"Czechoslovakia '38-What If They'd Fought?"

[lahoda]

Really the idea of the military staging a coup against Hitler seems more like a postwar construction. The military did not strike a coup after Hitler's first failure in Austria and did not lift a finger after the disasters of Stalingrad, Kursk and Bagration.

We can only speculate if such coup would happen or not, but as Carl stated, there was quite a lot of evidence that it was not fake. Hitler replaced Bloomberg and Fritsch as the result of the Hossbach Memorandum conference - the of (lack of) support of war in 1937-8 is evident, and Hitler's position was quite weak, it all changed after the Munich in September 1938, his success of getting Czechoslovakia without a shot was highly regarded (plus Hitler replaced Bloomberg and Fritsch). What was Hitler's first failure in Austria?

Regarding the possibilities that Czechoslovakia had, it is really unlikely that they would resist more than Poland with half the population and much less territory to withdraw.

The situation in 1938 and 1939 was quite different, for multiple reasons:

- German army was much weaker in 1938 : they lacked training (extra year was huge, both for experience and strength of units) - They had more than 2 mil. soldiers in Polish campaign, but this could be 50-75% in 1938. The Czechoslovak army mobilized into 1.2 mil. strength, which was more than what Polish army had (<1 mil.) The same goes for equipment, few examples: in 1938, Luftwaffe had around 500 Bf-109 of B,C,D variants (weak engines and armament) as well as Ar-68 and He-51 in frontline service against 370 B-534, in 1939 Luftwaffe had Bf-109E, which was much stronger. There were about 2000 tanks in Wehrmacht in 1938, but less than 100 were modern Pzkw-3 and Pzkw-4 types, Czechoslovakia had 350 more modern. tanks. In 1939 Poland had almost 500 tanks but Wehrmacht had 2500 tanks, including Lt-35 and Lt-38 from Czechoslovakia.

- The border terrain was much more favorable for defense in Czechoslovakia, compared to most of the terrain in Poland. Czechoslovakia had a system of fortifications (not complete, but functional and valuable), which Poland lacked.

- there was a strategic depth. Czechoslovak military planned to shorten the front and withdraw eastwards. Loss of capital was expected and would not constitute an end to the war. Germans would see huge casualties when overcoming the border (fortifications), their logistic stretched and have to fight against army of similar size on relatively short front, once again in a favorable terrain (Moravian Highlands, Slovak border mountains)

- It was unlikely Czechoslovakia would see second front (like Poland did being attacked by the USSR), Romania and Yugoslavia would keep Hungary in check, and USSR could possibly deliver some help, such as airplanes.

- German economic situation was much worse in 1938, the gained a lot by seizing Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

[ljadw]

Intentions have no importance in treaties . The only thing that counts is what is written . And in the French/CZ treaty it was not written that France would fight if there was a war between CZ and Germany . Thus France had no obligation at all .
Treaties have not more value than the paper that is used to write them . No one fights because of a treaty .
There was also the risk of a war between Poland and CZ,both allies of France .Who should France help ? And how could it help one of both ?
France had the choice between
A To persist to enforce Versailles and StGermain, which it could not do and for which there was no reason and what people in France refused to do .
or
B Face and accept reality ,which was that sooner or later Germany would rearm and dominate Central Europe ,as it did before 1918 .
And the question was : was this good,bad or neutral for France ? NOT :was this good ,bad or neutral for Poland or CZ .
The French were and are realists :at the end of the 1920s they accepted that times had changed and that Germany would become again a great power who would dominate Central Europe and the French took the logical decision to fortify their border and to no longer expect any help from Poland and CZ .
Poland and CZ can be blamed because they refused to admit reality which was that if there was a war. they would have to chose between Hitler or Stalin .If Germany was defeated Stalin would rule in Warsaw and Prague .If Stalin was defeated, Hitler would rule in Prague and Warsaw .
The only thing that could save Poland and CZ was the status quo .But to save the status quo,war would be needed .
The problem was insoluble .
As Chamberlain wrote to his sisters during the Sudeten crisis :we can only wage a war of revanche which will destroy Europe and the problem will still persist = the refusal of 3 million + Sudeten Germans to remain in CZ and their wish to become a part of Germany .

