Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

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Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#1

Post by Steve » 19 May 2018, 11:38

In September 1939 Poland had a good medium bomber available named the Elk. How many there were varies slightly according to the source but probably 75 of which 36 were in combat units and the rest either in training units or being prepared for issuance. Surprisingly no bombing raid seems to have been launched against a major German target though the propaganda effect of this would have been huge. The Doolittle raid on Tokyo comes to mind. Poland had been asked to show restraint and postpone mobilisation in case they inadvertently provoked a German attack. Just as the confusion in Polish mobilisation can be blamed on the UK and France this can also be laid at their door.

On September 2 Marshall Smigly-Rydz met with General Zajac the head of the Air Force. Bombing of Germany could only happen with the permission of Rydz and he refused to give it. Presumably this was because of worries that the UK and France were looking for a reason not to honour their guarantee. On August 31st Mussolini had proposed a conference and the idea was taken seriously by the UK and France though not it seems by Hitler. The western allies did not declare war until nearly noon on September 3. A raid on say Berlin could perhaps have been viewed by the allies as provocative if Hitler only intended a limited war. For whatever reasons even after September 3 there were no raids on Germany.

The Elk was used in low level attacks to try and stop advancing German columns something for which it was unsuitable and its impact was negligible. A large part of the Polish Air Forces budget went into the development of the plane. A better idea would have been to spend the money on a modern fighter.

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Re: Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#2

Post by henryk » 19 May 2018, 20:47

But captured Elk were used by the Romanian Air Force to bomb USSR targets:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PZL.37_%C5%81o%C5%9B


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Re: Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#3

Post by gebhk » 20 May 2018, 23:32

The Elk was used in low level attacks to try and stop advancing German columns something for which it was unsuitable and its impact was negligible.
Somewhat dubious. Certainly not the view of many German officers on the ground. In fact 4th Panzer Division was significantly delayed through a combination of factors of which bombing by the Bomber Brigade was a significant one. This put it's partner, 1st Panzer Division, in a very vulnerable situation by 4th September. Had the Polish High Command taken the bull by the horns and defended the Prudka River Line more vigorously and then counterattacked from the flank, 1st Panzer would have received a nasty bloody nose and we would probably not be discussing the Bomber Brigade contribution in the same terms. .
A large part of the Polish Air Forces budget went into the development of the plane. A better idea would have been to spend the money on a modern fighter.
This concept is based on two faulty assumptions. Firstly that the choice was an either/or one (it was not - both programmes were running simultaneously) and, secondly, that transferring the resources from bomber development would have somehow resulted in a modern fighter by 1939 (something no country other than Germany, the UK and France achieved, the latter two only partially - and certainly no country of Poland's economic potential). The fundamental problem was the absence of a suitable powerplant and not of funds - this has been debated to death elsewhere on this forum.

With regard to the main question of the thread, the main objection was that such a raid would be suicidal and it is difficult to disagree with this analysis. To sacrifice the entire bomber potential for what would have been an entirely symbolic gesture, seems foolish and in my opinion, for once, Rydz-Smigly made the right decision.

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Re: Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#4

Post by Steve » 22 May 2018, 00:16

Hi, I’m not sure it is a dubious claim though of course it could be. I’m using The Polish Campaign 1939 by Stephen Zaloga and Victor Madej. According to them the bombing Brigade carried out about 225 bombing sorties and dropped about two hundred tons of bombs. The most significant raids were carried out against mechanised units along the Piotrkow Warsaw road which presumably included the 4th Panzer. The Karas planes suffered heavy losses and incidentally it seems showed great bravery. There were no significant losses to armoured vehicles but heavier losses were suffered by soft skin vehicles. As these planes were only equipped with light machine guns they were unlikely to stop a tank unless they dropped a bomb on or near it.

Wikipedia says that development of a modern single engine fighter started in late 1936 while design work on the Elk started in mid 1934. There was it seems a debate about whether Poland’s limited funds should be spent on bomber or fighter development. Head of the Air Force General Rayski apparently believed as many in the RAF did that the bomber would always get through and pushed for a bomber. If memory serves me well it was only thanks to a political decision that the RAF did not take the same wrong rout as General Rayski. Had work started on a fighter in 1934 then very likely something better able to keep the Luftwaffe at bay in 1939 would have been available. Am I right that the Bristol Pegasus xx engine used in the Elk had 920hp, if so why not have used that in a fighter? The FW190 used a big radial engine very successfully.

