1943: The Allied victory that never was.

[Carl Schwamberger]

The Allies did engage a significant force in 1942-43. Op Torch sucked in an army group of Axis troops to Africa, at the end of a long supply line. The forces employed were big enough have an impact while not too big to beat. The self inflicted decision to re-inforce Tunsia denied Germany troops, equipment and aircraft at the time when Stalingrad was the point of main effort.

Op torch also cleared axis forces from the continent of Africa and brought substantial French forces into the Allied order of battle. Op Torch produced about the biggest and most capable Allied force in Europe. The 18th Army Group united the expereinced British forces that had been fighting from the Middle East with Anglo American forces from te UK and US, It was also a training ground for intra and intra allied and service co-operation. The Tunisian campaign has bgeen down played by the Russians and by those Americans who are still keen to argue Marshall's arguiments of April 1942.

This graph of air losses samples one of the most interesting aspects of the Allied effort in 1943. That & similar illustrations of the Submarine losses from the last quarter of 1942 through the first qtr of 1943 shows how several of the Allied strengths was beating the Germans or Axis badly long before major Allied ground forces were engaged. In the case of the North African war we can see the Tunisian campaign, or in a larger sense how a western Mediterranean ground creates the condition or context for a larger & more destructive air war. One way to consider this is to think about what the graphs look like if there is no Mediterranean campaign. One can also think about what the loss rates for the German AF looks like were there this 1943 intrusion of a Allied Army group onto the French coast. Similarly there is the question of what happens in the Atlantic battle were there no TORCH operation or western Mediterranean campaign in the first half of 1943. Does waiving away the dual convoy routes to both the UK and NW Africa and consolidating the the ASW effort on a single shipping effort to the UK improve anything for the Allies Oct 1942 through March 1943? Some back of the envelope calculations using the numbers from Hughes and Costellos Battle of the Atlantic & the relevant chapter in Brute Force suggest there would be a large improvement, or swifter defeat of the submarines.

[Kurt_S]

Op Torch sucked in an army group of Axis troops to Africa

Too busy for full response today but must quickly address this...

Germany sent only 4divs to Africa after Torch. They called it an army group but by any reasonable standard it was a corps.

[glenn239]

What rule was violated? I asked a poster to explain where anyone, including me, had said the thing supposedly to be defended. Which rule does that violate?

I warned you last week to contact me offline to go over the situation.

[glenn239]

Glenn, your reply seems to be based on the assumption that it was obvious before 7 December 1941 that Normandy would be the only practical place to land. Given that the decision of the landing area was a live issue until some time after that, how could it be believed much earlier that Normandy was the eventual site?

No, not Normandy specifically, just the assumption that it was reasonable for Allied planners to conclude in 1941 that an invasion of France would be necessary.

[Richard Anderson]

This graph of air losses samples one of the most interesting aspects of the Allied effort in 1943. That & similar illustrations of the Submarine losses from the last quarter of 1942 through the first qtr of 1943 shows how several of the Allied strengths was beating the Germans or Axis badly long before major Allied ground forces were engaged.

It also highlights what the Wehraboos are always missing when they start up their fantasies. Yes, Trevor's work and the follow on studies we did after his death that did not in any way utilize QJM/TNDA analysis demonstrated pretty conclusively that the Germans were on average superior tactically versus the Allies in ground warfare. However, wars are usually not won solely through tactics or just on the ground. Germany also failed strategically and except for its early success in the west and its first few years in the east, they also often failed operationally.

Their early campaigns in France and the Low Countries, Norway, the Balkans, and Greece were masterful combinations of ground and air power, as well as occasionally sea power. The early campaigns in the east were as well. Then the wheels started falling off the bus. Well, actually, they started to wobble prior to the attack on Poland.

The Luftwaffe training and mobilization program was a joke. Its air success were bought by using a small pool of highly trained and skilled pilots to destruction.

