1943: The Allied victory that never was.

[Richard Anderson]

The LCT lost at Dieppe were LCT 121, 124, 126, 145, and 149. BPC-2 ("Beach Protection Craft, ex-LCT 122, type later known as LCF) was also lost. All were LCT-II type. The ten LCT employed to carry the Calgary's tanks were 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, 145, 159, 163, 165, and 166, all LCT-II.

What is confusing is that the hull numbers displayed on the LCT employed at Dieppe did not correspond to the actual pennant number. For example, the LCT numbered 5 shown burning on the beach in German photos was LCT 121, number 6 was LCT 163, number 8 was LCT 124, and number 4 was LCT 126. They were numbered according to a loading plan as #1-10, similar to the LTIN in NEPTUNE, for the operation.

Also note that Number 8 (LCT 124) was photographed broached - parallel rather than perpendicular to the beach, demonstrating the hazard encountered by the LCT designed for steep gradients like RED Beach at Dieppe.

[Onslow]

My main thesis in this thread is that a 1941 PoD should have been feasible. I.e. that decisive strategic insights were available to 1941 observers:

The principal excuses so far offered are:

1. That the US couldn't plan for Cross Channel - not even on a contingency basis - until its Pacific commitments were clarified. This is a fatuous excuse somehow actually printed by Matloff and Snell and quoted in this thread. Even the person who quoted it, Richard Anderson, has refused several invitations to mount a substantive defense (i.e. to do more than quote Matloff and Snell).

2. Nobody knew or could have known that shallower hull gradients were needed for many/most French beaches. This excuse, dubious as a matter of fact, assumes that a competent contingency plan for Cross Channel would have just assumed French beaches had the same gradient as English/Scandinavian beaches. It assumes, in other words, that US/UK planners were dumb. More likely, it assumes that readers are too dumb to notice the embedded assumption, and is an effort to win an internet argument rather than to interrogate history and strategy.

Also embedded in (2) is the assumption that steep gradient landing craft were useless, despite things called tides and the irrefutable fact that LCT(3)'s gave some service in Normandy. Also despite other adaptations of suboptimal craft, such as longer ramps.

The persistence of these bad excuses testifies to the unwillingness of most to consider revising their fundamental views of WW2. Most online WW2 fans are older men wedded to romantic notions of the war and threatened emotionally and psychologically by any suggestion that they missed something over the last 7 decades and need to reconsider fundamentally.

Kurt, the fact that you are saying so many things that are utterly false is just illustrating your cognitive issues. No one has said "steep gradient landing craft were useless", and it is a falsehood to claim that it's embedded in (2). What people have actually said here about steep gradient landing craft was that their deeper stern sections made them BETTER for purposes other than a landing on flat French beaches.

What people have said is that "earlier LCTs were designed for a wider range of operations"; that "earlier LCTs (2) and (3) were designed for other areas and therefore had deeper stern draft for seaworthiness and beach extraction. The deeper stern draft was good on most beaches"; that "The Brits had built their earlier LCTs for distant operations"; that LCT(1)s had saved many men at Crete etc. LCTs 1-3 were not "useless"; they were actually better than LCT(4)s for many purposes.

No one is saying the UK/US planner were dumb for creating craft that were at their best at the steeper gradients found at most beaches. Earlier in the war, it was sensible for the UK to create craft that could be used for other operations since the UK in 1940, for example, was not in a position to invade France in the near future.

Tides do not change the fact that a craft with a shallower max draft is better on flat beaches so why you raise them is baffling.

Your insults about about "online ww2 fans" are, as noted, simply lies. The popularity of alternative strategy discussions show that many such people are fascinated by the possibility of different strategies (as am I, for example). What we are not interested in are liars who are ignorant of the realities behind WW2.

[Richard Anderson]

Seems like a logical extension of planning for war against the Axis Powers. The German occupation of France was by definition unacceptable to the US leaders, the existence of such planning if exposed would not be particularily embarrassing, so planning to evict them, at least to some degree or other, seemed logical. To remove Germany from Western Europe the Allies would have to conduct a landing and then eject them.

Why? Prior to 22 June 1941 it was uncertain if the British could hold off an invasion of the British isles. The German occupation of France was not a declaration of war in the United States.

IMO, they would not. Until Germany invaded the SU, Allied planners would be reasonable to assume Soviet hostility.

Exactly.

