If Japan have attacked Russia and not the Usa?

[Andreas]

You do not want to seriously argue that the battle was anything else than a serious Japanese defeat?

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources ... a2.asp#86a

All the best

Andreas

In Khalkhin Gol the Soviets had numerically superior forces. This wouldn't be the case in 1941.

Yes, and that matters how? In Khalkhin Gol they were attacking a fortified position. In your scenario they are defending. Clearly the two are not directly comparable, but so far there is a lack of a coherent argument by you as to why the experience of Khalkhin Gol does not matter at all, and why suddenly the Japanese who were routed in 1939 should sweep all before them. Other than 'it is so because I say so', of course, and mutterings about small fishes, insinuations that really the Red Army lost because it suffered higher casualties, and unsupported statements about the professional capacity of the Red and Japanese air forces. Try harder if you want to convince the sceptics.

All the best

Andreas

[LWD]

....In Khalkhin Gol the Soviets had numerically superior forces. This wouldn't be the case in 1941.

This is not necessarily true. According to:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=131052
The Soviets had 31 divisions in the far east prior to the German attack.
according to:
http://djclausewitz.wordpress.com/2007/ ... nese-army/

By the time of Pearl Harbor the Japanese had 35 of 51 divisions in China as well as 38 of 39 independent brigades.

So the Japanese had about 50 Divisions in China and another 15 elsewhere. But many of those in China could not be used vs the Soviets becasue:
1) They were fighting the Chinese
2) Moving them to a position to attck the Soviets would be an almost sure give away.

As for:

There is absolutely no reason to assume that the Soviets could send troops west sooner or in more of them if it was in war with Japan.

Given the mobility and equipment of the Japanese there is a very good chance that a Soviet armored counter attack could have pocketed and destroyed a significant portion of the attacking Japanese army. If the Chinese went on the offensive at about the same time the Japanese army would be hard pressed to even consider further offensives and the Soviets would be free to move most of their forces West. Of course if the Japanese participation gave away the German attack which it might well have there would have been less of a hurry getting those forces West as well.

[Lkefct]

There is little doubt that a general offensive by the Japanese would be able to advance into Soviet territory. Soviet infantry is probably about even to Japanese infantry when fighting in the open, although they have a higher proportion of artillery, particularly in larger calibers. The soviets that do make a stand in any strong positions will get surrounded, and then a very tough fight will follow leading to the Soviet pockets being wiped out.

The catch is what are the Japanese going to do then? the Japanese armies will have to feed men into the advance, leaving men to defend the flanks, getting progressively weaker. The Soviets in the east can afford to let the Japanese advance, and then mass their men on a flank or other weak spot, and turn the tables on the Japanese. A rapid thrust by a mechanized corp into the Japanese rear and then a encirclement battle of their own would leave a sizable force of Japanese destroyed.

What would the Japanese have done in order to launch an attack? What would be their objective? It is hard to visualize the Japanese crushing the Soviets unless there is some element of maneuver and a massive amount of surprise involved to give the Japanese an advantage. They are a light infantry army who excelled at using maneuver in the jungles to gain the initiative and force the European armies to react to them, and they maintained the initiative. The senario being described is one where the Soviets can easily regain the initiative by trading space, which is what the Russians have done historically.

If someone can propose a scenario where the IJA can attack in such a way as force the Soviets fight the battle on Japanese terms, then that does change things. But I have yet to hear what the Japanese would be attempting to due except being a punching bag for the Soviets while Hitler wins the war. mean while the very resources that the Japanese crave are not available to them since they don't launch the attacks to go get them.

[ThomasG]

Yes, and that matters how? In Khalkhin Gol they were attacking a fortified position. In your scenario they are defending. Clearly the two are not directly comparable, but so far there is a lack of a coherent argument by you as to why the experience of Khalkhin Gol does not matter at all, and why suddenly the Japanese who were routed in 1939 should sweep all before them. Other than 'it is so because I say so', of course, and mutterings about small fishes, insinuations that really the Red Army lost because it suffered higher casualties, and unsupported statements about the professional capacity of the Red and Japanese air forces. Try harder if you want to convince the sceptics.

I am not claiming that they would achieve any spectacular victories. They would simply tie the Soviet troops which were historically transferred to the west which would help the Germans much.

Japan was able to take Singapore which was heavily fortified despite the Allied numerical superiority.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=123671

In my opinion they will take Vladivostok with a surprise offensive and concentrate large forces to defend it. The Japanese can easily sink the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

[Lkefct]

The Japanese attacks that started WW2 did not have overall numerical superiority, but by gaining the initiative and maintaining it with the speed of their advance they were able to beat the Allies by maintaining a local superiority in numbers and firepower. Much of the firepower that the Japanese have in their infantry units is very light and decentralized. Just the right stuff for blitzing and maintaining a lightning advance against an unprepared opponent who seriously underestimates them.

