1944: Flak Alone Blasts the Allies out of the Sky

[T. A. Gardner]

1 What happened AFTER WW2 is irrelevant : we discuss the possibility for the Germans to produce and use sufficient SAMs to change the outcome of the air war .

It is relevant. We can use successful SAM systems that were developed through the mid 50's as a comparison, along with R&D results from 1946 on.

2 To produce 5000 Wasserfall SAMs per month (only 5000 ) 14000 workers would be needed and more than 1 million hours to teach them how to produce these missiles . And 5000 would be totally insufficient : it would mean that only 170 missiles could be fired every day .And given that these missiles had to defend AND the German cities AND the plants of the synthetic oil industry AND the other armament plants (tanks, artillery, ...) AND the air fields of the LW AND the railway stations AND the trains (every day there were thousands of trains driving through Germany ) it is obvious that the use of the SAMs would change nothing, unless Germany could produce every day not 5000 SAMs, but 500000 ,what it could not do .

Wasserfall was very probably the least successful design of a SAM Germany made. The potentially most successful would have been Rheintocter and Enzian. The Hs 117 Schmetterling would have been acceptable as a low to medium altitude SAM. In a word, Wasserfall as a design, sucked.
Given all three of the most likely successful designs used extensive wood components and required a minimum of metal working, making them wouldn't have been much of a challenge. The airframes are simple to build and existing craftsmen had little difficulty making hundreds of prototypes for testing between the various designs.
Producing 1000 + a month would have taken a fraction of the materials and manpower that guns and shell production required. Hell, industry could have simply pushed men working to make the V-1 and 2 into SAM production.
If the Germans were able to fire 170 missiles a day at targets, even at 5% hit rates, they'd be shooting down 8 to 10 planes a day. That puts all of German flak to shame.

3 The fact that TODAY (80 years after the air attacks ) no one is still using flak guns against aircraft,does not mean that the use of SAMs would 80 years ago be successful .

SAMs that the Germans were developing in 1944 were at least marginally viable. The big problem was the fire control system for them, not the missiles themselves.

4 You know how many train stations had to be defended against allied air attacks ?

Like flak did a reasonable job of protecting them.

5 In January 1945 there were 56000 Allied flights above Germany :the LW committed 591 aircraft who shot 73 allied aircraft,127 were shot by the Flak,the LW lost 152 aircraft .

Okay, I won't dispute that. That's about 1800 sorties a day. If a widely deployed SAM system with a 3% probability of success per firing, it would take down 54 planes a day out of that sortie rate. Even a 1% success rate has 18 per day or 558 planes for the month.

How big should be the allied losses to hurt them/to stop the air attacks ?

About 7% losses is sufficient to force a reassessment of tactics as neither the US or British can keep up with that daily loss rate.

Let's take 10 % ,or 5600 aircraft .How many SAMs would be needed to do this .

The whole of the daily Allied air campaign for the time period you mentioned was about 1800 sorties by something like 2500 aircraft total (including those down for repairs, etc.). If SAMs could take down just 18 per day from a widely deployed set of SAM batteries--say 200 total--it would be unsustainable.

6 Not only would the training of the workers take a lot of time, which the Germans did not have, but the men who would fire the SAMs would also need a lot of time .

The workers necessary were already available. The problem was manufacturing the necessary tubes and other electronics to support them.

7 Conclusion :
the production/ use of SAMs would need a lot of time which Germany did not have
this production/ use would demand additional raw materials and man power which Germany could not afford
there is no proof that this use would make the situation better for the Germans .
as Michael Neufield said :the wonder weapons did not come too late, but too early .
It would take Germany an additional 20 years to be able to do what US and the USSR could do and did in less than 10 years .
The only wonder weapon was the A Bomb. And only the US had the possibility to produce it, and to use it .

Conclusion: You have no idea what you're talking about. Flak was not going to stop the Allied air offensive by itself. The SAM systems the Germans were developing had potential but were let down by several issues:

* Lack of a sufficiently advanced and sized electronics industry.
* A lack of good solid rocket fuels beyond, by 1943, badly dated diglycol (double base smokeless powder)
* Lack of a focused program rather than relying on aircraft manufacturers to make the missiles while not really coordinating with the electronics industry to produce a guidance system.
* An internal command problem where the Luftwaffe's leadership didn't recognize the potential of these systems and then dismissed them because they didn't understand the technology.

