1944: Flak Alone Blasts the Allies out of the Sky

[Yuri]

In January 1945 the Flak was responsible for 63 % of Allied aircraft losses and was thus better than the fighters.

This is just using bad statistics. How many flak guns were there in service in January 1945? I'm sure it's in the thousands. How many fighter sorties did the Luftwaffe manage in January 1945, hundreds at most?
It's clear that fighters outperformed flak significantly in terms of shootdowns given their much smaller numbers in action. Thousands of flak guns by comparison managed to shoot down a relative handful of planes in comparison to their numbers.
Thus in Jan 1945 fighter aircraft were still far more effective than flak, and the only reason flak got most of the kills was through its sheer abundance compared to the number of fighters flying.

Your calculation suffers from significant flaws. For example, like this. The personnel of anti-aircraft units repelling raids on the territory of the Third Reich consisted of German boys and girls aged 15-17 years, factory workers, foreign workers, Italians and prisoners of war. In January 1944, the territories of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Western Belarus and Western Ukraine were included in the Third Reich. All citizens who lived in these territories before September 17, 1939 (except the Great Russians, that is, Russians in the narrow sense) were subject to mobilization. At the same time, the Luftwaffe received the right to recruit personnel from these people for anti-aircraft units. The commanders of anti - aircraft units in the territory of the Third Reich were artillery officers of two categories:
a) older age groups of the era of the First World War; b) invalids of the current war (armless, legless, one-eyed, etc.) or wounded who were being treated. Actually, the Luftwaffe personnel in anti-aircraft units were no more than 25%, of which no more than 25% were suitable for combat use. In other words, in the anti-aircraft units defending the territory of the Third Reich, the Luftwaffe proper personnel, suitable for combat use, was no more than 10% of the total number of personnel serving anti-aircraft guns. The losses among the personnel of the Luftwaffe anti-aircraft units defending the territory of the Third Reich were very insignificant. Thus, in terms of one person from the part of the Luftwaffe personnel that could be used in combat, the effectiveness of anti-aircraft personnel was significantly higher than that of the personnel of flight units.
This is only one of the reasons that greatly reduce, so to speak, the "cost" of a shot from an anti-aircraft gun.

[T. A. Gardner]

You still continue to mix two totally different eras who are 80 years away from each other .
That today SAMs outperform guns by exponential amounts is totally irrelevant for the question what SAMs could have done 80 years ago .Besides you can't compare the SAMs of today with their potential forefathers from 80 years ago .

Prototypes of SAM's were outperforming guns by the end of 1945. Project Bumblebee, the program that became the USN's Talos missile (along with Terrier and Tartar) had prototype ramjet missiles flying at Mach 1.75 out to 12 miles and 35,000 feet by then as but one example.

And : it is absolutely not so that if in 1944 flak guns performed '' better'' than SAMs, the flak guns would be still in use today 80 years later .
What happens today can not be used as a proof for what could have happen 80 years ago .And,what happened 80 years ago can not be used as a proof for what could happen today ,80 years later .

If flak guns performed better than SAMs in 1944, the US, Britain, and Germany wouldn't have been developing SAMs. Again, to use Project Bumblebee, the US Navy was specifically committed to developing a SAM that could shootdown an aircraft far beyond gun range.
The recognition even in 1944, that jet bombers flying at much higher altitudes than current piston engine planes could, would be beyond the range of AA guns was a near universal with major militaries.
The British with their LOPGAP missile program in 1944 -45 saw the same thing. Both the US and Britain also were looking into developing an ABM to take down something like the V-2, a weapon no gun system could successfully engage.

About the argument that there were more Flak guns than fighters and that thus the fact that the Flak guns killed more allied aircraft is thus not a proof of the superiority of the Flak guns :this is a wrong argument, because only a small part of the Flak guns were involved in the air war in January 1945 .

So, now what you claim is that most flak guns sat unused and useless while even those that did shoot down a plane were still expending thousands of rounds to do it. Fighters, far fewer in number, were more efficient and successful than flak guns even in your modified set of conditions.
For example, on 25 October 1944, the USAAF attacked Hamburg Germany with 720 bombers. There were 44 heavy AA batteries defending the city, a total of 264 guns. They fired--through overcast the USAAF bombed off radar--a total of 24,416 rounds of 8.8, 10.5, and 12.8 cm shells or an average of 92 rounds per gun.
For that expenditure, they shot down exactly one (1) bomber. The USAAF plastered the city, so all that fire had little or no deterrent effect on the bombing.