In Russia, after the initial shock wears off, what does that accomplish. The open terrain will promote a major tank attack. Despite the quality of the majority of the Soviet tanks (t-26 and BT), the Japanese are short of every sort of anti-tank weapons. Their offensive is going to have a tough time out marching the Soviets who can use mechanization and rail to move troops around. Once the Japanese dig in, they will be exposed to the much heavier caliber and more numerous Soviet guns. old ww1 vintage 75 mm guns are not going to be able to provide the sort of firepower needed to stop massed tank and infantry attacks in the open areas. The soviets can just mass their men up at some weak spot in the Japanese line, and throw everything at one spot. Japanese troops are very short of infantry guns, anti-tank guns and artillery in the sort of numbers needed to stop a massed tank attack.

The Japanese are a very tough and determined infantry army, but the lack modern arms and other modern equipment. They are not ready to fight a modern tank army in tank country. In the south pacific, where they can force the Americans to perform frontal assaults (every amphibious invasion is a frontal assault), into prepared defenses, with their guns dug in they certainly did reasonably well, although in the final exchange the US where killing Japanese off at a 10:1 ratio. The soviets will not do that well, but the Japanese stand fast and die bravado tends to help them get slaughtered in place rather then have them thinking about how to maneuver. The Soviet commanders in the east know how to maneuver.

I am not sure what the attack on Vladivostok is suppose to achieve. So they take out the city? There are other routes to get supplies to the Soviets, and the Soviets would put the Japanese back under siege after they destroy the field armies in Russia and possibly attack into China and Korea. Once the Japanese are surrounded, the Soviet guns will blast them until the infantry and tanks force them out. The Soviet fleet is no threat to the Japanese, they don't need to attack it.

Ideally if you want to tie down a large force, you want to do so without sacrificing their own army to do so. the entire Japanese army is the only force large enough to constitute a major threat to the Soviet army in the far east. If the Soviets put together a major attack they will roll over the Japanese, who will then have nothing to show for it. Germany only interest in Japan as an ally is as a diversion to keep the Allies occupied. They would be more then happy to let the Japanese hang out to dry and get slaughtered.

[Jon G.]

I am not claiming that they would achieve any spectacular victories. They would simply tie the Soviet troops which were historically transferred to the west which would help the Germans much...

What exactly would be in it for the Japanese, though? As the numbers I provided upthread show, Sakhalin's oil - a mere 6% of the Dutch East Indies supply, and Japan already had access to half of it - was far from enough to cover Japan's needs.

And do you think that Japanese leaders would think in terms of tying Soviet troops down in order to keep them away from Europe? What happened when Japan was embroiled in a developing border war with the Soviet Union in 1939? Oh yeah, their faithful ally Germany signed a pact with Stalin. So apart from dubious incentives to go to war with the USSR, Japan also had to contend with an ally who put self-interest above commitments to the Axis. Based on the historical record rather than misguided analogies with the Japanese capture of Malaya and Singapore, Japan's recent experience with fighting the Soviets was not positive.

[ThomasG]

What exactly would be in it for the Japanese, though? As the numbers I provided upthread show, Sakhalin's oil - a mere 6% of the Dutch East Indies supply, and Japan already had access to half of it - was far from enough to cover Japan's needs.

Japan annexes huge tracts of Siberian territory and obtains an oil supply from the Soviet Union after the negotiated peace.

And do you think that Japanese leaders would think in terms of tying Soviet troops down in order to keep them away from Europe?

That would be their main function in practice. Japan of course desires and can get the Soviet territories.

What happened when Japan was embroiled in a developing border war with the Soviet Union in 1939? Oh yeah, their faithful ally Germany signed a pact with Stalin. So apart from dubious incentives to go to war with the USSR, Japan also had to contend with an ally who put self-interest above commitments to the Axis.

Germany was not Japan's ally in 1939 as the Tripartite pact had not yet been signed. Your comment about Germany following her self-interest is irrelevant if you don't explain how this could harm the Japanese.

Based on the historical record rather than misguided analogies with the Japanese capture of Malaya and Singapore, Japan's recent experience with fighting the Soviets was not positive.

The war against Soviets would be a small risk compared to the war against the US which had a powerful navy and the potential to threaten even Mainland Japan.

Again, the war with the Soviet Union is the only reasonable option for the Japanese. If the Japanese leadership had common sense they would know that a war with the US could only lead to a defeat. Neutrality was not an option because of the oil embargo. Appeasement towards the US was politically impossible. The only way to win the war was to fight with the Germans against the Soviet Union.

[Andreas]

I am not claiming that they would achieve any spectacular victories. They would simply tie the Soviet troops which were historically transferred to the west which would help the Germans much.

Not if the Red Army hands them a crushing defeat in short order as they did in 1939, which is at least possible.

