Poor Poland.

Discussions on all aspects of Poland during the Second Polish Republic and the Second World War. Hosted by Peter K
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Re: Poor Poland.

Postby wm » 31 Jul 2017 08:16

1 November. Report of the Ambassador in Rome on conversations within the diplomatic corps during the Czechoslovak crisis
Rome, 1 November 1938
SECRET.

Dear Mr. Minister, I wish by this letter to send you my usual report from the more important discussions I have had with representatives of the local diplomatic corps, including on the Czechoslovak crisis.[...]

I will begin with the Englishman. With the ambassador of Great Britain I had a lengthy discussion on the eve of our entry into Silesia, i.e., on 1 October. To my arguments about our rights to Silesia and a lack of understanding for the legitimacy of our demands on the part of both English politicians and its public opinion, which is continually ill-disposed toward us, he responded by saying that England had been on the verge of war with Germany not in order to defend Czechoslovakia, but on the principle that it cannot by any means accept the fact that someone, through war or the threat of war, forces his will on Europe. Meanwhile, we are settling our claims with regard to the Czechs in an identical manner even though we have been promised that our affairs would be settled within three months.
I replied that we are forced to proceed in this manner, because we do not trust the Czechs and, unfortunately, we have lost our trust in the Western Powers.

This was the first reason, while the second was that we realise perfectly well that within three months neither France nor England would have much to say in this corner of Europe but only Germany will. So in order to avoid an unnecessary conflict with Germany our government decided to seize the part of Silesia due to us at the same time as the Germans.
On 10 October I had a second conversation with the English ambassador in which he had to admit my earlier arguments had been right. When I explained to him the significance of a common frontier with Hungary for peace and the regulation of relations in Central Europe, he replied: 'You are perhaps right again, but the matter cannot be settled otherwise than on an ethnographic basis'.

from: Polish Documents on Foreign Policy. 24 October 1938 – 30 September 1939.


17 December. Report of the Ambassador in Paris on French foreign policy following the Munich Conference
Paris, 17 December 1938
CONFIDENTIAL TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN WARSAW.

POLITICAL REPORT No. XL/3

[...]The analysis of the actual situation from a purely political standpoint must unfortunately show that neither in the attitude of the government as represented by Bonnet, nor in the statements by parliamentary politicians, nor in the press is there anything to indicate a tendency to impart a vital force to the alliance with us or to treat it today as an instrument of French foreign policy.
In fact, there is no lack of indications that, should France be required, for one reason or another, to fulfill obligations resulting from its alliance with us, the effort to evade these obligations would be undoubtedly larger than the action toward fulfilling them. The above opinion appears to disagree with Minister Bonnet's statements which I had the honour to report to you; yet it is undoubtedly right and reflects the true state of affairs.
Minister Bonnet is a weak man, who is unable to be firm on any matter and succumbs to a tendency of adapting himself to each of his consecutive interlocutors. Without questioning the sincerity of his statements concerning us, there is not the slightest doubt that, when confronted by the government, as well as the press and Parliament, he does not take the same attitude in matters of the alliance with us as he does in discussion with me.

Summarizing, France considers only the alliance with England as a positive asset; it looks upon the alliance with us and the pact with Soviet Russia as a burden, and thus acknowledges them only unwillingly. This situation may change should France, under the British influence, adopt an offensive policy toward Germany and Italy, which seems totally unlikely in the near future, or should the events show that we can resist German policy effectively and consequently influence the attitude of other states of Central and Eastern Europe toward Berlin.

As regards Central European problems, the French policy relative to Germany's expansionist efforts not only exhibits complete inertness and defeatism but is also incapable of assuming in the face of these efforts an attitude different from that which characterized it for the last twenty years.[...]
According to the information I received from Minister Bonnet, Minister von Ribbentrop obtained assurance that France would not oppose German economic expansion in the Danube basin, and he could not have failed to leave Paris with the impression that also a political expansion in this direction would not meet with any determined action on the part of France.
In the particular area of Eastern European problems, and especially the Russian question, complete chaos prevails both in French policy and in French public opinion. Confidence in Soviet Russia, or rather in its power, is constantly diminishing, as are pro-Russian sympathies. Evaluation of the internal Soviet situation is pessimistic; here and there, mostly in military circles, anxiety is voiced that a military coup in Moscow might lead to dangerous cooperation between Berlin and Russia.
from: Polish Documents on Foreign Policy. 24 October 1938 – 30 September 1939

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Re: Poor Poland.

Postby xsli » 02 Aug 2017 04:13

Hi, gebhk,

Just back from vacation and now have books available. :D

I may have not phrased my sentence precisely - the part should be:

only Poland and Hungary seek territorial revision with Poland being the one more active (before and after the agreement).

Poland being more active (than Hungary) is supported by a number of examples which I assume you are familiar with.

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Re: Poor Poland.

