What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

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Politician01
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Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

Post by Politician01 » 13 Mar 2020 21:16

ljadw wrote:
13 Mar 2020 21:00
Your argument of authority is not a valid one
Oh but it is much much better than your argument of nothing.

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Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

Post by Woody Wetter » 05 Apr 2020 02:55

One important factor what is almost always forgotten while talking about LL is SU industry planning.

In 1941/1942 Stalin knew very soon he will have large amounts of material help by LL. So he can exactly adjust industry to produce maximum numbers all kind of arms without having to worry about trucks or radios , locomotives(for example). Adjusting industry does not happen overnight also building new factories.

Just example. Lets say SU had increased production of trucks in 1942 because huge losses . ZIS-5 weight is around 3 tons . Since it uses some wood and not the highest quality of metal in construction i think its reasonable to assume 1X T-34 tank is equal at production cost with 50X ZIS-5 truck. 50 thousand trucks will equal 10 thousand T-34 tanks. In 1942 SU produced 12660 T-34/76 tanks. Suddenly T-34 does not seems so cheap? Soviets were able to make it in huge numbers because they were able to drop most non frontline products.

50K trucks was only around 15% of trucks by LL !

Also i have read the mass production of T-34/85 was delayed for month because cutting tools by LL for turret rings took longer to arrive.

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Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 05 Apr 2020 14:28

Woody Wetter wrote:
05 Apr 2020 02:55
One important factor what is almost always forgotten while talking about LL is SU industry planning.

...

Just example. Lets say SU had increased production of trucks in 1942 because huge losses . ZIS-5 weight is around 3 tons . Since it uses some wood and not the highest quality of metal in construction i think its reasonable to assume 1X T-34 tank is equal at production cost with 50X ZIS-5 truck. 50 thousand trucks will equal 10 thousand T-34 tanks. In 1942 SU produced 12660 T-34/76 tanks. Suddenly T-34 does not seems so cheap? Soviets were able to make it in huge numbers because they were able to drop most non frontline products. ...
The bottle neck here would be motors. Theres some substantial savings but not remotely at the 50-1 ratio. I'd be surprised if it were 10-1. There might be substantial savings in motor wear as the 30 ton tank ran down motors faster than ten to cargo loads. If you get 50% more trucks and the motors last 500% longer its still a useful trade off.

Where the absence of LL hurts is in items with non expandable production 1942-1944. Chemicals, alloys, electronics. Those impact communications, ammunition, aircraft performance.

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T. A. Gardner
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Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

Post by T. A. Gardner » 05 Apr 2020 23:35

Or items the Soviets can't produce themselves like tungsten carbide machine tools, various metal alloying agents, vitamins, coffee, or citrus products. Thousands of tons of nuts, bolts, screws, and nails were sent to the Soviets. For want of a nail... Such a mundane item, but critical to making stuff and building things. These would have taken up numerous screw and wire machines making them had they not been supplied.

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Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 07 Apr 2020 04:38

A more realistic scenario has been touched on a few times in this thread. That is LL is focused on this:
T. A. Gardner wrote:
05 Apr 2020 23:35
Or items the Soviets can't produce themselves like tungsten carbide machine tools, various metal alloying agents, vitamins, coffee, or citrus products. Thousands of tons of nuts, bolts, screws, and nails were sent to the Soviets. For want of a nail... Such a mundane item, but critical to making stuff and building things. These would have taken up numerous screw and wire machines making them had they not been supplied.
No massive rebuild of the Persian railway, no mass of Studebaker or GM trucks, No mass of M4 tanks. The effect being keeping commitment of cargo ship capacity nearer to 1942 levels. The balance being used for things like boosting cargo ship numbers for west Allied cargos, mitigating losses to submarines in the Atlantic, more of the fast transports used for the long journeys to the far east available to the Atlantic & Mediterranean runs, perhaps a larger operation TORCH, a faster & larger build up of Allied forces in the MTO in 1943, a earlier & larger Op BOLERO. This amounts to a more powerful Alled army in the west, & a less capable Red army in the east.

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Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

Post by ljadw » 09 Apr 2020 15:10

No LL does not mean a larger Torch,as a larger Torch was depending mainly on more available US divisions and these were not available in November 1942 .
A larger Torch does not mean a faster end of the war in NA,as a larger Torch would be faced by more logistical problems than the HTL Torch = to move the US divisions from Morocco and Algeria to Tunisia .
The same for a stronger allied force in the west : the Red Ball Express was unable to supply the existing US forces, thus how could it supply stronger US forces ?
GM trucks and Studebaker trucks who would not go to the east, would not automatically go to the west .
Besides : would the west need more trucks ?

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Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

Post by History Learner » 11 Apr 2020 23:06

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
24 Mar 2019 01:35
Richard Anderson wrote:
16 Mar 2019 00:23
...

In a sense, yes, if the Lend-Lease sustainment requirement was eliminated, then the US theoretically would have been able to generate Wedemeyer's 215-division "Victory Plan"...except it was never a "plan", but rather a requirements study. However, given the reality of the poorly-managed US manpower effort - we were by far the least mobilized of the major belligerents - I have no doubt 215 divisions was still unrealistic as well.
I'd have thought maybe a dozen extra US ground combat divisions, along with corps and army overhead out of the Soviet LL. Eighty extra does sound a bit 'large' under any circumstance.
Alternatively, I wonder if the resources used to produce those land instruments could be put to use instead to more planes and ships?

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Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

Post by History Learner » 11 Apr 2020 23:10

Politician01 wrote:
12 Mar 2020 15:07
There was a pretty good in depth article on this in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies a few years ago.

