What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

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Art
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#61

Post by Art » 19 Oct 2007, 17:09

LWD wrote: War is a chaotic system.
That's why? Sorry, but I can't refrain from remembering one guy called Sergey Pereslegin who once wrote an articel entitled "The rate of military operation as a quantum-mechanical value". If to be more serious I think if the war is chaotic then it there would be as much sense in studying the military history as in studying the history of weather.
Ie if 1/3 of the Soviet automobiles were trucks but 2/3 of the lend lease automobiles were trucks using automobiles as a measure may be misleading.
The bulk of Soviet automobiles were truck or truck-based vehicles. Due to the reasons of economical and social character in the pre-war years there was no serious internal market of the personal cars in the USSR and that fact strongly influenced the automobiles production. I have to find more information, but I think there are no reasons to expect that this factor would be of first-rate importance.

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LWD
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#62

Post by LWD » 19 Oct 2007, 20:20

Art wrote:.... If to be more serious I think if the war is chaotic then it there would be as much sense in studying the military history as in studying the history of weather.....
Why would the fact that it's chaotic affect how much sense it makes to study it? Indeed chaotic systems may be more worthy of sudy. Remember just because a system is chaotic doesn't mean that it has no patterns or is completly unpredictable.


ThomasG
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#63

Post by ThomasG » 03 Dec 2007, 12:51

Fugate writes:

"Perhaps the area of greatest deficiency in Soviet armaments was that of motor transport. In 1941 the mechanized corps had approximately a third of their necessary trucks. This lack of vehicles acted as a serious handicap to the Red Army's ability to maneuver rapidly throughout the entire war. At the end of the war Russian tank armies were still 10-25 percent short of vehicles, but even this advance in numbers was not due to indigenous production. In the spring of 1945 the Soviet armed forces were estimated to have about 665,000 motor vehicles of all types; of these, some 427,000 [32] had been shipped to the USSR from the United States through the Lend-Lease agreement. It is believed that in 1945 fully 50 percent of all vehicles actually in service in the Soviet armed forces were American. This aid, plus hundreds of locomotives and thousands of railroad cars, large numbers of aircraft, and other kinds of equipment, such as radios, gave the Russians the transport, the mobility, and the communications they needed to defeat the Wehr-macht. Without this aid, their full and strategic victory would have been made extraordinarily more difficult, if not impossible{18}."

http://militera.lib.ru/h/fugate/01.html

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Lkefct
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#64

Post by Lkefct » 03 Dec 2007, 20:38

Personally, I can't see how chaos fits in with this discussion. You are taking about uncertainty and a poorly understood system and dynamics. The study of chaos really only applies to systems where you understand what is going on and can study the interactions. When Ed Lorenz studied convective rolls on his early computer, he got pretty much the same results early on in his forecast, it was only later on that the small uncertainty that he had introduced due to rounding that he did when he tried to re-run an interesting event. But initally, he got the same forecast, it was only later on that the rounding created huge differences. Later still he discovered that how much he rounded how much error he introduced by rounding really didn't have a predictable amount of error in the final forecast. In this case, there is a lot more that falls under we don't understand how. LWD is trying to argue that a small percentage of Lend Lease trucks carry a disproportionate amount of supplies. I am not arguing against his point, but to point out that is not chaos. presumably if you knew how many trucks of what type, and how reliable each is, you could calculate how much of the supply capacity each contributed. That line of thinking is very much a linear approach. Chaos is a non-linear pheomena.

This case, there are several issues that should probably be answered if people know. First, where do the Soviets use their trucks. German accounts of the tank battles in the Ukraine in the 1943-1944 period note that when tank attacks broke into the Soviet rear areas, they did not find masses of "tail" for the advancing armies. Are the trucks used to move troops and guns, or are they used to bring up the supplies to continue the advance? Is there a major difference in how the Soviets use their trucks vs the lend lease trucks, or are the units mixed? The soviets used to build a lot of light tanks and SU 76 in truck factories. Did they gain a great deal of firepower from these vehicles, or would they have been better off with more trucks (had lend-lease ones not been available)? Given the lack of the initiative that the Germans had in the latter part of the war, does it even matter? If the Germans are too weak to defeat the Soviet attacks, does it even matter if it slows the pace of operations?

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LWD
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#65

Post by LWD » 03 Dec 2007, 21:24

Lkefct wrote:Personally, I can't see how chaos fits in with this discussion. You are taking about uncertainty and a poorly understood system and dynamics. The study of chaos really only applies to systems where you understand what is going on and can study the interactions. ... LWD is trying to argue that a small percentage of Lend Lease trucks carry a disproportionate amount of supplies. I am not arguing against his point, but to point out that is not chaos. .... Chaos is a non-linear pheomena.
I guess I wasn't clear enough. Possibly because I was actually argueing a couple of different points.

