1943: The Allied victory that never was.

[EwenS]

To assist with landings on French beaches some LCT were fitted with “Mulock Ramp Extensions” as shown below
http://ww2talk.com/index.php?attachment ... ng.315992/
http://ww2talk.com/index.php?attachment ... ng.315993/
http://ww2talk.com/index.php?attachment ... ng.315994/
http://ww2talk.com/index.php?attachment ... pg.313253/

Clearly all LCT types used at Normandy were expected to suffer some problems with French beaches as the kit was applicable to LCT (3),(4),(5) &(6)

[Onslow]

As far as I can find, from diagrams showing the sequence of landing waves and secondary material, the (3)s at Normandy didn't land "normal" tanks - they were in the minority and landed carriers, SPGs, Crocodiles with trailers and DD tanks, which would mean that the craft could be loaded less down the stern and therefore go into shallower water. Using the DDs obviously don't require the craft to ground.

I'm away from my normal sources but am checking up other ones.

See for example https://www.ddaylepe.org.uk/wp-content/ ... rchive.jpg

[EwenS]

At Normandy more DD were landed directly from LCT onto the beaches or close inshore to wade ashore than were launched further out to “sail” ashore as intended. You will find a breakdown here
http://the.shadock.free.fr/sherman_minu ... drive.html

[Kingfish]

Hmmm...

The best use for these divisions was to liberate Lorient and Saint Nazaire,

It is better to have your reserves concentrated than to disperse them over a distance of 1500 km .

Can you spot the contradiction?

[ljadw]

US reserves were dispersed over a distance of 1500 km (Antwerp-Nice ),where they were wasting their time .
And to use three of these divisions to liberate Lorient and Saint Nazaire, which would alleviate the transport problems,is no contradiction,as after the liberation of these two ports, these three divisions would be again concentrated in the Paris region .

[Sheldrake]

US reserves were dispersed over a distance of 1500 km (Antwerp-Nice ),where they were wasting their time .
And to use three of these divisions to liberate Lorient and Saint Nazaire, which would not alleviate but Exacerbate the transport problems.

Let me correct that for you....

Sorry, but zooming off in a different directtion wasn't going to help with the logistics. Nor would the capture of ports on the Bay of Biscay do anything to repair the wrecked French rail network which forced the allies to rely on road transport red Ball Express etc.

[Onslow]

At Normandy more DD were landed directly from LCT onto the beaches or close inshore to wade ashore than were launched further out to “sail” ashore as intended. You will find a breakdown here
http://the.shadock.free.fr/sherman_minu ... drive.html

I note the author of the data of the bottom table.

[ljadw]

US reserves were dispersed over a distance of 1500 km (Antwerp-Nice ),where they were wasting their time .
And to use three of these divisions to liberate Lorient and Saint Nazaire, which would not alleviate but Exacerbate the transport problems.

Let me correct that for you....

Sorry, but zooming off in a different directtion wasn't going to help with the logistics. Nor would the capture of ports on the Bay of Biscay do anything to repair the wrecked French rail network which forced the allies to rely on road transport red Ball Express etc.

NO : after 15 September 1944 an invasion of Germany was no longer possible and had to be delayed til 1945 .Given this fact, what should one do with the 3 divisions scheduled for Brittany ?
The best solution was to use them to liberate Saint Nazaire and Lorient, this would mean that the civilians of these regions should no longer be supplied by Rouen or Cherbourg ,and this would alleviate the transport problems in Northern France .After the campaign, the best option was that these divisions would be sent to Paris,where they would remain til 1945 .
How much it would help ? No one knows , but it would help and it would be better than send more divisions to the east,divisions who would make the transport problems only bigger .
The following is from ''American Transportation in the Siegfried Line Campaign ''
1 '' In September and October road and rail transport were unable to supply even the minimum daily requirements of the armies . ''
Thus : why send even more divisions to the east where it was almost impossible to supply them ?
And, the opening of Antwerp in November would only increase the problems .
2 '' Worsening weather and stubborn German resistance impeded the American advance as much as any logistical difficulties .''
As much is an euphemism.
More supplies was impossible and with less supplies for smaller forces victory was possible in 1944, but this depended on the Germans .If they collapsed, one could go to Berlin with two divisions .
But this was denied by SHAEF and the media in 1944 and is still denied by the media, for obvious reasons .

[Carl Schwamberger]

The argument made by others is that the British and Americans had the capacity to assign France as the decisive theatre in 1942 and then bend all strategic deployments, industrial production, and operations around that decision, subordinating other theatres and industrial priorities in the process. They did not do this, and whether that was or was not the correct decision is the subject of this thread.

Strictly speaking the OP specified 1943. But parts of the 1942 digression are applicable to 43. So...

It looks to me like both the operational and strategic success of the 1943 invasion depends on how far back a firm commitment/decision is made. Leaving out things like the 1920 Marsh plan for US Army mobilization or a 1939 US entry into the war it appears to me the realistic PoD would be during the 1942 Allied strategy conferences. However likely or unlikely a clearer overall strategic vision and related commitment to a 1943 second front in France are from late summer or autumn of 1942, it allows some of the technical and logistics problems to be resolved. Exactly what problems can be worked through and conditions improved are the second group of questions.

