henryk wrote: ↑30 Dec 2019, 21:47
Futurist wrote: ↑30 Dec 2019, 01:20
henryk wrote: ↑09 Apr 2019, 20:10
Futurist wrote: ↑09 Apr 2019, 04:37
henryk wrote: ↑30 May 2018, 20:27
Well, I don't think that the US had very many experts on Eastern Europe back in 1919.
So the Inquiry was flawed and their conclusion about a democratic Russia untrustworthy.
Didn't the Balts and Ukrainians themselves initially want to remain in Russia but to have more autonomy, though? I seem to recall that they only became pro-independence after the Bolshevik Revolution occurred in Russia in November 1917.
What is the basis for your statement? Facts show the contrary.
https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.n ... nd_finland
Making Sense of the War↑
Reactions to the outbreak of the war in the Baltics were very different from those in Finland. Among Baltic Germans, who feared hostilities against anything German in the Russian Empire, and among Russian Jews, expectations were pessimistic; however, particularly parts of the Russian-oriented rabbinic Litvaks publicly supported the war, hoping that a patriotic stance might help them gain legal equality.[9] In Finland, a pro-German attitude prevailed among intellectuals hoping that a defeat of Russia would significantly improve the chances of Finnish independence, while the economic elite supported Russia.[10] Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian elite groups overwhelmingly expressed solidarity with the Tsarist regime due to allegedly aggressive minority policies of the German Empire and expectations of a quick victory.[11] The war was mainly regarded as a conflict between the Russian and the German Empires. Among the large diasporas, however, the war was expected to decide over the “national” future of the small nations, and concrete ideas for independent states were discussed.[12] At first, among Lithuanian intellectuals, such ideas gained ground once the Russian Army was driven out of East Prussia. The evacuations and destruction wreaked by the hands of Tsarist soldiers in the course of their retreat made their return seem unlikely. This changed only with the Russian counter attacks in autumn 1916 and the stabilization of the front at Dvinsk and Riga.[13]
Socialists and social democrats in the Baltics overwhelmingly opposed the war, stating that the Baltic Sea region should not be a focus region for the struggle between the imperialist powers. As Finland did not directly participate in the war, Finnish socialists could avoid the dilemma of having to decide for or against patriotism. Despite their contempt for Tsarist rule, social democrats in the Baltics did not support a German victory either, as German social democracy had, in their eyes, discredited itself by their agreement to Burgfrieden and the Peace Interpellation (Friedensinterpellation), which was perceived as an approval for annexations.[14] The anti-German stance increased after the February Revolution in Russia, which made a democratic Russian federation seem the most attractive option for the realization of national forms of social democracy – not only for political, but also for economic reasons.[15]
Annexation Plans and German Concepts of a Post-War Order↑
The region of the future Baltic States played a significant role in the annexation plans of German politicians, military top brass and conservative intellectuals. Due to its early occupation and its conception by Ludendorff as being his personal military state,[91] the whole region of Ober Ost became a possible area for German colonization, ostensibly as a continuation of the centuries-long history of German settlement in the east (Ostsiedlung). In particular, Courland, which, unlike Lithuania, had a long history of Baltic German economic, political and cultural dominance, served as a projection screen for German annexation fantasies, as the forced evacuation of Latvians left large areas unpopulated and increased the share of German speakers.[92] A radically pro-annexationist report by agronomics professor Max Sering (1857-1939);[93] a popular image of the eastern Baltic region as vast and undeveloped;[94] and propaganda by the “Baltic Trust Council” (Baltischer Vertrauensrat) established by Baltic German émigrés, furthered annexation plans. As a consequence, no other occupied area was visited by so many delegations of noblemen, parliamentarians, ministers, government officials and journalists from the German Empire.[95] Nonetheless, colonization and annexationist ideas were again taken up after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the overthrow of Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (1856-1921), as German military leaders sought to establish puppet regimes in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland. These plans became obsolete when the chancellorship was taken over by Max von Baden (1867-1929), who abstained from any active interference in the region;[96] and finally by German defeat in the west. The idea of a German colonization of the Baltics, however, survived until well after the collapse of the German Empire, as plenipotentiary to the Baltic Lands, August Winnig (1878-1956), envisioned a Baltic state ranging from West Prussia to Latvia and the idea of settling at the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea became a motivation for volunteers to join Freikorps.[97] Moreover, this concept had a significant influence on German colonization plans in World War II.[98]
German annexation plans had become particularly unattractive for the local elites after the collapse of the Tsarist order and the prospects of a democratic Russia.[99] Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian nationalists, who initially had put cautious hope in cooperation with the Germans, now came to regard autonomy within a democratic Russia as preferable to incorporation into the German Empire. The Russian Provisional Government, however, while supporting Finnish statehood, because of its constitution and apparent willingness to consider Lithuanian and Ukrainian demands, met Latvian and Estonian demands for autonomy with surprise and reluctance.[100] While it finally agreed to unify the governorates of Estonia and the north of Livonia into one Estonian province on 30 March 1917,[101] it never conceded the same to Latvia, partially because the region of Latgale had, for more than a century, been part of Vitebsk governorate.[102]
The Baltics also had a strong significance for debates on a post-war Poland. The idea of re-establishing Poland in its pre-partition borders, which included Lithuania and Courland, was powerful among some groups of Polish political activists and intellectuals. Even among activists who favoured a smaller Poland, the inclusion of at least the Vilnius region was integral – a claim which became a major bone of contention in the interwar period.[103]
https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.n ... le/ukraine
The Ukrainian Revolution and Attempts to Create Independent Countries↑
The revolutionary events in Russia in February 1917 brought the development of analogous processes in its outlying lands of different ethnic groups. The period from March 1917 through October 1920 has been commemorated in Ukrainian lands as the period of the Ukrainian Revolution, as a result of which several attempts were made to create its own nation state. Three phases of revolutionary events stand out: firstly, the creation of the Ukrainian Central Rada (March 1917 - April 1918); secondly, the establishment of a Ukrainian State, or the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadskyi (1873-1945) (the end of April to December 1918); thirdly the formation of the Directory, the course of the Civil War, and the coming of the Bolsheviks to power (January 1919 - October 1920)[8].
On 4 March 1917, a Ukrainian Central Rada (UTsR) was created in Kiev, an urban sociopolitical organization which was transformed into the leader of the Ukrainian national liberation movement. A well-known historian, Mikhail Grushevskii, was elected as its leader and sociopolitical figures Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880-1951) and Sergei Efremov (1876-1939) as his deputies. On 15 June the first Ukrainian government was created, the General Secretariat. The UTsR published four legislative acts, "Universals", regulating the change of the state legal status of Ukrainian lands. Whereas the First Universal (23 June 1917) declared Ukraine joining a democratic Russia with autonomous status, the Fourth Universal (22 January 1918) had already proclaimed the creation of an independent Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR).[9] On 9 February 1918 the UNR and the countries of the Quadruple Alliance signed the Brest Peace Treaty. The phenomenon of the "Ukrainian Brest" is in the realization that it is "...the first peace in this horrible war."[10] This treaty saved Ukraine from absorption by Soviet Russia and in exchange for military support from Austria-Hungary and Germany it was obligated to supply them with agricultural products. The UNR exhibited an inability to fulfill its obligations, and therefore the Austro-German command was interested in a change of government.