Hi Clio13Clio13 wrote:None of the above arguments persuade me to change my initial assertion, namely that the conditions and underlying tensions in Britain which persisted in early 1917, could theoretically have been replicated in 1941. However I am well enough versed in realpolitik to realise that the necessary investments were unlikely to be made. Blair's observations are a welcome strand of the debate but his view is far from hegemonic in British academic circles at least.
As for the British response, the lesson of WWI was that intelligence, convoy, minefields and destroyers were the only riposte to the U-boat threat. In the later 1930s when Britain was rearming, there was still no emphasis on destroyers and corvettes. There was a lingering fondness for big showy warships - which looked great on newsreels and made people feel good - but could not depth-charge a U-boat or shepherd a convoy. I am not suggesting that these ships were useless, not by any means. What I am saying is that the perception of the U-boat threat did not necessarily result in a commensurate increase in means to combat it, ie destroyer output.
Finally, it ought to be pointed out that the French Atlantic bases, while immeasurably useful, were not essential to fighting the Battle of the Atlantic. The comparatively feeble U-boote of the KDM had managed the norweg quite nicely in WWI.
Deep down inside I know its just my idle speculation though !
In the theme of JonG’s recent post I will add the following for the record.
Though Blairs thoughts may not be widely supported in British academic circles, it is no reason to discount them completely, as every appraisal and re-appraisal has to start somewhere with somebody.
You have rightly identified the failings of the Admiralty/RN in terms of some of the lessons learnt and then lost after WW1, however you fail (at least in that specific post) to give any context to those failings. The plethora of Naval Treaties, a harsh budget climate, the Governments appeasement policy and the slavish adhesion to the 10yr rule, all affected the ability of the Admiralty/RN to achieve the fleet it truly desired.
In relation to destroyers (DD) and the above paragraph, we can see the RN lose some 433 DD’s and for only some 130 replacements built. These DD’s were the bigger types as JonG mentioned, and by time the clouds of war gathered, the Admiralty were in a position that some 60 DD’s were under construction come the wars start.
The lingering fondness for the big glory ships was still there but given the global challenges the RN faced, it required a large cruiser force, modern BB’s etc to combat those of its potential rivals.
The loss of the French coastline for the RN had a huge influence on its whole strategy. The RN strategy for merchant shipping was based around that escort protection for the convoys had only been envisaged in the waters approaching the UK. Thus with the placing of the U-Boats on the French coast, the RN had to move its strategy from escorting along the western approaches, to escorting from the mid-Atlantic and eventually escorting all the way across the Atlantic.
Regards
Andy H
- is simply silly. For example, the loss of tonnage was not the sole driver for decreased imports into the UK. Another, as I alluded to, was the convoy system itself - convoying creates inefficiencies in the transportation system. Another was the lost of the East Coast ports, especially London, which had just been renovated and expanded in the 1930's, to normal traffic. That placed a strain on the West Coast ports because so much traffic was coming in - it created bottlenecks, especially when British labor got into the act, at the docks and thence onto the rail system. Yet another was the loss of Continental coasting traffic, later partly replaced by traffic from Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, since a decrease to about one-quarter of the prewar totals were enough to sustain Britain, dissecting those imports and comparing them to afterwards should tell us something (which I hope to do later when I can access my sources).