The LW committed in January 591 fighters and those killed 51 allied bombers and 22 fighters, a total of 73. This means that only 13 % of the used German fighters were successful in January 1945.
There are no figures available for the numbers of Flak guns who destroyed 127 allied aircraft in January 1945, but the reality is that most German cities were attacked only sporadically that month and others were not attacked , but almost all German cities had to be protected by Flak guns ,also those who were not attacked by the allied air forces and a lot of Flak guns were used only in ground fighting ,we can assume that the majority of the Flak was not/seldom committed in the air war in January 1945.

Again, fighters did a better job than guns. The numbers above work out to one plane shot down per 8 sorties. If you have a major German city defended by flak, like Hamburg was, there'd be hundreds of heavy AA guns defending it. They'd fire tens of thousands of shells to destroy a single plane in many cases. I could easily something like a quarter million rounds fired during the month to get that 127 kills. That would work out to about 2000 rounds per shootdown. German industry couldn't keep up with that sort of massive use of artillery, and at the same time it would have deprived the other branches of the military ammunition they desperately needed.

Dresden was not attacked in January 1945, Nürnberg only one time, Frankfurt only twice .
Other point : the aim of the Flak was not to shoot down allied aircraft but to prevent them ,not from attacking cities and plants, but from destroying, damaging cities and plants ,thus to protect these cities and plants .

Well, by those standards, German flak utterly and completely failed to do their mission...

[T. A. Gardner]

Your calculation suffers from significant flaws. For example, like this. The personnel of anti-aircraft units repelling raids on the territory of the Third Reich consisted of German boys and girls aged 15-17 years, factory workers, foreign workers, Italians and prisoners of war. In January 1944, the territories of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Western Belarus and Western Ukraine were included in the Third Reich. All citizens who lived in these territories before September 17, 1939 (except the Great Russians, that is, Russians in the narrow sense) were subject to mobilization. At the same time, the Luftwaffe received the right to recruit personnel from these people for anti-aircraft units. The commanders of anti - aircraft units in the territory of the Third Reich were artillery officers of two categories:
a) older age groups of the era of the First World War; b) invalids of the current war (armless, legless, one-eyed, etc.) or wounded who were being treated. Actually, the Luftwaffe personnel in anti-aircraft units were no more than 25%, of which no more than 25% were suitable for combat use. In other words, in the anti-aircraft units defending the territory of the Third Reich, the Luftwaffe proper personnel, suitable for combat use, was no more than 10% of the total number of personnel serving anti-aircraft guns. The losses among the personnel of the Luftwaffe anti-aircraft units defending the territory of the Third Reich were very insignificant. Thus, in terms of one person from the part of the Luftwaffe personnel that could be used in combat, the effectiveness of anti-aircraft personnel was significantly higher than that of the personnel of flight units.
This is only one of the reasons that greatly reduce, so to speak, the "cost" of a shot from an anti-aircraft gun.

Yes, I get that one of the reasons Germany chose flak was because they didn't have the resources to keep a large air force flying daily. The use of persons like you suggest doesn't make things better for Germany because it takes those people away from other tasks or even daily rest. If, for example factory workers are doing a 12-hour shift, or an 8 hour one, then have to go and man the air defenses for several more hours even if just on alert, that means they will be less rested and able to perform their work the next day. Toss in that their house gets damaged or destroyed, and you just make things even worse for them.
If you are using teens to help with the guns, same thing. They aren't in school, learning a trade, or otherwise being readied for productive work in society. Using foreigners, many of whom hate the Germans, doesn't make for a willing workforce. Even if they don't outright commit sabotage, just doing sloppy, uncaring, work will have its effect.

Aside from that, something like 20% of all munitions production in Germany went to flak guns. That's millions of rounds made for these guns. A single raid by late 1943 could see tens of thousands of shells fired during it. That created a shortage of other ammunition. Making more flak guns created a shortage of artillery and other types of guns to the point where captured guns and munitions had to be used, and used widely almost to the point where the Heer was using more captured artillery than standardized German weapons.

SAM's used either digylcol solid fuel, or one of a variety of liquid fuels, none of which impacted munitions manufacturing. The launchers were relatively simple compared to the complexity of producing a large caliber, heavy gun. The fire controls, either way, were about equally complex.

