Reasons for UBoat success 1942 US Coast?

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#16

Post by gabriel pagliarani » 06 Jan 2005, 06:36

red devil wrote:You are saying that Admiral Doenitz very nearly brought Britain to her knees in the Battle of the Atlantic and was WRONG?....
Yes :D I did it.

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#17

Post by The Argus » 09 Jan 2005, 05:17

Your both barking up the wrong tree!

To win the battle of the Atlantic the easiest way (with a claean sheet of paper) would be for Germany to mount a stretgig bombing campaign on Britains docks and shipyards AND a Uboat campaign at the same time in 39-41.

Before L-L from the US kicked in, there just wasn't the shipyard capacity in the rest of the free world combined to keep up with attrition in the Atlantic. So pounding the UK ports and dockyards would stop the reinforcement flow (trickle) and let Donitz's boats make the most of their efforts. The dammaged shipping would pile up in ports waiting for repair, the trickle of new escorts would dry up and it would be all down hill form there.

shane


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#18

Post by gabriel pagliarani » 09 Jan 2005, 06:45

I don't think we are barking both at the same wrong tree, Shane. In 1942 the main target was USA not GB. Obviously the strategic post was dramatically enhanced for Axis just after Dec 7th 1941. Doenitz simply never adjusted his winning strategy against GB to the new extended menace coming from USA harbours. If he was very close to block totally the traffic between GB harbours and Murmansk by cutting it in the waters of Iceland, he was not able to do the same pressure towards the same kind of traffic between USA harbours and all the other Allied harbours. Simply Borghese realized this easy fact: for subs the blockade of harbours is much more effective even if not easier than cutting traffic midway. Subs pushing the 1st kick with the strategic advantage of surprise are the worst menace possible for any naval traffic: these advantages are wasted when waiting for convoys in Mid Atlantic exactly where Royal Navy was waiting the prompt incoming of U-booten.

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#19

Post by red devil » 09 Jan 2005, 14:12

.......... and in the Atlantic, hunter killer groups roamed at will, following HF/DF to track down U Boats and hunt them without distraction. Let us also not forget, as GP just said, the subject of this thread is the US COAST; not UK ports or such.

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#20

Post by The Argus » 10 Jan 2005, 01:36

Granted this thread is about US coastal waters, but then the U-Boat campaign wasn't.

The US was never the prime strategic focus for the U-boats, it was a target of opertunity. As soon as American coastal ASW got up to a reasonable standard, the U-boats packed up and left, to return to their old hunting grounds in the mid Atlantic. The absolute focus of the Donitz and most of the KM's effort was to isolate Britiain, America just wasn't important in comparison. This has nothing to do with nationalality, it's pure geography. Without the British Isles, America (as a continent not a country) wasn't relevent, the 'Unsinkable aircraft carrier' and all that.

Without Britian as a base what could America do? Coastal strikes from Carriers would be about it untill the B-36's came along, a friend of mine has gone into this in some detail and believes it would have stretched the war another two years and needed the nuking of Germany to finish it. BUt thats just speculation.

Donitz was a 'tonnage' man, it didn't matter where the tonnage was, where it was headed too or had just come from, what the cargo was, or what that cargo might do once landed, he didn't care. All that mattered was that the ships were sunk, look how he resisted all the vairous diversions of his boats into the med and arctic for tactical reasons, and how he told OKW to get lost when they wanted him to concentrate only on east bound shipping (loaded from America). His campaign was directed at the big picture, the Allies had XX million tons of shipping and it was his job to put XX million tons on the bottom, his prime figure in this very statistical war was the U-Boat Quotent, how many tones per day were sunk each month, this to compare with how many tons of new ships were launched in the same period. When L-L kicked in this rose to about 170 tons a day (IIRC), provided that or more was sunk each day any effect on the wider war was convienent but incidental.


Blockadeing Ports.... oh lord. I wish Donitz HAD tried to blockade the ports. A submarine's prime advantage is stealth, especially in WWI-II where it had neither the speed or striking range of modern boats. But in themselves early submersables were not very stealthy other than their ability to submerge, they relied on the Big Ocean - Small Ship effect.

There is a very good reason why the Convoy system, was the prime responce to the sub threat in both wars and remains so to this day (not that it's been used much in practice). It is no only the most effective defensive measure available, it is also the most positive agressive measure too.