The mobilization of industry was poorly thought out and wasteful. Convert a large part of the automotive industry to constructing aircraft parts for aircraft flown by increasingly badly trained pilots? Prioritization by fiat of the supreme leader? FDR, Stalin, and Churchill occasionally did the same but normally had enough sense to let their professionals make those detailed decisions. The utilization of captured resources in occupied countries was poor as well.

The notion that the Kriegsmarine could contest naval supremacy with submarines was absurd. The failure to coordinate the KM and LW operations was typical of German strategic and operational intraservice skill.

Sure, three-quarters to two-thirds of the German Ground forces were engaged at any one time in the East. However, at most less than half the Luftwaffe was after BARBAROSSA and only a fraction of the Kriegsmarine was engaged there.

Strategic warfare is the art of the possible, which the Germans failed to learn in two world wars.

The focus on strategic and operational objectives was Squirrel! No, it was Squirrel! Then there was the focus on Squirrel!

At least Marshall and Brooke usually managed to keep the more lunatic strategic notions of FDR and Churchill at bay, while Stalin eventually learned the same after the disasters of the first year of the war.

[Tom from Cornwall]

No big deal, the single thread in which I've been very active on this forum doesn't justify worrying too much about being banned.

True, but it would be a shame to flounce off just because not everyone agrees with you.

I personally have welcomed your provocative contributions which have sent me off down some interesting tangents - I'd not seen the UK Land Force Committee meeting minutes from 1939, for example, nor taken the time to read up on Churchill's report (dated 2 March 1940) to the War Cabinet on the Admiralty's desired Naval Programme for 1940-41. The latter includes interesting remarks about "the uncertainties of war" and that, for example, the immediate decision to halt work on a future batch of battleships to match those being built by both Germany and Japan should be reviewed by the end of the 1940 calendar year, "when the position should be clearer".

The position was certainly different, if certainly not "clearer" by 31 December 1940, but probably not as expected or hoped for in the Admiralty!

There are tough decisions aplenty in the report, including this section which is either visionary, madness or based on incompetence. I'm sure historian's interpretations vary:

CAB66-5 - WP(40) 53 - Naval Programme 1940-41 - 2 Mar 40 - p.2 para 5.jpg

All the UK War Cabinet papers are available for those who actually want to do some research on the UK National Archives website. This report is in CAB66/5, for example.

Regards

Tom

[Richard Anderson]

No, not Normandy specifically, just the assumption that it was reasonable for Allied planners to conclude in 1941 that an invasion of France would be necessary.

They did. What they did not have worked out was the how and where and when. That developed through multiple planning iterations and multiple negotiations and multiple operations that worked out what was necessary to accomplish it. Each iteration of amphibious assault in European Theater was different than the next, adding TTPs and new and modified equipment that were based upon the previous experience.

Getting back to Gary's original plan, a landing on the east coast of the Cotentin in 1942 would almost certainly end up on the wrong beach and at the wrong time and sequence. Control craft for landing craft waves were non-existent. The LCC were developed from experience in TORCH, HUSKY, JUBILEE, AVALANCHE, BAYTOWN, SLAPSTICK, and SHINGLE...and even so, landing at least some craft at the wrong location was a usual event unless there were very easily seen distinct landmarks on shore that could be followed.

[glenn239]

The situation is pretty obvious to me: Mods are of a certain view, a certain researcher is of the same general views, that researcher is allowed to say/do things that others are not. This isn't shocking, humans being humans. We form our own little clubs, especially to protect epistemic bubbles. It's not a club for which I'm willing to make serious compromises. If it's against the (unwritten) rules to point that out and object to it then I'll be banned. No big deal, the single thread in which I've been very active on this forum doesn't justify worrying too much about being banned.

In checking the past pages, I personally think you were the target of rules violations in post 752, 759 and 782, while you've been warned in 2 posts. I didn't go back further than that. I wouldn't worry about it, just post your game without breaking any conduct rules.

[Richard Anderson]

glenn,

"Mind your privileges...Do not try to moderate a thread yourself."

If you think that Onslow or I violated rules, then use the ! button and state why.