Basically it came to the conclusion:

Germany against the USSR without LL and without US/GB military Intervention = USSR loses big time.
Germany against USSR with LL but without US/GB Military Intervention = Possible Soviet defeat in 1941/42 - stalemate if USSR survives until 1943.
Germany against USSR without LL but with US/GB Military Intervention = Stalemate by the time of Kursk or very slow crawl throughout Eastern Europe.
Dennis Havlat's article, I think? Here's the abstract, for those so interested:
During World War II the Soviet Union received large amounts of aid from the Western world in the form of supplies and military intervention, both of which were declared to have been irrelevant for the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany by Soviet historians. This article examines the claim made by Soviet historiography, and it comes to the conclusion that both Western supplies and military intervention were far more helpful than claimed by the Soviets. Without this aid the Red Army would not have been able to perform as well as it did historically, tilting the balance in Germany’s favor. Soviet claims about the irrelevance of Western aid can thus be dismissed as propaganda and inaccurate.
Only thing I disagree with him on is that, in the absence of Lend Lease, the USSR will lose whether or not the U.S. intervenes militarily or not given the Soviet state would starve due to widespread food shortages.

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Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 Apr 2020 00:11

History Learner wrote:
11 Apr 2020 23:06
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
24 Mar 2019 01:35
Richard Anderson wrote:
16 Mar 2019 00:23
...

In a sense, yes, if the Lend-Lease sustainment requirement was eliminated, then the US theoretically would have been able to generate Wedemeyer's 215-division "Victory Plan"...except it was never a "plan", but rather a requirements study. However, given the reality of the poorly-managed US manpower effort - we were by far the least mobilized of the major belligerents - I have no doubt 215 divisions was still unrealistic as well.
I'd have thought maybe a dozen extra US ground combat divisions, along with corps and army overhead out of the Soviet LL. Eighty extra does sound a bit 'large' under any circumstance.
Alternatively, I wonder if the resources used to produce those land instruments could be put to use instead to more planes and ships?
Of course. More air craft would probablly more efficient in fielding combat power. Lots of other stuff that could increase combat power in one respect or another.

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Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 Apr 2020 01:02

History Learner wrote:
11 Apr 2020 23:06
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
24 Mar 2019 01:35
Richard Anderson wrote:
16 Mar 2019 00:23
...

In a sense, yes, if the Lend-Lease sustainment requirement was eliminated, then the US theoretically would have been able to generate Wedemeyer's 215-division "Victory Plan"...except it was never a "plan", but rather a requirements study. However, given the reality of the poorly-managed US manpower effort - we were by far the least mobilized of the major belligerents - I have no doubt 215 divisions was still unrealistic as well.
I'd have thought maybe a dozen extra US ground combat divisions, along with corps and army overhead out of the Soviet LL. Eighty extra does sound a bit 'large' under any circumstance.
Alternatively, I wonder if the resources used to produce those land instruments could be put to use instead to more planes and ships?
Of course. More air craft would probablly more efficient in fielding combat power. Lots of other stuff that could increase combat power in one respect or another.

Carl Schwamberger
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Re:

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Apr 2020 03:27

DrG wrote:
20 Jul 2004 00:18
In this page there are some useful data comparing the Land-Lease supplies and Soviet production: Lend-Lease as a Function of the Soviet War Economy.
Looks like that link has been hijacked by a Orbat advertisement.

Theres a dozen others on the same subject better or worse. Looking them over I see two key points. 1. Was the initial aid to the USSR in 1941 was largely from and paid for by the UK. That was converted to items provided by Britain, but paid for by the US. During 1942 there was a conversion to US material.

2. The initial amounts of assistance were relatively small. And the severest portion of the crisis was past at the end of 1942

1941... 360,778 tons Thru 30 September the USSR paid in Gold & other minerals.
1942...2,453,097 tons First Protocol 1 Oct 42 to 30 June 42 were principally items from Britain with US credit financing
1943...4,794,545 tons Second & Third Protocols principally from the US
1944...6,217,622 tons Fourth Protocol principally from the US
1945...3,673,819 tons This material seems to have been primarily for use against Japan & largely irrelevant to preventing a
German victory over the USSR

It looks to me like 84% of the material arrived after the principle crisis, after the USSR was out of danger of defeat. It may very well have been useful for getting the Red Army to Berlin, but thats a different issue.

There are credible arguments the most important items sent were food, high performance aviation fuel, and some specific metals such as Aluminum & alloys, and certain classes of machine tools. Lets assume the OP is followed & the US declines to provide significant LL. That leaves Britains contribution which tho finances by the US was a credit & pmt arraignment & not the LL as usually understood. Note also Soviet shipments to the US during the war included 300,000 tons of Chrome ore, Manganese, Platinum, & Gold. This allows for continuing material to the USSR in the first 17 critical months on a cash basis. That may or may not cover everything sent under the First & Second Protocols but it does to leave the Red army naked & unfed, or unarmed through the decisive period of 1941-42.

What about the rest? Thats 14,685,986 tons not sent & for US/Brit use. I'll leave it for some other time trying to calculate how much tons/day of cargo ship space that saves. A straight crude calculation for 1943-1944 divides that into 730 days or 20,118 tons per day. At 900 tons per day required per division slice of a army thats twentytwo and a third divisions plus their tactical air support and logistics tail, or ten extra corps for Ike. I have to wonder at this point what the equivalent of ten US or Brit corps would be in the Red Army & its air support.

Anyway in simple terms I see the Red Army able to repel German advances in 1943-44, but unable to make the same scale of offensive operations as OTL. The other side of the coin is the US can build up its ground and air forces faster in the Mediterranean & UK during 1943 & 1944. What the Germans do I'll leave aside for the moment.

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