[Kurt_S]

it appears to me the realistic PoD would be during the 1942 Allied strategy conferences. However likely or unlikely a clearer overall strategic vision and related commitment to a 1943 second front in France are from late summer or autumn of 1942, it allows some of the technical and logistics problems to be resolved. Exactly what problems can be worked through and conditions improved are the second group of questions.

My main thesis in this thread is that a 1941 PoD should have been feasible. I.e. that decisive strategic insights were available to 1941 observers:

(1) That the Soviet Union had a viable chance of surviving Barbarossa and continuing to occupy the majority of German power in 1942. This should have been clear no later than the Battle of Smolensk, which contemporary news reports and intelligence saw as a major check on German plans.

(2) That it was not feasible to defeat Germany totally absent (1). This is the realization reached later in 1942 when contemplating the possibility of Soviet collapse.

(3) Given (1) and (2), an Allied intervention in Europe was an important action to ensure Soviet survival were collapse imminent. Nobody in 1941 could have known that the USSR would survive 1942 with minimal Allied assistance.

(4) Also given (1), and were the Soviet Union not facing imminent collapse in 1942, then the West needed to fight only a fraction of the German army to win the war completely and quickly. A landing in France should therefore be prioritized over a long attritional strategy of bombing and encirclement that would cost many more lives (Allied and foreign) than a shorter, sharper war.

Many of the things we've been discussing here, including the design/production of landing craft, relied on the Allies not reaching the foregoing strategic insights. UK/US craft were designed for strategic versatility beyond Cross Channel. Versatility is a valuable thing but not as valuable as having the specialized tools to execute optimal strategy.

The 1942 PoD is too late as a matter of good strategic practice and as a practical matter of being able to launch a strong 1942 invasion. The recitation at Arcadia that 1942 was too early for an offensive was a shallow piece of analysis built on unwillingness to reconsider global strategy in light of the USSR's emergence as a great power rivalling Germany. Its shallowness is demonstrated by its reversal, mere months later, in US strategy.

As I have shown in this thread, some military professionals - but not high leadership - reached the foregoing insights and proposed the appropriate course of action (land in France). Vast swathes of the public, advocating "Second Front Now!" beat the military professionals to this insight. Not being subject to the delusions of the elite classes is often better, for analysis purposes, than having the education/information of elite classes (very often this is not true, of course).

On both sides of the war, failure to apprehend Soviet strength before, and delay in revising one's priors during, the war is the defining parameter of WW2 grand strategy (Japan being an exception).

[Kurt_S]

My main thesis in this thread is that a 1941 PoD should have been feasible. I.e. that decisive strategic insights were available to 1941 observers:

The principal excuses so far offered are:

1. That the US couldn't plan for Cross Channel - not even on a contingency basis - until its Pacific commitments were clarified. This is a fatuous excuse somehow actually printed by Matloff and Snell and quoted in this thread. Even the person who quoted it, Richard Anderson, has refused several invitations to mount a substantive defense (i.e. to do more than quote Matloff and Snell).

2. Nobody knew or could have known that shallower hull gradients were needed for many/most French beaches. This excuse, dubious as a matter of fact, assumes that a competent contingency plan for Cross Channel would have just assumed French beaches had the same gradient as English/Scandinavian beaches. It assumes, in other words, that US/UK planners were dumb. More likely, it assumes that readers are too dumb to notice the embedded assumption, and is an effort to win an internet argument rather than to interrogate history and strategy.

Also embedded in (2) is the assumption that steep gradient landing craft were useless, despite things called tides and the irrefutable fact that LCT(3)'s gave some service in Normandy. Also despite other adaptations of suboptimal craft, such as longer ramps.

The persistence of these bad excuses testifies to the unwillingness of most to consider revising their fundamental views of WW2. Most online WW2 fans are older men wedded to romantic notions of the war and threatened emotionally and psychologically by any suggestion that they missed something over the last 7 decades and need to reconsider fundamentally.

[Richard Anderson]

Clearly all LCT types used at Normandy were expected to suffer some problems with French beaches as the kit was applicable to LCT (3),(4),(5) &(6)

Time to clear up some more misunderstandings.

"Mulock Ramp Extensions" were not designed to enable LCT to land on flat beaches. They were designed to ease the angle of the ramp from the bow to the ground, which did not vary much whether or not the LCT was designed for a flat beach landing. That was to make it easier to drive onto the beach from the LCT - the lesser downward slope helped keep the tank or vehicle from moving to fast and nosing into the beach - and also to better support the end of the ramp. In any case, they were designed based upon experience in HUSKY, AVALANCHE, SLAPSTICK, BAYTOWN, and SHINGLE, which would not have existed in October 1942 and they did not complete development until March 1944.

