Sho-Go 5

[Kingfish]

Getting over a nasty cold and stuck inside the house, I am bored to tears, so why not rewrite history.

So I decided to mix up the battle of Leyte Gulf by dividing the IJN into four TGs assigned to four separate routes into battle.

To the north Ozawa's sacrificial carrier force would enter via the same historical route and timeline, except I will detach the two hybrid CV/BBs.

Shima will also come in from the north with his original OOB plus the CV/BBs from Ozawa but instead head for San Bernadino Straits.

Nishimura will follow his historical southern route but will add Nagato, Chokai and Haguro to his historical OOB.

Finally, Kurita will swing south and transit thru the Sula Archipelago and swing underneath Mindanao. This will avoid Darter and Dace, and thus the loss of Maya, Atago and Takao - although I'm not sure who else might be lurking along that route.

The longer transit for Kurita means the other groups will be detected first, and thus fix US attention on them. Halsey will bomb Shima out of the water, then detect Ozawa and go chasing after him. Meanwhile, Oldendorf will cover the Surigao but Shima's larger force will take more time to eliminate.

This leaves Kurita with Bat div 1 and 3 plus about a dozen cruisers facing Taffy 2(?)

Does Kurita adhere to the Bushido code or will it be Deja Vu all over again?

[Carl Schwamberger]

Looks as complicated as anything the Japanese leaders cooked up. I don't have enough information on the planning and don't understand the thinking behind the details of the Sho Go 5 as executed.

Does Kurita adhere to the Bushido code or will it be Deja Vu all over again?

Strictly speaking the Bushido Code was a Army thing. The Naval infantry certainly were of the 'No Surrender' flavor, usually. I recall the unit charged with guarding the new airfield on Guadalcanal retreated when the US Marines landed. Other than ambushing th Gottege Patrol they kept a low profile.

More to the point here is IJN combat officers had a long record of breaking off surface actions as soon as they thought they'd won. You don't find many examples in 1942 or 1943 of taking the cruisers or destroyers on into harms way after the initial gunfight. ie: Not searching out the US transports after the Savo Island battle. Satisfied with sinking the covering force the commander went back to Rabual for lunch.


Five months later at the Tassafaronga battle the Japanese commanders battle plan was to launch a torpedo attack at range and run. He executed that & did not stick around to evaluate results or make a secondary follow up attack. Japanese doctrine for these cruiser and destroyer forces was to make a fast torpedo & gun attack, then cut off the action. It was only in a Big Decisive battle of capitol ships did the doctrine approach something like stand and slug it out. So...

This leaves Kurita with Bat div 1 and 3 plus about a dozen cruisers facing Taffy 2(?)

Kuritas breaking off the historical action fits the doctrine for slash and run tactics of the light fleet elements. Designed to attrition the enemy fleet. Since he had a fair sized BB and heavy cruiser fleet his breaking off the action does not fit the doctrine as I understood it. His decision has been picked over many time & I'll skip that.

... Meanwhile, Oldendorf will cover the Surigao but Shima's larger force will take more time to eliminate.

Twenty minutes vs fifteen? It was over before half the USN battle line got into position. This is one of the few night surface actions where the Japanese did not make a massed torpedo attack.