While bombing Berlin would have been a great propaganda coup if RAF daylight raids over Germany are anything to go on not many planes would have come back. However, they could have struck at somewhere nearer like Danzig for example and supported the Polish garrison holding out. Very likely it was quickly obvious that the Elk had a poor defensive armament and could only operate with a fighter escort but the plane was faster and with a longer range than Polish fighters. A fine plane in the wrong place at the wrong time and so produced very little for a lot of effort.

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Re: Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#5

Post by gebhk » 22 May 2018, 11:30

The most significant raids were carried out against mechanised units along the Piotrkow Warsaw road
I guess it all depends on what one considers significant - my point being that when the Panzers had passed Piotrkow it was too late to do much - the horse had bolted and there was little that could be done by anyone at that stage. In any event, my impression was that the maximum bombing effort was 3-5 September, ie before the Germans had bypassed Piotrkow - however I don't have access to stats at the moment so could well be wrong.

In my opinion many commentators make the mistake of measuring success in terms of total destruction of enemy forces regardless of what the aims of the action was. This in my view gives somewhat misleading assessments. To paraphrase, it's a bit like criticising the winner of a 1000 m race for not running faster by sprinting all the way at 100m racer rates!

The method of execution of the bombing carried out on 3-4 September (raids carried out sequentially at short intervals, but - of necessity - by small numbers of aircraft in each raid) was clearly aimed at slowing the Panzer Divisions down (by forcing dispersal and the taking up of anti-aircraft positions) and not at destroying the tanks. Therefore counting wrecked tanks is not a particularly useful way of measuring success. What is relevant is how the behaviour of the German Corps was affected. In fact significant delay was inflicted (not just by the bombing, it needs to be said) which allowed the Poles time to reinforce the Prudka river line and, equally importantly, ensured the Panzer Corps arrived at that line with only one division rather than two.

What does need to be considered is what likely would have happened had this delay not been inflicted. One could easily argue that the 1st and 4th Panzer Divisions would have rolled over the Prudka bridges virtually unmolested and been in Piotrkow by evening of the 3rd/morning of 4th which would have translated into an even bigger disaster than the one that actually unfolded. In fact, through a combination of bombing and other delaying factors as well as, arguably, some old fashioned dumb luck, by the end of 3rd September much of 1st Panzer had bottled itself up into a small cauldron with an entire Polish army on its open flank, its tanks far behind and blocked off by a traffic jam of British Easter Bank Holiday proportions and 4th Panzer even further behind, at times out of radio contact even. Thus a unique opportunity presented itself to deal 1st Panzer a painful blow that would have, most likely, prevented it from breaking through to Piotrkow before at least the 6/7th September, allowing the Poles to set up successive lines of defences which in reality they were not able to do by a factor of a day or so. As I said, had this happened, I suspect we (and countless others :D ) would not be discussing the aerial operations the way we do. And yet, the fact that the Polish high command blinked at the critical moment and the opportunity was lost, is not the fault of the Bomber Brigade!

We can probably divide the criticisms levelled at the Bomber Brigade operations into three categories
(i) Rather than carrying out continuous small raids, mass raids with the full force should have been carried out. This would have increased German losses and reduced BB losses. While probably true, I remain sceptical that this would have delayed XVI Panzer Corps more effectively than the tactics actually used - probably less so. Also, it is worth noting in this context, that many unnecessary losses were incurred because the crews (against strict orders!) went down to low levels to use their MGs. This added little to the effect desired by high command but contributed greatly to the losses incurred by BB. There is little to suggest that this behaviour would have changed if mass raids were carried out.

(ii) Better delaying effect could have been achieved by bombing POL/ammunition echelons rather than the advance columns of the Panzer Divisions.
This argument ignores the German capability to air-drop supplies when necessary at short order - a capability ably demonstrated when the Kempf panzer group was cut off entirely from its supply base for a number of days during the Polish campaign.

(iii) Other 'softer' targets should have been chosen. The question here is, to my mind, what was the point if XVI Panzer Corps was allowed to carry on, on its merry way, unmolested. It is like using your shield, even a feeble one, to protect your toes when the enemy is aiming a bolt at your heart. There was no more important priority than slowing down XVI Panzer Corps on 2-5 September.

