If Hitler and the Nazis never come to power in Germany, does Poland keep its 1937 borders up to the present-day?

[Futurist]

If Hitler and the Nazis never come to power in Germany, does Poland keep its 1937 borders up to the present-day?

I know that the Weimar German government waged an unsuccessful years-long trade war (ironically ended by Hitler with the 1934 Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact) against Poland (see here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German%E2 ... ustoms_war ) in an attempt to bully Poland to agree to allow Germany to reacquire both Danzig and the Polish Corridor (and *maybe* Polish Upper Silesia as well). Without Hitler and the Nazis, this trade war might very well continue for a longer time period--perhaps a much longer time period. That said, though, I don't see it being any more successful than it was in real life--and it wasn't very successful in real life. Poland would presumably still feel that once it would compromise on its German border, neighboring countries such as the Soviet Union and Lithuania could press their own claims to Polish territory as well--thus leaving Poland as a landlocked and greatly shrunken rump state.

In turn, though, this raises an interesting question--once Germany's government (which will be non-Nazi in this scenario--either a surviving democratic Weimar German government if Wilhelm Marx will win in 1925 and win reelection in 1932 or an authoritarian but non-Nazi right-wing German government if events will go the same way as in real life until the start of 1933) will realize that economic warfare is not going to be enough to get Poland to agree to territorial revision, might it become more open to the idea of a military solution to its territorial conflict with Poland? I mean, a non-Nazi Germany would have in all likelihood absolutely loathed the idea of going to war against Britain and France (this would have been especially true for a German government that remains democratic but would have also been true for a non-Nazi authoritarian right-wing German government). At the same time, though, might Germany want to wait until a point in time (if such a point in time will ever actually come, that is) where Britain and/or France are distracted (for instance, by some colonial conflict--such as one over Indochina and/or Algeria) and thus might be disinclined to militarily intervene if Germany will attempt to militarily conquer Danzig and the Polish Corridor? Of course, even this approach would require some degree of German brinkmanship--albeit much less than the amount of brinkmanship that Hitler had in real life. In addition, there would also be the question of whether Germany would want to have Lithuania and especially the giant Soviet Union as "partners in crime" in regards to attacking Poland at a convenient time or whether Germany--if it would have ever actually decided to attack Poland, that is--would have preferred to attack Poland by itself and then to offer to protect Poland from Lithuanian and especially Soviet revanchism if Poland will agree to its new western border with Germany.

Anyway, any thoughts on all of this?

[gebhk]

This whole thing has so many moving parts that I think you may as well prognosticate from tea leaves.

Essentially, if all else fails, sooner or later Stalin will move to annex Poland. No one would do anything to stop him. However, one suspects he would not feel ready for this till 1941-42 after the red army has had time to rebuild its officer corps. If, instead, Stalin goes for no-holds-barred takeover bid for the whole of Europe, an alliance between Poland and Germany may well have to occur

Germany will be powerless to do anything militarily to Poland unless it re-arms. Whether a non-Hitler government would have done so? Who knows, though I think less likely.

Conflict with Chechoslovakia? Lithuania? Alliances instead? Alliance with Hungary?

[Futurist]

This whole thing has so many moving parts that I think you may as well prognosticate from tea leaves.

Essentially, if all else fails, sooner or later Stalin will move to annex Poland. No one would do anything to stop him. However, one suspects he would not feel ready for this till 1941-42 after the red army has had time to rebuild its officer corps. If, instead, Stalin goes for no-holds-barred takeover bid for the whole of Europe, an alliance between Poland and Germany may well have to occur

Germany will be powerless to do anything militarily to Poland unless it re-arms. Whether a non-Hitler government would have done so? Who knows, though I think less likely.

Conflict with Chechoslovakia? Lithuania? Alliances instead? Alliance with Hungary?

I've previously heard the idea that it was only a matter of time before Germany would have rearmed with or without Hitler. As for Stalin, there was no way in Hell that he would have attacked Poland without getting prior German consent to such a move. Even so, he might want Germany to actually initiate an attack on Poland and for the Soviet Union to join in later so that the Soviet Union isn't seen as being as much of an aggressor as it would have been had it been the first one to move on Poland. If Germany is already rearmed, it could militarily intervene to protect Poland in exchange for Polish concessions in regards to Danzig and the Polish Corridor.

[wm]

Germany was too fragmented politically for such a grandiose project. Only a risk-prone dictator could have done it. The political and economic costs of an invasion of Poland were simply too great.

Stalin was a cautious man. That he waited seventeen days during the September campaign amply demonstrates that.
Even in the case of Finland, he said later he had only a few months when the invasion was politically possible.
According to Marxism, and Stalin was a true believer, all countries would eventually become communist, it was just a matter of time, so Hitler-style, costly invasions were pointless and actually against the "holy" communist doctrine.