Postby gebhk » 02 Aug 2017 12:10

I'm afraid I am still not clear about your definition of 'active'. That would be helpful.

However, it was not just Poland and Hungary that were seeking territorial revisions. I would suggest that the Slovaks and a number of other minorities were just as keen.....

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K

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Re: Poor Poland.

Postby xsli » 02 Aug 2017 13:08

Hi, gebhk,

Soviet seeking territory from Czech? Certainly I am not talking about the complex inter-country demands in the region. AFAIK, besides Germany, Poland and Hungary are the only two. Hitler tried to woo/pressure the two in his Sudeten quest since he needed an "alliance" to squeeze Czech. He wanted them to participate on his side once a war erupted.

Hitler had high hopes on the two but Hungary never took the initiative and only timidly sent request after pressure. On 1938-09-21, Poland demanded a plebiscite in the Teschen region and moved troops to the border. Under much pressure from Hitler, Hungary sent a memorandum a bit later but did nothing else. After signing, Poland sent an ultimatum immediately while Hungary did not.

As a result, Hitler was furious at Horthy and changed his plan of chopping up Czech and splitting it with Poland and Hungary. Later he told Hungary: you missed the bus!

There are a few paragraphs in Chapter 4 of Watt's "How war came" talking Poland/Hungary, which supports the "Poland more active than Hungary" part.

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Re: Poor Poland.

Postby Steve » 02 Aug 2017 23:51

The British Government seems to have taken the view that the issue of Teschen was an unnecessary complication and never showed much interest in the matter. On September 26 a joint Anglo French letter was give to Beck. The letter stated that the Czechoslovakian government was ready to accept a territorial concession provided the Polish government adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality. Shortly afterwards the British ambassador in Prague was instructed to tell the Czechoslovakian government to cease “diplomatic manoeuvring” and agree to handing over territory inhabited by a Polish majority. The French took a slightly different course. General Gamelin wrote a letter to Smigly-Rydz saying he was certain the matter of Teschen could be sorted out between Poland and Czechoslovakia by direct negotiations. He warned that if Poland took Teschen by force it could find itself in a camp opposed to France. It seems likely (the full text of the letter does not exist) that there was also a veiled threat that if Poland became involved in war with the USSR (an ally of the Czechs) France would not support her.

As for the Germans a meeting took place on the evening of September 27 between on the Polish side Ambassador Lipski and Councillor Lubomirski and German State Secretary Weizsacker to iron out a last minute problem. In a map presented to the British at Godesburg the area of Bohumin was shown as German. The French and British showed the map in Warsaw causing it seems considerable surprise to the Poles. Bohumin was now put on the Polish side of the new proposed Polish Czech border. The Germans also promised to consult on plebiscites in the areas of Frydek and Moravska Ostrava.

It seems that by the end of the crisis the only people opposed to handing over Teschen were the Czechs. With the Sudetenland issue settled German thoughts now moved swiftly on to Danzig. One of the Polish aims during the crisis had been to establish a land frontier between Poland and Hungary. On October 22 Weizsacker in a note to Ribbentrop suggested that in return for agreeing to a Polish Hungary border Germany should ask for compensation in Danzig and Memel.

From Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939 by Anna M Cienciala

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Re: Poor Poland.

Postby wm » 03 Aug 2017 13:31

Steve wrote:
As for the Germans a meeting took place on the evening of September 27 between on the Polish side Ambassador Lipski and Councillor Lubomirski and German State Secretary Weizsacker to iron out a last minute problem. In a map presented to the British at Godesburg the area of Bohumin was shown as German. The French and British showed the map in Warsaw causing it seems considerable surprise to the Poles.


To be quite correct, it was the French military attaché in Warsaw who showed the map to Beck on the morning of September 27, then the same day the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, instructed by Beck, initiated the "ironing" during an unrelated meeting with Weizsäcker.
The next day during another meeting with Weizsäcker the problem was discussed, Weizsäcker honestly had no idea what was the reason for the incursion into the territory claimed by the Poles. As the Polish ambassador demanded the problem was solved the same day there was another meeting later when Weizsäcker accepted Polish demands. But it wasn't the end of it because the matter actually dragged on for another week.

It rather wasn't a "considerable surprise", in his instructions to Lipski Beck discussed it at the end, showing he didn't believe it was a serious problem as long as it could have been resolved quickly.

A week later the Germans asked the Poles for assurances that in the future they would agree to passage through the disputed territory of the future Danube–Oder Canal and for some help in reorganizing the Berlin-Breslau-Vienna railway line (which ran through the territory too). So the canal could have been one of the reasons for the German demand.

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Re: Poor Poland.

Postby wm » 03 Aug 2017 13:58

xsli wrote:Hitler tried to woo/pressure the two in his Sudeten quest since he needed an "alliance" to squeeze Czech. He wanted them to participate on his side once a war erupted.