[ljadw]

I like to see an example of a successful use of SAMs after the war .
The Taliban used SAMs against the Soviets and the US,but the results were not successful :the Soviets and the US continued to use their air force against targets on the ground . Thus :why should the German use of SAMs be successful ?
And, as no one used SAMs in WW2,why should the German use of SAMs be successful ..
And, that ''the Flak was not going to stop the Allied air offensive by itself '' is meaningless,as no one said that the Flak would do it .
Last point : that the LW leadership did not recognize the potential of these systems ( unproved assertion ) is also meaningless ,as NO one could know what the SAMs could do if they existed and were used, besides :when you are in a very difficult situation, it is not wise to invest scarce supplies to produce weapons that COULD have a potential if they were used defensively .
If they had potential, it would not change the outcome of the war . Better was to use them offensively (V1 and V2 ) to terrorize the enemy population and hoping that this would compel the enemy to negotiate .
Without the SAMs, the LW was still able to force Harris to give up the attacks on Berlin .
And, the use of SAMs would not have saved Dresden from destruction .
The offensive use of SAMs failed (Britain was able to eliminate the V1s) ,thus,why should Britain not be able to destroy the SAMs that were used against its bombers ?

[Carl Schwamberger]

I like to see an example of a successful use of SAMs after the war .

Interesting question. One direction to look would be the War of Attrition between israel & Egypt. Specifically in 1970. Theres is a popular perception the build up of a Soviet equipped air defense along the Suez canal defeated Israli air attacks. There were a series of complex multi layered air battles as the Isralis continued a series of air raids deep into Egypt in early 1970, then through mid year moved the targets and penetration closer to the canal. The Egyptian defense was one of combined interceptor aircraft and SAM missiles. The interceptor missions were designed to lure or force the israeli aircraft into 'SAM traps' The actual numbers involved and lost by each side is small. The perception is the per sortie rate of loss was judged unacceptable by the Israelis. They progressively avoided targets covered by the new SAM systems arriving from the USSR in 1970 and as the year ran out ceased air operations across the Canal. They negotiated a agreement with the Egyptians to cease military ops along the canal.

Another air battle, or actually series of air battles would be over Viet Nam. From 1966 through 1972 the USN and USAF prosecuted a series of bombing campaigns of North Veit Nam. Losses at several stages were heavy on a per sortie basis. Both side adapted tactics and equipment multiple times. The USSR provided a wide variety of equipment and worked out multiple suggestions for tactics or doctrine. Eventually as with Egypt the USSR sent the equivalent of a regional air defense system to the Red River Delta or Hanoi/Haiphong region. The best know of the US efforts against this was Operation LINEBACKER. In that one the loss of the participating B52 heavy bombers was larger than anticipated. Both sides claimed victory in these air battles or campaigns.

Other examples are available to study; the War of Attonment or 1973 war. The Indo Pakistani wars. The Falklands war of 1982. Ect...

[T. A. Gardner]

I like to see an example of a successful use of SAMs after the war .

The first successful shootdown of a target was by a SAM-N-2 Lark SAM in January 1950.
The next would be an S-75 Divna (SA 2) shooting down a U-2 over the Soviet Union. Several more of those followed, including one in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
In Vietnam, both the US and N. Vietnam scored successes with SAMs. The S-75 Divna there was scoring about a 30% success rate until the US adopted heavy jamming techniques. Even with astoundingly stupid repetitive bombing runs by B-52's the jamming proved effective enough to reduce that kill rate to about 1 to 2%. Even at 1 to 2% the missiles proved cost effective.

The US Navy scored close to 80% successes using the Talos SAM against N. Vietnamese aircraft of several occasions. The shootdowns usually occurred at ranges in excess of 60 miles and were sufficient that the N. Vietnamese stopped trying to fly missions against US ships altogether.

The other thing SAM's did in Vietnam was force many US aircraft into flying lower where they became vulnerable to flak guns resulting in more AA shootdowns than had occurred before the N. Vietnamese got SAMs.

