with the Germans, then the buildup in the UK is required.

Just seems a duplication of effort for the US to build a vast base infrastructure in the UK only to have a build another one in France a few months/a year later. To a certain extent there would be the British Army bases available for temporary use after most of them have gone to the continent!?
Some of the US divisions would still be moving from Africa I guess if we're looking at a July '43 date.

BTW, I simply love Giumara's argument that because the weather in October 1944 had no effect on cross-channel operations, then that means the Allies would know they could execute an amphibious assault on the Cotentin in October 1943. Let that soak in for a moment. Aside, from the notion the Allies had a crystal ball, he seems to have missed that beach unloading ended in the first week of October 1944...because of the weather conditions.

Yes I think we can agree it's a landing in the Summer or not at all across the Channel.

Why would they scale back a campaign that was not really quite yet beginning? Why would FDR change his production proclamations? As an aside, those Presidential declarations had more effect on production planning than you might expect - they made a mess of tank production planning. And why would changing heavy bomber production affect landing ship and craft production? In reality, it was the decision to emphasize the war against the U-Boot that ha the greatest effect on landing ship and craft production. I don't see that changing between summer 1942 and spring 1943.

Scaling it back slightly from a staggering vast number of heavy bombers to a simply vast number of heavy bombers.
An Allied landing in France in '43 would likely lower bomber losses too.

IIRC the decision to give absolute priority to escort ships over landing ships and craft came quite late, February 1943?, pretty near horse/stable door territory anyway.

In June 1942 the UK employed 704,700 workers on orders for the Admiralty and 1,438,200 on orders for the Ministry of Aircraft Production. By June 1943 the number of Admiralty workers had increased by 82,100 to 786,800 and the numbers employed on orders for MAP had increased by 166,900 to 1,605,100.

Okay, but the necessary landing ship and craft production is going to come from the US. Reallocation labor to British yards will help, but it doesn't change that the British only converted three ships to LST and completed three LST-1 by October 1943. They would be wholly dependent on the 99 LST transferred through Lend-Lease prior to 30 June 1943, which would be about the latest to get them operational for an early October invasion. Add in eight LSI (H) converted in England or built in the States, ten LSI (M) and (S), and seven LSI (H) - those suffice for an assault force, but otherwise almost the entire force would be dependent on British-built LCT III and IV...I will have to try and dig up the operational availability of US LCT flotillas by mid 1943.

That also does not change the fact that the bulk of US ground and air force units do not become available to deploy until the second half of 1943, most of them from fall onward. Getting them into France is going to be tricky.

Yes it was agreed that LST would be a US production monopoly. Early capture of Cherbourg utterly essential and if there can't be enough landing craft and ships to land at 'Utah' as well, the plan best be scrapped.
I kind of think a landing in Summer '43 would be two beaches for the British, one for the Canadians and one for the US forces.