Sorry, that is not correct. He actually didn't want any helpers.

Lipski to Beck
September 20, 1938
Strictly Confidential

The Chancellor received me today in Obersalzberg in the presence of the Reich minister of foreign affairs, Ribbentrop, at 4 p.m. The conversation lasted for more than two hours.
[...]
3) For my confidential information, remarking that 1 could use it at my discretion, the Chancellor declared today that, in case a conflict would arise between Poland and Czechoslovakia over our interests in Teschen, Germany would be on our side. (I think that a similar declaration was made by the Chancellor to the Hungarian Prime Minister, though I was not told so.) The Chancellor suggests, in such an eventuality, that we undertake action only after the Germans occupy the Sudeten Mountains, since then the whole operation would be shorter.
From other long deliberations of the Chancellor the following results were clear:

a) that he does not intend to go beyond the Sudetenland territory; naturally with armed force he would go deeper, especially since, in my opinion, he would then be under pressure from the military elements who for strategic reasons push toward the subjugation of the whole of ethnographic Czechoslovakia to Germany;

b) that besides a certain line of German interests we have a totally free hand;

c) that he sees great difficulties in reaching a Rumanian-Hungarian agreement (I think the Chancellor is under Horthy's influence, as I reported to you verbally);

d) that the cost of the Sudetenland operation, including fortifications and armaments, adds up to the sum of 18 billion RM;

e) that upon settlement of the Sudetenland question he would present the problem of colonies;

f ) that he has in mind an idea for settling the Jewish problem by way of emigration to the colonies in accordance with an understanding with Poland, Hungary, and possibly also Rumania (at which point I told him that if he finds such a solution we will erect him a beautiful monument in Warsaw).

from: Diplomat In Berlin 1933-1939 by Józef Lipski

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Re: Poor Poland.

Postby Steve » 03 Aug 2017 19:54

Details can be quibbled over till the cows come home but what I think WM has proved conclusively in his last post is that there was co-operation between Poland and Germany over the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. This is something that has often been denied. The issue of Bohumin shows that this co-operation was not just on a theoretical level but extended down to drawing lines on maps in order to delineate the areas Germany and Poland would occupy.

After Munich Germany decided that the Polish desire for a common border with Hungary was not a good idea. Poland was not invited to the Vienna arbitration of October 31 over the Hungarian claims to Ruthenia. There would be no border between Poland and Hungary unless Hitler agreed; he was now the main arbitrator in east European affairs. Hitler was clearly in a better position after Munich than before. The Poles recieved very little in the great scheme of things and their position vis a vis Germany was now worse.

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Re: Poor Poland.

Postby wm » 03 Aug 2017 23:56

Not at all.
The Poles made their demands (and be quick about - it better be the same day) and the Germans accepted them.
Cienciala is absolutely wrong it was "ironing out" - Weizsacker summoned Lipski to inform him about the latest development and nothing more.
Beck's instructed Lipski that:
the problem should be solved promptly, in order to avoid political dissent or, even worse, a military clash between us and the Germans.

So no, it wasn't cooperation, Beck actually was ready for a military confrontation with Germany if something went wrong.

That Hitler rambled on for two hours making empty promises only proves he was rambling on, Lipski just listened patiently and didn't make any promises.

Steve wrote: Poland was not invited to the Vienna arbitration of October 31 over the Hungarian claims to Ruthenia.

Countries like Poland weren't invited anywhere as a rule. The Poles weren't invited to Munich too (well they didn't even invite the Czechs). The big boys were making deals between themselves and expected the small stuff to obey.
Well, the Poles weren't Czechs, as Polish diplomats liked to say, and they weren't going to obey. The had learned the hard way during the earlier years it wasn't worth it.

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Re: Poor Poland.

Postby Steve » 04 Aug 2017 18:48

When the British received the Godesberg map they must have quickly realised it was not the map the Poles were working from. That the British government seemingly knew which areas the Poles were going to occupy is surprising. As far as I am aware the Poles demanded from the Czechs the secession of all territory inhabited by a majority Polish population and plebiscites in territory where it was not certain. Did the French military attaché and the British ambassador inform the Poles on September 27 as an act of friendship or in an effort to disrupt Polish German relations?

The Germans knew what the Poles expected to get out of the crisis as Lipski had informed them on September 19 and the German ambassador in Warsaw had reported back on Polish claims. On September 23 Beck sent Lipski an outline of Polish claims. Line A on a Czechoslovakian map included the maximum area claimed line B excluded some areas and line C was the minimum. Sources in English on what transpired are as rare as hen’s teeth.