[ljadw]

You still continue to mix two totally different eras who are 80 years away from each other .
That today SAMs outperform guns by exponential amounts is totally irrelevant for the question what SAMs could have done 80 years ago .Besides you can't compare the SAMs of today with their potential forefathers from 80 years ago .

Prototypes of SAM's were outperforming guns by the end of 1945. Project Bumblebee, the program that became the USN's Talos missile (along with Terrier and Tartar) had prototype ramjet missiles flying at Mach 1.75 out to 12 miles and 35,000 feet by then as but one example.

And : it is absolutely not so that if in 1944 flak guns performed '' better'' than SAMs, the flak guns would be still in use today 80 years later .
What happens today can not be used as a proof for what could have happen 80 years ago .And,what happened 80 years ago can not be used as a proof for what could happen today ,80 years later .

If flak guns performed better than SAMs in 1944, the US, Britain, and Germany wouldn't have been developing SAMs. Again, to use Project Bumblebee, the US Navy was specifically committed to developing a SAM that could shootdown an aircraft far beyond gun range.
The recognition even in 1944, that jet bombers flying at much higher altitudes than current piston engine planes could, would be beyond the range of AA guns was a near universal with major militaries.
The British with their LOPGAP missile program in 1944 -45 saw the same thing. Both the US and Britain also were looking into developing an ABM to take down something like the V-2, a weapon no gun system could successfully engage.

About the argument that there were more Flak guns than fighters and that thus the fact that the Flak guns killed more allied aircraft is thus not a proof of the superiority of the Flak guns :this is a wrong argument, because only a small part of the Flak guns were involved in the air war in January 1945 .

So, now what you claim is that most flak guns sat unused and useless while even those that did shoot down a plane were still expending thousands of rounds to do it. Fighters, far fewer in number, were more efficient and successful than flak guns even in your modified set of conditions.
For example, on 25 October 1944, the USAAF attacked Hamburg Germany with 720 bombers. There were 44 heavy AA batteries defending the city, a total of 264 guns. They fired--through overcast the USAAF bombed off radar--a total of 24,416 rounds of 8.8, 10.5, and 12.8 cm shells or an average of 92 rounds per gun.
For that expenditure, they shot down exactly one (1) bomber. The USAAF plastered the city, so all that fire had little or no deterrent effect on the bombing.

The LW committed in January 591 fighters and those killed 51 allied bombers and 22 fighters, a total of 73. This means that only 13 % of the used German fighters were successful in January 1945.
There are no figures available for the numbers of Flak guns who destroyed 127 allied aircraft in January 1945, but the reality is that most German cities were attacked only sporadically that month and others were not attacked , but almost all German cities had to be protected by Flak guns ,also those who were not attacked by the allied air forces and a lot of Flak guns were used only in ground fighting ,we can assume that the majority of the Flak was not/seldom committed in the air war in January 1945.

Again, fighters did a better job than guns. The numbers above work out to one plane shot down per 8 sorties. If you have a major German city defended by flak, like Hamburg was, there'd be hundreds of heavy AA guns defending it. They'd fire tens of thousands of shells to destroy a single plane in many cases. I could easily something like a quarter million rounds fired during the month to get that 127 kills. That would work out to about 2000 rounds per shootdown. German industry couldn't keep up with that sort of massive use of artillery, and at the same time it would have deprived the other branches of the military ammunition they desperately needed.

Dresden was not attacked in January 1945, Nürnberg only one time, Frankfurt only twice .
Other point : the aim of the Flak was not to shoot down allied aircraft but to prevent them ,not from attacking cities and plants, but from destroying, damaging cities and plants ,thus to protect these cities and plants .

Well, by those standards, German flak utterly and completely failed to do their mission...