The Taliban used SAMs against the Soviets and the US,but the results were not successful :the Soviets and the US continued to use their air force against targets on the ground . Thus :why should the German use of SAMs be successful ?

Actually, MANPAD Stinger missiles proved very deadly to Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan. The Taliban really didn't have anything to counter aircraft however.

And, as no one used SAMs in WW2,why should the German use of SAMs be successful ..

This is just a fallacy of exclusive premises. It is also a nirvana fallacy in the form of a complex question. That aside, by late 1944 the US, Britain, and Germany were all testing SAMs in one form or another. The big hold up to putting one in service in every case was, guidance. Britain got so far as to test their Brakemine missile using beam riding, but neither the missile or system were close to something that would work operationally. The Fairey Stooge with MCLOS was little more than a basic demonstration project of no military value.
The US Army and Air Force took a less frenzied approach to development as they weren't faced with immediate need for such a weapon. The USN started several programs, Little Joe, Lark, and Bumblebee to develop SAM's.

Had the Germans successfully developed a half-decent guidance system like Elass or Brabant that they were working on, they could have deployed a SAM with a reasonable chance of success against slow flying, higher altitude bombers moving in formation. That was their big holdup, not the missile. As I stated, probably the best one they could have used was Rheintothcer, particularly if they could have found a better solid propellant than digylcol. The R-III version used a reasonably reliable liquid fuel engine for sustainer and had the range to work. With a better solid fuel, even the all-solid fuel version would have worked.

And, that ''the Flak was not going to stop the Allied air offensive by itself '' is meaningless,as no one said that the Flak would do it .

Then, regardless of whether flak, SAMs, something else is used, Germany loses in the end. One would think Germany wanted to win their air war, not just make things a bit more difficult for the Allies.

Last point : that the LW leadership did not recognize the potential of these systems ( unproved assertion ) is also meaningless ,as NO one could know what the SAMs could do if they existed and were used, besides :when you are in a very difficult situation, it is not wise to invest scarce supplies to produce weapons that COULD have a potential if they were used defensively .

If they had potential, it would not change the outcome of the war . Better was to use them offensively (V1 and V2 ) to terrorize the enemy population and hoping that this would compel the enemy to negotiate .
Without the SAMs, the LW was still able to force Harris to give up the attacks on Berlin .
And, the use of SAMs would not have saved Dresden from destruction .
The offensive use of SAMs failed (Britain was able to eliminate the V1s) ,thus,why should Britain not be able to destroy the SAMs that were used against its bombers ?

By the second half of 1942, the Luftwaffe's top officers were increasingly concerned that the use of flak guns and their massive expenditure of ammunition was unsustainable. Up to that point, bombing by the British alone had been a manageable issue. With the introduction of new, 4 engine bombers carrying far more payload, and the US now starting a daylight campaign the Luftwaffe recognized that the problem would become far more serious into 1943.
The V2 was a waste of resources, it's that simple. Without a nuclear warhead, ballistic missiles were waste of time. They were too inaccurate to hit anything smaller than a large city and then only randomly. The amount of resources that went into building them could never justify the results.
On the other hand, the V-1 was cheap and could be readily mass produced. Only about 1 in 4 reached their targets with the losses being about equally divided between shootdowns and mechanical failures (the US found their copy the JB-2 / Loon to have a high failure rate too).
But the V-1 was cheap enough that even with a 25% hit rate it was still very much cost effective.

As for shooting down SAMs... The V-2 flew at about 400 mph. That was within the capacity of Allied AA gun fire controls to handle for tracking and calculation. It also was within the speed of a piston engine fighters to intercept one. Of course, it helped that upwards of 40% of all V-1 failed to reach their target simply because of a mechanical failure.
The slowest--subsonic--SAMs flew at 550 to 650 mph. That's too fast for extant fire controls and defensive gun systems on bombers to track. Piston engine fighters stand no chance of intercepting and shooting one down. Once you get to supersonic versions going 900 to 1200 mph there's no chance whatsoever that they could be shot down with extant WW 2 gun and aircraft technology.

And, with SAMs the Luftwaffe might have done quite a bit better in slowing down the Allied bomber offensive. Even a SAM system with a very low hit probability of 1 to 3% is doing far better than a battery of flak guns was doing firing hundreds, even thousands, of rounds to achieve a single kill.