1) The as you call it linear effect of the lend lease trucks. The fact that they may or may not have carried a disporportunate amount of supplies is not completely relevant the point is that things were closely enough balanced that they may have provided the margin required. I'm not even saying they did just that not enough evidence has been presented to conclude they didn't, indeed I think that there is a good chance that they did but that is opinion only.

2) War is chaotic. Ie a little change in an input can produce a large effect (or a small one or no effect for that matter) in the output. Lend lease may have been a fairly minimal change input wise early in the war but that does not mean it didn't have a large effect in the out come.

Both points lead me to conclude that dismissing LL effects early in the war with any certainty are not well founded.

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Michael Emrys
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#66

Post by Michael Emrys » 04 Dec 2007, 04:13

ThomasG wrote:Fugate writes:

"In the spring of 1945 the Soviet armed forces were estimated to have about 665,000 motor vehicles of all types; of these, some 427,000 [32] had been shipped to the USSR from the United States through the Lend-Lease agreement."
How is this germane to the present discussion, since it is focussed on the period 1941-42?

Michael

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Roddoss72
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#67

Post by Roddoss72 » 06 Dec 2007, 08:21

For here is my two cents worth.

The Soviet Union for what it is worth desperately need the wests Lend-Lease to carry on the fight, strip away all that was delivered to the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union had to make up the shortfall would at worse cripple the Soviet Union to defeat or at best delay the Soviet victory for a further two to three years at best of four to five at worse, so we could effectively see the war in the East lasting well into 1949 (on the priviso that the US and Britain have'nt launched Operations Torch and Overlord) Germany most likely would have secured the A-A line and have captured the Maikop and Baku oilfields. This includes the capture of Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad by mid 1942 and then up to the Urals by mid 1943 (by now the Luftwaffe are bombing the crap out of the Soviet Idustrial heart east of the Urals).

Well there is my two cents worth.

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#68

Post by Art » 15 Dec 2007, 16:14

ThomasG wrote: In the spring of 1945 the Soviet armed forces were estimated to have about 665,000 motor vehicles of all types; of these, some 427,000 [32] had been shipped to the USSR from the United States through the Lend-Lease agreement.
As we have seen the real number of foreign vehicles in the Soviet Army was only a half of that:
http://www.1jma.dk/articles/1jmaarticlelendlease.htm
The discrepancy must be attributed to the war-time losses, transfer of vehicles to civilian organizations, Red Navy and NKVD troops, the fact that some number of vehicles arrived after May 1945, time lag between debarkation in ports and delivery to military units, losses en route etc. However, if one takes loading capacity instead of shear number the contribution of the LL automobiles most probbaly will be greater.
Are the trucks used to move troops and guns, or are they used to bring up the supplies to continue the advance?
In both roles as in other armies.
Is there a major difference in how the Soviets use their trucks vs the lend lease trucks, or are the units mixed?
Chassis for rocket launchers, prime-movers for light artillery. These roles require good cross country-mobility, not typical for the most part of domestically produced vehicles.
Given the lack of the initiative that the Germans had in the latter part of the war, does it even matter? If the Germans are too weak to defeat the Soviet attacks, does it even matter if it slows the pace of operations?
As the allready mentioned report of 26th June 1946 says, about a half of all loads carried by the automobile transport fell on the year 1944, when the rapid tempo of operations entailed a great separation of advancing troops from railheads in their rear. So the large number of vehicles was needed to sustain the scale and tempo of operations typical for late-war period.

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#69

Post by Gregolec » 15 Dec 2007, 21:57

Art wrote:As we have seen the real number of foreign vehicles in the Soviet Army was only a half of that:
http://www.1jma.dk/articles/1jmaarticlelendlease.htm
As I recall - and unfortunately I don't recall source - in USSR there was a specific way of usage of these trucks. Priority with using in the Red Army had LL trucks, with domestic models being a secondary choice, preferably used in the rear areas or deep in the country for civilian needs. Obvious explanaiton seem to me that they were much better and more efficient in front roles. Could you verify that?
If one can be positive about such a behaviour of soviet transport/supply managing elements, doesn't it mean that role of LL trucks in Soviet offensives was crucial?

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#70

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 16 Dec 2007, 02:22

Gregolec wrote:
Art wrote: If one can be positive about such a behaviour of soviet transport/supply managing elements, doesn't it mean that role of LL trucks in Soviet offensives was crucial?
Depends on the definition of "crucial". Without the LL trucks the RKKA still would have undertaken offensive operations, but they would have been different in character. Without the trucks the deep penetrations would have been much more difficult to supply. So different objectives would be designated. Possibly even more emphasis on the destruction of the German combat units since rapid capture of ground would be less practical. Air transport and more effcient restoration of the rail roads might be sought. So, LL trucks could be crucial to the RRKA advance as it was made, but not necessarily crucial to the eventual outcome of the war.