Point 3 also, I think, covers the question of bombing German towns. Aside from giving the Poles a moment of grim satisfaction (an objective equally well, achieved by enthusiastic if entirely fictitious newspaper reports!) there would have been little benefit and great loss. The cost would have to include the strategic consequences of not delaying XVI Panzer Corps even to the extent that it was. As with most propaganda 'coups' this one would have been a double-edged sword. A very double-edged one in fact, as Goebbels' propaganda machine trotted out photos of dead babies and dead pregnant girls before the world press to justify their own campaign of terror bombing.

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Re: Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#6

Post by gebhk » 22 May 2018, 12:23

With regard to the fighter design issue, this I think has been done to death in a thread entitled 'Why Poland was still using parasol-winged aircraft in 1939?' or some such on this Forum, so probably not worth repeating in detail. However, I think the salient point is that the search for a new generation fighter aircraft commenced in 1934, the same as it did in many other countries, including Germany and the UK. The reason work on a low wing monoplane with enclosed cockpit and retracting carriage did not commence until 1936 was not because a bomber was being designed, but because initially the Poles had hopes of producing a multi-purpose twin-engined aircraft that would fulfil a range of battlefield roles as well that of a fighter - a very attractive option, if successful, for a cash/resource-strapped air force. Only when this project failed that attention was turned in 1936 to what became the Jastrzab.

Whether the Pegasus engine could have been used in a fighter has been debated and opinions are divided. However, it would appear that there were other options at the time that offered - at least on paper - better performance in the role.

Ultimately, however, if one steps back a little, demanding that an aeronautical industry 16 years old in an industrially undeveloped, largely agrarian and impoverished country, produce in number a world-beating fighter aircraft of a completely new design class is, I would suggest, unrealistic and not achieved by any country of similar or indeed much greater industrial potential. The fact that it produced something like that with the 'Pulawski' fighters was verging on a miracle. And the fact is that miracles, by their very definition, can rarely be repeated indefinitely and on demand.

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Re: Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#7

Post by Steve » 22 May 2018, 20:55

Hi, you may well be correct that the Elk succeeded in slowing down the panzers and I would concede the point. Also using the plane against the haft of the spear rather than the point may have been better. However, the plane was designed as a medium bomber not a low level ground attack aircraft. Unless flying very low it is unlikely they could bomb a road fairly accurately. They probably had to come in very low to have any hope of stopping the advance. Rather like me designing a great shovel for digging the garden and then using it to cut the hedge.

At the outbreak of war the Elk would have had been dispersed to various secondary bases. I recall reading somewhere that these bases had grass runways and the plane could not take off from a grass runway with a full bomb load. Were all the planes fitted with radio communication?

A bomber cost more and took longer to make than a single engine fighter, for a start it had two engines. If General Rayski in 1934 had gone for a single engine fighter rather than a bomber then five years later you would have expected the Poles to have something better than the P 11. Given the Polish aircraft industry’s resources it is unlikely they could have developed a modern bomber and fighter together. If the intention was to produce something along the lines of a German BF110 and kill two birds with one stone that is understandable but I cannot find any mention of work on such a plane. Work was going ahead in 1939 on a more advanced version of the Elk the PLZ 49.

Looking up the name of the planes designer Jerzy Dabrowski took me to Wikipedia. There it says that the design specification issued by the Department of Aeronautics in 1934 was for a twin engine bomber. I’m not saying Rayski acted stupidly in wanting a bomber the RAF believed in a similar doctrine to him and prior to the fighters of the late 30s it probably made sense. It was a British cabinet decision in 1938 giving priority to fighter production in order to stop German bombers that saved Britain in 1940. Of course a change of priorities in 1938 would have been far too late for the Poles.

It was not a choice of bombing German civilians or nothing the plane could have bombed German marshalling yards or naval docks something for which it was designed. Damage would probably not have been great and given German air superiority and the potency of the BF109 no doubt few planes would have returned. There were no good choices in September given the huge imbalance of forces plus better leadership at higher levels on the German side.

Does this fit under the heading of esoteric discussion?