[ljadw]

I like to see an example of a successful use of SAMs after the war .

Interesting question. One direction to look would be the War of Attrition between israel & Egypt. Specifically in 1970. Theres is a popular perception the build up of a Soviet equipped air defense along the Suez canal defeated Israli air attacks. There were a series of complex multi layered air battles as the Isralis continued a series of air raids deep into Egypt in early 1970, then through mid year moved the targets and penetration closer to the canal. The Egyptian defense was one of combined interceptor aircraft and SAM missiles. The interceptor missions were designed to lure or force the israeli aircraft into 'SAM traps' The actual numbers involved and lost by each side is small. The perception is the per sortie rate of loss was judged unacceptable by the Israelis. They progressively avoided targets covered by the new SAM systems arriving from the USSR in 1970 and as the year ran out ceased air operations across the Canal. They negotiated a agreement with the Egyptians to cease military ops along the canal.

Another air battle, or actually series of air battles would be over Viet Nam. From 1966 through 1972 the USN and USAF prosecuted a series of bombing campaigns of North Veit Nam. Losses at several stages were heavy on a per sortie basis. Both side adapted tactics and equipment multiple times. The USSR provided a wide variety of equipment and worked out multiple suggestions for tactics or doctrine. Eventually as with Egypt the USSR sent the equivalent of a regional air defense system to the Red River Delta or Hanoi/Haiphong region. The best know of the US efforts against this was Operation LINEBACKER. In that one the loss of the participating B52 heavy bombers was larger than anticipated. Both sides claimed victory in these air battles or campaigns.

Other examples are available to study; the War of Attonment or 1973 war. The Indo Pakistani wars. The Falklands war of 1982. Ect...

About Vietnam : the use by NV of SAM s did not stop the US air attacks on Hanoi .Both sides claimed victory but both sides were wrong : the US air attacks on NV did not stop the NV help to the Vietcong and the use of SAMs against US B52 aircraft ,did not stop the attacks from the B52s.Would Hanoi be destroyed without the use of SAMs?Would NV have stopped its intervention in the South,if it had no SAMs ,but only conventional Flak ?
About the Canal :perception is not a proof .Besides, if the use of SAMs by Egypt was that successful,why did Egypt made a deal with Israel to stop the military activities ?
And, during the 1973 Yom Kippour war, Egypt was defeated although it used SAMs .
About the Falklands : would Argentine have won if Britain had no SAMs ? Even with the use of SAMs,the RN lost 4 war ships .
To attribute defeat/victory in a war to ONE weapon,is a very big exaggeration .

[ljadw]

About the German SAMs, Professor Esau,high placed German expert in nuclear affairs and in high frequenzy technology,said the following :
''Das selbstzielsuchende Geschoss bleibt dem nächsten Kriege vorbehalten .''
Rough translation : A self-seeking target gun is reserved to the next war .
Source : The Illusion der Wunderwaffen P 281 .
And ,from the same page : Guided Flak missiles remained hopes for the future and Germany had to satisfy itself with ''primitive solutions '' as the Taifun and the R100Bs.

[Kurt_S]

On the other hand, the V-1 was cheap and could be readily mass produced. Only about 1 in 4 reached their targets with the losses being about equally divided between shootdowns and mechanical failures (the US found their copy the JB-2 / Loon to have a high failure rate too).
But the V-1 was cheap enough that even with a 25% hit rate it was still very much cost effective.

Yeah V1 was a good weapon well suited to Germany's advantage of having the French/Dutch forefield: Germany could cheaply bombard London from this forefield; the Allies couldn't attack Germany proper from England with V1 copies like the Loon (and were unlikely to plaster Antwerp and Amsterdam with them).

Historically the Germans weren't able to create the communications infrastructure to coordinate the high-school math problem of firing mass V1 salvos at England - mostly due to mere months of active V1 campaign and Allied bombing. Had they been able to put, say, 200 V1's over Southeast England simultaneously, instead of shooting them one a time, they certainly would have overwhelmed the flak defenses, taxed the airborne interceptors, and could really have put London under severe threat.

