1943: The Allied victory that never was.

[T. A. Gardner]

Sorry, I thought you were. My mistake.

That response was not directed at you. Yes, I did research, but I did a bit more than that.

I'm sure.

[ljadw]

I don't see that an increasing port capacity of Cherbourg larger than before the war,was (very ) important ,as an increase of the port's capacity does not mean an increase of supplies leaving the port .The amount of supplies leaving a port was decided/limited by the capacity of the railways to transport these supplies .And this amount limited also the number of supplies that could enter the port .
Other point is that the advance to Germany after the fall of Paris was not only /mainly depending on the number of available supplies, but also and maybe more on the capacity of the Germans to slow/stop this advance . If ''the Hun was on the run '', there would be no supply problems and very few supply needs. If he was not on the run,more supplies would not defeat him .

The problem after D-Day was the Germans collapsed faster than the Allies predicted, and the advance across France was well ahead of schedule for them. Their planning left their logistics train strained.

I have to disagree .
The problem after D Day was that the Germans recovered faster than the Allies hoped they could do .Market Garden failed essentially because the Germans had recovered . The Hun was no longer on the run .Without the German recovery at the end of August, the Allies could have invaded Germany with a few battalions .
The Allies failed with the 3 divisions that were originally committed for the liberation of Lorient and Saint Nazaire, they could have crossed the Rhine in September without these divisions, IF the Germans were still collapsing .
The same situation occurred in the Summer of 1941,when Barbarossa failed because of the Soviet resistance .

[T. A. Gardner]

I have to disagree .
The problem after D Day was that the Germans recovered faster than the Allies hoped they could do .Market Garden failed essentially because the Germans had recovered . The Hun was no longer on the run .Without the German recovery at the end of August, the Allies could have invaded Germany with a few battalions .
The Allies failed with the 3 divisions that were originally committed for the liberation of Lorient and Saint Nazaire, they could have crossed the Rhine in September without these divisions, IF the Germans were still collapsing .
The same situation occurred in the Summer of 1941,when Barbarossa failed because of the Soviet resistance .

Market-Garden failed because it was a bad plan, not because the Germans recovered too quickly. Failing to open the port of Antwerp in a timely fashion was another failure not due to enemy action, but Allied (British in that case) leadership wanting something else.

The Allies by September halted their advance on German, for the most part, because of the supply situation, not because of German resistance.

Barbarossa in 1941 failed for the same reason: The Germans couldn't push supplies and replacements forward fast enough to keep up with the front. That and the service units couldn't keep up with equipment breaking down or getting stuck in poor conditions.

German attempts at counter offensives in the West in 1944 failed because the units available to conduct them were either worn out, short of everything, or crap. By the beginning of 1944, the German army was one comprised largely of scavengers. Most units were using a polyglot of substitute and captured equipment. Much of the manpower was questionable, and worse, they had learned lessons fighting in Russia that were highly detrimental to fighting in the West.

[ljadw]

There was nothing wrong on the plan of MG .If the Germans had not recovered, MG would have succeeded.
And,an earlier opening of the port of Antwerp would not have changed the situation on the Western Front :supplies in Antwerp are useless ,only supplies at the front could be used and the optimistic expectations of the number of supplies that could leave Antwerp proved to be illusions .
In December 1944 427,000 tons, 14000 tons a day, only,27,48 % of the total that was discharged in the West, were discharged at Antwerp ,less than in the ports of Southern France .In September 1944 less than 14000 tons a day would arrive in Antwerp .
And not all of these 427000 tons had as destination the front,and of those that were scheduled to go to the front, only a part could leave Antwerp because of transportation problems
In March 1945 only 19000 tons arrived every day at Antwerp.
It is wrong to say that the Allied offensive stopped in September because of the supply situation :the supply problems were caused by the German resistance ,if the Germans collapsed, there would be enough supplies for a very small force to invade Germany .
It was the same for Barbarossa .

[Onslow]

3- I'm not sure what tactical air power operating from the Cotentin really has to do with signal intel.

A faster response time on target was my assumption.

Good point about response times to intel.

Since glenn couldn't be bothered to answer, I guess I'll ask you. How are they supposed to get a faster response time on target from signal intel if they don't have any SIGINT?

I was merely agreeing that if SIGINT improved through butterflies (ie some breakthrough occurredd due to a landing ship sinking without making sure codebooks were destroyed, etc) then there could be faster response times.

Whenever there's vessels moving around there seems to be some chance for an intelligence breakthrough, as with Automyclon (sp) or Magdeburg. I wasn't saying that such a breakthrough is likely in any way.

