Flopped miserably on the other board, I give it a second try:
Being an arm-chair general with all the hindsight it's easy to declare the Kiev-Operation (turning Guderian's Panzer Group 2 and 2nd Army southwards to encircle and "finish" off the troops in the Kiev region) as being a big failure; almost all post-war commentaries blame Hitler for this decision to turn south instead of listening to Halder who wanted to "rush" to Moscow soon after Smolensk.
I personally think that the Hitler's decision to go for Kiev instead of Moscow in Summer 1941 was, at her time, perfectely right. Op. Barbaraossa called for the destruction of russian forces and not to capture the capital against all risks. The threat to AGC's southern (and, in lesser extend, the northern) flank would have been much too high. The Soviet resistance in the Smolenk pocket and south at Yelnja was fierce and even led to a ammunition supply crisis at AGC. Logistics wasn't therer to support an attack to Moscow at this time.
If you're looking for a snake in the grass of the German campaign against the Soviet Union, I think the German CoS Halder is a good bet. He opposed the inital ideas of the Barbarossa-plan, he was bullish to start "Typhon" even late in the year, he insisted to advance to Moscow in Nov. 1941 even though he had no logistics and no means to capture or encircle the town.
Cheers,
Moscow or Kiev in summer 1941?
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Gwynn Compton
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While your argument is essentially good, I'll have to part with you on one point...
The case for going after Moscow is a compelling one. Certainly, it presumes that Halder believed that the Russians were incapable of launching an effective counter attack, either through lack of resources, or share lack of competence. Through hindsight, we can see that the Russians would struggle to launch counter offensives until Operation Uranus in 1942, however, it is reasonable to suggest that the German planners were worried that the Russians could exploit a reasonably weak flank, and thus this reason was not enough to launch the assault.
Next is the idea of Moscow being the political, communications and railway hub of European Russia. These three factors are important, especially the first two, as one must remember, railways can always be rebuilt. Moscow, as the centre of political power in Russia is a crucial thing to think about. While it's pure speculation as to what would have happened had Moscow fallen, it's also reasonable to suspect that the disruption done by forcing the Government to flee, not to mention the damage to morale, would be significant. Coupled with this, the aformentioned disruption to Government, would leave the Germans with an oppotunity to consolidate their gains thus far, something which they would need time to do before winter arrived. As a railway nexus, Moscow served two crucial railways, one from Murmansk/Archangel, and the other from Siberia. The former railways brought armaments (when they could get through) from the British, the latter was important for the Siberian reinforcments. However, the effects of rail disruption, given that many of the places that the Moscow hub serviced were already in German hands, is difficult to measure.
The final piece of the Moscow plan is Guderian's idea of drawing the enemy into a final battle for Moscow. I recall some quote from Guderian who wanted to drive on Moscow, as it was where the bulk of the enemy lay, and that in threatening such a strategically important city, the Russians would throw everything they had into its defence. As we have seen, when Operation Typhoon was launched, Moscow was easily receiving the bulk of reinforcments, and becoming a drain on the resources of both sides. Had Guderian been able to launch his attack earlier, the German's would have had greater strength with which to persue this target, and the Russians, desperately waiting on Siberian reinforcements, would initially struggle.
As it is, I can understand the logic of the eventual choice to defer the attack. It is dangerous to leave large enemy concentrations on your flanks, and it is also dangerous to underestimate them. The German's played the safe option, rather than a potentially dangerous one, and thus, they may have sacrificed an oppotunity to defeat Russia in 1941. However, at the same time, they may have avoided a disasterous defeat in trying to obtain this goal, one that may have been even worse than the fate suffered by Operation Typhoon.
It's always an interesting topic to discuss, and I'm sure some of our members who are better versed on the Russian forces at the time, will have some valuable contributions to make
And as a closing note, why is it that German logistics in the Second World War always seem to be such a mess? My general impression is that in the First World War, logistics were handled far better than the second, thoughts anyone?