Beck’s reaction over the Godesberg map was indeed strong and he instructed Lipski in his discussions to use line C and the map the Poles had given the Czechs. Also to mention the conversation Lipski had with Hitler on September 20. Beck told the German ambassador he hoped no clash would occur between German and Polish troops. Lipski saw Weizsacker on September 28 at noon telling him the matter had to be resolved that day. Another meeting took place in the evening and the Germans gave way. Hitler said on October 5 he was not interested in Bohumin and would not haggle over it.

There is a theory that the reason the Germans gave in so easily could have been because of the Moravska Ostrava area which was more important to them. Goering could have deliberately created a crisis because he expected the Poles to claim it. By not contesting the Polish claim to Bohumin he could have hoped that the Poles in turn would not contest a German claim to Moravska Ostrava. Weinzsacker told Lipski on October 12 that if Poland claimed the area Germany would demand a plebiscite. Presumably because the Poles could not win one it was agreed the area stay with Czechoslovakia.

The second aim of Polish diplomacy that of creating a common border with Hungary was regarded as against German interests by the German Army High Command. It warned against this on October 6 “a common Polish Hungarian frontier ………..would facilitate the formation of an anti German bloc” It also warned against any orientation of an autonomous Slovakia towards Poland.

The Poles put a lot of effort into obtaining support from the major powers for the annexation of Ruthenia by Hungary. Romanian assent was crucial and Beck’s Chef de Cabinet went to Romania and then Beck went for a personal meeting with King Carol. The Romanians were not keen partly because the Germans were whispering in their ears. With plan A not succeeding Beck tried to get Poland included in arbitration to decide the matter. In a meeting with Ribbentrop Lipski mentioned Poland’s wish to be included in any arbitration to discuss the transfer of territory to Hungary. Ribbentrop brought up the subject of Danzig and Lipski decided to drop the matter of Poland taking part in arbitration of Hungarian claims.

Taken from Poland and The Western Powers 1938-1939 by Anna Cienciala

I shall have to withdraw from the fiery crucible of Axis History discussions for a while as I am off on holiday.

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Re: Poor Poland.

Postby wm » 04 Aug 2017 22:34

Steve wrote:When the British received the Godesberg map they must have quickly realised it was not the map the Poles were working from. That the British government seemingly knew which areas the Poles were going to occupy is surprising. As far as I am aware the Poles demanded from the Czechs the secession of all territory inhabited by a majority Polish population and plebiscites in territory where it was not certain. Did the French military attaché and the British ambassador inform the Poles on September 27 as an act of friendship or in an effort to disrupt Polish German relations?


I believe these below are all the facts known.
There were no British in sight, the French attaché simply delivered some documents, acting as a courier.

5) Today the French Military Attache presented to us the map of German claims attached to the Chancellor's memorandum. In accordance with this map, the Bohumin region is marked in red, as being contained within the frame of the Sofort program occupation, while a considerable part of the territory east of the river Ostravica (see map "C") is included in the plebiscite region.

6) Under these conditions the problem should be solved promptly, in order to avoid political dissent or, even worse, a military clash between us and the Germans.

7) Within the limit presently considered by you as possible, please inform any one among the competent political leaders of the Reich about our point of view.

To define the general scope of our interests use map "C"; others are not valid. If necessary, show the map of our immediate claims forwarded today to Prague, which you will find enclosed. Do this in order to avoid friction and, in emergency, to find a prompt realistic compromise. In this occasion refer to your conversation with the Chancellor at Berchtesgaden.


Steve wrote:The second aim of Polish diplomacy that of creating a common border with Hungary was regarded as against German interests by the German Army High Command. It warned against this on October 6 “a common Polish Hungarian frontier ………..would facilitate the formation of an anti German bloc” It also warned against any orientation of an autonomous Slovakia towards Poland.

That was the main aim, an anti-German and simultaneously anti-Soviet bloc. Teschen was just a side-show for internal consumption.
The big boys were appeasing and generally useless, so the small fry was going to organize themselves without them.

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Slovak Invasion and Occupation of Poland 1939

Postby henryk » 05 Aug 2017 19:08

https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php? ... nd%20(1939)
Slovak invasion of Poland (1939)
The Slovak invasion of Poland occurred during Germany's invasion of Poland in September 1939. The recently created Slovak Republic joined the attack, and the Slovak Field Army Bernolák contributed over 50,000 soldiers in three divisions. As the main body of the Polish forces were engaged with the German armies farther north of the southern border, the Slovak invasion met only weak resistance and suffered minimal losses.

Background

March 14, 1939 saw the Slovak State established as a client state of Germany within the area of Slovakia. Prior to this, on November 2, 1938, a part of Slovakia containing a substantial Hungarian population (Slovakia having been part of the Kingdom of Hungary for centuries) was taken by the Hungarian Army as a result of the First Vienna Award of November 2, 1938. Small parts of these disputed areas with mixed Polish and Slovak inhabitants belonged to Germany and to Poland.