[Onslow]

Glenn, I do appreciate your knowledge and reasoning and you appear to think Sledgehammer was practical, so can you give me some insight into how you think the LCT problem should be handled? As far as I'm aware, it's fairly simple;

It's not my proposal to begin with, and the ones making it do not seem to be active in the thread anymore. I am not the one to be answering your questions to such detail, I am not a substitute for the expertise of others here.

My take on Sledgehammer in 1942 is that the Allied armies would have muddled through. They would have suffered more debacles, more reverses, more defeats, more casualties as a consequence of all factors that have been outlined, but the benefits to an early liberation of France and the Benelux were worth the risks.

[/quote]

Thanks for your reply. I know it's not your proposal, but you appear to be interested in it and from what I have seen of your other threads, it's apparent that you can be trusted to be reasonable, and therefore to give my posts realistic criticism.

I had asked Kurt to actually explain two simple aspects of his own case (how the British could make enough landing craft and how LCT(2) and (3) would work on the flat beaches but he ran away from actually doing any real analysis or showing any actual expertise.

I shortened your response because the way I had asked my questions made a long reply necessary, and it seems that the paragraph above contains the cusp of much of the difference in our viewpoints. I'm more concerned about casualties to the landing forces than you are, both those of Sledgehammer and at other areas such as Crete where LCT(1)s were used to save many men during the evacuation. Both of those angles appear to me to be reasonable and both can be put down to factors such as the hangover of the huge European and Commonwealth casualties in WW1, or the absence of similar losses.

Since my post, I have been checking further and it appears that there was certainly no chance of using LCT(3) and (4) to land vehicles on the French beaches. To me that seems to put the seal on the whole Sledgehammer exercise, since the gap between the time the British stopped having to concentrate on basic survival and the time the whole landing force had to be trained and ready seems to be too narrow for any chance to assess the requirements, create the designs, test the designs and build the designs no matter how many of the available resources were thrown at the issue.

It OTL, there was a reason to build LCTs (1-3), because they could be used for purposes other than landing on French beaches. To build LCT(4)s and compromise other operations may be reasonable when there is a fair chance of landing in France in the near future, but there was little chance that would occur when the early LCTs were built. Unfortunately the fans of Sledgehammer don't seem to want to deal with these real issues.

Thanks again for giving some reasoned input.

[T. A. Gardner]

There was nothing wrong on the plan of MG .If the Germans had not recovered, MG would have succeeded.

There was plenty wrong with it. 1st Airbourne wasn't dropped anywhere close to their objectives. The planners didn't know what the Germans had in the area and that they could react as they did. Once the Germans figured out what was happening, it was easy to throw roadblocks into the Allies way and slow then stop the advance.

And,an earlier opening of the port of Antwerp would not have changed the situation on the Western Front :supplies in Antwerp are useless ,only supplies at the front could be used and the optimistic expectations of the number of supplies that could leave Antwerp proved to be illusions .
In December 1944 427,000 tons, 14000 tons a day, only,27,48 % of the total that was discharged in the West, were discharged at Antwerp ,less than in the ports of Southern France .In September 1944 less than 14000 tons a day would arrive in Antwerp .
And not all of these 427000 tons had as destination the front,and of those that were scheduled to go to the front, only a part could leave Antwerp because of transportation problems
In March 1945 only 19000 tons arrived every day at Antwerp.
It is wrong to say that the Allied offensive stopped in September because of the supply situation :the supply problems were caused by the German resistance ,if the Germans collapsed, there would be enough supplies for a very small force to invade Germany .
It was the same for Barbarossa .

The ports in France were further away from where the front was in late 1944. That meant that supplies landed there had to then be shipped by rail or truck to the front and that was a major bottleneck. Antwerp would put supplies closer to the front, particularly the British / Commonwealth sectors, and relieve some of the pressure on the rail and road system.

As for continuing the advance, the Allies unlike the Germans, weren't nearly as willing to risk a narrow front advance into Germany.

[ljadw]

There was nothing wrong on the plan of MG .If the Germans had not recovered, MG would have succeeded.

There was plenty wrong with it. 1st Airbourne wasn't dropped anywhere close to their objectives. The planners didn't know what the Germans had in the area and that they could react as they did. Once the Germans figured out what was happening, it was easy to throw roadblocks into the Allies way and slow then stop the advance.

