What if - Air War 1938?

[Oleg Grigoryev]

Hi, oleg:

Hypothetically, how do you rate the USSR's chances against Poland in October 1938? Assuming no-one else intervenes?

Relatively quick conquest, long tough fight, or a repeat of 1920?

(Interested in other people's answers too!)

I'd say rather bloody but not excesevly long it probably would be over by the 1939. 12 thousand tanks kind of hard to stop.

[Stauffenberg II]

Don't know the make up of the army, but the make up of the Czech population as a whole was roughly 50% Czech, 30% Slovak, 10% Hungarian and 10% Ruthenian and Sudeten German.

Your guess is a bit wrong. Here is the official census result from Czechoslovakia (1921), immediately after the Grand war to represent roughly the originial composition:

Bohemia: 6.670.582 Inh., of which German: 2.173.239 (32,5 %)
Moravia: 2.662.884 Inh., of which German: 547.604 (20,5 %)
Czechosilesia: 672.268 Inh., of which German: 252.365 (37,5 %)
Slovakia: 3.024.556
Carpatho Russia: 581.059
Total (incl. foreigners) 13.611.349

There is roughly the following break down as per as 1921 (it depends on whether to include foreigners or not):

Czech: 51,1 %
German: 23,0 %
Slovaks: 14,7 %
Hungarians: 5,6 %
Ucrains: 3,5 %
Jews: 1,4 %
Poles: 0,6 %

Hope this helps a bit!

[painisgain]

I would imagine that any invasion would result in the quick overruning of Czech airfields thus rendering the Czech air force impotent.

There was a number of field airports. The main aircrafts (B 535, S 328, A 100 and to some extent SB 71) were light enough to operate from "a meadow". Bombing air strips would deplete LW of its very thin supply of bombs, that might provide crucial for a later stage of such war.
Another piece : weather sucked for most of October, there were not that many days where LW could fly at all.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Looks like this thread drifted away from the topic. I have a few questions pertaining to it. specififcally about the number of flight hours the typical German, French, or Cezch pilot had accumulated by October 1938. That would include any pre 'Luftwaffe' training in the Reichswehr years.

Second question would concern the total number of trained pilots in each air force, including reservists.

Finally, there were some number for the relative air strength given early in this thread, but they did not look complete. Anyone have any complete numbers for each of the three AF?

All that is relevant if the war lasts more than a few weeks. If it is interrupted by a German Army coup then much of this data, and things like aircraft specs are irrelevant to the outcome.

What would be relevant is the perception of the German generals. If they think the French are about to launcha aggresive bombing campaign it is likely to push the generals into a coup faster. What the actual French plans were is less important than what the generals are led to believe.

[painisgain]

Agree with Carl we should stick to original topic.
The actual number of planes on both sides are difficult to dig in, specially on the LW side. The common myth is that LW was close to the strength they showed in the Poland campaign in 1939, but this is far from truth.. LW was rearming heavily and weren't afraid to replace airplanes introduced relatively recently. Here is a table comparing the plane types in both campaigns. Source is Czech Air Enthusiast magazine from 1989, seems to be the most reliable source (comparing the other alternatives) :

............................ (ČSR campaign)1938.......1939(Polish campaign)................................
..........................................B-534 era............PZL-11 era..............................................
Heinkel He 111B.................... 219 ............. X
Heinkel He 111E.................... 141 ......... 38
Heinkel He 111F ..................... 30 ............. X
Heinkel He 111J....................... 78 ............. X
Heinkel He 111H......................... X ............400
Heinkel He 111 P..........................X.............349
Junkers Ju 86A/D/G................ 200 ............. X
Dornier Do 17E/M ........... cca 300 ........ 119 +40
Dornier Do 17Z.............................X............. 212
Junkers Ju 87 A ................. cca 120 ............ X
Junkers Ju 87 B.............................X............. 366
Junkers Ju 88A..............................X............. 18
Henschel Hs 123A.............. cca 150 ......... 40
Messerschmitt Bf 109B/C......... 510 ......... 36 (just C)
Messerschmitt Bf 109D................X.............. 389
Messerschmitt Bf 109E................X............... 631
Messerschmitt Bf 110C................X................ 68
Messerschmitt Bf 110D................X................ 27
Arado Ar 68E/F................... cca 400 .......... 28 ks (just F)
Dornier Do 17F/P................ cca 180 .......... 257 (just P/S)
Heinkel He 45M................... cca 150........... 14
Heinkel He 70F........................... 49..............X
Henschel Hs 126A-O.................. 42 ............ 275
Totals ..............................cca 2500 ...... cca 3300