[Futurist]

Germany was too fragmented politically for such a grandiose project. Only a risk-prone dictator could have done it. The political and economic costs of an invasion of Poland were simply too great.

Even for a right-wing but non-Nazi authoritarian German regime? Also, even if Britain and/or France are going to be distracted by other matters--for instance, by some colonial war(s)?

Also, do you think that an Italy that wasn't a Fascist dictatorship would have refrained from invading Ethiopia and Albania?

Stalin was a cautious man. That he waited seventeen days during the September campaign amply demonstrates that.
Even in the case of Finland, he said later he had only a few months when the invasion was politically possible.
According to Marxism, and Stalin was a true believer, all countries would eventually become communist, it was just a matter of time, so Hitler-style, costly invasions were pointless and actually against the "holy" communist doctrine.

The fact that Stalin was cautious is certainly true. That said, though, the Bolsheviks did try using force to spread Communism to Poland, the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Finland, and Georgia in 1918-1921. I know that Stalin supported these efforts at least in regards to his homeland Georgia.

[wm]

Well, it wasn't on his watch.
And the early Soviet offensives were reasonable as long they weren't costly.

I can't somewhat imagine Schleicher, Brüning, or von Papen leading an invasion of Poland. Those people seriously didn't have balls for that.
Even repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles and recreation of the pre-war German Army would probably be too much for them.

[Futurist]

Well, it wasn't on his watch.

But he could still express his own opinion on this without any fear, no?

And the early Soviet offensives were reasonable as long they weren't costly.

And a Soviet invasion of Poland in the 1930s or later would have been costly in a no-Nazi Germany scenario?

I can't somewhat imagine Schleicher, Brüning, or von Papen leading an invasion of Poland. Those people seriously didn't have balls for that.

Agreed about Breuning and von Papen, but I'm less sure about Schleicher. After all, didn't Schleicher aim to turn himself into a right-wing military dictator? He always struck me as a person with large ambitions for both himself and Germany.

Even repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles and recreation of the pre-war German Army would probably be too much for them.

Didn't Germany already secretly begin repudiating the Versailles Treaty as a result of its 1922 Rapallo Treaty with the Soviet Union, though?

[Carl Schwamberger]

Even repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles and recreation of the pre-war German Army would probably be too much for them.

Didn't Germany already secretly begin repudiating the Versailles Treaty as a result of its 1922 Rapallo Treaty with the Soviet Union, though?

The negotiation of the Young Plan in 1925 & the Dawes Plan in 1929 chipped away at the economic requirements. The fiasco of the Ruhr occupation 1923-24 showed there was not the political support for harsh enforcement. The existence of the various activities that are referred to as the 'Black Reichswehr' showed the inspection regime & other military restrictions were weak. The ToV was falling apart as much from its own weaknesses as anyones efforts. The stress of the Depression and other changes as the 19th Century influences evaporated meant it did not required a pack of crazies like the nazis to gradually break it up. I suspect the 1930s would have placed severe stress on the ToV structure, politically, economically, and socially. More compromises have been made. Sometime in the 1940s the ToV would have become a toothless artifact as a new European order emerged.

[Futurist]

Even repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles and recreation of the pre-war German Army would probably be too much for them.

Didn't Germany already secretly begin repudiating the Versailles Treaty as a result of its 1922 Rapallo Treaty with the Soviet Union, though?

The negotiation of the Young Plan in 1925 & the Dawes Plan in 1929 chipped away at the economic requirements. The fiasco of the Ruhr occupation 1923-24 showed there was not the political support for harsh enforcement. The existence of the various activities that are referred to as the 'Black Reichswehr' showed the inspection regime & other military restrictions were weak. The ToV was falling apart as much from its own weaknesses as anyones efforts. The stress of the Depression and other changes as the 19th Century influences evaporated meant it did not required a pack of crazies like the nazis to gradually break it up. I suspect the 1930s would have placed severe stress on the ToV structure, politically, economically, and socially. More compromises have been made. Sometime in the 1940s the ToV would have become a toothless artifact as a new European order emerged.

Completely agreed with your assessment here, Carl! That said, though, it's an open question as to whether a resurgent non-Nazi Germany would actually be willing to wage war against Poland over Danzig and the Polish Corridor if such a war would actually trigger an Anglo-French military response against Germany. Such a Germany might try bluffing and aim to use the threat of war to extract territorial concessions from Poland, but would they actually be willing to risk having their bluff be called and thus be put in a position where they have to either back down or escalate?

[Carl Schwamberger]

Really couldn't say. Theres a crazy guy being referenced here.