[ljadw]

Really the idea of the military staging a coup against Hitler seems more like a postwar construction. The military did not strike a coup after Hitler's first failure in Austria and did not lift a finger after the disasters of Stalingrad, Kursk and Bagration.

We can only speculate if such coup would happen or not, but as Carl stated, there was quite a lot of evidence that it was not fake. Hitler replaced Bloomberg and Fritsch as the result of the Hossbach Memorandum conference - the of (lack of) support of war in 1937-8 is evident, and Hitler's position was quite weak, it all changed after the Munich in September 1938, his success of getting Czechoslovakia without a shot was highly regarded (plus Hitler replaced Bloomberg and Fritsch). What was Hitler's first failure in Austria?

Regarding the possibilities that Czechoslovakia had, it is really unlikely that they would resist more than Poland with half the population and much less territory to withdraw.

The situation in 1938 and 1939 was quite different, for multiple reasons:

- German army was much weaker in 1938 : they lacked training (extra year was huge, both for experience and strength of units) - They had more than 2 mil. soldiers in Polish campaign, but this could be 50-75% in 1938. The Czechoslovak army mobilized into 1.2 mil. strength, which was more than what Polish army had (<1 mil.) The same goes for equipment, few examples: in 1938, Luftwaffe had around 500 Bf-109 of B,C,D variants (weak engines and armament) as well as Ar-68 and He-51 in frontline service against 370 B-534, in 1939 Luftwaffe had Bf-109E, which was much stronger. There were about 2000 tanks in Wehrmacht in 1938, but less than 100 were modern Pzkw-3 and Pzkw-4 types, Czechoslovakia had 350 more modern. tanks. In 1939 Poland had almost 500 tanks but Wehrmacht had 2500 tanks, including Lt-35 and Lt-38 from Czechoslovakia.

- The border terrain was much more favorable for defense in Czechoslovakia, compared to most of the terrain in Poland. Czechoslovakia had a system of fortifications (not complete, but functional and valuable), which Poland lacked.

- there was a strategic depth. Czechoslovak military planned to shorten the front and withdraw eastwards. Loss of capital was expected and would not constitute an end to the war. Germans would see huge casualties when overcoming the border (fortifications), their logistic stretched and have to fight against army of similar size on relatively short front, once again in a favorable terrain (Moravian Highlands, Slovak border mountains)

- It was unlikely Czechoslovakia would see second front (like Poland did being attacked by the USSR), Romania and Yugoslavia would keep Hungary in check, and USSR could possibly deliver some help, such as airplanes.

- German economic situation was much worse in 1938, the gained a lot by seizing Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

Hitler'first failure in Austria was the failed Nazi coup in Austria from 1934 in which Dollfuss was killed .

[ljadw]

Really the idea of the military staging a coup against Hitler seems more like a postwar construction. The military did not strike a coup after Hitler's first failure in Austria and did not lift a finger after the disasters of Stalingrad, Kursk and Bagration.

We can only speculate if such coup would happen or not, but as Carl stated, there was quite a lot of evidence that it was not fake. Hitler replaced Bloomberg and Fritsch as the result of the Hossbach Memorandum conference - the of (lack of) support of war in 1937-8 is evident, and Hitler's position was quite weak, it all changed after the Munich in September 1938, his success of getting Czechoslovakia without a shot was highly regarded (plus Hitler replaced Bloomberg and Fritsch). What was Hitler's first failure in Austria?

Regarding the possibilities that Czechoslovakia had, it is really unlikely that they would resist more than Poland with half the population and much less territory to withdraw.