[ljadw]

From Karl-Heinz Ludwig ''Die deutschen Rakete im Zweiten Weltkrieg ''
''Als Geräte,deren technisch optimale Lösung sich im Frühjar 1945 nur erahnen liess,blieben die deutschen Flakraketen des Zweiten Weltkrieges eine Episode in der Geschichte der Raketentechnik .''
'' The German Flak missiles of WW2 did remain an episode in the history of the technique of the missiles. One could in the Spring of 1945 only guess their optimal technical solution .''
In other words: one can not use the present possibilities of Flak missiles as an argument for their use 80 years ago , as one can not use the present capabilities of the Leopard and other tanks as an argument for their production and use in WW1 .

[Aida1]

I like to see an example of a successful use of SAMs after the war .
The Taliban used SAMs against the Soviets and the US,but the results were not successful :the Soviets and the US continued to use their air force against targets on the ground . Thus :why should the German use of SAMs be successful ?
And, as no one used SAMs in WW2,why should the German use of SAMs be successful ..
And, that ''the Flak was not going to stop the Allied air offensive by itself '' is meaningless,as no one said that the Flak would do it .
Last point : that the LW leadership did not recognize the potential of these systems ( unproved assertion ) is also meaningless ,as NO one could know what the SAMs could do if they existed and were used, besides :when you are in a very difficult situation, it is not wise to invest scarce supplies to produce weapons that COULD have a potential if they were used defensively .
If they had potential, it would not change the outcome of the war . Better was to use them offensively (V1 and V2 ) to terrorize the enemy population and hoping that this would compel the enemy to negotiate .
Without the SAMs, the LW was still able to force Harris to give up the attacks on Berlin .
And, the use of SAMs would not have saved Dresden from destruction .
The offensive use of SAMs failed (Britain was able to eliminate the V1s) ,thus,why should Britain not be able to destroy the SAMs that were used against its bombers ?

The usual denial game.

[ljadw]

I see :you deny that Harris failed, you claim that if the LW had SAMs, Dresden would be saved ,you deny that Britain won the Battle of Britain,without the use of SAMs ,you deny that if the Taifun SAM was used, the expectations were that 1000 (THOUSAND! ) shots were needed for one ( ONE !)successful hit ..
And, of course, you will deny what Karl-Heinz Ludwig said : '' Die Frage nach Möglichkeiten eines wirkungsvollen Einsatzes deutscher Flakraketen noch im Zweiten Weltkrieg kann nur verneinend beantwortet werden,und zwar auch dann,wenn man unterstellt,dass die Entwicklungsaufträge schon ein Jahr früher als 1942 erteilt worden wären .''
Translation : One can only negatively answer the question if a successful intervention of German SAMs in WW2 was possible, even if one would assume that the development orders had been given a year before 1942 .

[ljadw]

Dornberger said that a successful intervention of SAMs was not possible,before the Spring of 1946,and this, without looking at the desperate situation of raw materials and fuel .
The logical conclusion is that the best solution was not to start the development and production of the SAMs .

[T. A. Gardner]

I see :you deny that Harris failed, you claim that if the LW had SAMs, Dresden would be saved ,you deny that Britain won the Battle of Britain,without the use of SAMs ,you deny that if the Taifun SAM was used, the expectations were that 1000 (THOUSAND! ) shots were needed for one ( ONE !)successful hit ..
And, of course, you will deny what Karl-Heinz Ludwig said : '' Die Frage nach Möglichkeiten eines wirkungsvollen Einsatzes deutscher Flakraketen noch im Zweiten Weltkrieg kann nur verneinend beantwortet werden,und zwar auch dann,wenn man unterstellt,dass die Entwicklungsaufträge schon ein Jahr früher als 1942 erteilt worden wären .''
Translation : One can only negatively answer the question if a successful intervention of German SAMs in WW2 was possible, even if one would assume that the development orders had been given a year before 1942 .

Dornberger said that a successful intervention of SAMs was not possible,before the Spring of 1946,and this, without looking at the desperate situation of raw materials and fuel .
The logical conclusion is that the best solution was not to start the development and production of the SAMs .

Repetition on your part doesn't make anything you say true.

Britain succeeded against the Luftwaffe because they were able to mount an effective defense using fighter aircraft for the most part. That's something the Germans couldn't manage after about early 1943. Flak as an alternative wasn't going to stop the Allied bomber campaign, it wasn't even going to make a dent in it on its own.