The underlying strategic premise to Britain continuing the war in 1940 was that the United States would eventually enter it on the side of Great Britain. So, the reason why the British would embark on developing LCT's, and fielding at least some number of them, would be in pursuit of that premise. "Build it, and they will come"

Indeed, and they did develop and build them. And gained experience with them in minor operations that revealed the constraining factors of the LCT-II and LCT-III designs, which led to the development of the LCT-IV and the commission to the United States in November 1941 to negotiate for a Lend-Lease production of an American variant. When the design was completed, 500 were ordered, but the order ran into problems from the beginning. By 4 April 1942, the Navy and Army requirements were diverging - the Navy wanted 100 LCT for the 8 LCD being planned and another 2,900 other craft. One illustration of the perils of sudden decision-making by senior officials was illustrated by this initial order. In March, FDR backed the Army, which wanted 8,100 landing craft, including 3,500 LCM (and including British production), so the President decreed 600 American-built LCM would be completed by September 1942. In order to get that number by then, the Navy ordered 1,100 on 15 April 1942. Even then, the production goals could not be met. One major bottleneck was engines. While the United States is viewed by some on this board as a bottomless resource, it had limits, and engines was one of them. Diesel and gasoline engines for landing craft competed with requirements for Army vehicles, especially tanks, and aircraft. In this case, the competition for diesel engines was a factor in the Army's Armored Force deciding at this time that after ten years of developing diesel engines for Army tanks and other combat vehicles, they would rely on gasoline engines. By the end of April, a JCS study pointed out that only about 20% of the proposed assault force for SLEDGEHAMMER 1942 could be embarked and in May a further White House meeting began discussing if enough landing craft could be ready for a spring 1943 SLEDGEHAMMER. Thus, even though Marshall and Eisenhower continued to hope for a 1942 SLEDGEHAMMER when they met with the British that summer, the reality was they were also well cognizant of the fact that the resources were unlikely to be there.

I remain uncertain why these very simple facts and timeline continues to confuse so many?

[Onslow]

I will note that they have yet to demonstrate exactly why the United States would begin planning for an assault landing on the coast of Normandy prior to 7 December 1941?

Seems like a logical extension of planning for war against the Axis Powers. The German occupation of France was by definition unacceptable to the US leaders, the existence of such planning if exposed would not be particularily embarrassing, so planning to evict them, at least to some degree or other, seemed logical. To remove Germany from Western Europe the Allies would have to conduct a landing and then eject them.

Why either the United States or Great Britain would plan for any support of the Soviet Union prior to 22 June 1941?

IMO, they would not. Until Germany invaded the SU, Allied planners would be reasonable to assume Soviet hostility.

Why Britain, with no prospect of confronting Germany on the European continent, would embark on building large numbers of LCT configured specifically for an assault landing on the Norman coast.

The underlying strategic premise to Britain continuing the war in 1940 was that the United States would eventually enter it on the side of Great Britain. So, the reason why the British would embark on developing LCT's, and fielding at least some number of them, would be in pursuit of that premise. "Build it, and they will come"

Glenn, your reply seems to be based on the assumption that it was obvious before 7 December 1941 that Normandy would be the only practical place to land. Given that the decision of the landing area was a live issue until some time after that, how could it be believed much earlier that Normandy was the eventual site?

The British DID develop and field LCTs as you know, but the point is that their landing craft did valuable pre-Normandy work in places like Madagascar, Crete, Greece and Norway. Why would they build craft that were inferior for such work in the belief that they would be used years later in one particular area of France?

[Georg_S]

A post by Kurt_S was deleted as it didnt contribute to the topic.it was more questioning another member. If you cant behave and be polite dont answer.

Consider this as a final warning. I strongly advice you to read the rules and behave accordingly.

/Georg - Admin

[Kurt_S]

Senior Research Historian (my actual last job title at TDI)

Your job description at TDI more closely matches a researcher's than a historian's.

The final report was primarily written by Chris Lawrence with
support and inputs from Richard Anderson.

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/e-4epw1and2final.pdf

Nice chatting with y'all. Later...

[Kurt_S]

I leave you all to ponder a question:

Was it a strategic failure, or not, for the US and UK not to have been capable (or willing) of engaging a significant portion of the German Army during 1942?

I'm inclined to believe that, on reflection, you all know it was a failure. But I understand, from a human point of view, why you are so committed to not facing those facts.

This apparently isn't the place to discuss Allied failures, per moderation policy, but maybe my brief active time on this forum will motivate you all to ponder on your own.

[Kingfish]

And to use three of these divisions to liberate Lorient and Saint Nazaire, which would alleviate the transport problems,

Sorry, but no. Allied strategy post-breakout was heavily influenced by the problems with logistics. Assigning 3 division and substantial artillery assets to a siege of two ports (which wouldn't be of use) would not alleviate this problem, it would exacerbate it.

It would be the epitome of "US reserves wasting their time"

is no contradiction,as after the liberation of these two ports, these three divisions would be again concentrated in the Paris region .

Why Paris? Because it would be easier to supply them there?
Then why not move them to Brest or Cherbourg? Easier to supply troops that are stationed literally next to the dockyards.

Hell, given that the invasion of Germany had to be postponed until the Spring of '45 -strange that the allied high command never got that e-mail- why not move the entire 6th, 12th and 21st AG to enclaves around each liberated (and functional) port. Supply and transportation problems solved.

[ljadw]

These two ports would have a big use and it is easier to station these 3 divisions in the region of Paris where there were many empty bases and barracks .

[ljadw]

Hell, given that the invasion of Germany had to be postponed until the Spring of '45 -strange that the allied high command never got that e-mail- why not move the entire 6th, 12th and 21st AG to enclaves around each liberated (and functional) port. Supply and transportation problems solved.

