Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑
01 Oct 2023 20:05
I've always been interested in the Op RUTTER plan, but never made the time to research that one. It would probably as instructive or more so than the JUBILLE plan.
RUTTER was insane. JUBILEE was worse. They made the planning for Gallipoli look like a work of genius.
1. Dieppe was chosen simply because it was within range of air support. No consideration was given to the difficulties of the terrain, beaches, and probable defenses.
2. Photo reconnaissance did not find any evidence of positions along the headlands or of antitank gun positions in town, so the assumption was made that they simply weren't there.
3. Barbed wire entanglements did not show up on photos of the promenade at Dieppe or the seawall at Puys, so the assumption was made that they simply weren't there.
4a. The success of the landing was based upon a heavy air bombardment just prior to touchdown. That was scratched so instead...
4b. The success of the landing was based upon achieving tactical surprise. There was no evidence that tactical surprise could be achieved, especially since landing at six different points required simultaneity, which was never achieved in any other operation of that scope or in exercises for RUTTER and JUBILEE. So the assumption was made that the landings would be simultaneous enough and tactical surprise would be achieved.
5. No consideration was made of the possibility of running into one of the many coastal convoys that ran almost nightly from port to port. The encounter between the British convoy to YELLOW Beach and the German coastal convoy totally disrupted that operation, which only succeeded because of the intrepidity of Major Peter Young and his troops on LCP 15. It was sheer luck that the Germans did not believe the encounter was anything other than a typical convoy action and it had no effect on the preparedness of the German troops.
6. When RUTTER was resuscitated as JUBILEE, no consideration was made that the Germans may have observed the RUTTER exercises and would recognize the preparations for JUBILEE as a possible raid. It was sheer luck that the Germans did not make the connection and it had no effect on the preparedness of the German troops.
Gary's recounting of some of the planning for an October 1942 SLEDGEHAMMER has all the hallmarks of the slipshod planning and wishful thinking that went into RUTTER and JUBILEE. A couple of airborne battalions are supposed to cut off the neck of the Cotentin and prevent the movement of German reinforcements. Massed landings by unsupported infantry in LCA and LCP would march ashore without opposition because it was dark. Allied aircraft would deny the airspace over the landing because they anticipated having enough drop tanks to support operations. Never mind that the fittings for belly tanks in the Spitfire V were not introduced into production and depot modification until 25 September 1942, and then it was only for the early 30-gallon and 90-gallon tanks, which caused aerodynamic issues that limited the carrying aircraft to straight and level flight until they were jettisoned, which also could only be safely done in straight and level flight. Worse, the 90-gallon tank fittings may only have been compatible with the tropicalized fuel system (Mod 647 in the Spit VB Trop). Mod 657 for the 170-gallon tank in the Spit VC was not until April-May 1943. Another problem was that additional fuel also required additional oil in proportion, so aircraft so fitted also had to have a larger oil tank installed, which was a characteristic of the "big-chinned" Spit VB Trop.