And,an earlier opening of the port of Antwerp would not have changed the situation on the Western Front :supplies in Antwerp are useless ,only supplies at the front could be used and the optimistic expectations of the number of supplies that could leave Antwerp proved to be illusions .
In December 1944 427,000 tons, 14000 tons a day, only,27,48 % of the total that was discharged in the West, were discharged at Antwerp ,less than in the ports of Southern France .In September 1944 less than 14000 tons a day would arrive in Antwerp .
And not all of these 427000 tons had as destination the front,and of those that were scheduled to go to the front, only a part could leave Antwerp because of transportation problems
In March 1945 only 19000 tons arrived every day at Antwerp.
It is wrong to say that the Allied offensive stopped in September because of the supply situation :the supply problems were caused by the German resistance ,if the Germans collapsed, there would be enough supplies for a very small force to invade Germany .
It was the same for Barbarossa .

The ports in France were further away from where the front was in late 1944. That meant that supplies landed there had to then be shipped by rail or truck to the front and that was a major bottleneck. Antwerp would put supplies closer to the front, particularly the British / Commonwealth sectors, and relieve some of the pressure on the rail and road system.

As for continuing the advance, the Allies unlike the Germans, weren't nearly as willing to risk a narrow front advance into Germany.

The supplies landed in Antwerp also had to be shipped by rail or truck to the front and the rail situation in Belgium was worse than in France .
In December 1944 427000 tons of suppliers arrived at Antwerp ,14000 tons a day .but only 315000 left Antwerp ( not all for the front ),10000 a day ,of which 4000 tons only by truck .Some allied ''experts '' thought that because the unload capacity of Antwerp before the war was 80000/100000 tons a day ( which was only theoretically ),the same was possible during the war .
It is probable that only 50 % of what arrived at Antwerp in December ,was going to the front and given the very bad rail situation in Belgium ,less supplies could be transported before December .
A big offensive that would end the war was not possible in 1944 ,which means that Antwerp would be important only in 1945 .
The discussion narrow/broad front is a wast of time ,as an attack on a narrow front with 40 divisions in 1944 was impossible .

[ljadw]

About MG : there are no proofs that it was possible to drop 1st Airborne to its objectives and that, if it was possible and was done, it would have made any difference .
There are also no proofs that if the Allies knew the German strength, this would have made any difference .
To stop the Allied advance, the Germans did not need more information, but more strength .
MG was a gamble of which success or failure depended on the German recovery .
To put it simple : if the Germans cried :comrade and raised both hands, MG would succeed .If they took a weapon and fought ,MG was doomed .
After the fall of Paris, there was a window of opportunity:the Hun was on the run .If on 17 September ,this window was still open, MG would succeed and the war would finish before Christmas,if the window was closed,was closing, MG would fail and the war would end in 1945 .
All this meant that the divisions who were scheduled to liberate Lorient and Saint Nazaire, could not make the difference on the German border .

[Carl Schwamberger]

I was trained to think of tactical skill in how the Captain, Lt, or Sergeant handled combined arms, the array from tactical bombers overhead to mines underground. In these German vs US remarks about tactical skill its always in the context of rifle squads and platoons or maybe companies, with precious little about skills of the company, battalion, regimen, division, corps leaders on either side executing the various arms in combination. Any thoughts from you on this?

Actually it is the opposite. The analysis done by Trevor et al was focused mostly on division-level. You can infer that the outcomes were built from tactical skill in the squad through regiment, but that was never really dissected in detail.

Yet when these conversations emerge there a strong trend to discussing the difference only in the context of pure infantry squads or companies. Dupy is often referred to, but the bulk of the thinking or comments pass by the combined arms reality.

I've never taken a deep dive into the Dupy work. & know nothing of the context the conclusions come from. But we digress & its a subject for a different thread.

[glenn239]

I'm more concerned about casualties to the landing forces than you are, both those of Sledgehammer and at other areas such as Crete where LCT(1)s were used to save many men during the evacuation. Both of those angles appear to me to be reasonable and both can be put down to factors such as the hangover of the huge European and Commonwealth casualties in WW1, or the absence of similar losses.

LCT-4's were used at Dieppe, as well as LCA's and LCM's. None were optimal, but their defects were not the reason why the raid failed,

https://jemesouviens.org/en/landing-crafts/

[Kurt_S]

LCT-4's were used at Dieppe, as well as LCA's and LCM's. None were optimal, but their defects were not the reason why the raid failed,
https://jemesouviens.org/en/landing-crafts/

LCT4's were used at Normandy and the first hand accounts mention no problems getting their loads ashore.
https://www.combinedops.com/HMLCT(4)%20749.htm
https://www.combinedops.com/LCT_980.htm

There's a list of first hand accounts, many from LCT4's here: https://www.combinedops.com/Combined-Op ... ng%20Craft

There's a lot of nonsense in this thread but, given the tone of moderators here, I'm not inclined to devote a ton more effort...