All the best

Andreas

[Esa K]

...I think I lack some pieces of info to grasp this, but did the German high command ever, before the Siberian divisons actually arrived to the battlefield, calculate with the possibility that Soviet Union would/could transfer the troops from the Far East to Europe? And if not, how would that gain Japan then to start a new war with SU with the goal to only tie the Soviet troops there. Wouldnt a better option for Japan in a what if war with SU instead of USA, be to wait untill Germany had crushed SU and then just to "walk" into Siberia and take what they wanted in the area...

And, another thought, no Japanese war with USA, wouldnt that mean no war with UK/Commonwelth, and that would mean that the British resources instead of used in the Pacific could be used in greater extent in the Med and North-atlantic areas...?

Well in the end questions, and no answers...

Best regards

Esa K

[Andreas]

And, another thought, no Japanese war with USA, wouldnt that mean no war with UK/Commonwelth, and that would mean that the British resources instead of used in the Pacific could be used in greater extent in the Med and North-atlantic areas...?

A very good point, actually. No war in the Far East would mean that Axis forces may face a very real risk of being turfed out of North Africa completely in Jan/Feb 1942, or interned in Tunisia, since Operation ACROBAT (the follow-on to CRUSADER) could go ahead. It would also mean that naval units originally sent to the Far East would be available to replace the damaged/sunk cruisers of Force K and the damaged battleships in Alexandria.

All the best

Andreas

[LWD]

What exactly would be in it for the Japanese, though? As the numbers I provided upthread show, Sakhalin's oil - a mere 6% of the Dutch East Indies supply, and Japan already had access to half of it - was far from enough to cover Japan's needs.

Japan annexes huge tracts of Siberian territory and obtains an oil supply from the Soviet Union after the negotiated peace.

Hugh tracks of Siberian land that are mostly useful for lumber and fur at least from what they knew at the time. As for oil. Japan is going to run out some time in 42 if they go to war in the Spring or early summer of 41. There is little possibility that the Soviets will be defeated and a peace treaty signed before the end of 41. Even if they could get oil concessions how long would it take for them to start recieving any significant quantity of Soviet oil? Well into 42 at best and probably 43 or later. In the mean time they have no strategic flexability at all during 42 and the US and allies are in a much stronger position than the historical case.

...
Germany was not Japan's ally in 1939 as the Tripartite pact had not yet been signed. Your comment about Germany following her self-interest is irrelevant if you don't explain how this could harm the Japanese.

Well once Germany and the Soviets are no longer fighting the Japanese have to be at least a little nervous about what the Soviets will do.

Based on the historical record rather than misguided analogies with the Japanese capture of Malaya and Singapore, Japan's recent experience with fighting the Soviets was not positive.

The war against Soviets would be a small risk compared to the war against the US which had a powerful navy and the potential to threaten even Mainland Japan.
[/quote]
There is no guarantee that the US won't get in the war. There is also a very good chane that most of the Japanese army will be destroyed . Fighting the Soviet Union and China on the ground in east Asia with the US supplying and under writing them doesn't seem like an intelligent thing to do for a relativly small country. Especially when the US is likely to take a more and more active roll.

Again, the war with the Soviet Union is the only reasonable option for the Japanese. If the Japanese leadership had common sense they would know that a war with the US could only lead to a defeat. Neutrality was not an option because of the oil embargo. Appeasement towards the US was politically impossible. The only way to win the war was to fight with the Germans against the Soviet Union.

If you look at the progressivly worsenting realtions between the US and Japan this is probably the most disasterous possible course. The entry of the US is all but guaranteed and the chance of the Japanese getting in a surprise knockout blow is just about nil. It just about guarantees a quicker and more complete defeat than the historical case.

[Lkefct]

I think the key thing is in the Japanese (and other powers) that the thinking doesn't tend to include a countries potential to produce military power, it just tends to focus on what is at hand. The Germans underestimated Soviet military power in the sense that they quickly destroyed the pre-war Soviet army, yet where still fighting hundreds of Soviet divisions. The Japanese expected to take the US fleet by surprise and destroy it. Using their own pace for rebuilding military vessels, it would be virtually impossible to rebuild a fleet. In hindsight, we know that is absurd. The US quickly built a new fleet as well as an army and air force and still had enough time to get them in action. But I don't think that was obvious to just about anyone at the time. By Japanese and virtually any other power's time frame, it would take a decade or more to rebuild an entire fleet.

On land, things move at a much different time frame and given the lack of Japanese preparation for a land war, and that the Soviets can easily build a much larger force, it is hard to imagine that they could not crush the Japanese in a series of major land battles. If nothing else, Japan would need to withdrawal out of much of China in order to free up men and material in order to put together any reasonable force that can challenge the Soviets. Given the "other" (read non-oil based) raw materials for Japanese industry come from China, that is not a reasonable thing to do.