This is not a serious argument: I did not say that the 3 AGs should be moved to enclaves around liberated ports . And this was besides impossible .
I am saying that the reserves should be concentrated in the Paris region and not in villages on the German border,where it was difficult to supply them .
The reason why this was not done was that to do it was to recognize explicitly that that the invasion of Germany could not happen in 1944,something that the media refused to accept .

[Aber]

Was it a strategic failure, or not, for the US and UK not to have been capable (or willing) of engaging a significant portion of the German Army during 1942?

No, becuase fighting the German Army is not the only way to wage the war that was happening in 1942.

[Aida1]

I leave you all to ponder a question:

Was it a strategic failure, or not, for the US and UK not to have been capable (or willing) of engaging a significant portion of the German Army during 1942?

I'm inclined to believe that, on reflection, you all know it was a failure. But I understand, from a human point of view, why you are so committed to not facing those facts.

This apparently isn't the place to discuss Allied failures, per moderation policy, but maybe my brief active time on this forum will motivate you all to ponder on your own.

It was not a failure. There was no compelling reason to do a landing in France in 1942. No reason to be in a hurry.

[Sheldrake]

I leave you all to ponder a question:

Was it a strategic failure, or not, for the US and UK not to have been capable (or willing) of engaging a significant portion of the German Army during 1942?

I'm inclined to believe that, on reflection, you all know it was a failure. But I understand, from a human point of view, why you are so committed to not facing those facts.

This apparently isn't the place to discuss Allied failures, per moderation policy, but maybe my brief active time on this forum will motivate you all to ponder on your own.

Lets dissect the question posed.

1. "Was this a strategic failure or not"(not to have attempted a cross channel assault in 1942). The bit in brackets is implied rather than explicit.

2. Were the allies incapable of engaging a significant portion of the German Army durign 1942.

3. Were the allies unwilling to engage a "significant portion" of the German army.

Lets start with what is a "significant portion " of the German Army. It would have been pretty dumb to choose to engage a force that was far too powerful for the forces that Britian and the the US could put in the field. It needed to be significant enough to have an impact on the war.

The option to launch a cross channel assault was dismissed by the senior professional soldier of the army that would provide most of the troops. In his opinion the allies were capable of engaging the German main forces in France, but were likely to lose. Some have argued that a pointless doomed gesture might have just the job to demonstrate to Stalin that we were doing our best. There is a lot of material on various Dieppe threads that shows that Hitler took the threat of a 1942 landing sufficiently serious to order a panzer corps and bomber groups from the Eastern Front to France. Brooke's diary note re Dieppe suggests he thought one and n half divisions was enough for a doomed symbolic gesture. No need to send an entire expeditionary force. The British were unwilling to commit their last army to fight a battle it was likely to lose. Marshall's pressure on Brooke to launch an operation in 1942 may well have resulted in his scepticism and opposition to plans for an assault earlier than mid 1944.

The allies did engage a significant force in 1942-43. Op Torch sucked in an army group of Axis troops to Africa, at the end of a long supply line. The forces employed were big enough have an impact while not too big to beat. The self inflicted decision to re-inforce Tunsia denied Germany troops, equipment and aircraft at the time when Stalingrad was the point of main effort.

Op torch also cleared axis forces from the continent of Africa and brought substantial French forces into the Allied order of battle. Op Torch produced about the biggest and most capable Allied force in Europe. The 18th Army Group united the expereinced British forces that had been fighting from the Middle East with Anglo American forces from te UK and US, It was also a training ground for intra and intra allied and service co-operation. The Tunisian campaign has bgeen down played by the Russians and by those Americans who are still keen to argue Marshall's arguiments of April 1942.

So the answer to your question is.

1. It was not a strategic failure. The Allies won. Defeating a cross channel assault was one of the few opportunities for Hitler to win the war. Avoiding this risk was a GOOD THING. (Not least for the populations of the UK and USA)

2. The Allies had the capability to engage a range of German forces ona spectrum of size and siognificance. They chose to engage in a theatre which they could defeat sizable forces whioch had an impct on the war.

[ljadw]

Good points, but one one point I do disagree = that the decision to reinforce Tunisia denied Germany troops,equipment and aircraft for Stalingrad .There is no automatism .

[Carl Schwamberger]

I will note that they have yet to demonstrate exactly why the United States would begin planning for an assault landing on the coast of Normandy prior to 7 December 1941?

Maybe as a academic exercise for students at the Staff and Command College? Beyond that the merits of each sector of coast were not self evident. As late as 1943 Morgan had his COSSAC staff review the entire coast from Aquatine to Netherlands to settle a number of questions. In the assorted plans or proposals covered under the Sledgehammer/Roundup tent Calais or Brittany, or even the Bourdeux region pop up. Until some strategic questions are settled its unrealistic to plan the details for this or that location.

I don't see this as a complete show stopper for a 1943 event, tho it does waive away some of the elegance and over insurance of the 1944 NEPTUNE operation.