1943: The Allied victory that never was.

[Sheldrake]

Op Torch sucked in an army group of Axis troops to Africa

Too busy for full response today but must quickly address this...

Germany sent only 4divs to Africa after Torch. They called it an army group but by any reasonable standard it was a corps.

Well according to i'internet Axis losses were around 300,000 of which some 150,000 were German.

The Axis armies suffered casualties of 290,000 to 362,000 men; the losses are uncertain but it is estimated that the German army suffered 8,500 men killed during the campaign and the Italians 3,700 men killed; another 40,000 to 50,000 Axis soldiers were wounded.[89] In the British official history, Playfair wrote that the Allies took 238,243 unwounded prisoners; 101,784 German, 89,442 Italian and 47,017 others.[91] In 2004, Rick Atkinson wrote that a quarter of a million prisoners is a reasonable estimate.[89] Playfair wrote that G. F. Howe, the American official historian, recorded the capture of 275,000 Axis soldiers, an 18th Army Group calculation of 244,500 prisoners (including 157,000 Germans), that Rommel estimated 130,000 Germans were taken prisoner and Arnim estimated 100,000 German and 200,000 Italian prisoners of war.[91]

The Luftwaffe lost 2,422+ aircraft in the Mediterranean theatre from November 1942 – May 1943 (41 per cent of the Luftwaffe).[101] At least 1,045 aircraft were destroyed; from 22 to 30 November 1942, the Luftwaffe flew 1,084 sorties losing 63 aircraft, including 21 destroyed on the ground. The Regia Aeronautica recorded the loss of four.[93] From 1 to 12 December, the Luftwaffe flew 1,000 sorties and lost 37 aircraft, including nine on the ground, while the Italians recorded the loss of ten more.[94] From 13 to 26 December, the Luftwaffe flew 1,030 sorties and lost 17 aircraft, while the Italians lost three.[95] From 27 December 1942 to 17 January 1943, the Luftwaffe lost 47 aeroplanes; Regia Aeronautica losses are unknown.[96] From 18 January to 13 February, the Luftwaffe lost another 100 aircraft but Italian losses are unknown.[97] From 14 February to 28 March, 136 German aeroplanes were lost and the Regia Aeronautica lost 22 more.[98] From 29 March to 21 April, 270 Luftwaffe aeroplanes were destroyed and 46 "operational aircraft and almost their entire remaining air transport fleet" was lost.[99] From 22 April until the end, the Luftwaffe lost 273 aircraft; 42 bombers, 166 fighters, 52 transport aircraft, 13 Storch observation aircraft and the Italians recorded the loss of 17 aeroplanes; 600+ aircraft were captured by the Allies.[100]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tunisian_campaign

[ljadw]

Hm :Italian estimates are different : O'Hara said on this forum (thread :how many German troops wasted in Tunisia ) that a precise number of Axis losses in Tunisia is impossible and that a good guess is something between 200000 and 270000 .
Rommel ( who left Africa before the capitulation ) said 130000 German POWs ,Arnim : 100000 ,Allied guess :157000
Conclusion : German and allied guesses are unreliable and most Axis losses belonged to the forces from Libya .
I also have no faith at all in the claims of the losses of the Axis air forces : the Mediterranean theatre is not the Tunisian theatre .

[Aida1]

Op Torch sucked in an army group of Axis troops to Africa

Too busy for full response today but must quickly address this...

Germany sent only 4divs to Africa after Torch. They called it an army group but by any reasonable standard it was a corps.

Well according to i'internet Axis losses were around 300,000 of which some 150,000 were German.

Which includes the forces already in North Africa before Torch.

[ljadw]

Also from OHara on the same thread :there were in December 1942 40000Axis soldiers in Tunisia ( Italians and Germans ) and in Tripolitania there were
70000 Germans
130000 Italians and 26000 natives .
It is also an historical fact that Montgomery's forces entered Tunisia only in February 1943 ,which means that til February 1943 the 226000 Axis soldiers in Libya did not suffer any losses in Tunisia .
Less than 40000 Axis soldiers went after December 1942 to Tunisia by ship ,this means that the majority of the Axis losses in Tunisia did not belong to the men sent to Tunisia, but to the men who left Libya for Tunisia at the end of January 1943 ,men who also would have been lost if there was no Axis intervention in Tunisia .

[Carl Schwamberger]

Have to kick this thread, being inert three days bothers me.

...

Tunisia is also illustrative. The main problem was establishing basing to contest Axis air power. A close study of what went on - the three months of labor to get to a point where they could suppress the Axis air power - could show the probable course of an attempt to do the same on the Cotentin.