The situation in 1938 and 1939 was quite different, for multiple reasons:

- German army was much weaker in 1938 : they lacked training (extra year was huge, both for experience and strength of units) - They had more than 2 mil. soldiers in Polish campaign, but this could be 50-75% in 1938. The Czechoslovak army mobilized into 1.2 mil. strength, which was more than what Polish army had (<1 mil.) The same goes for equipment, few examples: in 1938, Luftwaffe had around 500 Bf-109 of B,C,D variants (weak engines and armament) as well as Ar-68 and He-51 in frontline service against 370 B-534, in 1939 Luftwaffe had Bf-109E, which was much stronger. There were about 2000 tanks in Wehrmacht in 1938, but less than 100 were modern Pzkw-3 and Pzkw-4 types, Czechoslovakia had 350 more modern. tanks. In 1939 Poland had almost 500 tanks but Wehrmacht had 2500 tanks, including Lt-35 and Lt-38 from Czechoslovakia.

- The border terrain was much more favorable for defense in Czechoslovakia, compared to most of the terrain in Poland. Czechoslovakia had a system of fortifications (not complete, but functional and valuable), which Poland lacked.

- there was a strategic depth. Czechoslovak military planned to shorten the front and withdraw eastwards. Loss of capital was expected and would not constitute an end to the war. Germans would see huge casualties when overcoming the border (fortifications), their logistic stretched and have to fight against army of similar size on relatively short front, once again in a favorable terrain (Moravian Highlands, Slovak border mountains)

- It was unlikely Czechoslovakia would see second front (like Poland did being attacked by the USSR), Romania and Yugoslavia would keep Hungary in check, and USSR could possibly deliver some help, such as airplanes.

- German economic situation was much worse in 1938, the gained a lot by seizing Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

There is no proof that the military had the intention to overthrow Hitler if there was a war with CZ .
Germany's economic situation was not worse in 1938 than in 1939 .
There were no Czech fortifications at the border with Austria .
And CZ did nothing to save Austria, thus France had no obligation or interest to save CZ .
CZ had 15 million inhabitants of whom some 50 % + Czechs : 8 million Czechs faced 75 million Germans .Who would win ?
The Czech plans to give up Bohemia and Moravia and to continue the war in Slovakia where there was no enthusiasm to fight for the Czechs,indicate a total lack of realism .

[lahoda]

There is no proof that the military had the intention to overthrow Hitler if there was a war with CZ .
Germany's economic situation was not worse in 1938 than in 1939 .
There were no Czech fortifications at the border with Austria .
And CZ did nothing to save Austria, thus France had no obligation or interest to save CZ .
CZ had 15 million inhabitants of whom some 50 % + Czechs : 8 million Czechs faced 75 million Germans .Who would win ?
The Czech plans to give up Bohemia and Moravia and to continue the war in Slovakia where there was no enthusiasm to fight for the Czechs,indicate a total lack of realism .

Perhaps you should back your claims with some sources. Most of them are not true.

Picking one of them:

There were no Czech fortifications at the border with Austria .

Not sure where this comes from but the fortification line was built on entire border line with former Austria. See the attached map, it only shows objects that were actually built.

There is a list of objects built on the border with Austria only:

https://www.fronta.cz/omyl/predvalecne- ... -rakouskem

[ljadw]

There is no proof that the military had the intention to overthrow Hitler if there was a war with CZ .
Germany's economic situation was not worse in 1938 than in 1939 .
There were no Czech fortifications at the border with Austria .
And CZ did nothing to save Austria, thus France had no obligation or interest to save CZ .
CZ had 15 million inhabitants of whom some 50 % + Czechs : 8 million Czechs faced 75 million Germans .Who would win ?
The Czech plans to give up Bohemia and Moravia and to continue the war in Slovakia where there was no enthusiasm to fight for the Czechs,indicate a total lack of realism .

Perhaps you should back your claims with some sources. Most of them are not true.

Picking one of them:

There were no Czech fortifications at the border with Austria .

Not sure where this comes from but the fortification line was built on entire border line with former Austria. See the attached map, it only shows objects that were actually built.