Big Ocean - Small Ship, means the detection radius for one ship on it's own, is about the same as a a convoy of 50 or more. Say the radius for a ship 20 is miles (or 50, or 100, what ever), for a convoy two miles square (say 50 ships), the radius becomes 21 miles... that's an increase in area of about 10%. 50 ships sailing independantly increase the area several thousand percent. A convoy effectively empties the sea of ships, this is reflected in tactics used by submarines. In the early days of WWI when shipping sailed independantly, a U-Boat would go and stake out an area to wait for the next ship to come along, With the adoption of convoys, the U-Boats had to go looking for prey, latter forming 'pack's to stake out picket lines and patrol an area.

But to survive the U-Boat, was dependant on the same Big Ocean effect for protection, underwater it's detection radius dropped from the visual horizon to a matter of a couple of thousand yards by ASDIC/Sonar. When the Convoy was first adopted people saw it (and dispised it) as a defensive tactic, but then they realised that the convoy acted like a submarine magnet, forceing the subs to come to them. Drawing the elusive U-Boats out of the murky wastes of the sea, and into the small patch of water around a convoy where the ASW forces were already waiting for them. So in effect the ASW forces didn't have to hunt for subs across the whole ocean, they came to the front door and knocked politely (with a torp).

If Donitz had tried to blockade a port, all he'd have done in effect is present his forces on a platter for the ASW ships to kill. Such a blockade would have concentrated the U-boats into a defined area (or number of areas) in shallow (ish) and confined waters. They certainly would have shut down ports and played merry hell with trade disrupting the war and making life difficult for the allies, but in naval warfare the biggest challange is first to find your enemy, and a a blockade would have done that for the allies very nicely thank you. It was only out in the deep sea the subs had the room to hide and if they couldn't hide a sub wasn't much more than a slow torpedo boat.

Red Devil mentions HK groups, in WWII the RN ran 'Escort Groups' and 'Support Groups,' an EG was just that a convoy escort formation, the 'Support Groups' certainly swept the seas as they moved around, but their main role was to reinforce EG's when they came under threat, or more cynically take advantage of the Convoy as bait to hunt U-Boats. A port blockade would have been a stationary convoy and a submarine death trap.

shane

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#21

Post by red devil » 10 Jan 2005, 02:09

Walker are my pages on Walker, Hunter Killer they operated INDEPENDENTLY of escorts and convoys. I am well aware of the difference between EG and SG, Walker was SG. The US coastline was never stated as a important U Boat target, it was a target of opportunity. It took the USA a heck of a long time to get to grip with the catastrophe unfolding on their coast, I will not repeat myself. A Uboat as a blockade weapon would not have worked, imppossible. U Boat commanders themselves state that their primary function was as a surface attack vessel with underwater capabilities. They could not survive long enough underwater to act as a blockade weapon, having to surface to recharge batteries and replenish air. Indeed Walker had it worked out to the minute when a submerged U boat had to surface and would "wait" with 2 ships on top of the supposed U Boat position and the other 4 maintaining a ring around the area. He knew they could dive deeper than depth charges allowed, so would play the waiting game, which he could afford to do being independent of others. His book Walker RN explains all this. I have a first edition of this marvellous history of Walker and his ships and men.

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#22

Post by The Argus » 10 Jan 2005, 17:24

I don't see that we have any disagreement RD, so you can repeat yourself to your hearts content and I was not intending to preach to the congregation either. Since I've been looking for a copy of Walker for years, I hope you don't mind but I rather think I'll take advantage of your generosity and read your copy, thanks. :)

As far as I can see our only point of contention is the exact role of SG's and if I understand you correctly it looks like we're seeing the same coin from different sides. Yes the SG's were independant (in the command sense) of the EG's most of the time, and they operated in many different capacities from direct reinforcement of EG's to hunting down HF/DF-inteligence contacts. But AFAIK they also acted as distant 'escorts,' sweeping areas well ahead of Convoys or in places where the STR (ie Commander Winn) saw U-Boat patrol lines and projected convoy paths would cross.

shane

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#23

Post by red devil » 10 Jan 2005, 19:02

A very good site for out of print books and especially WW2 ones is

ABE BOOKS

Thats where I got Walker RN from and another very good one, The Battle of The Narrow Seas by Peter Scott (yes, the same Sir Peter Scott), about MTB's in the North sea and Channel.