The official political pretext for the Slovak participation in the Polish Campaign was a disagreement over a small disputed area on the Poland-Slovakia border. Poland had appropriated this area on December 1, 1938, in the aftermath of the Munich Agreement of September 1938. In addition, some Polish politicians supported Hungary in their effort to include into their state parts inhabited mostly by Hungarians.

During secret discussions with the Germans on July 20–21, 1939, the Slovak government agreed to participate in Germany's planned attack on Poland. The Slovaks also agreed to allow Germany to use its territory as the staging area for its troops. On August 26, the Slovak Republic mobilized its armed forces and established a new field army, codenamed "Bernolák", which comprised 51,306 soldiers. Additionally, 160,000 reservists were called up, with 115,000 entering service until September 20, 1939.

Order of battle

The Bernolák army group was led by the Slovak Minister of Defense Ferdinand Čatloš, and had its initial headquarters in Spišská Nová Ves, though after September 8 this was moved to Solivar near Prešov. It consisted of:
•1st infantry division "Jánošík" led by Anton Pulanich in sector Spišská Nová Ves – Prešov.
•2nd infantry division "Škultéty" led by Alexander Čunderlík in sector Brezno – Poprad.
•3rd infantry division "Rázus" led by Augustín Malár in sector east of High Tatra.
•A motorized unit "Kalinčiak" was created on September 5 but the campaign ended before it arrived on the front.

The group was part of the German Army Group South and was subordinated to the 14th Army led by Wilhelm List, contributing to the 14th Army's total of five infantry divisions, three mountain divisions, two tank divisions and one air force division. Bernolák's task was to prevent a Polish incursion into Slovakia and to support German troops.

Their opposition was the Polish Karpaty Army (Carpathian Army), which consisted of infantry units with some light artillery support and no tanks.

Campaign

The attack started on September 1, 1939 at 5:00 a.m. The 1st division occupied the village of Javorina and the town of Zakopane, then continued toward Nowy Targ, protecting the German 2nd Mountain Division from the left.[1] :50 During September 4–5, it engaged in fighting with regular Polish army units. On September 7 the division stopped its advance, 30 km inside Polish territory. Later, the division was pulled back, with one battalion remaining until September 29 to occupy Zakopane, Jurgów and Javorina.

The 2nd division was kept in reserve and participated only in mopping-up operations. In this it was supported by the Kalinčiak group. The 3rd division had to protect 170 km of the Slovak border between Stará Ľubovňa and the border with Hungary. It fought minor skirmishes, and after several days moved into Polish territory, ending its advance on September 11.

Two or three Slovak air squadrons (codenamed Ľalia, Lily) were used for reconnaissance, bombing and close support for German fighters. Two planes were lost (one to anti-aircraft fire, one to an accidental crash), and one Polish plane was shot down. Total Slovak infantry losses during the campaign were 37 dead, 114 wounded and 11 missing.

Aftermath

All Slovak units were pulled back until the end of September 1939. On October 5, a victorious military parade was held in Poprad. The mobilized units were gradually demobilized and the Army Group Bernolák was disbanded on October 7.

The Slovak Army took around 1,350 civilian prisoners in Poland. In February 1940, around 1,200 of these were handed to Germans, and some of the remainder to the Soviets. The rest were kept in a Slovak prison camp in Lešť.

All the disputed territory, whether part of Poland from 1920 or from 1938, was given to Slovakia (this was confirmed by a Slovak parliamentary resolution on December 22, 1939). This arrangement lasted until 20 May 1945, when the border line was returned to its 1920 position.

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Czecho-Slovakian Invasion and Occupation of Poland 1945

Postby henryk » 05 Aug 2017 19:14

http://ioh.pl/artykuly/pokaz/konflikt-g ... tach,1076/
Google translation of part of the Polish language article....................indicates omitted part.
Polish-Czechoslovak border conflict in 1945-1947
Author: Władysław Szczepański

After World War II Poland lost a total of about 76 thousand. Km2, and its boundaries have been shifted 200 km to the west. There was a huge displacement of the population on the so-called. Western and Northern Lands. These migration-territorial processes also affected the Kłodzko Land, where the 10th Polish Army Infantry Division was transferred. The mentioned Kłodzko Land was within the interest of the then Czechoslovak authorities, who at all times wanted to join it in their own country.

It was not just about correcting this part of the border area in favor of Czechoslovakia. Poland's postwar armed forces were not completely structured and structured to protect the Polish frontiers at least professionally, so the regular units of the Polish Army had to immediately cover new missions and new posts.
...........................................................................
There have been numerous incidents in Raciborsk, Glubczyce, Nysa and Kłodzko in the spring. On May 10, 1945, the Polish starosty staff, as well as the motorized and armed Czech operational group, arrived at Raciborz. The period of uncertainty lasted until May 12, when the local Soviet war commandant, after receiving an order to hand over Poles to the city and the right bank of the county, forced the Czechs to leave Raciborz. Still, the future of the rest of the county was still unclear. Both in and around Glubczyce came three-color flags. At the same time in Kłodzko, with the active support of the center of the Rookie, was formed the nucleus of the Czechoslovak administration. In Słonym, Zakrze and Kudów the Czech Starosters were tolerated by the Soviet military authorities.