That prototypes of SAMs outperformed guns ( which ones ? ) AFTER the war,does not prove that during the war German SAMs would have done better than German Flak guns .
And, without the intervention of the German Flak,the destructions in Germany would be much greater,thus it is not so that the German Flak failed .
The attack on Hamburg on 25 October does not prove that the German fighters did better than the German Flak,as without the Flak,the US air attack would have caused more destructions .
The North Vietnamese used also Flak guns against US air attacks ,this means that the Flak guns were not worthless and on 18 December 1972 129 US bombers attacked Hanoi : the North Vietnamese fired 86 SAMs which killed 3 aircraft, only 3 .
If the German Flak failed in October 1943 above Hamburg by shooting down only 1 aircraft, you must admit that the NV SAMs also failed by shooting down only 3 US aircraft .
To fail or not does not depend on the number of aircraft that were shot ,this applies and for the Flak and for the SAMs and for the fighters .
On 6 March 672 US bombers attacked not Berlin ,but targets in Berlin . The attack was a failure : of the 1626 tons of bombs that were dropped, only a few landed near the targets .
The LW shot 50 bombers, the Flak 14, BUT the Flak damaged 318 bombers ( 48 % of the total ). The Flak did not fail .
Goebbels wrote in his diary :'' The industry is almost completely untouched;in any event there can be absolutely no talk of damage to our armaments production .''

[Yuri]

Aside from that, something like 20% of all munitions production in Germany went to flak guns. That's millions of rounds made for these guns. A single raid by late 1943 could see tens of thousands of shells fired during it. That created a shortage of other ammunition. Making more flak guns created a shortage of artillery and other types of guns to the point where captured guns and munitions had to be used, and used widely almost to the point where the Heer was using more captured artillery than standardized German weapons.

Assuming that all the anti-aircraft ammunition produced in the Third Reich was spent against the Anglo-American Air Force, you are making the same mistake that is contained in the work of Dan Zamansky. See my criticisms of Dan Zamanski's work here.
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=251703&start=15

Briefly.
Starting in the summer of 1943 (that is, after the Battle of Kursk), 80 to 90 percent of 88 mm anti-aircraft shells were spent on the Eastern Front. There were nine motorized anti-aircraft divisions of the Luftwaffe. These motorized anti-aircraft divisions of the Luftwaffe protected the land army. And these anti-aircraft divisions of the Luftwaffe would be correct to call anti-aircraft anti-tank anti-infatry divisions.
In addition, own Land Army had separate motorized anti-aircraft battalions and abteilungs.
In addition, the panzer division of the Land Army and the Waffen-SS had one anti-aircraft abteilung.
In addition, in the anti-tank abteilung of all divisions (including infantry) there was one company of anti-aircraft guns.
If you add to this the consumption of anti-aircraft ammunition in Italy, and since the summer of 1944 the consumption in France, then you will get that only 5-10% of the anti-aircraft ammunition produced was spent on repelling Anglo-American air raids on the territory of the Third Reich.
Hence the conclusion.
Only 1-2% of the total production of all types of ammunition was spent on repelling Anglo-American air raids on the territory of the Third Reich.

[T. A. Gardner]

Aside from that, something like 20% of all munitions production in Germany went to flak guns. That's millions of rounds made for these guns. A single raid by late 1943 could see tens of thousands of shells fired during it. That created a shortage of other ammunition. Making more flak guns created a shortage of artillery and other types of guns to the point where captured guns and munitions had to be used, and used widely almost to the point where the Heer was using more captured artillery than standardized German weapons.

Assuming that all the anti-aircraft ammunition produced in the Third Reich was spent against the Anglo-American Air Force, you are making the same mistake that is contained in the work of Dan Zamansky. See my criticisms of Dan Zamanski's work here.
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=251703&start=15

Briefly.
Starting in the summer of 1943 (that is, after the Battle of Kursk), 80 to 90 percent of 88 mm anti-aircraft shells were spent on the Eastern Front. There were nine motorized anti-aircraft divisions of the Luftwaffe. These motorized anti-aircraft divisions of the Luftwaffe protected the land army. And these anti-aircraft divisions of the Luftwaffe would be correct to call anti-aircraft anti-tank anti-infatry divisions.
In addition, own Land Army had separate motorized anti-aircraft battalions and abteilungs.
In addition, the panzer division of the Land Army and the Waffen-SS had one anti-aircraft abteilung.
In addition, in the anti-tank abteilung of all divisions (including infantry) there was one company of anti-aircraft guns.
If you add to this the consumption of anti-aircraft ammunition in Italy, and since the summer of 1944 the consumption in France, then you will get that only 5-10% of the anti-aircraft ammunition produced was spent on repelling Anglo-American air raids on the territory of the Third Reich.
Hence the conclusion.
Only 1-2% of the total production of all types of ammunition was spent on repelling Anglo-American air raids on the territory of the Third Reich.