Gwynn
Certainly the resistance in the pockets was fierce, and was enough to hamper supplies and communications. However, the threat to the flanks presumes that the Red Army was capable of launching a counter offensive, something which, as I have previously discussed, the Red Army was unable to effectively do until November of 1942 (The 1941 December offensive was effectively a failure, though it did succeed in eliminating a direct threat to Moscow).I personally think that the Hitler's decision to go for Kiev instead of Moscow in Summer 1941 was, at her time, perfectely right. Op. Barbaraossa called for the destruction of russian forces and not to capture the capital against all risks. The threat to AGC's southern (and, in lesser extend, the northern) flank would have been much too high. The Soviet resistance in the Smolenk pocket and south at Yelnja was fierce and even led to a ammunition supply crisis at AGC. Logistics wasn't therer to support an attack to Moscow at this time.
The case for going after Moscow is a compelling one. Certainly, it presumes that Halder believed that the Russians were incapable of launching an effective counter attack, either through lack of resources, or share lack of competence. Through hindsight, we can see that the Russians would struggle to launch counter offensives until Operation Uranus in 1942, however, it is reasonable to suggest that the German planners were worried that the Russians could exploit a reasonably weak flank, and thus this reason was not enough to launch the assault.
Next is the idea of Moscow being the political, communications and railway hub of European Russia. These three factors are important, especially the first two, as one must remember, railways can always be rebuilt. Moscow, as the centre of political power in Russia is a crucial thing to think about. While it's pure speculation as to what would have happened had Moscow fallen, it's also reasonable to suspect that the disruption done by forcing the Government to flee, not to mention the damage to morale, would be significant. Coupled with this, the aformentioned disruption to Government, would leave the Germans with an oppotunity to consolidate their gains thus far, something which they would need time to do before winter arrived. As a railway nexus, Moscow served two crucial railways, one from Murmansk/Archangel, and the other from Siberia. The former railways brought armaments (when they could get through) from the British, the latter was important for the Siberian reinforcments. However, the effects of rail disruption, given that many of the places that the Moscow hub serviced were already in German hands, is difficult to measure.
The final piece of the Moscow plan is Guderian's idea of drawing the enemy into a final battle for Moscow. I recall some quote from Guderian who wanted to drive on Moscow, as it was where the bulk of the enemy lay, and that in threatening such a strategically important city, the Russians would throw everything they had into its defence. As we have seen, when Operation Typhoon was launched, Moscow was easily receiving the bulk of reinforcments, and becoming a drain on the resources of both sides. Had Guderian been able to launch his attack earlier, the German's would have had greater strength with which to persue this target, and the Russians, desperately waiting on Siberian reinforcements, would initially struggle.
As it is, I can understand the logic of the eventual choice to defer the attack. It is dangerous to leave large enemy concentrations on your flanks, and it is also dangerous to underestimate them. The German's played the safe option, rather than a potentially dangerous one, and thus, they may have sacrificed an oppotunity to defeat Russia in 1941. However, at the same time, they may have avoided a disasterous defeat in trying to obtain this goal, one that may have been even worse than the fate suffered by Operation Typhoon.
It's always an interesting topic to discuss, and I'm sure some of our members who are better versed on the Russian forces at the time, will have some valuable contributions to make
And as a closing note, why is it that German logistics in the Second World War always seem to be such a mess? My general impression is that in the First World War, logistics were handled far better than the second, thoughts anyone?
Gwynn
Some reasons:Gwynn Compton wrote: And as a closing note, why is it that German logistics in the Second World War always seem to be such a mess? My general impression is that in the First World War, logistics were handled far better than the second, thoughts anyone?
WW I was more "static" compared to Germany's manouver warfare during the early stages of WW II. The major fighting was done in the West with all the good traffioc systems and more or less "stable" fronts.
Interesting enough, there is only one study dealing with german logistics on the East Front in WW I, and I haven't read it so far.