In Nysa, a border governor of Czechoslovakia began to create militia in Kalisz, Jarnołtów and Jasienica Górna from local Germans, signaling the intention to occupy the border region with Otmuchow. This was the end of the intervention of the governor of Nysa Wincenty Karuga in the Soviet military authorities. Such an occupation by the Czech border communes also reported the plenipotentiary for industry to the district and the city of Nysa. Similar information was also obtained from poviats of Kłodzko, Bystrzycki and Wałbrzych. Many incidents were unlawful requisitions; In May and the first days of June 1945, Racibórz was penetrating the Czech police without obstacles, taking cattle and agricultural crops and shooting at Polish flags. On June 6, the Poles detained a 10-person group of Czechoslovak militiamen who had raced horses and cows up to Racibórz. After the intervention of the Czechoslovak War Commander, they were soon dismissed
Inspectorate in the first half of June 1945, Cieszyn and Racibórz counties, the second Silesian province governor Stefan Węgierov, discussed the above events, and paid attention to the need for a rapid takeover of the entire district of Racibórz, not in the context of the Czechoslovak threat, but because of the influx of settlers arriving in Opole, Mostly from Kresy.

But there was also a shortage of cross-border incidents. In the Kłodzko Valley for the southern border was taken, among others. From Mostowice the Horna composition, and from the Lasów crystalline factory. The Polish press unequivocally pointed to the Czechs as perpetrators of these requisitions. Similar events took place on other sections of the border. In Kałków, in the Nysa district, at the last moment the Czechs were dismantled and disassembled and exported to the mill with grain supplies. The number of the southern neighbor's requisitions was limited in the area until the beginning of June, when the Soviet military command post in Paczków sent the Polish side there economic objects and the Polish militia entered there. The border line in May 1945 was treated without special courtesy to Polish officials. In agreement with the industrial plenipotentiary of the city and district of Nysa, the German director of the Deaf-mute paper mill sank up to 100 km into the Czech Republic, removing various machinery and equipment from there. Similar actions were also taken by the German director of the District Electricity Networks.

Sabers and robberies were then commonplace in the Recovered Territories. On the southern front in the first weeks after the end of the war, the uncertainty surrounding the political future of these lands was further enhanced. The local Soviet commanders were also demilitarized. In Klodzko, the Polish operational group arrived on 17 May, but the authority could not take over until 3 June. In the press of July 1945, it was reported that on June 2, 1945 two trucks with 60 Czech policemen were to arrive in Kłodzko, so that they could convene a meeting with the slogan of Kłodzko's membership in Czechoslovakia. On June 5, 1945, the Polish administration began to function formally in Bystrzyca Kłodzka. A few days earlier, on May 26, the Soviet war commander told the Poles that there were no orders to send them to the city. The group following Wałbrzych the Russians even stated that the city would be transferred to Czechoslovakia. In this case, however, the doubts lasted longer, however, as it was already 28 May under the Polish administration.

Major incidents occurred at the turn of the first and second decade of June. On June 10, 1945, the Czechoslovak infantry battalion, backed by a tank platoon and two motorized platoons, crossed the border in Raciborsk, occupying 14 border towns and reaching a distance of 5 km from Raciborz. In Czech border cottages they searched in all homes, disarmed railway guards, arrested the station commander, and at the station broke up Polish plates and emblems. Poles received 2 hours to leave Chałupek and were taken to the Odra River. Responding to the moves of the Czechoslovak side, on June 12, the Warsaw government firmly demanded the withdrawal of the Czechoslovak troops. On the same day, the National Council recommended placing border posts along the border with Czechoslovakia (except for the Nadolzieński section). Marshal Michał Rola-Żymierski commanded the 1st Panzer Corps to go to the Prudnik-Cieszyn border and commander of the 2nd Army to line the Prudnik-Nysa line. Polish officers had to demand that Czechoslovak commanders withdraw within 24 hours. Otherwise, the Czechs were to be encircled and their captives taken to the border. Shoot the name only in response to the Czech fire. Administrative steps have also been taken by the authorities. The Ministry of Public Administration has instructed the Polish authorities not to give up their facilities in threatened areas, even in the case of the use of force by the Czechs, and to prepare for the reception of troops arriving there.
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Not only did the military participate in securing the site. In Kłodzko went vice-governor of Hungary, who visited the districts of Kłodzko and Bystrzycki, accompanied by district representatives on 13th June. For his part, District Attorney Stanisław Piaskowski delegated to the frontier of his lieutenant colonel. Orczykowski. From the morning of June 14th, from Wroclaw, Legnica and other Lower Silesian cities began to leave the Kłodzko branches of the industrial guards, in the total force of 500 people. According to the report that day, until the evening the Czechs had to cross the Kłodzko Valley to the border at a depth of 10-12 km and plant Lewin Kłodzko, Międzylesie and several neighboring villages. An operational group from Nysa was arrested, which on the Czech side was looking for NYSA warehouses.