Yes, LCT I, II, and III could land on a flat beach. The problem was they landed much further out, with water under the bow up to 7 or 8 feet deep. The issues that created were:

Broaching from following seas as only the bow was grounded and the stern was in deep water.
Angle of the ramp was extreme making unloading difficult, even with Mulocks.
They had to wait until drying out - for the receding tide - to unload and then could only retract on the rising tide.

Yes, LCT III were used in NEPTUNE but only by the RN on SWORD (10), JUNO (20), Gold (24), and in Follow-on Force L (50).

On GOLD they were in Assault Group G-1 (JIG Beach) - Group III (10) carrying 40 DD Tanks and in Group VII (2) carrying 3 Crocodile flamethrowers, 3 D-7 bulldozers, and the duplicate HQ 1 Dorsets and 1 Hamps. As such, Group VII was to land much later in the morning, after the tide had come in, and were then to dry out, retracting on the second tide. Assault Group G-2 (KING Beach) was identical, except the DD tanks were Group IV. JUNO was the same, except there were no LCT III tasked to land later and dry out. SWORD was also the same, but with only a single DD group.

Some of the LCT III in Follow-on Force L actually followed what was originally planned for the LCT - carrying large numbers of tanks - which was not what they ended up doing exclusively since the LCT were so versatile. Sixteen of L's LCT III embarked 22 Armoured Brigade for landing on JIG. Another 24 carried 30 Corps overheads for JIG and KING. It is unclear from the records what the last 10 carried but I suspect it was the 1 Corps overheads for SWORD.

The actual breakdown of LCT by type in NEPTUNE were:

UTAH - 36 LCT-IV, 61 LCT-5, 55 LCT-6
OMAHA - 2 LCT-IV, 36 LCT-5, 91 LCT-6
FOFB - 46 LCT-IV
GOLD - 24 LCT-III, 108 LCT-IV
JUNO - 20 LCT-III, 20 LCT-IV, 65 LCT-5
SWORD - 10 LCT-III, 119 LCT-IV
FOFL - 50 LCT-III
Total - 104 LCT-III, 331 LCT-IV, 162 LCT-5, 146 LCT-6

In addition, the support groups employed the following sepcailly modified LCT:

48 LCT(A), 18 LCT(HE), 5 LCT(CB), 31 LCT(R), 25 LCG(L), 29 LCF

[Richard Anderson]

All. Given that one poster continues to employ straw man and ad hominem arguments, I will not reply to them directly, since they continue to argue in bad faith.

I will note that they have yet to demonstrate exactly why the United States would begin planning for an assault landing on the coast of Normandy prior to 7 December 1941?

Why either the United States or Great Britain would plan for any support of the Soviet Union prior to 22 June 1941?

Why the United States would invest heavily in LCT-type craft prior to 11 December 1941, when it envisaged having to deploy its ground forces across oceanic distances in the Atlantic and Pacific, which made large short-range seagoing tank landing craft impractical. All, USN development of tank landing craft until 18 November 1941, when the Lend-Lease construction talks with the RN were completed, focused on the LCM, which could be carried and launched from an APA.

Why Britain, with no prospect of confronting Germany on the European continent, would embark on an early development of an LCT configured primarily to land on flat beaches on the Norman coast?

Why Britain, with no prospect of confronting Germany on the European continent, would embark on building large numbers of LCT configured specifically for an assault landing on the Norman coast.

Why either Britain or the United States, would begin planning on and investing in large numbers of LCT configured specifically for an assault landing on the Norman coast, prior to 11 December 1941.

They keep on prattling on about "excuses" but never offer and hard facts to back up their fantasies.

[glenn239]

Sorry glenn, but no LCT-IV were used at Dieppe. They were all LCT-II and LCF. There were only 6 LCT-IV in service by 6 October, and 2 LCT-5. The LCT-II was suitable at Dieppe because all the beaches were steep, most of them around 1:35, which was perfect for them.

Duly noted. I'd googled a site on the battle that indicated a few LCT-4's were used.

[glenn239]

I will note that they have yet to demonstrate exactly why the United States would begin planning for an assault landing on the coast of Normandy prior to 7 December 1941?

Seems like a logical extension of planning for war against the Axis Powers. The German occupation of France was by definition unacceptable to the US leaders, the existence of such planning if exposed would not be particularily embarrassing, so planning to evict them, at least to some degree or other, seemed logical. To remove Germany from Western Europe the Allies would have to conduct a landing and then eject them.

Why either the United States or Great Britain would plan for any support of the Soviet Union prior to 22 June 1941?

IMO, they would not. Until Germany invaded the SU, Allied planners would be reasonable to assume Soviet hostility.

Why Britain, with no prospect of confronting Germany on the European continent, would embark on building large numbers of LCT configured specifically for an assault landing on the Norman coast.

The underlying strategic premise to Britain continuing the war in 1940 was that the United States would eventually enter it on the side of Great Britain. So, the reason why the British would embark on developing LCT's, and fielding at least some number of them, would be in pursuit of that premise. "Build it, and they will come"