Your repeated claim that it made bombing less accurate is absurd on its face. The RAF targeted cities, not buildings, and as long as the bombs hit the city being targeted, they were good. When most major German cites by 1944 looked like this:



Flak had failed miserably to stop bombers from plastering their targets into rubble. In fact, by late 1944 it was often completely ineffective.

As for SAMs, they were absolutely a necessity, particularly if--from the German view--the war was to continue on into 1946 or later. If the US switched to B-29's and other higher-flying bombers, or worse, switched to jet bombers like say the B-45 (development starting 8 Sept 1944), flak guns would become exponentially less effective. The planes were flying higher and faster meaning engagement times would drop precipitously and only the relative few really heavy guns in the 12cm and up calibers would still be really effective.

The only alternative to that was a SAM. Not an unguided rocket like the Taifun or British 3" UP rocket, but a guided missile. Unguided rockets were worthless as an air defense weapon, something proven repeatedly during the war.

So, development of a SAM was imperative, not worthless. The problem facing any nation building one that was the hardest to overcome was getting a guidance system in place. Producing a functional missile wasn't nearly as difficult a problem as guiding it to a target. By late 1944, the Germans, US, and Britian all understood that problem and were actively working on solutions to it. By the end of that year, both Germany and the US had very similar systems in development to meet the guidance system need.

The problem for Germany was they lacked the electronics industry to support timely development and manufacture of a guidance system, a problem Britain also faced. In the US, there wasn't the same level of urgency in getting a system into production until the Kamikaze threat emerged in 1945.

The other problem Germany had was a lack of a decent solid rocket fuel. They had a great selection of liquid fuels but these are hard to handle, often cannot be stored on the missile for extended periods of time, and add lots of complexity to the missile design to work. They didn't have stuff like Aerojets Galcit 53 or Thiokol's polysulfide rubber ones to use. Nor did they do successful research into fuel cross sections that the US did at Allegany Ballistics Labs to make these fuels work more efficiently.

It is still possible that with a concerted effort to get a guidance system in place that by late 1944 the Germans could have had a SAM entering service. While they'd still lose the war at that point, a SAM would have been a far better weapon system to introduce than a slightly better fighter plane or more flak guns that had already proven nearly worthless as a defense system.

[ljadw]

I believe Dornberger when he said that before the Spring of 1946 a successful intervention of SAMs was not possible . Unless you can prove that Dornberger was wrong, your claim that by late 1944 the Germans could have a SAM entering service, is wrong .
And there is no proof that a SAM entering late 1944 would have been better than the Flak guns who had NOT been proven nearly worthless .In January 1945 the Flak was responsible for 63 % of Allied aircraft losses and was thus better than the fighters and as the SAMs did not exist that month and could not exist ,there is no proof that the SAMs would be better than the Flak .Something that did not exist can not be claimed to be better than something that exist .No one can claim that the Leopard 2 tank would be better in 1940 than the Pz3,as the Leopard 2 did not exist in 1940 . IFs can never be proofs .
An unguided rocket was worthless and a guided rocket was not possible before the Spring of 1946, which does not mean that it would be possible in the Spring of 1946 .
Other point : the RAF did NOT only target German cities ,they attacked also the Synthetic oil plants :Hamburg was attacked 70 times and mostly the targets were the U Boat pens and the oil refineries . The RAF attacked also the Renault plants which were located in the suburbs of Paris .
Conclusion : the development of a guided SAM was not imperative, but a luxury Germany could not afford and a luxury that would not prevent the German defeat .

[T. A. Gardner]

I believe Dornberger when he said that before the Spring of 1946 a successful intervention of SAMs was not possible . Unless you can prove that Dornberger was wrong, your claim that by late 1944 the Germans could have a SAM entering service, is wrong .

That's probably too optimistic in the original timeline. Had the Germans taken a far more serious track to SAM development, and not gone through several iterations of reorganizing development, they might have had one by the end of 1944.