There is a list of objects built on the border with Austria only:

https://www.fronta.cz/omyl/predvalecne- ... -rakouskem

The fortifications at the Austrian border were built only after the Anschluss and they could thus not have any serious importance in a period of 6 months .
Your map does not say when the fortifications were built and they were built in a region inhabited by ethnic Germans .
Besides : the result of the Anschluss was that the border with Germany was increased by 550 km . It was impossible to fortify 550 km and to man these fortifications in 6 months .

[lahoda]

The fortifications at the Austrian border were built only after the Anschluss and they could thus not have any serious importance in a period of 6 months .
Your map does not say when the fortifications were built and they were built in a region inhabited by ethnic Germans .
Besides : the result of the Anschluss was that the border with Germany was increased by 550 km . It was impossible to fortify 550 km and to man these fortifications in 6 months .

So you admit that fortifications were built even on the border with Austria? Does this mean that your previous post:

There were no Czech fortifications at the border with Austria .

is not true?

Besides, what is the point of the fortifications being only a couple of months old? Or they don't count because there were living German-speaking citizens near-by? There were also dense Forrests which were perhaps centuries old and steep mountains which were millions of years old which would make mechanized attack impossible in many areas - Germans would have to try to pierce through in predictable spots and thus they won't have local numerical superiority...very different from situation in Poland.

I don't want to discount that there were problems, as this line was built in hurry, and the heavy objects that only were planned needed to be replaced by field units (artillery), but the line was there and Germans would have to find a way through. Based on the reports of German army past October 1938, they had just a naive way how to cope with the fortification line which would most likely fail - i.e. German army had no knowledge that fortifications had systems to guide the firepower even without sight - there would be massive casualties as a result.
That was a stark difference between situation in Czechoslovakia in 1938 and Poland in 1939.

Germany could have 75 millions of citizens, but they had no conscription until 1935, so they didn't have enough trained soldiers and this also improved with an extra year of training.

Those are the facts, and sure you can choose to ignore them, but it stays what it is: just IGNORANCE.

[gebhk]

Hi Iahoda

I would agree with you that for a host of reasons Chechoslovakia's military position in 1938 was much better than that of Poland in 1939 - non least in the crucial air power balance and artillery sectors. That is unquestionable. However in the long run either by itself or even in alliance with Poland, the economic indicators are that Germany was going to emerge victorious. Not even an alliance with France or Britain alone would change that.

[ljadw]

No : it is the opposite : the position of CZ was worse in 1938 than the position of Poland in 1939 .
CZ had no ally and morally the German position was very strong .
Poland had the USSR as a possible ''ally '' and the Germans in the territories claimed by Berlin were only a minority
The Czechs were 55 % of the population of CZ ,the other 45 % were hostile to the CZ state they considered as a Czech state .
Poles were 65 % of the population and the others were also hostile ,but they were a less danger for Poland .
CZ was doomed even if it won the war .Poland also ,but war between Poland and Germany was out of the question .
Till the treaty between Germany and the USSR,war between Germany and Poland was very unlikely and everyone considered a treaty between Hitler and Stalin as totally impossible .
To capture Sudetenland ,Hitler had also to capture Bohemia -Moravia and Slovakia ,which till 1918 were a part of the empire of Austria and Hungary.
To capture the territories lost by Prussia in 1918, Hitler had to capture the rest (=main part ) of Poland that never had been a part of Prussia but that till 1918 was a part of Russia .And for this ,he needed the approval of Stalin .
The Czech army would be forced to abandon the Czech territories and to emigrate to Slovakia where the population would not support her .
The Polish army would not emigrate to Polish Ukraine .
It was much easier for the 75 million Germans to dominate 8 million Czechs than to dominate 24 million Poles .
And the alliance with France (there was no alliance of CZ with Britain ) would change nothing, as the only thing France could do was to wage a war of revenge which would still end with the presence of 3,5 million Germans in CZ.France could not prevent the conquest of CZ by Germany .