Yes there is that. The necessary airfields Tebessa & the other sites, were far from any substantial industrial base. Algiers & Oran with what early-mid 20th Century industry they had were 525km straight line & 600km+ by rail and bad roads. Then its off across the sea to the Allied industrial base in the US or UK. Quite a logistics challenge in a four month time line. Using the small ports of Bougie & Bone help some, tho not at panacea level. Reading though the histories of the air campaign the interference of the Axis air force in getting those airfields up and running is noted. Axis bombing had its effect & so did air superiority missions by interceptors over those airfields in March. Dolittle and his RAF counterparts had to adjust their operations to counter that.

Exactly, or generally how many combat operational aircraft the Allies start with in the UK or in range of the Cotientin Peninsula in May or August of 1943 I cant say. Theres what they had OTL, and whatever there might be added with a six to ten months preparation for executing a Op ROUNDUP. What is well established is they started with exactly zero over Algeria/Tunisia. It looks like there were still only 490 AAF aircraft operational in NW Africa by New Years 1943. The RAF was little better & the Desert AF had its own obstacle in establishing a a operational base for its 1000+ strength. The Axis had a slightly closer base on Sicilly that the Allies had in Algeria, but it does not seem to have made a significant difference.

[Michael Kenny]

Well according to i'internet...............

Nay lad, it's t'internet.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tIOGkIw ... =WORLDNEWS

[MarkF617]

Wow. This thread started with a simple point of departure where the Allies didn't cancel Sledge Hammer and invaded France in October 1942. This discussion had lots of facts to back up Rach argument. It has since become a fantasy where the allied leaders have chose a strategy that is not designed to win so they are either incompetent or deliberately choosing this so a deal can be struck with Hitler. Instead we are lead to believe that the British should have built an army of 40 divisions plus enough landing craft to carry them by October 1942. This half trained, half equipped hoard was to be unleashed Soviet style on Northern France where they will sweep aside the Germans and be in Berlin by 1943!

Just wow

[MarkF617]

Kurt_S

I don't think you understand the British way of fighting European wars. The British always fight on the peripheries using their naval power while forming alliances with other European countries to do the majority of the fighting on the mainland. This is the reason Hitler gave for Barbarossa, to remove the last potential continental ally. The British were certainly not looking to give up but there was no way they were going to invade Europe alone or until the Empire was secure. Sledge Hammer would only happen as an act of utter desperation.

Thanks

Mark.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Wow. This thread started with a simple point of departure where the Allies didn't cancel Sledge Hammer and invaded France in October 1942.

Actually no, the OP discussed 1943. the 1942 discussion was a bit of topic drift, into two different discussions.

This discussion had lots of facts to back up Rach argument. It has since become a fantasy ... ... unleashed Soviet style on Northern France where they will sweep aside the Germans and be in Berlin by 1943!

Ya. As so often happens things took a turn for the worse. Where hard evidence or a degree of analysis was presented it was either attacked with little counter evidence or ignored.

[Richard Anderson]

Actually no, the OP discussed 1943. the 1942 discussion was a bit of topic drift, into two different discussions.

Indeed, and most of my data collection was focused over the years focused on the 1943 operation, so the topic drift steered me into new data collection, which tends to show just how much less prepared the Allies were for something in October 1942.

Gary brought in some interesting data he collected years ago and I've gone through his original paper and sent him comments on about half. He kindly supplied me with some of the German maps he collected in Freiburg as well. I hope he will share the actual Allied planning documents he refers to though, since there are some gaping holes in the planning assumptions, which were reflected in the actual execution of JUBILEE.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Been sifting back through the useful parts of this discussion & theres support here for at least a few conclusions:

1. The core strategic objective of a 1943 invasion is not likely to be the same as that of the 1944 version of OVERLORD we all know and love. The core goal of the latter was to secure or liberate the bulk of France and Belgium in 6-8 months, setting up a position for operations directly against Germany in roughly 12 months from the invasion date. Given the lesser resources or mass of Allied combat power during 1943 its not likely all of France can be secured despite a weaker German OB in 1943 vs 1944. There fore the core strategic goal of this 1943 invasion would be realistically just establishing a Second Front in France. The expectation or hope being you get to the liberation of all France and position for direct attack on Germany approx 12 months sooner that expected from the intent for OVERLORD 1944. That is the Allies are intended to be on the German frontier in the summer of 1944, vs the spring or summer of 1945 as was thought possible for OVERLORD of OTL.

In this we have to dispose of the hindsight & the fact that OVERLORD 1944 far exceeded expectations. The expectation was a direct invasion of Germany and its collapse was something for latter 1945 & the finish in 1946.