[Aber]

Op Torch sucked in an army group of Axis troops to Africa

Germany sent only 4divs to Africa after Torch. They called it an army group but by any reasonable standard it was a corps.

To point out the bleedin' obvious

Axis =/= German

[ljadw]

Op Torch sucked in an army group of Axis troops to Africa

Germany sent only 4divs to Africa after Torch. They called it an army group but by any reasonable standard it was a corps.

To point out the bleedin' obvious

Axis =/= German

From Commando Supremo (Italian sources are almost totally neglected )
The Route of Death :Supplying Axis forces in Tunisia
The following men were sent to Tunisia /arrived in Tunisia
November 1942 :13302/13302
December 1942 :21872 /19503
1943
January : 18541/17567
February :10521/10366
March :10061/8891
April :3426 /2717
Total (rough figure )
Sent : some 78000
Arrived : some 72000
Conclusion :Italy sent a limited number of men to Tunisia of whom 92 % arrived .

[Onslow]

The principal excuses so far offered are:

2. Nobody knew or could have known that shallower hull gradients were needed for many/most French beaches. This excuse, dubious as a matter of fact, assumes that a competent contingency plan for Cross Channel would have just assumed French beaches had the same gradient as English/Scandinavian beaches. It assumes, in other words, that US/UK planners were dumb. More likely, it assumes that readers are too dumb to notice the embedded assumption, and is an effort to win an internet argument rather than to interrogate history and strategy.

Also embedded in (2) is the assumption that steep gradient landing craft were useless, despite things called tides and the irrefutable fact that LCT(3)'s gave some service in Normandy. Also despite other adaptations of suboptimal craft, such as longer ramps.

The persistence of these bad excuses testifies to the unwillingness of most to consider revising their fundamental views of WW2. Most online WW2 fans are older men wedded to romantic notions of the war and threatened emotionally and psychologically by any suggestion that they missed something over the last 7 decades and need to reconsider fundamentally.

1- Who said here that "nobody knew of could have know that shallower hull gradients were needed for many/most French beaches"?

As far as I can see, no one has said what you claimed. What people have said is that in the situation the UK faced in about 1940-41, they were better off building more seaworthy landing craft that could be used further afield.

2- No one has said that steep gradient landing craft were useless. They were not. Earlier LCTs were very useful as far afield as Crete. What has been said is that LCT4s, being specialised for shallow beaches and Channel use, were far less useful wider afield than other types.

3- Some LCT3s were used in Normandy but not in major roles in normal tank landing craft duty.

4- Tides are irrelevant for normal assault tank landing craft duty in Normandy. An LCT(3) drew the same at low tide as it did at high tide. If the 7' deep stern runs aground on a beach with a slope of 300/1 then the drop from the ramp is about 6'6" no matter what the state of the tide.

Yes, at some stages of the tide an LCT(3) could in some situations have found a steeper beach gradient, but there's a thing about tides - they go up and they go down. If a landing craft is restricted only to a narrow zone of a beach, it can only load or unload for a short period unless it remains aground as the tide falls, and that leads to congestion and sitting targets. For such reasons, it was OK to use an LCT3 at some times and some duties, but a very bad idea to do it at other times for other duties.

We know that you refuse to face the truth, as provided to you in clear quotes, but British naval designers were not mere tools of those who specified designs, and those who specified designs were not fools. They specified the LCT2 and LCT3 designs when they were to be used further afield because they were good for such a purpose, and then they switched to the LCT4 and other designs because such designs suited the cross Channel assault role better.

No one was stupid when they said one shouldn't assault French beaches relying on LCT2s and LCT3s, they knew that such craft had major flaws for that purpose. The simple fact is that no matter what you do with tides and ramps*, a machine or man coming off the bow of an LCT3 on a 300 to 1 slope is going to be stepping into 6'+ of water. That is simple mathematics and no abuse of other people can change the numbers.

So come on, please just simply explain in the numbers how a 7' deep craft can ground on a 300 to 1 beach slope in a way that allows normal machines to leave the ramp without being swamped. This is a very simple question for you. Please stop abusing people and simply answer this very simple mathematical question.