[ljadw]

The fortifications at the Austrian border were built only after the Anschluss and they could thus not have any serious importance in a period of 6 months .
Your map does not say when the fortifications were built and they were built in a region inhabited by ethnic Germans .
Besides : the result of the Anschluss was that the border with Germany was increased by 550 km . It was impossible to fortify 550 km and to man these fortifications in 6 months .

So you admit that fortifications were built even on the border with Austria? Does this mean that your previous post:

There were no Czech fortifications at the border with Austria .

is not true?

Besides, what is the point of the fortifications being only a couple of months old? Or they don't count because there were living German-speaking citizens near-by? There were also dense Forrests which were perhaps centuries old and steep mountains which were millions of years old which would make mechanized attack impossible in many areas - Germans would have to try to pierce through in predictable spots and thus they won't have local numerical superiority...very different from situation in Poland.

I don't want to discount that there were problems, as this line was built in hurry, and the heavy objects that only were planned needed to be replaced by field units (artillery), but the line was there and Germans would have to find a way through. Based on the reports of German army past October 1938, they had just a naive way how to cope with the fortification line which would most likely fail - i.e. German army had no knowledge that fortifications had systems to guide the firepower even without sight - there would be massive casualties as a result.
That was a stark difference between situation in Czechoslovakia in 1938 and Poland in 1939.

Germany could have 75 millions of citizens, but they had no conscription until 1935, so they didn't have enough trained soldiers and this also improved with an extra year of training.

Those are the facts, and sure you can choose to ignore them, but it stays what it is: just IGNORANCE.

I see that you remain silent about the possibility that the Czechs had the money,raw materials and manpower to build in a few months fortifications in regions where there were no fortifications and where the population was hostile to the Czechs .
The the claim that Germany had not enough trained soldiers (what is : not enough ? ) to defeat the Czech army ,because conscription existed only since 1935 ,is
A unproved
B very questionable .
Conscription since 4 years or 5 years does not decide the outcome of a war .
And : the 1,2 million manpower of CZ is also questionable as it includes the manpower of 5 million Germans and Slovaks .
Last point : if the Czechs were that strong and also stronger than Poland, why did they not fight ?
Poland fought.The Czechs did not fight .
The explanations are
1 The Czechs were not that strong as they claimed : they said that they had 40 divisions,while Britain had only 2 divisions ,but still they blamed Britain .
2 Winning the war would not change the strategic position of CZ
3 The Czechs knew that Hitler would attack if they said no,while the Poles thought that he bluffed .
Conclusion : there is no reason to blame France and Britain for Munich .

[ljadw]

It is not so ,as is claimed in post 136,that Hitler replaced Blomberg and Fritsch because of the Hossbach conference Memorandum .
The position of Blomberg was unsustainable after the leaks about the private life of his wife .
And the allegations about Fritsch made it impossible to keep him as commander of the army .
There is also no proof that one of both or both opposed the plans/propositions/ideas/intentions ( of which we have little reliable information ) expressed by Hitler during the conference of November 1937 ( almost a year before Munich ! )

[lahoda]

I would agree with you that for a host of reasons Chechoslovakia's military position in 1938 was much better than that of Poland in 1939 - non least in the crucial air power balance and artillery sectors. That is unquestionable. However in the long run either by itself or even in alliance with Poland, the economic indicators are that Germany was going to emerge victorious. Not even an alliance with France or Britain alone would change that.

What are the economic indicators you are talking about? While Germany was recovering from depression which brought Hitler to power and managed to eradicate unemployment and ramp-up (mostly military) production, the economy was on the brink of collapse in 1938. Hitler needed to do Anschluss of Austria (and seize its gold) he needed a war with Czechoslovakia in fall 1938 and as this was not happening (as Munich agreement "only" gave him borderlands with limited industrial base and wealth), he was pretty much forced to start massive extractions from the Jewish population to survive the winter. He managed to get rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and once again - seized the the wealth of the country, which allowed to keep the military production to grow to be able to attack Poland then France and then USSR.