The Japanese can only hope to tie down a sizable force, but cannot win a decisive victory themselves due to the Geography. But the Soviets can deliver a lethal blow and destroy the bulk of the Japanese land army in a single campaign. Since the might of the Japanese empire is their navy, it would also imply that the Japanese have wasted their time preparing for such a battle.

[JonS]

What exactly would be in it for the Japanese, though? As the numbers I provided upthread show, Sakhalin's oil - a mere 6% of the Dutch East Indies supply, and Japan already had access to half of it - was far from enough to cover Japan's needs.

Japan annexes huge tracts of Siberian territory and obtains an oil supply from the Soviet Union after the negotiated peace.

Hugh tracks of Siberian land that are mostly useful for lumber and fur at least from what they knew at the time. As for oil. Japan is going to run out some time in 42 if they go to war in the Spring or early summer of 41. There is little possibility that the Soviets will be defeated and a peace treaty signed before the end of 41. Even if they could get oil concessions how long would it take for them to start recieving any significant quantity of Soviet oil? Well into 42 at best and probably 43 or later. In the mean time they have no strategic flexability at all during 42 and the US and allies are in a much stronger position than the historical case.

Easy - after their victory the Japanese invent a time travel machine and send the oil they need to acheive victory back in time so they can acheive the victory they need to create the time machine to send themselves the oil.

What? It makes at least as much sense as the rest of this thread.

[TRose]

People should also look at the structure and weapons of a typical Japanese infantry division and those of the Soviet Union at that time. Although the Terrain in Mongolia and parts of Northern China are good tank country, there also a lot of swamp and taiga to fight over in Siberia.
The Soviet Division has much more firepower then the Japanese division from sub machine guns, which the Soviet have plenty of and the Japanese almost zero to artillery in which the Japanese have to make due with just 36 75 mm guns to the Soviets 32 122 guns 12 152 guns, I think the Japanese would have a tough time with the superior Soviet fire power.

[Jon G.]

What exactly would be in it for the Japanese, though? As the numbers I provided upthread show, Sakhalin's oil - a mere 6% of the Dutch East Indies supply, and Japan already had access to half of it - was far from enough to cover Japan's needs.

Japan annexes huge tracts of Siberian territory and obtains an oil supply from the Soviet Union after the negotiated peace.

Japan already has huge tracts of Chinese territory, and why would she aim for winning a war in which an oil supply might be part of the peace treaty? Why not bargain for oil without going to war? Or take the Dutch East Indian oil? The 1925 accord over Sakhalin indeed did give Japan some oil, albeit not much.

And do you think that Japanese leaders would think in terms of tying Soviet troops down in order to keep them away from Europe?

That would be their main function in practice. Japan of course desires and can get the Soviet territories.

Why does Japan desire Soviet territories?

What happened when Japan was embroiled in a developing border war with the Soviet Union in 1939? Oh yeah, their faithful ally Germany signed a pact with Stalin. So apart from dubious incentives to go to war with the USSR, Japan also had to contend with an ally who put self-interest above commitments to the Axis.

Germany was not Japan's ally in 1939 as the Tripartite pact had not yet been signed. Your comment about Germany following her self-interest is irrelevant if you don't explain how this could harm the Japanese.

No, the Tripartite pact had not yet been signed in 1939 - but the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed in 1936, making Germany and Japan allies.

Germany's subsequent signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact 1) deprived Japan of her European ally while she was in the middle of a serious border skirmish with the USSR, and 2) demonstrated that Germany was not trustworthy. That harmed Japan. It may also have caused second thoughts (along with the outcome of the Khalkin Gol battle) about the wisdom of striking at the USSR with an ally that could not be trusted.

Based on the historical record rather than misguided analogies with the Japanese capture of Malaya and Singapore, Japan's recent experience with fighting the Soviets was not positive.

The war against Soviets would be a small risk compared to the war against the US which had a powerful navy and the potential to threaten even Mainland Japan.

Japan was willing to risk war with the US in order to gain access to old European colonial possessions at the negotiating table. War with the USSR might have been less risky - note however that Japan had many mainland Asian territories which could potentially be lost - but the rewards would also have been correspondingly smalller. Quite apart from the fact that attacking the USSR because the US has initiated an economic blockade on you is illogical.

Again, the war with the Soviet Union is the only reasonable option for the Japanese. If the Japanese leadership had common sense they would know that a war with the US could only lead to a defeat.Neutrality was not an option because of the oil embargo. Appeasement towards the US was politically impossible. The only way to win the war was to fight with the Germans against the Soviet Union.

How does going to war with the Soviet Union guarantee that Japan will not end up being at war with the US as well? And how does going to war with the USSR break the American blockade of Japan? Why would Japan want Soviet oil at the negotiating table if the Dutch East Indian oil was there for the taking?