* yes, you could send LCT3s in at high tide, ground their 7' deep sterns on the flat beach and then wait under gunfire for the tide to drop. That is not a successful way to carry out an invasion.

[Carl Schwamberger]

This graph of air losses samples one of the most interesting aspects of the Allied effort in 1943. That & similar illustrations of the Submarine losses from the last quarter of 1942 through the first qtr of 1943 shows how several of the Allied strengths was beating the Germans or Axis badly long before major Allied ground forces were engaged.

It also highlights what the Wehraboos are always missing when they start up their fantasies. Yes, Trevor's work and the follow on studies we did after his death that did not in any way utilize QJM/TNDA analysis demonstrated pretty conclusively that the Germans were on average superior tactically versus the Allies in ground warfare. However, wars are usually not won solely through tactics or just on the ground. Germany also failed strategically and except for its early success in the west and its first few years in the east, they also often failed operationally.

That last is what I was leading around to. Despite some spectacular tactical victories in 1943 the Germans were losing operationally as well as strategically. This is why I don't often argue the nuance of wing loading of fighter planes, tank armor slope, or LCT draught in these conversations. Whatever the inferiority of the P40 & Spitfire models to the FW 190 or Me109 the Axis were shot out of the sky over Tunisia and again over Sicily, and again over southern Italy. over a period of eight months. Over that same 7-8 months multiple Axis ground offensives failed vs the 'inferior' Commonwealth/US ground forces. All that despite many tactical victories. Its a understudied or underead aspect.

[Richard Anderson]

That last is what I was leading around to. Despite some spectacular tactical victories in 1943 the Germans were losing operationally as well as strategically. This is why I don't often argue the nuance of wing loading of fighter planes, tank armor slope, or LCT draught in these conversations. Whatever the inferiority of the P40 & Spitfire models to the FW 190 or Me109 the Axis were shot out of the sky over Tunisia and again over Sicily, and again over southern Italy. over a period of eight months.

Very true. Things like the inferiority of aircraft and limitations of types and numbers of landing craft tell us what might have been possible, not what would have happened. It also tells us though that because of the learning curve of the Allies, the ability to generate numerical superiority at the landing areas would have been critical.

The air battle of Dieppe is illustrative. The British generated 2,614 sorties versus the German's who managed about 995. So about 2.6:1. However, the losses were 100 versus 48, nearly two-to-one in favor of the Germans. The Germans contested the air over the beaches all day and sank the destroyer Berkeley. The British sortie loss rate was 3.8%, while the German was about 4.8%.

On D-Day, 14,674 Allied sorties were flown versus about 400 German. Allied losses, mostly to flak, were 127, 0.9% per sortie. None of the German sorties were effective and their losses were irrelevant. Quantity has a quality all its own, but the Allied aircraft, basing, and support were way ahead of anything that could have been provided in 1942 - at least four times as many aircraft for one thing.

Tunisia is also illustrative. The main problem was establishing basing to contest Axis air power. A close study of what went on - the three months of labor to get to a point where they could suppress the Axis air power - could show the probable course of an attempt to do the same on the Cotentin.

Over that same 7-8 months multiple Axis ground offensives failed vs the 'inferior' Commonwealth/US ground forces. All that despite many tactical victories. Its a understudied or underead aspect.

Oh, it is actually pretty well studied and some are well read in the subject, but the what-iffers seem to care less about having a solid background in reality before they spin their fantasies.

[Richard Anderson]

The principal excuses so far offered are:

2. Nobody knew or could have known that shallower hull gradients were needed for many/most French beaches. This excuse, dubious as a matter of fact, assumes that a competent contingency plan for Cross Channel would have just assumed French beaches had the same gradient as English/Scandinavian beaches. It assumes, in other words, that US/UK planners were dumb. More likely, it assumes that readers are too dumb to notice the embedded assumption, and is an effort to win an internet argument rather than to interrogate history and strategy.

