Hanny wrote: ↑
18 Feb 2019 21:43
It is 5.4% using the link i posted, for 43 and all the other years as i posted from it, you just have to do the % calc from the data set yourself.
First, hope you have a speedy recover; please feel no rush to respond to this, as I'll certainly be around at a later date to continue.
Now then, let's double check here because I think we're using the same source:
Military stock 01/01/43: 404,500
Civilian stock 01/01/43: 221,600
New Production: 48,000
95,100/674,100 = 14.1%
Er ok, they started with 20600 so they have 10k left, not a 10k loss.
Even taking that at face value with no other considerations means they are completely unable to expand their armored forces like they did throughout the war and lack modern tanks entirely. Once you expand it into other considerations, however, the picture becomes even starker: the 1941 stock is overwhelming pre-war light tanks, of limited viability and livability in the modern environment that begins to emerge from 1942 onwards as the standard for German armor becomes the 50mm Panzer III at worse and begin to quickly move into the 75mm from then on.
Also, I really doubt Soviet production will be as high as it was historically. For one thing, the loss of the Ukraine and other occupied areas had engendered shortages of coal (The Donbass was home to roughly 60% of Soviet output by itself), aluminum (Main Soviet facility was along the Dnieper, about 60-80% of production), iron ore (60% of production), steel (50% of production), electric power (30% of output), manganese ore (30% of production), and nickel (30% of production). Overall output of the machinery and metal goods sector fell by 40%. The USSR was also unable to meet the demand for copper, tin, zinc, lead, aluminum, and nickel with remaining sources while antimony, tungsten, cobalt, vanadium, molybdenum, tin, and magnesium were also almost entirely lacking. Lend Lease was sufficient to meet all of these demands except for aluminum and nickel:
Even ignoring the lack of materials, Lend Lease provided something on the order of 25% of the machine tools growth in the Soviet economy during the war; this a rather critical point given the aforementioned decline of the machinery sector by 40%. Further, while Soviet production in certain sectors such as tanks and aircraft was large, it was entirely lacking in other areas
Tanks and SP guns: 6,180 / 24,640
Armored cars: 982 / 2,623
Half-tracks: 10,152 / 0
Trucks: 81,276 / 30,947
Cars: 27,895 / 2,567
Locomotives: 2,637 / 9
Train cars: 60,892 / 147
Tanks and SP guns: 12,063 / 24,092
Armored cars: 806 / 1,820
Half-tracks: 16,964 / 0
Trucks: 109,483 / 45,545
Cars: 34,478 / 2,546
Locomotives: 5,243 / 43
Train cars: 66,263 / 108
Tanks and SP guns: 19,002 / 28,983
Armored cars: 485 / 3,000
Half-tracks: 17,143 / 0
Trucks: 89,069 / 53,467
Cars: 21,656 / 5,382
Locomotives: 3,495 / 32
Train cars: 45,189 / 13
Simply put, even if they had the materials to make the same amount of tanks and aircraft, they'd still have to reduce protection to meet their needs in other areas of war production.