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Re: Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#8

Post by gebhk » 22 May 2018, 21:01

If the intention was to produce something along the lines of a German BF110 and kill two birds with one stone that is understandable but I cannot find any mention of work on such a plane.
That was precisely the intention. Look up PZL P38 Wilk - I believe the Wiki entry gives the essential bare bones.
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Re: Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#9

Post by gebhk » 22 May 2018, 22:10

However, the plane was designed as a medium bomber not a low level ground attack aircraft. Unless flying very low it is unlikely they could bomb a road fairly accurately. They probably had to come in very low to have any hope of stopping the advance.
Actually it makes little difference at what height you fly and where you drop the bombs exactly. All that is needed is for the planes to fly over and the bombs to drop and 'achtung, flieger!', everyone goes into 'air defence mode' instead of driving nicely down the road. You cause almost as much chaos by hitting the road (and the Polish crews were somewhat better than average when it came to accuracy) as you do by hitting a vehicle on the road. Once the planes are gone, you have to come to order, fill in blooming great holes in the road, calm your men, gather your column. meantime the minutes are ticking by. And repeat. The objective is to slow progress down not to stop it dead by inflicting heavy casualties. The latter is clearly unattainable.

The bomber crews were under orders to bomb from 1500m, though it would appear that often bombing was carried out at 700-800m before the planes came down low to machine gun the columns - which is when the trouble really started.
At the outbreak of war the Elk would have had been dispersed to various secondary bases. I recall reading somewhere that these bases had grass runways and the plane could not take off from a grass runway with a full bomb load. Were all the planes fitted with radio communication?
You are correct that at the outbreak of war all warplanes had been dispersed to field airstrips. This avoided them being wiped out in the first hours of the war but at the cost of, as you say, reduction in bombload (by 40% I believe). Not sure about the radio question, will have to look it up unless one of our more aeroplane-savvy colleagues can come up with the answer first.

If General Rayski in 1934 had gone for a single engine fighter rather than a bomber then five years later you would have expected the Poles to have something better than the P 11.
Sorry to have to keep repeating this, but the reason that work on a new single-engine fighter was not commenced in 1934 was not because a bomber was also being developed, but because the powers that be opted for a twin-engine fighter rather than a single-engined one. In any event, I'm afraid that I do not share your belief that even if work had been started on a low wing monoplane in 1934, this would have resulted in a modern fighter in the line by September 1939. Work on the AVIA B35 programme commenced in Czechoslovakia shortly after work on the new twin-engined fighter started in Poland, yet by 1939 only three prototypes were extant - despite Czechoslovakia being in an altogether different, higher, league industrially, compared with Poland. The problem, QED, is that it is more difficult to design a really good fighter than it is to design a good bomber.
It was not a choice of bombing German civilians or nothing the plane could have bombed German marshalling yards or naval docks something for which it was designed.
Fundamentally bombing some marshalling yards etc, however effectively, would have made little or no difference to the outcome while even a few hours delay in the advance of XVI Panzer Corps made all the difference in the world. Therefore all the tools available, even if not best suited to the task, had to be applied to that priority. Secondly, whether civilians were really affected or not (and even modern conflicts with infinitely better controlled weapons regularly fail to avoid 'collateral damage'), one can be sure that the Goebbels propaganda machine would have ensured some suitable bodies were available for the foreign press to see.

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Re: Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#10

Post by gebhk » 23 May 2018, 12:18

Hi Steve

On the radio question, the implication (albeit not confirmed explicitly) is that all aircraft were equipped with 2-way radio with a 'but'. This but was that the radios fitted were N1 L/L medium range sets (Phillips). They were to be replaced with long-range W2 L/B radios (French Bronzavia SARAM 3-03) in the autumn of '39. This sadly didn't happen for the obvious reasons.

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Re: Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#11

Post by Steve » 23 May 2018, 14:01

Hi, If a question ever comes up on a UK quiz show about the pre war Polish aircraft industry I’m sure anyone present will be astonished by my (new found) knowledge.

I agree that in a short campaign trying to stop the panzers was more important than bombing say a railway marshalling yard. However, if they had bombed Berlin quite likely German fighters would have been diverted from Poland to stop any repeat of such an embarrassment helping the situation there. It all belongs in the realm of what if.

I think the problem was General Rayski (Turek) not the ability of the Polish aircraft industry which was surprising considering where it started from. The P11 was a fine plane for the early 1930s and the Elk was a fine plane for the mid 30s. Rayski was an amazing character and it seems dominated the Polish Air force. He achieved a lot with very little but was completely wrong on how aerial warfare would develop. His successor in early 1939 General Zajac was right in believing that fighters were more important than bombers.