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#24

Post by The Argus » 10 Jan 2005, 22:42

Shut up.... thats another book I've been after for years, I've only found 3 libarys with copies in my state, most anoying. :)

Unfortunatly, as I'm looking after my invalid father on a pension, buying books just isn't on, although I thank you for the link.

shane

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#25

Post by red devil » 11 Jan 2005, 00:15

Sorry about your dad, my walker book cost me the princely sum of about £11 :P But as stated earlier can be read on my site at

WALKER RN

You can imagine how long it took me to get the whole book online, so a small donation on the pay pal button would be nice, but not compulsory :P

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#26

Post by The Argus » 11 Jan 2005, 14:19

I read it last night and I thank you for the effort.

I don't have a paypal account, or even a credit card, so as much as I'd like to, the only compensation I can offer is gratitude, and as we all know that graitiude an' two quid will by you a cup of coffee. :roll: Sorry.

shane

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#27

Post by gabriel pagliarani » 11 Jan 2005, 23:10

The Argus wrote:....Blockadeing Ports.... oh lord. I wish Donitz HAD tried to blockade the ports. A submarine's prime advantage is stealth, especially in WWI-II where it had neither the speed or striking range of modern boats. But in themselves early submersables were not very stealthy other than their ability to submerge, they relied on the Big Ocean - Small Ship effect...
I don't know if Doenitz really tried the blockade by using appropriate assault weapons, I don't think Germans really never developed this kind of naval weapon. But Borghese shown it was possible and effective not only against merchant ships but also against dreadnoughts. The real problem was in intelligence: air recon in Mediterranean was not able to discriminate between a sunk dreadnought and a floating one. Adm. Cunningham pulled up the union Jack on the upper deck for a month with naked feet in the water and italian recce was not able to discriminate between a real sunk or a giant bluff. The poor quality of photo paper (Ferrania) and the high ceiling (10000 mt) could not show to Supermarina the difference between a fiasco or a success for a too long time. What if a dreadnought or a carrier had to be sunk in american ports? Who was able to report a success or a failure so far from Italy in a siutable short time?U-2 and spy-satellites were far to be invented in 1942.

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#28

Post by The Argus » 22 Jan 2005, 17:51

GP, you mention 'weapons' by this do you mean sepcialist weapons developed for blockade work, like 'Human Torpedos?'

I was speaking of a conventional submarine 'blockade' with the U-Boats clustered around the ports sinking ships by torpedo. Useing 'Frogmen' and simmilar techniques would have had some effect of course, just as a conventional blockade would, any new tactic can be expected to have some measure of sucess before the enemy adjust to it.

But I can't see how it would have been a viable way to fight the BoA. Harbour penertrations both Axis and Allied were sucessful in WWII, but I strugle to think of any examples that were not raids, except Gibralter and that was an unusual circumstance. Canoe raids, human torpedos and miniture submarines all needed a lot of effort and highly skilled and motivated people to work. On the other hand imporving the defenses of the ports would have been realitivly easy compared to beefing up ASW to defend the convoys properly.

I don't think it would have been impossiable, but it would come down to the trade off between a new set of difficulties and the know ones of convoy attacks. You could get Mini-subs into New York harbour, a Japanese I class boat could do the job easily (the IJN used them for exactly this in Madagascar and Sydney), and I don't dobt you could get through the defenses, but the question is how many times could this be repeated and at what cost?

shane

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#29

Post by red devil » 22 Jan 2005, 20:50

Argus: you assume that Germany has U Boats to waste? How do you intend these U Boats toblockade ports and NOT have the defence do anything? U Boats blockading a port may as well put up their periscopes with a flag attached announcing "here we are" come and sink us. There would be every U Boat the Germans had sunk, within 2 days of a blockade being set up. Talk about easy to find!! It is utterly impossible to set such a thing up.

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#30

Post by The Argus » 23 Jan 2005, 16:00

Hold on RD!

Those point are exactly those I made a couple of posts up, I couldn't agree with you more. But as I said, it would be possiable and any decission would be a ballance between cost and result. Of course it would be death for U-Boats and the rewards would never justify the risks, in a hyperthetical sense it would be possiable, just not very cleaver.

shane

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