2. Having the combat power to make this Second Front stick requires a decision NLT late summer or autumn of 1942. That is the several strategy conferences on 1942 need to each end with a clearer vision, & that is directed to France/Belgium with other theaters or fronts as secondary. This is essential to having: A. the existing combat power/support services directed to the UK. B. Preparation of additional forces needed to increase the invasion force. Both from diversion from other Fronts/Theatres, and diversion of resources within the forces being developed in the US. A portion of the very real deficiencies in Ground, Air, and Support forces available OTL can be made good through redirection of production organization and training. Its not a panacea, but it looks like there is considerable room for redirection.

3. One major chunk of that redirection would be in the cancellation of Op TORCH & most of the 1943 Mediterranean Theatre campaigns. That waives away the stripping of the US 8th AF in the UK to help build the 12th AF in Algeria and diversion of subsequent air power from the US to the MTO vs the UK. It is correct everyplace and aircrew man cannot be redirected. The bulk will, that created the 12th AF accelerating the activity of the 8th AF in the first half of 1943. Another major redirection would be keeping the Third Protocol (& likely the Fourth) at the levels of the Second Protocol This does not "cancel" Lend Lease to the USSR as is frequently accused. What it does is redirect a large amount of cargo shipping for use in supporting this Second Front into 1944. Theres other redirected resources such as consolidating the ASW assets used to protect the cargo shipping to Algeria from October 1942 through summer 1943 on the North Atlantic route to the UK. Again not a panacea, but it does address the complaint of how Op TORCH reduced the ASW force on the N Atlantic route. Some redirection from the S Pac is possible as well. Tho not as much as from the N African Sicilian campaigns or the jumped up Third Lend Lease Protocol.

Theres a lot of secondary items, and questions of Axis actions. The effect of new and different Allied Deception operations, A much altered suite of Allied leaders on the ground or in the air. The effect of the target date for the nvasion. What the Axis decide to do in Africa absent a Op TORCH. & what they do with ground or air forces not sent to Africa/Sicilly abet Op TORCH. The effect of subsequent Allied amphib ops after the main event. The replacement of the material sent to the USSR in the Third Protocol with something useful to the Allied forces in France (not the same as the cargo ship thing).

Anyway items 1 thru 3 provide at least one frame work for the original PoD of this thread. I see it as one of the closer to reality structures. Placing the PoD further back into 1941, 1939, 1935, 1920 or whatever is increasingly difficult. So is the PoD of January 1943, the SYMBOL Conference. Maybe seven months can overcome enough problems, but it looks a lot easier if decision is reached 4-6 months earlier. So is having a realistic strategic goal.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... since there are some gaping holes in the planning assumptions, which were reflected in the actual execution of JUBILEE.

I've always been interested in the Op RUTTER plan, but never made the time to research that one. It would probably as instructive or more so than the JUBILLE plan.

[Richard Anderson]

I've always been interested in the Op RUTTER plan, but never made the time to research that one. It would probably as instructive or more so than the JUBILLE plan.

RUTTER was insane. JUBILEE was worse. They made the planning for Gallipoli look like a work of genius.

1. Dieppe was chosen simply because it was within range of air support. No consideration was given to the difficulties of the terrain, beaches, and probable defenses.
2. Photo reconnaissance did not find any evidence of positions along the headlands or of antitank gun positions in town, so the assumption was made that they simply weren't there.
3. Barbed wire entanglements did not show up on photos of the promenade at Dieppe or the seawall at Puys, so the assumption was made that they simply weren't there.
4a. The success of the landing was based upon a heavy air bombardment just prior to touchdown. That was scratched so instead...
4b. The success of the landing was based upon achieving tactical surprise. There was no evidence that tactical surprise could be achieved, especially since landing at six different points required simultaneity, which was never achieved in any other operation of that scope or in exercises for RUTTER and JUBILEE. So the assumption was made that the landings would be simultaneous enough and tactical surprise would be achieved.
5. No consideration was made of the possibility of running into one of the many coastal convoys that ran almost nightly from port to port. The encounter between the British convoy to YELLOW Beach and the German coastal convoy totally disrupted that operation, which only succeeded because of the intrepidity of Major Peter Young and his troops on LCP 15. It was sheer luck that the Germans did not believe the encounter was anything other than a typical convoy action and it had no effect on the preparedness of the German troops.
6. When RUTTER was resuscitated as JUBILEE, no consideration was made that the Germans may have observed the RUTTER exercises and would recognize the preparations for JUBILEE as a possible raid. It was sheer luck that the Germans did not make the connection and it had no effect on the preparedness of the German troops.