The PZL Company did most if not all of the design and manufacturing of Polish Air Force planes. In 1934 Rayski ordered development of a twin engine fighter bomber the P38 but it was a failure and work stopped early 1939. While work was proceeding on the P38 the Polish Government placed an order with PZL for an advanced passenger plane the P44. One prototype was flying in 1939 and the Soviets captured that but it shows what PZL could do. There was also a P45 fighter project work on which seems to have been abandoned in 1939 and a P37 fighter work on which does not seem to have gone very far. Work on the P50 the best hope for a modern fighter started late 36. Rayski wanted a Polish engine used (built under licence) but with this engine the plane was only about 25mph faster than the P11. In April 1939 with the Air Force now under Zajac it was decided the plane was not good enough and needed a redesign. If the plane had been flying in numbers by September 39 it would have been shot out of the sky by the faster ME109. After five years of working on some sort of fighter there was nothing to show apart from a few failed or underpowered prototypes.

The Polish Air Force in September had good bases and well trained manpower but only one modern plane and that could not fulfil its intended role without fighter protection. Something seems to have gone wrong but I would guess it was not with PZL. Am I right in thinking that communications between Air Force headquarters and the dispersed planes would have mainly used the civilian telephone and telegraph network as the army did? If so then co-ordinating attacks with dispersed units must have been almost impossible.

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Re: Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#12

Post by gebhk » 23 May 2018, 17:39

PZL Company did most if not all of the design and manufacturing of Polish Air Force planes
PZL was a state-run enterprise rather than strictly a company. You are quite right that most of the PAF planes that found themselves in the line in 1939 were PZL makes (fighters, bomber/recce and light bombers). However it was not the only one. There were two other state enterprises involved in aircraft design/manufacturing (PWS and LWS) and DWL a private one. I only have production figures to hand for 1937/38. In fact it was DWS that produced the highest number of airframes (220 vs 180 by PZL) in that financial year, albeit I presume this total includes aircraft made for the civilian market. LWS and PWS supplied the PAF with observation, communication and trainer aircraft.
P38 but it was a failure and work stopped early 1939
Strictly true, but not the whole story. The Wilk was developed as the PZL-48 Lampart (Leopard) - 1 prototype built by September '39 and then further developed as the PZL-54 Rys (Lynx) on paper. Both these aircraft figured prominently in the future plans for the PAF.
P37 fighter
Not sure what this is unless its the nutty idea someone had after Zajac took over to convert Los bombers into giant fighter planes by installing more machine guns in the nose (or some such).

Regarding communications, telephone connections would have utilised civilian networks as far as possible, however the air force had its own signal's units which, among other things, were adept at building and repairing telephone lines. The telephone system was backed up by radio communications.
if they had bombed Berlin quite likely German fighters would have been diverted from Poland
Alas, I somehow doubt it. Given that the Germans were preparing for the onslaught of British and French strategic bomber forces and would have made allocations accordingly, I doubt that the appearance of 36 Polish planes would have made any great difference to their dispositions. More likely Adolf would have had one of his hissy fits and ordered the razing of Warsaw 5 years earlier.

Another point to bear in mind in this discussion is that Poland had no long-range artillery. So any job that required the application of same could only be executed by the Los bombers.

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Re: Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#13

Post by Steve » 24 May 2018, 20:42

Hi, according to Wikipedia (operational history of the Luftwaffe (1939-45) the Luftwaffe did expect a Polish aerial attack on German territory and kept 406 fighters back for home defence. As it had 1,179 fighters available in September it could well be correct.

In 1939 British bombers were forbidden from attacking any target that might involve civilian casualties. Roosevelt had issued an appeal over civilian bombing and the British, French and Germans agreed to it. As for German retaliation on Warsaw did they need an excuse? Richthofen in charge of the aerial assault on Warsaw asked permission to destroy the city completely as “it would, in the future, be only a customs station.” As I said it all comes under what if.

Can’t find the link for the P37 fighter but it was apparently intended to operate in conjunction with the P38 and looked just like the P45 to me. I don’t think it went beyond the drawing board. Have found a write up about a PZL 39 which seems to say pretty much what I read about the P37 so it could be confusion in numbers.