This is clearly fallacious. Heavy flak ammunition production topped out at between 1.2 and 1.4 million rounds a month. With expenditures per raid as high as 10 to 30,000 rounds at 10% that would allow for just 4 to 8 major raids being fired on in a month. Clearly, that is wrong. Far more ammunition was being expended than that. Box / barrier barrages in particular ate up massive quantities of ammunition and were commonly in use.

Flak ammunition in 1943 represented about 20% of the total ammunition Germany manufactured. In 1944 that rose to 30 to 35% (Westermann 190).

In point of fact, if it weren't for captured AA guns, equipment, and ammunition put into service by Germany, it's likely flak guns would have eaten up close to half of all German military production.

As it was, about 60% of all heavy flak batteries by 1943 were in defense of the Reich. Even if their firing rates were equal to those stationed elsewhere, they'd consume 60% of the ammunition used.

Also, flak firing on Allied bombing raids in Italy and France count in the total, not as some separate thing. German air defenses didn't begin at the border of Germany but extended into captured areas as well.

[T. A. Gardner]

That prototypes of SAMs outperformed guns ( which ones ? ) AFTER the war,does not prove that during the war German SAMs would have done better than German Flak guns .
And, without the intervention of the German Flak,the destructions in Germany would be much greater,thus it is not so that the German Flak failed .
The attack on Hamburg on 25 October does not prove that the German fighters did better than the German Flak,as without the Flak,the US air attack would have caused more destructions .
The North Vietnamese used also Flak guns against US air attacks ,this means that the Flak guns were not worthless and on 18 December 1972 129 US bombers attacked Hanoi : the North Vietnamese fired 86 SAMs which killed 3 aircraft, only 3 .
If the German Flak failed in October 1943 above Hamburg by shooting down only 1 aircraft, you must admit that the NV SAMs also failed by shooting down only 3 US aircraft .
To fail or not does not depend on the number of aircraft that were shot ,this applies and for the Flak and for the SAMs and for the fighters .
On 6 March 672 US bombers attacked not Berlin ,but targets in Berlin . The attack was a failure : of the 1626 tons of bombs that were dropped, only a few landed near the targets .
The LW shot 50 bombers, the Flak 14, BUT the Flak damaged 318 bombers ( 48 % of the total ). The Flak did not fail .
Goebbels wrote in his diary :'' The industry is almost completely untouched;in any event there can be absolutely no talk of damage to our armaments production .''

Oh, so now cherry picking data hum? The 6 March 1944 raid on Berlin was part of "Big Week" and the first USAAF raid on Berlin. The primary objective of it was to draw the Luftwaffe's fighter arm into a fight and decimate it. In that the US was successful. For the loss of 69 bombers (to all causes) and 11 escort fighters somewhere between 81 and 160 (depends on who's figures you want to use) German aircraft were shot down. The US could replace their losses, the Germans couldn't.

While flak scored some successes, it did nothing to stop the raid. Weather was the big factor that made the bombing results poor.

The big contributor to poor bombing results wasn't flak, but poor weather over the target. Most of the US bombers had to bomb through overcast or cloud cover resulting in a scattering of the bombs rather than a good concentration. The USAAF considered the raid a success because of the number of German fighter losses they incurred.

The USAAF came back two days later and repeated the raid, again trying to bring up the Luftwaffe's fighters to decimate them.

Interestingly, you picked the 6 March 1944 raid which also had the highest numerical losses of any US bombing raid on Germany for your comparison.

[ljadw]

Cherry picking data ? If you use the 25 October attack on Hamburg, I can use the 6 March attack on Berlin .
The aim of the Flak was not to stop the raid on 25 October or on 6 March ,but to inflict substantial damage on the attacking air force.

[ljadw]

My conclusion is the conclusion from Neufeld .

''The net result of these weapons,delayed or otherwise,was that the Reich wasted a lot of money and technical expertise (and killed a lot of forced and slave laborers )in developing and producing exotic devices that yielded little or no tactical and strategical advantage . ''
In other words :Germany would have been better off without these weapons as it had not the means to produce and to use them and as their use would not have delayed the German Unconditional Surrender .
The qualities or defects of weapons can not be a reason to develop,produce and use them or not,only the possibility to do it and the possibility that these weapons could be a gamechanger were /are valid reasons for their development,production and use .
Germany needed a gamechanger that could be developed,produced and used .The SAMs were not a gamechanger, neither were the jets,the Tigers,etc...
If some one had made a prototype of a Leopard tank, this should not be a reason to produce and use this tank,as production was not possible and as use would change nothing .

