Well as with most navies of their time, the senior members of the various navies were advocates, through experience, of the ‘big ship’ navy. That normally meant BB’s, CA’s and A/C’s. I would disagree that the DD’s & SS’s were considered Cinderella’s but just lower down the priority food chain for a whole host of reasons.I have reason to believe that 'big ship' advocates tended to worm more easily into positions of responsibility within the Inter-War Admiralty and tended to be both more vociferous/influential and be afforded newspaper columns to advance their views. There was a perception that destroyer and submarine branches languished as the Cinderella’s of the Thirties RN
Well all I can add is that if I was an influential political voice in the inter war years and knew that my country had nearly been brought to its knees by submarine warfare a couple of decades before, I would make mightily sure I had the means to meet that submarine threat in the future, no matter what direction that threat emanated from. I would not complacently bask in the reflected glory of having emerged triumphant in the War to End All Wars. My priority would be to safeguard Britain and the transatlantic route (in the absolute knowledge that it had proven vulnerable in the last show). My means would be intelligence, convoy ASDIC sets (that really worked) mines and oh, destroyers, destroyers and more destroyers.
As I have indicated earlier and Mescal more recently, the submarine threat especially in European/Atlantic waters was deemed minimal. Firstly the major threat, that of Germany, had no U-Boats and wasn’t likely to have any in the foreseeable future. Also it was hoped that the submarine would be outlawed at the 1930 London Naval Treaty.Here is something in support of your view. As early as 1935 Britain took steps to resurrect the convoy system under Admiral Manisty. Admiralty did however reinstate a destroyer building programme on the scale suggested by WW1 experience, presumably because the greater threat was thought to be from German surface raiders. I like to think that I would have predicted that the Germans would start building U-boats again to once again threaten Britain's Atlantic Achilles Heel.
As Andy writes, the 1930 London Naval Treaty, and also the 1922 Washington Treaty both aimed to basically outlaw unrestricted submarine warfare. A naïve view, perhaps, to think that prospective future enemies would abide by treaties which clearly favoured Britain, but there you are, and well into the 30s it was actually thought that Hitler could be bargained with.Clio13 wrote:... As early as 1935 Britain took steps to resurrect the convoy system under Admiral Manisty. Admiralty did however reinstate a destroyer building programme on the scale suggested by WW1 experience, presumaby because the greater threat was thought to be from German surface raiders...
Having the means to safeguard against any theoretically possible opponent is the best position in which to be.Clio13 wrote: Well all I can add is that if I was an influential political voice in the inter war years and knew that my country had nearly been brought to its knees by submarine warfare a couple of decades before, I would make mightly sure I had the means to meet that submarine threat in the future, no matter what direction that threat emanated from.
Well, as I said previously, not only destroyers counted as ASW ships - sloops and later corvettes and frigates were also extremely useful.Clio13 wrote: My means would be intelligence, convoy ASDIC sets (that really worked) mines and oh, destroyers, destroyers and more destroyers.
As long as other navies had battleships, the RN could not escape to have its own battle fleet.Clio13 wrote: Did Britain really need so many capital ships ? I mean they proved such a decisive factor in WWI didn't they ?
No.Clio13 wrote: Call me a dreamer if you like.
Hi Clio13Clio13 wrote:The capital ships of the RN were old and need of extensive refits at best or new classes being built. These were desperately needed as those navies of our potential enemies were building newer better ones.
Did Britain really need so many capital ships ? I mean they proved such a decisive factor in WWI didn't they ?
Could you elaborate ? I would be interested by information from such primary source.Clio13 wrote: the ADM 199/ 26-42 records together with shipyard returns, tell their own eloquent tale of wheezing inadequacy.
He cites their poor habitability and limited endurance as their main shortcoming.Despite their age, the V&Ws seem to have been little worse than later destroyers.[p21]
Major conversions of elderly tubs are rarely worthwile but the Long Range Escorts seem to be an exception[p22]
You may want to replace "Denmark Strait" by "North Cape"Clio13 wrote: Denmark Strait (Scharnhorst sinking)
I am suggesting that more resources would produce more output, linear relationship or not. Part of what happened was more U-boats; more aircraft too but that is a different topic and failing. How many more seems to be a moot point.RichTO90 wrote:In any case, the German experience with attempting to expand their U-Boat building capacity is real world again and not a what if. Why in the world would you think that a "what if the Germans built shadow U-Boat factories" is more realistic an analysis that looking at what actually happened when they did attempt to expand that capacity? And, yes, of course the number of U-Boats built increased, but not uniformly or predictably as yards, money, and resources allocated to them did.
Ideal solutions are not always available but you have to do what you can. The Romans has no navy until they found they simply HAD too. The expansion in U-boats made hard demands on finding adequate crews and, above all, captains and officers. To win the Germans needed to find them but patience was never a virtue that Hitler had.RichTO90 wrote:BTW, yes, I agree that a large part of the German problem was simple strategic myopia, but that doesn't mean that they neccessarily had better solutions they could have picked.
Hi ClioI must assert that Britain was appallingly deficient in submarines during the years 1939-41 which is why the 'L' and 'H' classes (designated training submarines) were brought back into the North Sea campaign. Only in 1941 when the later 'S', 'U' and 'T' class boats came into service could British submarines mount an effective campaign. In my view a scandalous state of affairs.
Oh dear, you still aren't quite getting it. When do these "more resources" get allocated? How do they get paid for in the pre-1 September 1939 German economy that was already running full blast? Who are the skilled dockyard workers that will build them? Why do they decide to do so?hagen wrote:I am suggesting that more resources would produce more output, linear relationship or not. Part of what happened was more U-boats; more aircraft too but that is a different topic and failing. How many more seems to be a moot point.
Who is supposedly trying to comfort you and why? Just curious really, since otherwise i cannot make heads or tails of what you are trying to say.Somehow I cannot find comfort in the idea that contemporary planners got it all wrong to be concerned about German capabilities and that it was never really a close run thing. The Germans simply had not a chance.
Er, uh, yeah...so do you think maybe perhaps what the Germans did do might represent what they could do rather than the "ideal solution"? And that, just maybe perhaps, the "ideal solution" was never practical for all the myriads of reasons that have been pointed out - ad nauseum - that you apparently wish to ignore in the interest of finding a Roman solution to the German problem?RichTO90 wrote:Ideal solutions are not always available but you have to do what you can. The Romans has no navy until they found they simply HAD too. The expansion in U-boats made hard demands on finding adequate crews and, above all, captains and officers. To win the Germans needed to find them but patience was never a virtue that Hitler had.