[Futurist]

Really could say. Theres a crazy guy being referenced here.

You mean "Really couldn't say", correct?

As for the crazy guy, you mean Hitler, right?

[Futurist]

Steve, what are your own thoughts on this question of mine (as in, the question in my original post here)?

[Steve]

Gustav Stresemann was briefly German Chancellor in 1923 and foreign minister from 1923 to 1929 he died in 1929. He negotiated the Locarno treaties in 1925 which settled Germany’s western borders among other matters. To get an idea of what German politicians were thinking prior to the Nazi’s Stresemann could provide it.

The border with Poland was not settled at Locarno and Stresemann though that by managing to avoid recognition of the border there was a possibility of regaining territory lost to Poland. He wrote a letter to the leader of the D.N.V.P party the main nationalist party saying that Locarno was only an armistice which gave Germany a chance of recovering territory in the east. In a letter to the Prussian Crown Prince he wrote of correcting the eastern frontier and the return of Danzig and the corridor. In a speech on December 14 1925 he told his audience that the arbitration treaty with Poland signed at Locarno did not imply recognition of the border.
Taken from “From Versailles To Locarno” by Cienciala and Komarnicki 1984

The deal Hitler was offering the Poles in 1939 would seem to have been better than they could have got from a non Nazi government in the 1920s. Stresemann had hoped that the trade war with Poland launched in 1925 would bring the Poles to their knees and force them to make border concessions but it failed. A rearmed Germany led by someone like Stresemann may well have been prepared to go to war, the German military in 1939 seem to have been quite keen on the idea. Only the tea leaves can answer the question with certainty.

[Futurist]

Gustav Stresemann was briefly German Chancellor in 1923 and foreign minister from 1923 to 1929 he died in 1929. He negotiated the Locarno treaties in 1925 which settled Germany’s western borders among other matters. To get an idea of what German politicians were thinking prior to the Nazi’s Stresemann could provide it.

The border with Poland was not settled at Locarno and Stresemann though that by managing to avoid recognition of the border there was a possibility of regaining territory lost to Poland. He wrote a letter to the leader of the D.N.V.P party the main nationalist party saying that Locarno was only an armistice which gave Germany a chance of recovering territory in the east. In a letter to the Prussian Crown Prince he wrote of correcting the eastern frontier and the return of Danzig and the corridor. In a speech on December 14 1925 he told his audience that the arbitration treaty with Poland signed at Locarno did not imply recognition of the border.
Taken from “From Versailles To Locarno” by Cienciala and Komarnicki 1984

Yep, I've definitely read about that before. That said, though, AFAIK, Stresemann was (at least officially) interested in peaceful revision as opposed to war. That said, though, had he lived and had peaceful revision not worked out, I wonder what exactly his Plan B would have been.

The deal Hitler was offering the Poles in 1939 would seem to have been better than they could have got from a non Nazi government in the 1920s. Stresemann had hoped that the trade war with Poland launched in 1925 would bring the Poles to their knees and force them to make border concessions but it failed. A rearmed Germany led by someone like Stresemann may well have been prepared to go to war, the German military in 1939 seem to have been quite keen on the idea. Only the tea leaves can answer the question with certainty.

The German military was also wary of going to war against Britain and France, no? I suspect that you're correct that the German military wanted Danzig and the Polish Corridor back--but I suspect probably not at the expense of going to war with Britain and France (due to the fear that Germany might very well lose such a war). I guess that my curiosity is whether a different, non-Nazi German leadership in 1939 would have actually been willing to risk war with Britain and France over Danzig and the Polish Corridor with the hope that Britain and France are going to back down at the last moment like they did in 1938 in real life over the Sudetenland.

Also, Yes, Hitler probably did offer the Poles a better deal in early 1939 than a surviving Weimar Germany would have--at least for a long time.

[Steve]

Stresemann had to use peaceful methods as there was no military option for Germany in the 1920’s. I doubt that a Germany run by normal politicians would have risked war with Britain and France over the eastern border. I also doubt that Britain and France would have gone to war if a normal German state just seized Danzig which was a German city. Anything more than that may have caused the French to honour their alliance with Poland and the British would not have been prepared to see France defeated so would have joined in.

On August 22 1939 Hitler had a meeting with military leaders at the Berghof about the attack on Poland. No notes were taken by those present but Hitler seemingly told them that there was a high probability that the west would not intervene. Because of the forthcoming pact with Russia a blockade of Germany as in WW1 would not work. The generals had been worried about a war in the west (they expected Poland to fall quickly) but what Hitler said apparently reassured them No one disagreed with Hitler and the mood was described as resigned since it was too late to do anything now. Hitler’s reaction when Britain declared war would indicate that he did not expect it.