And there is no proof that a SAM entering late 1944 would have been better than the Flak guns who had NOT been proven nearly worthless .In January 1945 the Flak was responsible for 63 % of Allied aircraft losses and was thus better than the fighters and as the SAMs did not exist that month and could not exist ,there is no proof that the SAMs would be better than the Flak .Something that did not exist can not be claimed to be better than something that exist .No one can claim that the Leopard 2 tank would be better in 1940 than the Pz3,as the Leopard 2 did not exist in 1940 . IFs can never be proofs .

There is every proof that SAMs out perform guns by exponential amounts. Even at a kill probability of 1 to 3%, they're doing 100 to 1000 times better than a gun firing shells. The proof of that is that every, all, militaries have abandoned heavy flak guns for SAMs, and even light AA guns are being slowly pushed out in favor of smaller MANPADs and similar small SAMs.
If flak guns performed better than SAMs they'd still be in use today.

An unguided rocket was worthless and a guided rocket was not possible before the Spring of 1946, which does not mean that it would be possible in the Spring of 1946 .

An unguided antiaircraft rocket that is ground launched is worthless regardless of the existence of SAMs or not.

Other point : the RAF did NOT only target German cities ,they attacked also the Synthetic oil plants :Hamburg was attacked 70 times and mostly the targets were the U Boat pens and the oil refineries . The RAF attacked also the Renault plants which were located in the suburbs of Paris .
Conclusion : the development of a guided SAM was not imperative, but a luxury Germany could not afford and a luxury that would not prevent the German defeat .

But, even in those cases, their aim point wasn't a single building or even the plant necessarily, but the whole of the target and even the surrounding area.

A guided SAM would have made far more of a difference than doubling or tripling the number of flak guns would have. That's how much of an improvement they are over flak guns.

As for this claim of yours:

In January 1945 the Flak was responsible for 63 % of Allied aircraft losses and was thus better than the fighters.

This is just using bad statistics. How many flak guns were there in service in January 1945? I'm sure it's in the thousands. How many fighter sorties did the Luftwaffe manage in January 1945, hundreds at most?
It's clear that fighters outperformed flak significantly in terms of shootdowns given their much smaller numbers in action. Thousands of flak guns by comparison managed to shoot down a relative handful of planes in comparison to their numbers.
Thus in Jan 1945 fighter aircraft were still far more effective than flak, and the only reason flak got most of the kills was through its sheer abundance compared to the number of fighters flying.

[ljadw]

There is every proof that SAMs out perform guns by exponential amounts. Even at a kill probability of 1 to 3%, they're doing 100 to 1000 times better than a gun firing shells. The proof of that is that every, all, militaries have abandoned heavy flak guns for SAMs, and even light AA guns are being slowly pushed out in favor of smaller MANPADs and similar small SAMs.
If flak guns performed better than SAMs they'd still be in use today.

You still continue to mix two totally different eras who are 80 years away from each other .
That today SAMs outperform guns by exponential amounts is totally irrelevant for the question what SAMs could have done 80 years ago .Besides you can't compare the SAMs of today with their potential forefathers from 80 years ago .
And : it is absolutely not so that if in 1944 flak guns performed '' better'' than SAMs, the flak guns would be still in use today 80 years later .
What happens today can not be used as a proof for what could have happen 80 years ago .And,what happened 80 years ago can not be used as a proof for what could happen today ,80 years later .
About the argument that there were more Flak guns than fighters and that thus the fact that the Flak guns killed more allied aircraft is thus not a proof of the superiority of the Flak guns :this is a wrong argument, because only a small part of the Flak guns were involved in the air war in January 1945 .
The LW committed in January 591 fighters and those killed 51 allied bombers and 22 fighters,a total of 73 .This means that only 13 % of the used German fighters were successful in January 1945 .
There are no figures available for the numbers of Flak guns who destroyed 127 allied aircraft in January 1945, but the reality is that most German cities were attacked only sporadically that month and others were not attacked , but almost all German cities had to be protected by Flak guns ,also those who were not attacked by the allied air forces and a lot of Flak guns were used only in ground fighting ,we can assume that the majority of the Flak was not/seldom committed in the air war in January 1945 . :
Dresden was not attacked in January 1945, Nürnberg only one time, Frankfurt only twice .
Other point : the aim of the Flak was not to shoot down allied aircraft but to prevent them ,not from attacking cities and plants, but from destroying, damaging cities and plants ,thus to protect these cities and plants .