[Onslow]

Absolutely wrong, Kurt. Can you actually start reading instead of spewing more nonsense and insults? For you to sneer at the moderators when you cannot even comprehend simple sentences is just ridiculous.

NO ONE has said the LCT(4)s had problems getting their loads ashore at Normandy. The whole point that has been made is that LCT(4)s were designed especially FOR Normandy's flat beaches. It was the EARLIER LCTs that had problems on flat beaches, because they were designed for distant and steeper shores. Therefore Sledgehammer could not use those earlier LCTs, which changes the entire possible schedule.

Look, here it is in black and white for anyone who can actually comprehend the English language;

In post 704, I referred to the fact that the LCT(4)'s design was "shallow, especially aft, to be used on the Channel beaches."

Richard mentioned in post 640 that the (4) "the LCT IV was designed to a gradient of 1:150, because of the problems encountered with the I, II, and III" (on shallow beaches).

In post 641 I discussed the fact that the earlier LCTs were designed for deeper beaches, and that the "The LCT(4) was designed specifically to cross the Channel craft once. That allowed it to trade off weight, handling, seaworthiness etc for shallower draft aft. Such a craft was less useful at earlier times."

In posts 657 and 659, Mike Meech and Richard both refer to the fact that the EARLIER LCTs were designed for steeper beaches and the LCT(4) was designed for Normandy's flatter beaches.

NO ONE says that the LCT(4) had problems at Normandy because people who understand things know - and state - that it was designed for those conditions, at a compromise in seaworthiness and in operation on steeper beaches. The issue was that the earlier LCTs (2) and (3) were designed for other areas and therefore had deeper stern draft for seaworthiness and beach extraction. The deeper stern draft was good on most beaches but on the flat French beaches it meant that the vessel would run aground further out in deeper water, too deep for tanks, machines and men.

The Brits had built their earlier LCTs for distant operations because they knew that there was no realistic short-term chance of them attacking across the Channel. Therefore when the US came into the war and they needed craft that could work in the Channel, they needed to design and build new craft. These were intelligent responses to the fact of the time but the result was that they needed time to build landing craft that would work.

Start comprehending plain, simple English posts instead of insulting the mods, the military and other posters.

[Onslow]

I'm more concerned about casualties to the landing forces than you are, both those of Sledgehammer and at other areas such as Crete where LCT(1)s were used to save many men during the evacuation. Both of those angles appear to me to be reasonable and both can be put down to factors such as the hangover of the huge European and Commonwealth casualties in WW1, or the absence of similar losses.

LCT-4's were used at Dieppe, as well as LCA's and LCM's. None were optimal, but their defects were not the reason why the raid failed,

https://jemesouviens.org/en/landing-crafts/

No one has said that the LCT(4) was a problem on flat French beaches like Dieppe. The LCT(4) wasn't a problem on those beaches, because it was designed for those beaches. As your source said, it was "built especially to cross the English Channel" which meant compromising on seaworthiness and sloping-beach performance in exchange for optimised performance on short crossings and flat beaches.

The issue is that earlier LCTs were designed for a wider range of operations, using the normal deeper beaches and requiring better seaworthiness. The deeper beaches allowed (and encouraged) a craft that was deeper aft. That immersed the rudders and screws and improved beach recovery and seaworthiness and handling.

However, on the flat French beaches these craft, designed for slopes of about 1 in 30, would run aground at the stern when the bow was still in comparatively deep water. That would mean that the vehicles coming off the bow ramp would be in water that was too deep for their fording capabilities and they would conk out.

If the LCT(2) and (3) were used at Sledgehammer (there were very few 1s) the first vehicle off the ramp would have dropped into almost 4' of water and stopped running, leaving the remaining vehicles stranded and perhaps the whole LCT stranded in front of the beach. That was not just going to be sub-optimal, it was going to be a huge snafu.

[Kingfish]

Badly needed divisions were used to capture Brest (which after its capture was not used ) DURING the advance to the German border,thus why would three divisions not be used in November\December when the front was stationary and when they were thus not badley needed ?

You have this ass backwards. The divisions were needed once the front stabilized. Prior to that the spearheads kept the Germans on the run.