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#71

Post by john1761 » 16 Dec 2007, 03:03

Then the war in the east would drag out longer and not gain as much ground.Without the ability to carry out deep penetrations the Soviets would see the Germans pull back and then counter attack -as was their tactical doctorine. This plays into the Germans strengths . Maybe no Stalingrad, Bagration etc. just continual Soviet attacks ,small breakthroughs , then German counter attacks.

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#72

Post by Gregolec » 16 Dec 2007, 11:12

Carl Schwamberger wrote:Depends on the definition of "crucial". Without the LL trucks the RKKA still would have undertaken offensive operations,
I'm in not going to object that.
Carl Schwamberger wrote:but they would have been different in character.
...but that's the point where I precisely see the 'crucial'. As the war was going on time went against the Reich - but also against the USSR. Inevitable manpower shortage was step or two behind RKKA. To have no instruments for deep penetration meaned that RKKA was about to run a shallow war of attrition. They were about to put their dwindling numbers against German efficiency - that probably mean no operations like Uranus, Rumyantsev, Bagration then. And perhaps a little operation Mars in each of these instances. Under such conditions a year of war longer would at least cost Soviets dearly - if not change into end of existence of USSR.

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#73

Post by Art » 16 Dec 2007, 15:44

Gregolec wrote: As I recall - and unfortunately I don't recall source - in USSR there was a specific way of usage of these trucks. Priority with using in the Red Army had LL trucks, with domestic models being a secondary choice, preferably used in the rear areas or deep in the country for civilian needs.
I posted the data on the distribution of LL vehicles that I have here:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 15#1127415
Obviously, the most part of foreign automobiles was concentrated in the frontline units, only a small part of them being in military districts in the rear.
Obvious explanaiton seem to me that they were much better and more efficient in front roles.
Loading capacity, cross-country mobility, at last the fact that LL vehicles were new and were in better technical condition - all that factors must contribute.
It would be interesting to see the number of LL vehicles used in civilian sector, unfortunately I haven't seen it .
They were about to put their dwindling numbers against German efficiency - that probably mean no operations like Uranus, Rumyantsev, Bagration then
Well, operation Uranus was carried out when the number of foreing trucks was relatively small. Then excluding LL automobiles the RKKA had about 440 thousands vehicles at the end of war. That was roughly the same number it had in mid-1943. It's reasonable to expect that without LL automobiles its perfomance would remain on the same level. I can't say that ot was tragically poor but it wasn't brilliant too.

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#74

Post by Gregolec » 17 Dec 2007, 13:58

Art wrote:
Gregolec wrote:They were about to put their dwindling numbers against German efficiency - that probably mean no operations like Uranus, Rumyantsev, Bagration then
Well, operation Uranus was carried out when the number of foreing trucks was relatively small.
My obvious mistake.
Art wrote:Then excluding LL automobiles the RKKA had about 440 thousands vehicles at the end of war. That was roughly the same number it had in mid-1943. It's reasonable to expect that without LL automobiles its perfomance would remain on the same level. I can't say that ot was tragically poor but it wasn't brilliant too.
I'm not convinced. According to the cited page on the beginning of 44 ca. 19% of RA vehicles were of LL provenience. Taking the rapid growth of truck deliveries in that year (highest of all war years), one can assume that before Bagration 25% of trucks were of LL origin. And that's just the number - without possible evaluation how much more (if any) were these vehicles efficient.

So - had SU enough industrial reserves to product the needed number of own trucks which would work as efficent as these 100 000+ western trucks? What were they *not to produce* to gain industrial power to build these vehicles?

BTW - knowledge of western trucks being produced for Red Army gave the Soviets an important information - there were areas secured for their war effort and they didn't have to worry how to develop them.

Another question - bordering the LL truck park - are known pre-war Soviet problems with tires. State of soviet tire stocks give assumption that (without LL) from the overall truck number of soviet origin one has to subtract a large percent of vehicles inoperable from lack of tires. I don't know if it was easy to replace by Soviet production sources (they had a production base, ok, but what with the source of rubber?). So, we substract LL trucks, then vehicles without tires, then vehicles inoperable because of technical problems (GAZs and ZISs AFAIR were not famous for their durability), then look at workload levels of remained trucks achievable while acting on russian roads... No funny thoughts for a Soviet commisar of transportation.

Much shallower Bagration means longer war and more blood on Soviet side. With less German units destroyed there, all future soviet operations on the east (like going through Carpathians) looks less doable. But in the face of Allied landing in Normandy Soviet Union's cease of existense has rather little probability.

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#75

Post by Andreas » 17 Dec 2007, 14:18

Gregolec wrote:Much shallower Bagration means longer war and more blood on Soviet side. With less German units destroyed there, all future soviet operations on the east (like going through Carpathians) looks less doable. But in the face of Allied landing in Normandy Soviet Union's cease of existense has rather little probability.
Most of the German units were destroyed in the first ten days. Even a shallower overall operation would not have rescued them.

All the best

Andreas

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