[Carl Schwamberger]

Thanks for those numbers. My best guess is those represent aircraft accepted from the factories & not those 'built' but not yet passing hand over requirements. While a maximum effort at maintinance would have brought the available number to better than 95%, ordinary mechanical attrition & accidents would bring that back below 90% in the first week. If losses from the Polish campaign are any indicator the first week would see roughly 500 lost or unfit to fly after a few days.

"common myth is that LW was close to the strength they showed in the Poland campaign in 1939"

This applies to pilot training/experience as well. In theory there were a large number of veterans of the Spanish war. But, not as many as ten months later in August 1939. Also the rookie pilots do not seem to have had much flight time after their initial training. I dont have confirmed numbers for flight hours for any sir force in this question. What might be a good indicator would be the accident rate per flight hours for the Germans vs the French or Cezh. I know the German accident rate was fairly high post 1939.

[painisgain]

Those aircraft numbers are most likely those "ready for combat", definitely there was more aircrafts coming from the factory lines...note that Bf 109 D was missing from the list in 9/1938 although there were aircrafts produced. This was a dubious advantage of the Czechoslovakian Air force, having more obsolete airplanes meant that the logistic of them was well set and all the (repair) components were available. For luftwaffe, having new planes coming from the factories and having multiple models on service at the same time (Bf 109 B/C/D and E just around the corner) would be a major logistic headache, and it is hard to estimate how many of their airplanes would be operational or missing propellers, radios, gunsights etc.) Luftwaffe had a number of older Ar 68 / He 51 fighter planes (some of them still in the first line in 9/1938) and if they were forced to use them they were slightly inferior to Avia B-534.

Concerning the quality of the pilots, it is hard to get any reasonable numbers to compare. The "large number of veterans of the Spanish war" was not that large, and they were mostly in Spain in that particular time (in 9/1938 Luftwaffe was still waiting for the reorganisation to more modern structure) so they were not much of a factor. However German army was very young at that time and getting proper training was a problem. It is recorded that pilots only got a basic flight training and advanced/gunning was skipped in order to send them to their destination. Czechoslovak Air Force had no such problem, there were enough pilots who had a lot of training time, although they missed any (Spanish) fire baptism, but as evidenced in France and BoB campaigns, that was not a real problem and their quality was really well regarded. Although they spent bulk of the time working on flying in formations (of threes) instead of more appropriate gunning/acrobatics, I would say average Czechoslovak pilot Joe would be slightly more advanced compared to 1938 edition of Luftwaffe pilot, and this would be even more highlighted if there were substantial casualties. It simply took some time to get enough flying staff and extra year of training prior the Polish campaign together with large number of Bf 109 E did wonders to value of the Luftwaffe. 10/1938 would be much more a wash, rather that total Luftwaffe air superiority that some predict, but the timing is everything there.

[Carl Schwamberger]

....
Another piece : weather sucked for most of October, there were not that many days where LW could fly at all.

Which brings the question of how muddy the battlefield would be that month or in November. The Panzer battalions dont count for much if they are spinning their tracks in soggy ditches.

[painisgain]

....Which brings the question of how muddy the battlefield would be that month or in November. The Panzer battalions dont count for much if they are spinning their tracks in soggy ditches.

Exactly. Agree this could be a factor. Plus there were plans to destroy some of the dams / lakes to add to normal wetness.