On 13 June, the Polish government issued another, even sharper note. On the same day, Vlado Clementis, the secretary of state of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told the Prague Radio that he was about to announce the Czechoslovak Government to the Allies with proposals for border corrections in Kłodzko, Raciborsk and Glubczyce. Czechoslovak missions were ordered to leave Racibórz by 1800 on 15 June. Still, Warsaw the same day sent a 24-hour ultimatum to Prague, demanding the withdrawal of the Czechoslovak administration, the police and the army from Zaolia.

The armed conflict with the Czechs was hanging in the hair, but everything was decided by "good Stalin". About June 18, the action was dismissed by Marshal Żymierski, commanding concentrated troops to cross border. In Klodzko, according to the order of the 10th commander, Colonel Alexander Struc, commander of the school, and the reconnaissance company of the 25th Infantry Regiment. They entered the area of ​​Kłodzkie County on June 19th. On the same day the Czechs were to leave all previously occupied towns. Also the Czechoslovak armored train operating between the Śpieawka Średnia and Kłodzko has retreated abroad. On June 22, the Polish military command and garrison began to function in Kłodzko. Two days later the Polish Army entered Paczków and Głuchołazy. The behavior of the incoming troops was much to be desired, but the establishment of the border greatly improved security there. Despite the fact that the robbery expeditions carried out from the southern border, minor incidents also occurred at a later date.

On June 28, 1945, soldiers of the First Battalion, 1st Battalion, were shot in the vicinity of Śnieżka. On the same day, after firing over a white-and-red flag, the fire, combined with the grenades, was repeated. Explaining this event, the Czechs stated that they had taken Polish soldiers as Germans.

At the beginning of July 1945, the Czechoslovak government protested against the violation of the border by regular units of the Polish Army and their temporary occupation. Frydlant, Libava, Mezim and Lusatian Luby and Żytawa. When investigating this matter, the 2nd Army Staff stated that neither the 26th nor the 12th December, 1945, at the 7th and 10th DPs, stationed at the altitude listed in the village, had not violated the border. As it turned out, Czechoslovak territory marched 16th DP Regiment. According to the explanations of the 1st Army of the Polish Army, when the commander of the regiment realized that he had accidentally entered the Czech Frydlant, lying at the borders of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Germany, he wanted to turn around, but the local Czechoslovak commander allowed the Polish unit to continue the march.

It must be stressed that the actions taken in the hot weeks of May and June 1945 did not ultimately produce any visible effects. The decisive attitude of Warsaw and the acceptance by the Soviet authorities of the Odra and Lusatian lines as the western border of Poland, confirmed in the Polish-Czech border region by the gradual transmission of Polish power by the local commandos, thwarted Czechoslovak attempts to create facts there. The Soviet side was also a decisive factor in nullifying the Polish intentions of using Czechoslovak activities in Raciborsk and Kłodzko as a subtext for armed intervention in the Zaol.

The Communist government in Warsaw wanted some territorial concessions. It was necessary to consider the conduct in Polish hand of the railway lines Bogumił-Racibórz-Koźle, Koźle-Prudnik and the Odra line. In Kłodzko, Bardo, Złoty Stok, Nowa Ruda and Ścinawka Średnia were the most important for Poland. The border could run about 8-10 km south of the latter, at the height of the fork north of Kłodzko. Poland was ready to propose the majority of the Kłodzko Basin to be exchanged. Glubczyce, Baborów and Kietrz. The possibility of leaving Czechoslovakia, in return for fragments of Zaolzia, a dozen or so communes in the Głubczyce district, inhabited before the war by 20 thousand. Inhabitants, with a total area of ​​168 km2, and Pietraszyn, Krzanowice, Borucin, Boleslaw, Samorzawic and Owisiszcze in Raciborsk, which would give the Czech Republic another 48 km2 with 8.9 thousand. residents. They also suggested, in order to straighten the border, the exchange of the wedge wedge between Prudnik and Głubczyce, to Ciermięcice-Dobieszow.
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The first such document was prepared by then-war correspondents Edmund Omańczyk and Mieczyslaw Zarzycki, who were then in Prague. In their opinion, in the county of Racibórz the commune with the majority of Czechoslovakia was incorporated into Czechoslovakia in 1920, and the rest of the county is purely Polish, as evidenced by the results of the plebiscite and the long-term activity of Polish organizations. As regards the district of Głubczyce, it was stated that it was ¾ exaggerated, "... and what happened in the northern part of the county is Polish". Authorities have stated that the Czech countryside is not there and was not there. The only basis for the Czech pretensions was seen in the fact that in the case of the Polish victory in the plebiscite the southern part of the county was supposed to come to Czechoslovakia. The document concludes that Czech claims are merely political speculation, while Polish law is based on the long struggle of Poles with Germanisation.