Also embedded in (2) is the assumption that steep gradient landing craft were useless, despite things called tides and the irrefutable fact that LCT(3)'s gave some service in Normandy. Also despite other adaptations of suboptimal craft, such as longer ramps.

The persistence of these bad excuses testifies to the unwillingness of most to consider revising their fundamental views of WW2. Most online WW2 fans are older men wedded to romantic notions of the war and threatened emotionally and psychologically by any suggestion that they missed something over the last 7 decades and need to reconsider fundamentally.

1- Who said here that "nobody knew of could have know that shallower hull gradients were needed for many/most French beaches"?

As far as I can see, no one has said what you claimed. What people have said is that in the situation the UK faced in about 1940-41, they were better off building more seaworthy landing craft that could be used further afield.

Indeed. The ability some have of creating straw men combined with ad hominem and a lack of critical thinking is remarkable.

1. It isn't considered that the development of large landing craft to carry tanks began in 1940 and was in its infancy.
2. It isn't considered that the design of landing craft required a series compromises of form versus function.
3. It isn't considered that designing for better sea-keeping and greater ocean going range compromised the practical beach gradient.
4. It isn't considered that designing for better beaching capability compromised sea-keeping and greater ocean going range. It also led to hogging and reduced structural strength.
5. It isn't considered that beaches and tides vary, sometimes from place to place.
6. It isn't considered that the prospects for a British invasion of continental Europe prior to 11 December 1941 were remote.
7. It isn't considered that all of the 26 airfields turned over to the USAAF required extensive expansion and building projects - quite a few were satellite and emergency fields with little infrastructure - and that eventually 170+ more were built, including the 67 bomber stations.
8. And so on...it isn't considered unless it fits into the preferred narrative - the Allied leadership was incompetent in not going ahead and landing whatever forces they could on the Cotentin in summer-early fall 1942. Of course another term for fact-fitting to preconceived beliefs is confirmation bias, which goes along with the anchoring bias, cognitive bias, commitment bias, hindsight bias, and...

2- No one has said that steep gradient landing craft were useless. They were not. Earlier LCTs were very useful as far afield as Crete. What has been said is that LCT4s, being specialised for shallow beaches and Channel use, were far less useful wider afield than other types.

Yes, but because a couple of posters made the error of thinking that was what was said, some of them can no longer let it go. False information or reasoning, once accepted, is difficult to let go.

3- Some LCT3s were used in Normandy but not in major roles in normal tank landing craft duty.

Indeed, I believe I gave the number used and what they were used for. Again, information that does not fit into an accepted belief system gets rejected, which is a variation on anchoring bias.

Gee, I could have used this as a case study when I was teaching critical thinking and structured analysis at DIA.

Yes, at some stages of the tide an LCT(3) could in some situations have found a steeper beach gradient, but there's a thing about tides - they go up and they go down. If a landing craft is restricted only to a narrow zone of a beach, it can only load or unload for a short period unless it remains aground as the tide falls, and that leads to congestion and sitting targets. For such reasons, it was OK to use an LCT3 at some times and some duties, but a very bad idea to do it at other times for other duties.

Yep. Note that the problem did not go away postwar. The initial designs of the LCU were very similar to the LCT-5 and had many of the same problems. The "solution" eventually became the LCAC but those are expensive.

We know that you refuse to face the truth, as provided to you in clear quotes, but British naval designers were not mere tools of those who specified designs, and those who specified designs were not fools. They specified the LCT2 and LCT3 designs when they were to be used further afield because they were good for such a purpose, and then they switched to the LCT4 and other designs because such designs suited the cross Channel assault role better.

Yep

yes, you could send LCT3s in at high tide, ground their 7' deep sterns on the flat beach and then wait under gunfire for the tide to drop. That is not a successful way to carry out an invasion.

Yep. The ability of the LCT I, II, and III as assault vessels carrying tanks to an opposed beach landing were limited to suitable beach gradients and favorable tides. That does not mean they could not be so used, as was demonstrated at Dieppe.