It was like a delicate chain of events that could be broken at any point and had the war happened in 1938 the Germany's only chance for success was a rapid collapse of Czechoslovakia in matter of days. Had Czechoslovakia gotten support from France (at least on the par of what Poland was getting in 1939, i.e. declaration of war on Germany and forcing them to keep substantial part of the army on the western border) and given the much weaker German army in 1938 (compared to what it was in 1939), Germans were not that likely to pull that off. They were economically unable to wage a war of attrition where Germany and its 75 millions of citizens would prevail over Czechoslovakia with 15 million of citizens and smaller industrial base.

There is a nice video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=go2OFpO8fyo) on Germany pre-war economy and Hitler's reasons for his activities, it is rather long but around 19:00 there is explanation why they were forced to expand and export their hidden inflation or face collapse.

I think the economic collapse and fall of Hitler's regime was the most likely outcome in fall 1938 or spring 1939 at the latest, had Chamberlain spared his personal "piece of our time" initiative. Hitler was extremely lucky there and the whole world got horrors of WW II as a result.

[gebhk]

What are the economic indicators you are talking about?

GDP is a very good indicator of who will emerge victorious from a war, particularly if it becomes a total war of attrition. In billions international dollars 1990, Germany's in 1938 was 351. Czechoslovakia's was 30. Even the addition of Poland (77), France (186) and France's colonies (if they could be mobilised in time - 48) was not enough to tip the balance. Only the fully mobilised resources of Great Britain, her colonies and dominions were a game changer.

If indeed such a coalition could be mounted, then it is reasonable to assume that Germany would have been defeated - eventually, albeit not without a fair amount of death and destruction - and, I have little doubt, Czechoslovakia would have suffered significantly more than she, in fact, did. The fly in the ointment is that it is difficult to imagine that Uncle Joe would not take such a splendid opportunity to help himself to what he wanted. So the end result would, likely, have been much the same or worse but at much greater cost to Chechoslovakia.

Ultimately, therefore (and here I have to agree with Ijadw) it is difficult to see, just as in the case of Poland, any ouctcomes other than either Hitler or Stalin ruling from Prague and Warsaw respectively. The only question was how to avoid as much death and destruction in the process as possible. I think Prague chose wisely.

[ljadw]

I would agree with you that for a host of reasons Chechoslovakia's military position in 1938 was much better than that of Poland in 1939 - non least in the crucial air power balance and artillery sectors. That is unquestionable. However in the long run either by itself or even in alliance with Poland, the economic indicators are that Germany was going to emerge victorious. Not even an alliance with France or Britain alone would change that.

What are the economic indicators you are talking about? While Germany was recovering from depression which brought Hitler to power and managed to eradicate unemployment and ramp-up (mostly military) production, the economy was on the brink of collapse in 1938. Hitler needed to do Anschluss of Austria (and seize its gold) he needed a war with Czechoslovakia in fall 1938 and as this was not happening (as Munich agreement "only" gave him borderlands with limited industrial base and wealth), he was pretty much forced to start massive extractions from the Jewish population to survive the winter. He managed to get rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and once again - seized the the wealth of the country, which allowed to keep the military production to grow to be able to attack Poland then France and then USSR.

It was like a delicate chain of events that could be broken at any point and had the war happened in 1938 the Germany's only chance for success was a rapid collapse of Czechoslovakia in matter of days. Had Czechoslovakia gotten support from France (at least on the par of what Poland was getting in 1939, i.e. declaration of war on Germany and forcing them to keep substantial part of the army on the western border) and given the much weaker German army in 1938 (compared to what it was in 1939), Germans were not that likely to pull that off. They were economically unable to wage a war of attrition where Germany and its 75 millions of citizens would prevail over Czechoslovakia with 15 million of citizens and smaller industrial base.

There is a nice video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=go2OFpO8fyo) on Germany pre-war economy and Hitler's reasons for his activities, it is rather long but around 19:00 there is explanation why they were forced to expand and export their hidden inflation or face collapse.