Gary's recounting of some of the planning for an October 1942 SLEDGEHAMMER has all the hallmarks of the slipshod planning and wishful thinking that went into RUTTER and JUBILEE. A couple of airborne battalions are supposed to cut off the neck of the Cotentin and prevent the movement of German reinforcements. Massed landings by unsupported infantry in LCA and LCP would march ashore without opposition because it was dark. Allied aircraft would deny the airspace over the landing because they anticipated having enough drop tanks to support operations. Never mind that the fittings for belly tanks in the Spitfire V were not introduced into production and depot modification until 25 September 1942, and then it was only for the early 30-gallon and 90-gallon tanks, which caused aerodynamic issues that limited the carrying aircraft to straight and level flight until they were jettisoned, which also could only be safely done in straight and level flight. Worse, the 90-gallon tank fittings may only have been compatible with the tropicalized fuel system (Mod 647 in the Spit VB Trop). Mod 657 for the 170-gallon tank in the Spit VC was not until April-May 1943. Another problem was that additional fuel also required additional oil in proportion, so aircraft so fitted also had to have a larger oil tank installed, which was a characteristic of the "big-chinned" Spit VB Trop.

[Carl Schwamberger]

RUTTER was insane. JUBILEE was worse. They made the planning for Gallipoli look like a work of genius.

1. Dieppe was chosen simply because it was within range of air support. No consideration was given to the difficulties of the terrain, beaches, and probable defenses.

This has the odd implication nowhere else was in range of air support.

2. Photo reconnaissance did not find any evidence of positions along the headlands or of antitank gun positions in town, so the assumption was made that they simply weren't there.
3. Barbed wire entanglements did not show up on photos of the promenade at Dieppe or the seawall at Puys, so the assumption was made that they simply weren't there..

Illustrating why multiple source intel is important. Im guessing there was nothing from the embryonic French underground. Surface or horizontal photos would have been useful in this...

4a. The success of the landing was based upon a heavy air bombardment just prior to touchdown. That was scratched so instead...

This desire or dependance on a last minute air bombardment is a frequent feature of these affairs. Perhaps my experience in planning and executing those has given me a cynical PoV, but in WWII they don't seem to work as expected very often. Probably worth a long essay on just that subject.

4b. The success of the landing was based upon achieving tactical surprise. There was no evidence that tactical surprise could be achieved, especially since landing at six different points required simultaneity, which was never achieved in any other operation of that scope or in exercises for RUTTER and JUBILEE. So the assumption was made that the landings would be simultaneous enough and tactical surprise would be achieved.

Surprise is the Holy Grail, the golden vision for every military operation. Always have a plan flexible enough if it does not occur


I once explained the timing, the sequence of events in the NEPTUNE operation. When the individual receiving this realized the airborne ops that initiated around 12:30 & alerted the Germans some four hours before the fleet was sighted, he was aghast. He declared the airborne op the stupidest thing ever as it was guaranteed to blow tactical surprise. I'll leave that one for another day.

[Richard Anderson]

This has the odd implication nowhere else was in range of air support.

Not really. It could have been Fécamp. but that was getting too close to the major port of Le Havre and its defenses and reserves. It could have been Berck or Le Touquet, but that was getting too close to the major port of Boulogne and its defenses and reserves, especially the major coastal batteries around Wimereux and Calais. Then it becomes a chocie between Veulettes-sur-Mer, Saint-Valery-en-Caux, Le Treport, or Dieppe. Dieppe got picked possibly because it was in the middle.

Illustrating why multiple source intel is important. Im guessing there was nothing from the embryonic French underground. Surface or horizontal photos would have been useful in this...

The technique of oblique photography using very fast, low flying PR aircraft was still developing I believe. The problem with the embryonic French underground run by SOE was that it was woefully insecure, amateurish, and of limited capability.

This desire or dependance on a last minute air bombardment is a frequent feature of these affairs. Perhaps my experience in planning and executing those has given me a cynical PoV, but in WWII they don't seem to work as expected very often. Probably worth a long essay on just that subject.

Yes, heavy bombing as a panacea had a hard time going away.

Surprise is the Holy Grail, the golden vision for every military operation. Always have a plan flexible enough if it does not occur


I once explained the timing, the sequence of events in the NEPTUNE operation. When the individual receiving this realized the airborne ops that initiated around 12:30 & alerted the Germans some four hours before the fleet was sighted, he was aghast. He declared the airborne op the stupidest thing ever as it was guaranteed to blow tactical surprise. I'll leave that one for another day.

The thing is tactical surprise was never anticipated for NEPTUNE, but operational and strategic surprise was. The airborne assault also played into German fears of mass desants by the Allied Airborne Army, which they believed included no less than six airborne divisions.