Also, the question of the Kłodzko Land, in the context of Czechoslovak territorial claims, has also been the subject of several studies and expert opinions. Based on the results of the study of the most prominent expert on this subject, Professor Jozef Kubin, it was stated that the population of the Czech element in Kłodzko in 1908 was 4,800. They settled (by naming the then): Brzozowice, Zakrze, Kudowa, Błażej, Red, Jakubowice, Pstrążna, Bukovina, Poverty, and Dawn Mountain, in a small number, Lewin, and Jeleniów Jerzykowice. It was so called. The Czech angle, with an area of ​​about 80 km2, populated in 1939 by 11 thousand. people. The rest of the county was purely German at the time, so Czech claims to these areas were considered to be unfounded. Similarly, the Czech arguments were applauded by Professor Kazimierz Piwarski from the Jagiellonian University. Czech claims to district Klodzko, Głubczyce Racibórz and in the year 1918/1919 and after World War I strive for elimination of threatening communication between Prague and Warsaw Lower Silesia performance completely lost their military rationale upon happily integrate Poles on the Oder and Neisse and eliminate the threat of Prussia, On the basis of their arguments, the authors of the Czechoslovak memorials of 1919. It should be clearly stated that the scale of the Czech propaganda campaign to increase the state area of ​​Kłodzko, Racibórz and Głubczyce was grossly incomparable to Poland's argument.

The final argument was to settle among others. Kłodzko Valley for 160 thousand. Poles who went to their homes behind the Bug were "no less tied than the press members of the Kłodzko Friends' Union to the Czech angle." It was also alleged that Czechoslovakia proceeded in a border dispute, contrary to its verbal declarations, "... a Slavic unity against the German question". This argument dates back to the time of the CSR in April 1946 to the representatives of the Great Powers with the Territorial Rewind Program. On the pages of the weekly "Polish Western" was an extensive relationship with the largest demonstration against the actions of the Czech Republic, ie. Odbytego of 5 May 1946 year, the Week of the Recovered Territories, 20-thousand rally in Kłodzko. Then Vice-President of National Council Stanisław Grabski said that the Polish government will not allow that for "... the Czech chauvinist fantasy" Poles living in these areas once again have to go to the misery.

At the same time, the administration of the Polish Kladsko troubled moves towards the Czechoslovak authorities, as it was called, to "reczechizowania" significant faction of the local component of the German and protect it from the same displacement and loss of property. At that time, measures were taken to break the beginnings of the Czech administration in Kłodzko. In the summer of 1945, Jozef Bernard, Oldřich Vacek, Frantisk Kubečka, JosefaUlrych and priest Martin Hofman were arrested. Seized more birth certificates stamped and signed in Nachod and Meziměstí and metrics without signature or date of issue, as well as documents confirming Czech origin, issued by ONV (District National Council) in Nachod, including 60 blank. However, in March 1947 Poland had to come to terms with the definite loss of Zaolzia, while Czechoslovakia abandoned its program of border changes in Silesia.

The issue of border corrections was of importance for the Czech Communists before the elections, as well as the Polish government in Warsaw, which in this way consolidated its position. Finally, the Polish-Czechoslovak border conflict was regulated legally in the fifties

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Steve
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Re: Poor Poland.

Postby Steve » 19 Aug 2017 01:38

Cienciala gives the source for her claim that the British showed the Godeserg map to the Poles as - Archives of the Former Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs deposited in the General Sikorski Historical Institute London - the relevant section being Polish British relations 1938. On September 27 the British Ambassador kennard met Minister Arciszewski and showed him the map.

It seems slightly odd that Arciszewski was shown the map as he does not seem to have been an important character but maybe he had important friends. The British would have provided the French with the map as the French were not at Godesberg. With Slovakia joining the German side the defense line the Polish army was hoping to hold was turned and the situation was now much worse without Czechoslovakia than it had been with Czechoslovakia

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wm
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Re: Poor Poland.

Postby wm » 20 Aug 2017 22:14

That the French attaché showed Beck the map was in accordance with the spirit, or maybe even the letter of the Franco-Polish alliance. Why the British ambassador bothered with his map is much less clear.

Slovakia didn't really join the German side in 1938. Post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia existed just fine. The main difference was it's name became longer.
Although a half a year later the Slovaks (and the Czechs too) chose the Germans, it didn't change anything as Poland was going to "get it" anyway. It made a few things different, but not worse. The situation couldn't be made worse, militarily it was at "the worst" already.


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