[ljadw]

In the three first months of 1943 Allied aircraft losses by German fighters were 96, by Flak 90 .
Damage by fighters was 81, by Flak 724 .
In January 1943 the WM expenditures for weapons and and munition were 132 million of RM of which 39 million for the Flak .But there is no proof that less munition for the Flak would mean more munition for the Army or the KM as Flak ammunition is not thhe same as Army ammunition .
Between March and July 1943 German fighters damaged 183 Allied aircraft, the Flak damaged 2155 aircraft.
In the first quarter of 1944 the RAF lost 321 aircraft to German fighters and 179 to German Flak and during that period German fighters damaged 245 aircraft and the Flak 462 .
Thus :the Flak did completely fail .

[T. A. Gardner]

My conclusion is the conclusion from Neufeld .

''The net result of these weapons,delayed or otherwise,was that the Reich wasted a lot of money and technical expertise (and killed a lot of forced and slave laborers )in developing and producing exotic devices that yielded little or no tactical and strategical advantage . ''
In other words :Germany would have been better off without these weapons as it had not the means to produce and to use them and as their use would not have delayed the German Unconditional Surrender .
The qualities or defects of weapons can not be a reason to develop,produce and use them or not,only the possibility to do it and the possibility that these weapons could be a gamechanger were /are valid reasons for their development,production and use .
Germany needed a gamechanger that could be developed,produced and used .The SAMs were not a gamechanger, neither were the jets,the Tigers,etc...
If some one had made a prototype of a Leopard tank, this should not be a reason to produce and use this tank,as production was not possible and as use would change nothing .

This is rather jaundiced view of things. Yes, the V-2 was a total waste of resources. If what went into the V-2 instead were pushed into SAM development, Germany might have had a working SAM shooting down more aircraft. The V-1 as a bombardment weapon was economically viable. Had the missile been more reliable than it was, it would have been a truly serious bombing threat.

Germany certainly needed a gamechanger and in air defense that would be the SAM. The simplest deployable SAM would have been to pursue something like the Ba 349 Natter. This was for all intents a manned surface-to-air missile. Again, even with a 2 to 5% success rate, the Natter would have made sense as a system.

Germany pretty much was going to lose their war whatever they did short of maybe developing a working nuclear weapon ahead of the US and being able to make sufficient numbers to cause the Allies and Soviet Union to negotiate a peace. Short of that, they were doomed.

[ljadw]

Germany pretty much was going to lose their war whatever they did short of maybe developing a working nuclear weapon ahead of the US and being able to make sufficient numbers to cause the Allies and Soviet Union to negotiate a peace. Short of that, they were doomed.

This is a wrong conclusion : the possession of a working nuclear weapon was not a gamechanger, because Germany could not attack US with nuclear weapons and as a nuclear attack on Britain risked to be replied by a mass attack on Germany with poison gas .
Besides :Japan was not defeated by the use of nuclear weapons, it was already defeated before Hiroshima and Nagasaki .
And : what would be ''sufficient numbers "?
Germany wasted a lot of resources in the attempts to produce a nuclear weapon .
The same for the attempts to produce SAMs .What would be the needed sufficient number of SAMs ?

[ljadw]

My conclusion is the conclusion from Neufeld .

''The net result of these weapons,delayed or otherwise,was that the Reich wasted a lot of money and technical expertise (and killed a lot of forced and slave laborers )in developing and producing exotic devices that yielded little or no tactical and strategical advantage . ''
In other words :Germany would have been better off without these weapons as it had not the means to produce and to use them and as their use would not have delayed the German Unconditional Surrender .
The qualities or defects of weapons can not be a reason to develop,produce and use them or not,only the possibility to do it and the possibility that these weapons could be a gamechanger were /are valid reasons for their development,production and use .
Germany needed a gamechanger that could be developed,produced and used .The SAMs were not a gamechanger, neither were the jets,the Tigers,etc...
If some one had made a prototype of a Leopard tank, this should not be a reason to produce and use this tank,as production was not possible and as use would change nothing .

This is rather jaundiced view of things. Yes, the V-2 was a total waste of resources. If what went into the V-2 instead were pushed into SAM development, Germany might have had a working SAM shooting down more aircraft. The V-1 as a bombardment weapon was economically viable. Had the missile been more reliable than it was, it would have been a truly serious bombing threat.