It seems that the Elk pilots did achieve good results on September 4 but for obvious reasons could not keep it up. Apparently a major problem for the dispersed Polish Air Force was obtaining fuel at the secondary airfields they were now operating from.

The article on Wikipedia about the P50 Jastrzab says that the first prototype crashed on September 6 after running out of fuel at Rawa Luska. My book on WW2 fighters says if was shot down by Polish anti aircraft fire when flying to Rumania.

The organisation of the Polish Air Force seems odd. Executive orders for the Air Force entitled “General Guidelines for the Use of the Air Force” were only given to Zajac on 28 July that is 34 days before the outbreak of war. The way I understand it is that General Zajac did not command all the Air Force but only the dispositional Air force and air defence units. Part of the Air Force consisting mainly of scout and ground attack planes was assigned to armies for direct support. Who commanded these units, army commanders or Zajac? He directly commanded the bomber brigade and the pursuit brigade defending Warsaw plus antiaircraft units defending key installations.

I have figures of 185 P11s but only 125 operational in 12 squadrons and 115 P7s but only 30 in combat units. Were there really so few in September?

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Re: Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#14

Post by gebhk » 24 May 2018, 21:36

The article on Wikipedia about the P50 Jastrzab says that the first prototype crashed on September 6 after running out of fuel at Rawa Luska. My book on WW2 fighters says if was shot down by Polish anti aircraft fire when flying to Rumania.
The Wiki version is supported by the account of the pilot, Jerzy Widawski. The plane set out from Popow Koscielny field airfield on the morning of 6th September for Lwow. Flying at low level throughout, it ran out of petrol and was forced to land in light woodland. The pilot emerged unscathed but the plane was totalled.

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Re: Why Poland did not bomb Germany in 1939

#15

Post by gebhk » 25 May 2018, 11:07

You are quite right in that the PAF was not an independent service like the army and navy. This was not a particularly unusual arrangement - after all there was a similar overall setup in Japan and the USA, to quote just two examples. However, due to it's relatively small size, it fitted into the pattern of all the other arms within the armed forces - for example the infantry, artillery, armour or engineers. In peacetime, life and training was carried out in 'parent' units, typically regiments and independent battalions. These were managed centrally by their respective departments of the ministry and of the General Inspector's office. On mobilisation, the peacetime 'parent units' produced combat and other units according to the mobilisation plan. They were then either converted into replacement units or wound down.

The resultant units were inserted into the wartime structure, as required by the mob plan. In the case of the army's air force, this meant the bulk of the resources going to the various armies as army-level units (although there were some divisional assets on occasion - such as the air platoon of the Warsaw Armoured/Motorised Brigade) with, as you say, a number of units reserved for the CiC (the bomber and pursuit brigades as well as various liaison units). The command structure reflected that of the armed forces as a whole - that is divisional assets were commanded by the divisional commander, army assets by the army commander and dispositional assets were commanded by the CiC through his air force commander (Zajac). Incidentally gen Zajac was already commander of air defence, when command of the air force was added to his bailiwick. If memory serves (however I am not 100% certain) gen Zajac was also in command of the various airfield management units throughout the country.

Although the operational command lay with the relevant field commanders, as with all other arms, 'maintenance' was managed centrally. The air force was responsible for training of replacements and the supply of aircraft and related equipment; the commissary service (Gen Masny) for finance, uniforms, fuel, food etc; the armament service (col Blaszkowicz) for ammunition, bombs, gas masks, armourers; the health service (col Maszadro) for medical equipment and personnel, the sapper department (gen Dabkowski) for entrenching tools and so on. Besides providing specialist equipment, these central organs were responsible for the supply of specialists and specialist training in their areas of competence - eg doctors, medics, weapons' and explosives' specialists, drivers, etc.

Hope this clarifies the picture somewhat.

In essence, despite some efforts on the part of the air force to gain independence, it remained firmly under the thumb of the respective 'senior' services. Given the small size, poor operational communications' structure and emphasis on army co-operation (whether this was the right way to go is a subject for a different debate!), it can be (and was at the time) quite reasonably argued that this was the right command structure. On balance I would suggest that until the dispositional air assets became sufficiently large to warrant it, there was little point in duplicating command structures unnecessarily by creating a new service.

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