The German "doctrine" (if we use this word) favored motorization over the traditional rail transportation. Failed in Russia 1941.
The railway hadn't been mobilized as needed to "feed" a war as large as it bacame in 1941; much of this is due to the "blitzkrieg" concepts and the absence of a long-termed war plan; it's awfully complex to get the railway system on strategic war footing (experienced railway personnel, locomotives, wagons, rw-lines, schedules etc.). There was no way to solve the logistical mess which showed up in late 1941. It was too late.
The tendency to fill the divisions with "full" supply (say: everything should be at 100%), simultaniously facing an essential shortage in transportation, was another "stress multiplier" to the german transportation system. Instead of prioritizing transportation according to its urgency, german logistics tried to transport all and everything and had to fail in this. This was changed in 1942.
An overall reluctance in the german General Staff to deal with this "boring logistics". Since the time of the Napoleon Wars (who also failed against Russia), the Quartemaster's job ("The Calculator") had a somewhat lower reputation compared to "Operational" staff. For many, the Quartermasters I b-position was only a jumping point for a later Ia-(operational) position. In general, logistics' task was to get all the stuff what was needed to fullfill the operational plans and ops didn't consider logistical limits as being essential bottlenecks to their own operational goals. Africa and Barbarossa are fine examples.
Unfortunately there are no studies on German logistics in WW II in english - the only one I'm aware of is Martin Van Crevelt - but there are a good dozen studies in German dealing with that problem.
Sorry for straying aside from the "Moscow vs. Kiev"-line, but german logistics in Barbarossa is my aerea of expertise (if there is such)
I'll comment later on the "Moscov vs. Kiev"-thread.
Cheers,
I think that the decision to concentrate on Kiev was correct but that the real mistake was to then attempt to take Moscow too late in the year. Once the decision was made to divert forces south to Kiev the Southern sector should have remained the focus for the remainder of that year. Field-Marshall Von Rundstedt felt in September that the campaign should be carried no further and that a winter line should be established. I think that Von Rundstedt knew what was in store for the Germans in the Winter and his ideas should have been implemented in September.
If 70 grains of IMR 4064 in a 7.92x57 case behind a 197 gr. fmj is too much then 85 grains should be just right.
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Lord Gort
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I dont want to get into the tactical operations side as i dont have time to type.
However i just would like to say that both Napoleon and before him the poles in the early 1600's have both occupied Moscow (The poles for a considerable time) and not defeated Russia, i think that the Stab at Moscow might have worked i.e the Soviet Union might have collapsed from lack of leadership and loss of morale. However i still am highly sceptical and see this as a big what if. In the end we just dont know. It is interesting to note that The soviet armies encircling Berlin in 1945 had more men, Artillery, tanks, planes etc than Hitler fielded in his invasion of the entire Soviet Union.
Regards,
However i just would like to say that both Napoleon and before him the poles in the early 1600's have both occupied Moscow (The poles for a considerable time) and not defeated Russia, i think that the Stab at Moscow might have worked i.e the Soviet Union might have collapsed from lack of leadership and loss of morale. However i still am highly sceptical and see this as a big what if. In the end we just dont know. It is interesting to note that The soviet armies encircling Berlin in 1945 had more men, Artillery, tanks, planes etc than Hitler fielded in his invasion of the entire Soviet Union.
Regards,
The Nazis performance in trying to capture large cities is not very impressive, unless the Nazis could completely encircle Moscow and advance about 50 miles beyond the city center in all directions they would have been drawn into house to house fighting and their invasion force may have been encircled and cutoff like at Stalingrad. In any case, given Russian history and Stalins effective propaganda the Russians would not have stopped fighting if Moscow fell. If the Soviet forces in the south were not destroyed they would come back to threaten the Nazi flanks as the battle for Moscow bogged down.
If 70 grains of IMR 4064 in a 7.92x57 case behind a 197 gr. fmj is too much then 85 grains should be just right.