Germany certainly needed a gamechanger and in air defense that would be the SAM. The simplest deployable SAM would have been to pursue something like the Ba 349 Natter. This was for all intents a manned surface-to-air missile. Again, even with a 2 to 5% success rate, the Natter would have made sense as a system.

Germany pretty much was going to lose their war whatever they did short of maybe developing a working nuclear weapon ahead of the US and being able to make sufficient numbers to cause the Allies and Soviet Union to negotiate a peace. Short of that, they were doomed.

The A4(V2 ) was an offensive weapon, the SAMs were defensive weapons ,thus : not to build the V2 would not result in more SAMs .
The V1 :his result was negligible .British fighters and British Flak shoot him very easily .
From Wiki (Wunderwaffe ):'' most of the Wunderwaffe remained prototypes which either never reached the combat theater,or if they did,were too late or in too insignificant number to have a military effect .''
And, I like to add that when,decades after WW2 ,Wunderwaffe were produced in significant numbers, they never were gamechangers . Drones did no/do not decide the outcome of war, neither did Leopard 2 tanks, etc,the use of Stingers did not force the Soviets to leave Afghanistan .
In 1940 there was no need on Wunderwaffe which did even not exist as prototypes.
In 1944/1945 Wunderwaffe existed almost only as prototypes and when they were used ,their result was negligible .
The Wunderwaffe came to early and when after WW2 ,they were committed, the result was not what the Wunderwaffe lobby had claimed .
Wunderwaffe, when they exist in the needed numbers, can only have effect in collaboration with the other weapons ,and as the WM as such was defeated in 1944,without any hope on recovery, Wunderwaffe could not change the outcome of war .
There are no miracles in war ,miracles exist only in Lourdes or Fatima ( for those who believe in Miracles ) .It is the same for game changers .

[T. A. Gardner]

This is a wrong conclusion : the possession of a working nuclear weapon was not a gamechanger, because Germany could not attack US with nuclear weapons and as a nuclear attack on Britain risked to be replied by a mass attack on Germany with poison gas .
Besides :Japan was not defeated by the use of nuclear weapons, it was already defeated before Hiroshima and Nagasaki .
And : what would be ''sufficient numbers "?
Germany wasted a lot of resources in the attempts to produce a nuclear weapon .
The same for the attempts to produce SAMs .What would be the needed sufficient number of SAMs ?

No, my conclusion is not. If Germany has a working nuclear weapon, and several of them for use, it is a game changer. They don't have to hit the US for that to be true. If it were ready say sometime in early 1944, they could nuke Moscow instead of London. Soviet air defenses weren't sufficiently good that they could stop such a bombing attack by one plane, or a few planes particularly if they came at night and bombed at dawn or in early morning twilight to make sure they hit the target. Same with Leningrad.

Hitting several British cities at once would be devastating. If the Allies--the US would know what happened since they would still be advanced on a bomb of their own--retaliate with poison gas, then the Germans are going to start using that too. That isn't a response in kind, and nukes are far more vicious than gas.

As for SAMs, if they were to dump the V-2 and get one or two versions in service of a SAM, they'd need several hundred batteries in place across all of Germany. That would have definitely upped, by several times, the number of bombers being shot down. It would also force the Allies to reassess their tactics in using bombers, something they had to do several times before each resulting in a commensurate, and significant, drop in effectiveness of their bombing.
SAM's wouldn't be some panacea, but they definitely would have been a better option than more guns.

[ljadw]

1 Several hundred of batteries of SAMs was out of the question for the Germans . This would mean tens of thousand of SAMs, which Germany never could produce because lack of time and lack of raw materials .Where would Germany find the needed trained manpower, the needed raw materials, the needed plants to produce tens of thousand of SAMs in a few months .
2 If the Germans had aircraft that could go to Moscow with nuclear weapons and return, the Soviets would have aircraft with poison gas that could attack Berlin and return .
Nuclear weapons would not be a game changer, not in WW2, not after WW2 .
3 If the Germans had aircraft/missiles that could attack Britain with nuclear weapons, US and Britain would reply with attacks with poison gas on Germany who would kill millions of Germans .And, if Germany also would attack with poison gas, this would not help the millions of dead Germans killed by poison gas .
4 To hit three British cities with nuclear weapons, many more than three bombers and three nuclear bombs would be needed,as the chance in 1944 for a German bomber to fly over Britain and to destroy a specific city,was almost non-existent .