I think the economic collapse and fall of Hitler's regime was the most likely outcome in fall 1938 or spring 1939 at the latest, had Chamberlain spared his personal "piece of our time" initiative. Hitler was extremely lucky there and the whole world got horrors of WW II as a result.

1 There is no proof at all that Germany's economy was on the brink of collaps in 1938 .
2 The Anschluss and the annexation of Sudetenland did not happen for economic reasons
3 The taxes on the remaining Jewish Germans after the Kristallnacht had no influence of the German economic situation .
4 There is no proof that the attacks on France and the USSR would have failed without the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia .
5 There was no reason for France to risk a war to help CZ. War or no war depended on the Czechs only . If they accepted Hitler's demands, there was no war, if not there was a war between Germany and CZ, followed by a French DOW on Germany,but this DOW would not help CZ .
Besides : as CZ did nothing to help its neighbor Austria in February 1938, why would France help CZ in October 1938 ?
Last point : Hitler did not need and even did not want war with CZ .

[pugsville]

I would agree with you that for a host of reasons Chechoslovakia's military position in 1938 was much better than that of Poland in 1939 - non least in the crucial air power balance and artillery sectors. That is unquestionable. However in the long run either by itself or even in alliance with Poland, the economic indicators are that Germany was going to emerge victorious. Not even an alliance with France or Britain alone would change that.

What are the economic indicators you are talking about? While Germany was recovering from depression which brought Hitler to power and managed to eradicate unemployment and ramp-up (mostly military) production, the economy was on the brink of collapse in 1938. Hitler needed to do Anschluss of Austria (and seize its gold) he needed a war with Czechoslovakia in fall 1938 and as this was not happening (as Munich agreement "only" gave him borderlands with limited industrial base and wealth), he was pretty much forced to start massive extractions from the Jewish population to survive the winter. He managed to get rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and once again - seized the the wealth of the country, which allowed to keep the military production to grow to be able to attack Poland then France and then USSR.

It was like a delicate chain of events that could be broken at any point and had the war happened in 1938 the Germany's only chance for success was a rapid collapse of Czechoslovakia in matter of days. Had Czechoslovakia gotten support from France (at least on the par of what Poland was getting in 1939, i.e. declaration of war on Germany and forcing them to keep substantial part of the army on the western border) and given the much weaker German army in 1938 (compared to what it was in 1939), Germans were not that likely to pull that off. They were economically unable to wage a war of attrition where Germany and its 75 millions of citizens would prevail over Czechoslovakia with 15 million of citizens and smaller industrial base.

There is a nice video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=go2OFpO8fyo) on Germany pre-war economy and Hitler's reasons for his activities, it is rather long but around 19:00 there is explanation why they were forced to expand and export their hidden inflation or face collapse.

I think the economic collapse and fall of Hitler's regime was the most likely outcome in fall 1938 or spring 1939 at the latest, had Chamberlain spared his personal "piece of our time" initiative. Hitler was extremely lucky there and the whole world got horrors of WW II as a result.

1 There is no proof at all that Germany's economy was on the brink of collaps in 1938 .
2 The Anschluss and the annexation of Sudetenland did not happen for economic reasons
3 The taxes on the remaining Jewish Germans after the Kristallnacht had no influence of the German economic situation .
4 There is no proof that the attacks on France and the USSR would have failed without the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia .
5 There was no reason for France to risk a war to help CZ. War or no war depended on the Czechs only . If they accepted Hitler's demands, there was no war, if not there was a war between Germany and CZ, followed by a French DOW on Germany,but this DOW would not help CZ .
Besides : as CZ did nothing to help its neighbor Austria in February 1938, why would France help CZ in October 1938 ?
Last point : Hitler did not need and even did not want war with CZ .

France had reasons to risk a war to help CZ in 1938. The French were formally allied to break faith with Ally is significant evener.
It would cause the value of french influence and alliance to dramatically drop.

France needed allies. It's harder to get allies when you desert an ally in time of need.